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Abstract 
Thirty years have passed and five major reforms have followed since the establishment of 
the Greek National Health System (NHS) in 1983 on universal coverage as an elementary 
policy goal, and the Greek NHS is still insufficient with regard to organisation, coverage, 
funding and delivering health services. The primary objective of the thesis is to employ 
quantitative empirical methods to explore some key aspects of equity in the receipt of 
health care in Greece among the older population via two nationwide and one urban setting 
datasets. This thesis comprises three essays which shed light on the equity issue before and 
after NHS major reforms of 2001-4 and 2005-7. 
 
The findings of this thesis suggest that inequalities in health care exist mainly for the 
probability of specialist and dentist private visits.  Income- related inequalities are less 
apparent in probability of inpatient admissions and probability of outpatient visits, favoring 
the less advantaged. Income itself is not the only contributor. The findings indicate intra 
and interregional inequalities in most of health care services use except for probability of 
GP visits, favoring residents of thinly-populated areas. Compared to Athens region, 
regional disparities-inequalities are not apparent for inpatient care, as well. Furthermore, 
the findings suggest that even though we signify territorial disparities in the probability of 
specialist visit favoring the better off, once the positive contacts of specialist visits are 
included, the elderly have equal probability to make a specialist private visit, irrespective 
of their income and their region of residence.  
 
In addition, this thesis finds that inequalities are apparent among the Social health 
insurance funds (SHIFs) in use of most health care types, except the probability of 
inpatient admissions. Non Noble Farmers OGA SHIF - who tends to be less advantaged - 
has a more pronounced pro poor contribution to overall inequity in the probability of 
specialist private visit than the Noble SHIFs, revealing an unfair relationship. This thesis 
also finds that OOP expenses constitute a significant financial burden to inpatient and 
outpatient care. There is a regressive trend in OOP amount for inpatient admission in terms 
of ability to pay and region of residence favoring residents of thinly-populated areas and 
Central Greece region- who tend to be less advantaged. For outpatient care, there is a 
progressive trend in OOP amount in terms of ability to pay, SHIF coverage and region of 
residence. 
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The thesis provides useful tools for understanding and measuring inequalities in the use of 
health care among the older population, who are the most constant consumers of health 
services. It urges policy makers to review the governance of primary health care by setting 
conditions and implements measures for improving efficiency, unifying SHIFunds, 
eliminating geographical inequalities and control the role of OOP expenses as significant 
barriers to access health care, especially during the current period of economic crisis.  
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Structure of the research questions 
  
This thesis conforms to the requirements of a doctoral thesis from the London School of 
Economics and Political Science. Guidelines state a minimum of three papers of 
publishable standard—in addition to introduction and conclusion chapters—not exceeding 
100,000 words. Accordingly, this thesis presents an introduction – conceptual framework 
chapter, where background, conceptual framework and evidence are given. The Chapter 
two presents the methodology we follow, an overview of research questions and data, the  
data and methodology limitations are given. The Chapter three provides an overview of the 
health status and socioeconomic profile of older population in Greece, as well as a detailed 
description and discussion of the healthcare system in Greece. Chapters four, five and six 
are three essays based on two nationwide and one urban setting datasets that constitute the 
survey tools of the thesis. Chapter four is about PatraHIS survey, Chapter five is about 
GreekNHIS survey and Chapter  six is the SHARE survey. Chapter seven presents the 
summary of the findings, policy recommendations, limitations and future research agenda.  
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Chapter One 
 
1. Conceptual Framework - Motivation 
 
This chapter summarizes the conceptual approaches, frameworks and principles that 
underpin the recommendations for action in recognizing and eliminating inequalities in use 
of health care. The challenges and relevant evidence that the Greek health care system 
faces are presented in relation to health care use among the elderly.  
1.1 Equity in health care 
In order to present the conceptual framework of the study for examining the inequity in 
utilisation of health care among the elderly, we need firstly to define what equity in health 
care is. There are at least four distinct conceptual approaches/schools concerning the equity 
term in health care, each of which are connected to the role played by both the State and 
the individual freedom in this policy area: (a) egalitarianism, (b) libertarianism, (c) the 
utilitarian, (d) rawlsianism approach. 
According to the egalitarianism school, equity in health care means: Equality of public 
expenditure, in cases- for instance- that no attention was paid to differences in health status 
or need for health care. Another interpretation focuses on equality of outcome, that is, the 
distribution of health itself. The egalitarian approach mainly concentrates on the burdens to 
explain what the school defines as equity into valid policy recommendations (Mooney, 
1992a, 1992b). The egalitarian explanation or interpretation we choose to follow in this 
research, considers the concept of need for health care services and consequently equality 
of treatment for equality need, financed health care according to ability to pay (Wagstaff & 
Van Doorslaer, 2000). It definitely doesn’t mean equalising health outcomes. Additionally, 
it can be translated into more specific policy recommendations. 
Libertarianism preserves personal liberty and connects equity in terms of distribution to 
entitlement. This implies entitlement to what the individual possesses considering it was 
acquired rightly. Nozick proposed that such possessions are based on earnings, inheritance 
or are obtained by government of holdings redistribution which was acquired illegally 
(Pereira, 1993). In a nutshell, regarding a situation as equal fully depends on the way or 
process used to get to it. It becomes obvious that the libertarian approach differs greatly 
from any equity statement in the policy area in most European countries. To sum up, for 
libertarians the market is an extra source of fairness. For this school, access to health care 
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is a privilege- not a right-- and only when the individual obtains it through the market, it 
could be considered to have a right over it. (Williams, 1993). The interest in the libertarian 
approach is connected to the redistribution and the state role is seen as unjust in itself.  
The utilitarian school pays attention to maximisation principles, according to which 
resources should be allocated to maximise total or aggregated utility. This is related to the 
maximisation of health gain by means of provision of health care services. There is no 
possibility of redistribution and no role for State action is prioritised as well. There are 
several technical and methodological handicaps and limitations in applying the utilitarian 
approach. If such an approach is to be used, we must answer questions like: “whose 
utilities matter?’’ “How should we attempt to measure them?’’ “How can we actually 
compare interpersonal utilities?’’ “How should we proceed in the aggregation of such 
utilities?’’ Those questions are still in the core of the debate among health economists.  
Rawls’ maximin and the veil of ignorance imply that social policies should try to maximise 
the position of the least well-off. Rawls’ standing point has been criticised greatly (Le 
Grand, 1987a; 1987b). How should the most disadvantaged group be defined? How can we 
tell whether inequalities are to their advantage or not?    
It is worth mentioning that the libertarian and egalitarian views on equity differ highly due 
to the equity-efficiency trade-off. The libertarian viewpoint focuses on a “private” system, 
and the level of access relies upon the ability and willingness to pay. On the other hand, the 
egalitarian view suggests a publicly financed system where “equal opportunity of access 
for those in equal need would be the determining rule” independently “of who is paying for 
the care…. The success criterion in the egalitarian system is the level and distribution of 
health in the community” (Williams, 1993). Therefore, the debate between the libertarian 
and egalitarian perspective is not resolved in practice and illustrates the obvious impact 
that equity of access to health care has on the design and performance of the health system.  
Overall, the approach used in this research is a pro-egalitarian view of equity, which 
assesses the extent to which health care is for practical reasons distributed according to 
need, and financed according to ability to pay (Van Doorslaeer et al., 1993). More 
specifically, egalitarians may judge equity by evaluating whether individuals, who could 
be ranked as in equal need- as a result of sharing a similar health status (as measured by ill-
health indicators)- receive equal treatment as measured by the use of health care types 
(Van Doorslaeer et al., 1993). There are various reasons for such a choice. In a similar 
way, as it happens with other European countries, in Greece there is a mixed system 
providing health care, but the egalitarian viewpoint appears to prevail. Moreover, 
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according to the findings of a lot of empirical work on equity in health care this egalitarian 
standpoint, for the purpose of comparative research, one could argue in favour of this 
approach. Being aware of the relevance of this approach, due to the universal coverage 
conditions in Greece, this research has focused on utilisation equality. In health care 
delivery conceptual framework three –very significant- equity principles have been used: 
equality of health, allocation with regard to need and equality of access. The conceptual 
framework of this study will adopt the principles of health care allocation according to 
need and equality of access.  
1.2 A feasible working definition of equity in health care 
Additionally, in order to clarify a feasible working definition of equity for policy-makers, 
Whitehead (1991) builds on Mooney’s proposed seven equity principles in order to 
develop an operational definition involving the three dimensions of accessibility, 
acceptability and quality, as displayed by Allin S. et al (2009).  
1. Equal access to available care for equal need – entails equal entitlements (i.e. universal 
coverage); fair distribution of resources throughout the country (i.e. allocations on 
basis of need); and removal of geographical and other barriers to access. 
2. Equal utilization for equal need – to ensure use of services is not restricted by social or 
economic disadvantage (and ensure appropriate use of essential services). This implies 
differences in utilization arising from individuals who exercise their right to use or not 
use services according to their preferences. This is in line with the definition of equity 
based on personal choice, for example, an outcome is equitable if it arises in a state in 
which all people have equal choice sets (Le Grand 1991). 
3. Equal quality of care for all – that is, care allocated on the basis of need ; same 
professional standards for everyone (such as consultation time, referral patterns); 
finally, care regarded as acceptable by everyone. 
In a similar effort to define equity under the perspective of health policy-makers,  Oliver & 
Mossialos (2004) argue that “equal access for equal need is the most appropriate definition, 
because it outlines health care and respects the plausible acceptable reasons for 
differentials in health-care utilization”. Moreover, unequal access across groups defined by 
income or socio-economic status is the most appropriate starting point for directing policy 
and is consistent with many governments’ aims to provide services on the basis of need 
rather than ability to pay (Oliver & Mossialos 2004). Most governments’ policy documents 
and a number of European-level strategies underlie and share the goal of equal (or less 
unequal) health outcomes. Moreover, at EU level, since the European Union Lisbon 
22 
 
summit in March 2000 and the Open Method of Coordination for social protection and 
social inclusion, a number of European-level strategies have been developed to underlie 
and support the improvement in equity of access (Atkinson et al. 2002). During that period 
the commitment to improve equality in health was less evident (Gulliford 2002).  
However, since the Reform Treaty in Lisbon on 19 October 2007, the EU stressed the 
overarching goal of reducing health inequalities. One of the key issues pointed out by the 
EU Health Strategy (2008-2013) was to strengthen the measuring of health inequalities, 
monitoring, evaluation and reporting by “improving the data and knowledge base and 
mechanism determinants to implement effective action in relation to particular population 
groups and determinants” (COM,2007). Moreover, the main principle of universal health 
coverage (UHC), as introduced by the WHO Health Report 2010 and WHO-CSDH (2013) 
and adopted by the Greek Government is that UHC embodies one of the ultimate goals of 
health systems and intermediate objectives associated with effective coverage, financial 
protection and improved health system performance: that all people obtain the health 
services they need (i.e. equity in service use relative to need) and that these services are of 
sufficient quality to be effective. Given the definition of UHC, however, fully achieving 
UHC is impossible for any country (Kutzin J, 2013). Even countries that succeed in 
attaining universal financial protection have shortfalls in effective coverage.  
1.3 Distinction between access and utilisation 
From Hulka B.S. and Wheat JR. (1985) to Dixon et al. (2007) several theoretical 
approaches of health care utilization have been formed in an attempt not only to understand 
from different perspectives (economic, psychosocial, behavioural, epidemiological, etc.) 
why health care utilization patterns differ from one person to another, but also which are 
the barriers and to what extent (geographical, financial, and socio-cultural) account for 
affecting health care.  
Utilization means obtaining the health care provided by the health care services in the form 
of health care contact (Fernandez-Olano C. et al, 2006). One thing we should take into 
account is the distinction between utilisation and access as identified by Culyer A, et al 
(1991) and Mooney G, et al. (1991). Equality in terms of access means that all individuals 
in need can have equal opportunities in health service use; equality of utilisation demands 
that they really use the service. For reasons we have accepted (i.e. various socio-cultural 
and individual preferences), people in equal need and with equal opportunities to health 
care may not use those opportunities equally. These acceptable reasons should not be 
confused with unacceptable reasons for differential use of health care. The difficulties in 
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giving actual outcomes to choices or to factors beyond individual control are obvious. As a 
consequence, most researchers in the field have focused simply on the differences in 
utilisation. For this, they have claimed that any differences result from inequalities in 
access and not from free choice. Thus, inequality in utilisation is considered to be 
inequitable, either because it is inequitable in and of itself, or because it is a proxy for 
access inequalities. We will accept this last interpretation through this research: that is, we 
regard observed inequalities in utilisation as proxies for inequalities in access and hence as 
inequitable. 
In our research we will also follow the conceptual approach that “variations and inequity in 
utilisation is present almost everywhere, even in the universal health systems that provide 
the majority of services free at the point of delivery” (Dixon et al., 2007; and Allin S. et al, 
2007). As the existing evidence points out, people in more vulnerable population groups-
who have more need for health care (e.g. worse health status), do not always receive this 
care because their knowledge on services’ availability is poor and because they face 
barriers to access (financial, socio-cultural, geographical etc) that incommensurately 
influence the lower socioeconomic groups (Dixon et al., 2007; EC, 2008; Allin S. et al, 
2007). 
1.4 Definition of Need 
Although the debate concerning need in the years since Bradshaw’s analysis has been great 
(Doyal L, Gough I., 1991), there is still great disagreement about what constitutes ‘‘need’’ 
for health care, and it is obvious that understanding, defining, measuring, and comparing 
the needs coming from individual health problems or illnesses, will be a complicated and 
hard task (Oliver A., Mossialos E., 2004).There must be a lot of effort to develop a 
generally accepted  definition of need for health care, but two components- sometimes 
contradictory to one another- are highly important (Oliver A., Mossialos E., 2004):  
a) There is a tendency to equate need for health care with ill-health ,i.e. as the sicker 
patients are given more care to recover - currently treated by most clinicians (Culyer and 
Wagstaff, 1993).  
b) It equates as the individual’s capacity to benefit from health care (need defined as “the 
amount of resources required to exhaust the capacity to benefit”) currently embraced by 
most health economists (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 1998; Culyer AJ., 2001).In practice   
it is too difficult to measure capacity to benefit. The research reviewed in this paper 
directly or indirectly defines need in terms of health status. On the other hand, although 
these two components of need will sometimes conflict with one another, they are possibly 
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important (Oliver A., Mossialos E., 2004). Overall, as Allin et al (2009) highlight “no 
definition of equity can involve the multiple supply- and demand-side factors which affect 
the allocation of effective, high-quality health care on the basis of need” (p.198). 
Definition of equity is highly complex and requires a comprehensive set of information 
about individuals, their contacts with health care, the organizational characteristics of the 
system as well as the application of strong methodological techniques in order to evaluate 
and assess 
1.5 Health Equity and Social Determinants of Health  
Over the last decade there has been a considerable European and International focus on the 
issue of health inequalities. Addressing health inequalities was a key action of the EU 
Health Strategy “Together for Health: A Strategic Approach for the EU (2008-2013)”.1 In 
2008, the European Commission established an Expert Working Group on Social 
Determinants and Health Inequalities.
2
 Under mandate by EU in order to address these 
health inequities within and between countries, the WHO’s Commission on Social 
Determinants of Health (CSDH) published the WHO Global CSDH Review on health 
inequalities in 2008 (WHO - CSDH, 2008). The Commission collected, collated and 
analysed evidence from around the world about the social determinants of health and the 
policies that affect them. Based on this evidence, the report of the CSDH –WHO (2008) 
and the subsequent strategic European Review on Health Inequalities (WHO, 2013) have 
provided a robust framework and evidence for action emphasizing the link between social 
conditions, social inequalities, inequities in health and health status. Globally, the 
Commission (CSDH) conceptualized the social determinants of health as the conditions in 
which people live their daily lives and the structural influences on these conditions that 
ultimately reflect the distribution of power and resources within and between countries. 
Simply put, the Commission concluded that societal inequities in health arise from social 
inequalities. Reducing inequities in health and thereby improving overall population health 
requires action to address the processes that promote relative disadvantage and social 
exclusion by building a fairer society. The Commission proposed three principles of action 
to tackle inequities in health: 
 improve the conditions of daily life – the circumstances in which people are born, grow, 
live, work and age; 
                                                          
1 White Paper: Together for Health: A Strategic Approach for the EU 2008-2013 - EU Health Strategy: Brussels, 
23.10.2007 - COM(2007) 630 final http://ec.europa.eu/health-eu/doc/whitepaper_en.pdf  
2 Meetings of the EU Expert Group on Social Determinants and Health Inequalities  
http://ec.europa.eu/health/social_determinants/events/index_en.htm  
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 tackle the inequitable distribution of power, money and resources – the structural 
drivers of these conditions of daily life – globally, nationally and locally; 
 and measure the problem, evaluate action, expand the knowledge base, develop a 
workforce that is trained in the social determinants of health and raise public awareness 
about the social determinants of health. 
According to the WHO-CSDH, the conditions of daily life that are influenced by structural 
drivers, include: economic arrangements, distribution of power, income, gender equity, 
policy frameworks and the values of society, as well as the immediate, visible 
circumstances of people’s lives, such as their access to health care, schools and education; 
their conditions of work and leisure; their homes, communities, and rural or urban settings; 
and their chances of leading a flourishing life. In addition, these structural determinants 
influence how services are provided and received and thereby shape health care outcomes. 
Following, the Commission adopted in 2009 a joint Communication by DG SANCO and 
DG EMPL entitled: "Solidarity in Health: Reducing Health Inequalities in the EU", which 
aimed to reduce health inequalities by supporting action by Member States and 
stakeholders, and through EU policies, via issuing a number of Reports and Working 
Documents. Health Inequalities have also been addressed by the Council of the European 
Union since 2013. EC via addressing health inequalities reflects that “a lot can be done by 
the health sector in terms of raising and maintaining awareness and ensuring that health 
systems are based on the core values of universality, access, goods, equity and solidarity” 
(EquityAction, 2013). While the general relationship between social factors and health is 
well established, the relationship is not precisely understood in causal terms (WHO, 2010). 
In this framework, models have been developed by the WHO-CSDH (2008) to reflect the 
deep-rooted, interrelated and cyclical causes of health inequalities. The conclusions and 
recommendations across the 53 countries of the WHO-EU of this review have informed 
development of the European health policy framework Health 2020 (WHO, 2012a) in the 
Europe 2020 strategic plan (EC, 2014) with the main vision - goal: “To improve the health 
and well-being of populations, to reduce health inequities and to ensure sustainable people 
- centred health systems”. Following, the more recent WHO global strategy on people-
centred and integrated health services (WHO, 2015b and 2016) emphasizes the 
importance of integration and sets strategic priorities on strengthening health systems “to 
become more people-centred in order to accelerate health gains, reduce health inequalities, 
guarantee financial protection and ensure an efficient use of societal resources”. At the 
same time, universal health coverage (UHC) is considered both an instrumental and 
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intrinsic goal of health systems
3
. According to the WHO-CSDH (2008) recommendations 
and WHO people-centred strategy (2015b) “One response to addressing health inequities 
open to all is to ensure universal coverage of health care”. In promoting universal health 
coverage, the states aim to narrow the gap between health needs and utilization, improve 
the quality of care, ensure financial protection and enhance equity by identifying and 
protecting vulnerable and marginalized groups. Moreover, in order to progress towards 
UHC, “regular measurement of equity is paramount. Average levels of the indicators are 
critical measures of overall progress but must be supported by disaggregated 
measurements to redress inequalities across different population groups. This includes 
disaggregation by income/wealth, education, sex, age, place of residence (e.g. rural/urban), 
migrant status and ethnic origin (e.g. indigenous groups)” (WHO, 2012).  
1.6 Ageing and Health Equity Challenges 
Considering ageing and health equity, a lot of international and EU policy instruments 
have guided action on healthy ageing since 2002 with the United Nations Political 
declaration and Madrid international plan of action on ageing (UN, 2002) and WHO’s 
Organization’s policy framework on active ageing (WHO, 2002); the WHO-CSDH (2008 
and 2013 Review) that adopts the life-course model with recommendations on the 
“fundamental stage of older age” and the most resent WHO’s World Report on Ageing and 
Health (WHO, 2015). Moreover, the importance of reducing health inequities at older age 
has been recognized by the European Council and European Parliament through its 
designation of 2012, as “the European year of active ageing and solidarity between 
generations”. These documents identify the importance of health in older age, both in its 
own right and flag several key issues that include among other “promoting health and well-
being throughout life; and ensuring universal and equal access to health-care services to 
reduce health inequities at older age” (WHO-CSDH, 2013 Review). Therefore, ensuring 
access to appropriate health services will be essential to overcoming these inequalities for 
the growing older population. However, there are few key challenges – barriers, related to 
current ineffective public-health approaches to population ageing that need to be 
overcome, if improved access is to be the most important determinant of health, especially 
for vulnerable groups, such as the elderly (WHO, 2015). They include:  
                                                          
3
 Starting with the 58th World Health Assembly resolution in 20053, which called for countries to plan for the transition 
to UHC, till the United Nations Resolution A/67/L36/2012 on universal health coverage and the recent Joint 
WHO/World Bank report with the first global monitoring report on tracking UHC (WHO, 2015), a broad consensus 
regarding the importance of UHC has been steadily building. 
27 
 
 Despite the fact that older people’s right to health is enshrined in international law, yet 
people often experience age discrimination in terms of age-based rationing of health 
care on the notion that health services must be allocated to achieve the greatest good for 
most people. However, there is no clear association between chronological age and 
health. 
 Although health inequities are apparent in the health status of older people due to the 
health dynamics of older age, the association with the demand for, and utilization of, 
health services is less clear-cut. It is likely that disadvantaged older people are caught 
between their greater need for health care and having less access to, or less use of, 
appropriate services, even in high-income countries. 
 Although the world is experiencing a rapid transition towards ageing populations, health 
systems generally have not kept pace:  
 Most health services have been designed to cure acute conditions than to manage 
and minimize chronic states prevalent in older age. For long-time, paying attention 
to long-term health and functioning was not a priority.  
 All too often, older people are rendered invisible in policies and plans. Health 
systems are poorly aligned with the needs of the older populations they serve. 
 Consequently, many older people suffer from gaps in the coordination of their care 
across treatment levels, as the health systems leave the burden on the older person 
or their family to communicate relevant health information when needed.  
 Considering the economic implications of population ageing, common perceptions and 
assumptions exist, as following: 
 There is a common assumption that aging population presents a major economic 
barrier to the health system’s effectiveness. Despite the evidence for income 
inequalities in demand for health care, the link between age and health-care 
expenditures is not linear, as it is influenced by the health system itself (ie incentives 
to providers, interventions in frail older people, cultural norms etc). Therefore, it 
seems that aging population does not present a major economic barrier. 
  According to evidence, ageing has far less influence on health care expenditures 
than other factors, including the high costs of new medical technologies. 
 About current evidence, there is a lack of data in addressing and measuring equity in 
health care use among the older population, despite older people being by far the 
highest consumers of health services.  
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 Older people likely face potentially greater difficulties in accessing health care 
services than their younger counterparts: greater financial difficulties due to reduced 
income, geographical barriers may arise from limitations in mobility, and lengthy 
waiting times may present a greater health burden than younger. 
 Within the older population it is probable that those who are more better off 
financially would likely experience less barriers than those who are less educated and 
on lower income. As a result, one would expect to observe inequitable patterns of 
service use across income groups within the elderly. 
 
1.7 Health Equity and Ageing in the Greek health care system  
The conceptual approaches and key policy challenges that the Greek health care system 
faces for ensuring access to health services to overcome health care inequalities among the 
elderly, are presented as following. 
1.7.1 Constitutional Right to health and health care 
According to Greece’s political system4, the Parliament undertakes legislative tasks that 
apply to the whole of the country. Health is consolidated in the Greek Constitution of 1975 
(revised in 1986, 2001 and 2008) as a social and individual right (Hellenic Parliament, 
2008) via general principles and three provisions that guarantee a set of fundamental rights 
of social protection and social security. In particular, the Articles 5§5, 21§3 and 21§6 
define healthcare and social rights; Article 22§5 establishes social insurance rights for all 
workers and employees -including the health branch of the Social Security Funds; finally, 
Article 25§1, which was introduced during the Constitutional revision of 2001, places 
these rights under the larger principle of a “Welfare State Rule” (Hellenic Parliament, 
2008). The relevant principal health-related provisions - Articles, as revised by the 
parliamentary resolution of May 27th 2008 of the VIIIth Revisionary Parliament are the 
following: 
 “All persons have the right to the protection of their health and of their genetic identity. 
Matters relating to the protection of every person against biomedical interventions shall 
be specified by law” (Article 5§5);  
 “The State shall care for the health of citizens and shall adopt special measures for the 
protection of youth, old age, and disability for the relief of the needy”. (Article 21§3); 
                                                          
4 Greece’s political system is a parliamentary democracy established by the 1975 Constitution (as amended in 
1986, 2001 and 2008), following a seven-year military dictatorship regime (1967–1974). 
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 “People with disabilities have the right to benefit from measures ensuring their self 
sufficiency, professional integration and participation in the social, economic and 
political life of the Country” (Article 21§6); and 
 “The State shall care for the social security of the working people, as specified by law” 
(Article 22§5). It includes the health branch of the Social Security Funds; 
 “The rights of the human being as an individual and as a member of the society and the 
principle of the welfare state rule of law are guaranteed by the State. All agents of the 
State shall be obliged to ensure the unhindered exercise thereof” (Article 25§1). 
The above provisions enshrine the right to the protection of citizens’ health. The state has a 
legal obligation to undertake the effort through the appropriate bodies to provide citizens 
the protection of their health, namely to protect this social right. According to civil law 
authors, the above constitution provisions (“right to the protection of their health” –Art. 5.5 
and “care for the health of citizens” – Art.21.3) indicate that the State ensures the 
protection of citizens’ health in a general and abstract wording, without specifying 
particular protection framework. It seems that, the provisions emphasize more the 
objective nature of health protection (Anthopoulos C.,1993; Dagtoglou P.,1991; Vegleris 
F.,1982; Kremalis K. ,1987). Moreover, there are two main principles of entitlement. One 
is entitlement on the basis of citizenship and the other is entitlement on the basis of 
occupational status and insurance contributions. 
Government decisions also have to be enacted by the law or by lower level regulations for 
which the executive has received delegated powers from the legislative: presidential 
decrees, ministerial decisions and decisions of the social security administration, with the 
prior approval of the supervisory ministry or body. Therefore, the social and individual 
right to health in the way that is enshrined in the Constitution (“protection” and “care”) 
cannot have direct effect before the adoption of a special law. Indicatively, the enactment 
of Law1397/1983 on the Greek NHS - ESY was occurred eight years after the adoption of 
the Constitution of 1975, indicating that ultimately it is a matter purely of the State whether 
a right will be activated, to what extent and degree, or to delay its implementation.  
In any case, the founding law of the Greek National Health System (NHS) or ESY in 1983 
(Law 1397/1983) encompasses the Constitutional social and subjective right of citizens to 
health services provided by the rules, and up to date is considered to be the most 
significant attempt to make a radical change in the health sector, which would gradually 
lead to a comprehensive public health care system. The philosophy of the law was based 
on the principle that health is a social good and that all citizens, irrespective of their 
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socioeconomic status or location of residence, should have equal rights to access to 
healthcare services. Its aim was to expand coverage and reduce inequities, particularly in 
finance, access and resource allocation (Mossialos E. et al, 2005). According to the Law 
1397/1983, five keystones express the fundamental principles of NHS-ESY and the stated 
objectives of the health system that it should be: comprehensive, equal, with universal 
coverage, of high quality and free of charge at the point of delivery. Therefore, the 
establishment of the ESY aimed at comprehensive and universal coverage of the 
population based on the principle of equity. Following the establishment of the NHS-ESY 
in 1983 (L.1397/1983) five major reforms (1992, 1997, 2001-4, 2005-7 and 2011 – today)  
including a number of legislative acts were undertaken, in the same philosophy of 
universal coverage of the population: 1992 (L.2071/1992); 1997 (L.2519/1997); 2001-4 
(L.2955/2001; L.3172/2003; L.3235/2004); 2005-7 (L.3329/2005, L.3370/2005, 
L3457/2006, L3580/2007) and 2011 – today (L.3863/2010, L.3918/2011, L.4025/2011, 
L.4052/2012, L.4368/2016). These reforms and the relative legislation are presented 
briefly in the overview of the Greek health care system Chapter, below. The universal 
coverage of the population has been a major policy goal, taking for granted that all citizens 
must have access to health care services in accordance to need, not their ability to pay; to 
diminish inequity. More recently, the Greek government passed legislation (a number of 
Ministerial Decrees and Law 4368 /2016) that set out entitlement of uninsured people and 
their families to access primary and inpatient health services, and pharmaceutical care. 
1.7.2 A fragmented welfare state as the origin of the Greek health care system  
The institutional peculiarities of the Greek health care system are strongly related to the 
way the Greek Welfare state has developed in the post–authoritarian era since 1974. 
Welfare provision is not a right associated with citizenship, but a quality associated with 
the participation in the labour market. The Greek Welfare system since its onset is 
characterized by the fragmentation of funds, heterogeneous measures for treating specific 
issues and a complete lack of overview and planning. It is divided between overprotected 
insiders (stable participants to labour market) who have access to welfare programmes, and 
under protected outsiders (part-time workers, young unemployed) who do not. 
Fragmentation and incomplete coverage are evident in all areas of social security. 
(Venieris, 1997: 268; Mylonas and Maisonneuve, 1999, Petmesidou, 2001; O’ Donnell and 
Tinios, 2003: 264-8; Sotiropoulos, 2004: 269). As a result, the relatively high level of 
social spending in Greece has paradoxically not been translated into effective social 
transfers, and the inequalities based on occupational status and political affiliations are 
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further exacerbated (Guillen and Matsaganis, 2000: 122). What makes the Greek case 
exceptional is the degree of inequity implicit in present arrangements. Moreover, despite 
the successive reforms, the current crisis and the successive bailout agreements since 2010 
have put into question the sustainability of the system (even in the medium-term), mainly 
due to the fast decreasing revenues of social insurance funds, in addition to the over 50% 
losses on their bond holdings that incurred in spring 2012. The recession, extensive 
contributions evasion, undeclared labour and demographic ageing constitute a perilous mix 
that puts at stake the system’s viability. Drastic downward pension adjustments for current 
and future retirees increase insecurity.  
1.7.3 Current features - challenges of the Greek Health Care System  
Despite success in improving the health of the population, the Greek health care system 
still faces structural problems concerning the organization, financing and delivery of 
services. Four decades after the establishment of the NHS in 1983, the system hardly 
reached the state of a fully-fledged national health service, in the face of sustained 
opposition to most of the major changes proposed (Mossialos and Davaki, 2002; 
Economou, 2010; Economou, 2015). Both in terms of funding and service delivery a 
mixed system continued to operate until recently: a fragmented, occupation-based health 
insurance system was combined with a national health service, while, in parallel, private 
provision expanded rapidly until the eruption of the crisis. The health system still functions 
within an outmoded organizational culture dominated by clinical medicine and hospital 
services, without the support of an adequate planning unit or adequate, accessible 
information on health status, utilization of health services or health costs; with a regressive 
system of funding including extensive user charges and informal payments; inefficient 
allocation of resources based on history rather than needs, perverse incentives for 
providers; a heavy reliance on unnecessarily expensive inputs, and without being proactive 
in addressing the health needs of the population through actions in public health and 
primary health care. As a result, the public is generally dissatisfied with the health care 
system and many of the major players in reforms appear puzzled at the relative failure of 
successive well-meaning reform efforts, influenced by clientelism, political particularism, 
conflict between political parties and economic interests, resistance by the medical status 
quo and absence of consensus (Mossialos and Davaki, 2002, Mossialos et al, 2005). The 
most significant of the problems regarding health policy in Greece is the gap between 
declared objectives, enactment and implementation of legislation. Future reforms need to 
focus on high-priority areas, including: restructuring of primary health care, pooling of 
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financial resources, changing the payment system of providers, introducing new 
managerial and administrative methods, adopting cost-effective and monitoring 
mechanisms, and developing policies for better allocation of resources.  
1.7.4 Peculiarities/characteristics of the Greek health care system in terms of health 
care provision to the ageing population 
In terms of the overview of health care policy and health care provisions available to older 
people, Greece’s peculiarities include the following characteristics: 
 Absence of specialist geriatric assessment services. Due to this fact, other services such 
as internal medicine, cardiology and psychiatry are placed under considerable pressure, 
because older people require longer than average periods of hospitalisation. Moreover, 
lack of support and limited resources in terms of the availability of alternative care 
provisions, such as rehabilitation care, sometimes leads to older people being 
“abandoned” in hospital resulting in inappropriate and costly care, as studies in Athens 
revealed and recognised in reports (Mestheneos E., et al, 2004; Lamura G., 2003; 
Sissouras A, et al, 2002).  
 Older people have the same access to healthcare provisions as the rest of the population 
under the common fear “that the development of separate services for older people 
could create a two-tier system, in which care of the elderly would be given lower 
priority - thus leading to poorer services” (Lamura G., 2003 p.10; Triantafillou and 
Mestheneos, 1994).  
 Since the creation of the NHS-ESY in 1983, Greece has lacked a GP-based 
comprehensive, integrated primary health care system, with gatekeeping functions, 
particularly in urban areas. Thus most people attending a primary health care centre, 
without access to a GP or family doctor, continue to be attended by specialists. This 
inadequacy results in older patients and their families to have a “consumer” approach of 
“shopping around” for specialist services as they perceive them to be necessary.  
 Given that there is no universal statutory scheme for LTC and integrated care still 
remains a neglected subject, there is a gap in long-term care for older persons (EC, 
2014). This determining factor for the (under) development and scarce organisation of 
public services consists also a potential source of inequalities among the elderly. 
 There are no structures in place within the health care services to respond to the 
priorities of more disadvantaged or vulnerable groups, as the elderly. The coordination 
between the health, the social care sector and care services for the elderly is not 
adequate. 
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 The low percentages of elderly hosted in residential homes (about 3%) or receiving 
home care, show that providing elderly care is mainly based on the family, and much 
less on formal services, given that LTC is not statutory established. The family 
generally plays the central role in the process of care and in many instances it is 
considered as the most effective institution for offering the “integrated” balance of 
health and social care to the older person (Rodrigues R. et al,2012; Lamura et al.,2008 
and Leichsenring K.,2003).  
 Moreover, the central role of the family lies in the traditional principle of reciprocity 
which rules the Greek society. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the 
financial situation of both cared for and caring persons represent one main factor of 
inequality among elderly people in Greece (Lamura et al., 2008; Tinios P. & Zografakis, 
S.,2001).  
 So far, Greece, although stated in governmental strategy documents (National Action 
Plans for Public Health 2008-2013, 2014-2020; Health in Action Initiative, 2012 etc) 
has never really implemented any successful strategy for healthy ageing. Major barriers 
include: focus on curative services; lack of cooperation of municipalities with health 
centres; fragmented and uncoordinated PHC system; significant cuts due to the 
economic crisis. 
 The fact that older people have the same access to healthcare provisions as the rest of 
the population, and in order to describe the way that health care services are provided 
to the Greek elderly and examine whether this could be a source of inequalities, we 
need, after presenting the health and socioeconomic profile of the Greek elderly, to 
describe the features of the Greek health care system, as in Chapter Three below.    
1.8 Framework of health access barriers 
The factors that potentially affect diverse access to health care across different groups 
should also be taken into consideration. With the information and data we currently 
possess, we cannot easily disentangle them and be led to a fully understandable and 
coherent policy response (Goddard M. and Smith P., 2001). A searching in the literature 
for studies in utilisation and receipt of health care reveals that barriers to access can be 
present at different points between the supply and demand. A barrier to access frequently 
relies upon the complex interaction of supply and demand-side factors and both factor 
types will determine the extent to which access to health care is equitable (Mossialos E. 
and Thomson S., 2003). Barriers involve both structural factors relating to the costs and 
organisation of services and problems with knowledge, cultural beliefs and attitudes 
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regarding medical conditions, and patient preferences and priorities regarding treatments. 
In order to explain the impact of non-need factors/potential barriers on inequity in 
utilisation of health care among the elderly, the framework we are going to use is related 
and based on the framework of health access barriers by Wörz/Foubister/Busse/Mossialos 
et al. (2006). This framework comes from the HealthACCESS European project which 
aimed at investigating access to health services in 10 Member States of the European 
Union both within and among countries. In this framework, hurdles for obtaining 
accessible, appropriate and acceptable health services are formulated as a filter that 
consists of six layers of barriers to access health care, as in the figure 1 below. Moreover, it 
should be mentioned that one descends the filter, individual preferences gain importance. 
The layers of barriers are the following: 
 The first barrier – the proportion of population having health insurance – deals with the 
extent to which citizens are legally entitled to care under systems of health care 
coverage (e.g. Statutory Health Insurance, National Health Service or more specific 
systems of coverage). Here, the structure of the different systems of coverage which 
exist within one country (including health and long-term care coverage) is also 
examined. However, if health insurance is offered, then the relevant benefit has to be 
included under the insurance scheme in question (in the case that someone cannot pay 
out of pocket health care).  
 The second barrier - the content of the health insurance benefit package - refers in detail 
to the actual benefits under the systems of health care coverage and the issue of possible 
differences in benefits coverage between systems within countries. Given these two 
conditions one can distinguish four more barriers depicted in Figure 1, which are in a 
way more interrelated and also cannot be set in chronological order. These are cost 
sharing arrangements, geographical and organisational barriers and accessible services 
utilisation.  
 The third barrier – the cost sharing arrangement - refers to cost-sharing demands for 
covered health services in the systems described in the two first items above. These 
cost-sharing demands are separated into different kinds of health services (e.g. inpatient, 
outpatient, pharmaceuticals etc.). The introduction of cost sharing arrangement affects 
the utilisation of accessible services (Wortz et al, 2006).   
 The fourth barrier – the geographical barriers - refers to potential regional differences 
with regard to supply of health care facilities and personnel and urban/rural disparities 
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(concerning flows of patients across internal borders).Finally, it refers to provision of 
ambulance services and their performance concerning time limits. 
 The fifth barrier – the organisational barriers - refers to the introduction of waiting lists 
which prevents access and it is an important motive for flows of patients. In addition, it 
refers to other plausible organisational barriers in the system, such as differing 
reimbursement rates.  
 The last barrier – the utilisation of accessible services – concerns a significant 
distinction regarding access to health services: the availability of services and their 
actual utilisation. It also entails differences in utilization detected in relation to several 
socio-demographic categories (socio-economic status, sex, age, ethnicity etc.). 
 
Figure 1.1 The health access barrier filter 
 
Source: Wörz/Foubister/Busse/Mossialos et al. (2006)  
1.9 Emerging points or why a thesis addressing inequalities in health care use 
among the older population in Greece? 
Given the above characteristics of the current situation, investigating and understanding the 
underlying determinants of health inequalities among older people is a great challenge for 
the Greek health care system. This study comes at an important moment in Greek health 
care system. Emerging points of the current situation include: 
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 Greece has a dramatically increased ageing population (the fourth highest proportion in 
OECD 42 countries and the EU28), leading possibly to additional demands for, and 
utilisation of health and care services.  
 Although it is often difficult to assess the relationship between health care expenditure 
and ageing owing to many projection methodology differences - Greece has not recently 
gathered official data – older data reveal that a significant proportion of public health 
expenses – more than 30% are devoted to the health treatment of the elderly which is 
mainly due to the fact that their health cost per capita is on average 4.3 times higher (for 
those over 75 years of age: 5.9% higher) than for the younger population (MoH, 1999: 
14).  
 These demographic changes create new challenges in inequalities in health care use, 
especially during the period of the crisis that Greece experiences since 2009, with the 
cuts in public health and social care expenditure. In particular: 
 The economic recession in Greece and Europe, the longer life expectancy, the strain 
on social support services and increasing economic pressures on families and older 
people via severe cuts in salaries and pensions, lead to negative effects, particularly 
for those most at risk of vulnerability, especially in terms of increased restrictions on 
access to quality health and social care, affecting their health status (Rechel et al., 
2011).  
 The general approach of cost-containment measures has taken the form of horizontal 
cuts, rather than a more strategic approach targeting resource allocation. This 
highlights the fact that, so far, cost-containment and greater efficiency have not been 
achieved via the introduction of necessary and major structural reforms. Beyond the 
inefficiencies of the NHS-ESY, other areas that have not been included in the health 
reform agenda include: measures to ensure continuity of care, establishing palliative 
care services and the integration of health and social care services. 
  In addition, they have put into question the sustainability of whatever public care 
structures have been developed since the early 1980s (Matsaganis M, LeventiC, 
2014; Economou C et al, 2014; Mitrakos T, 2013; SimouE., KoutsogeorgouE., 2014; 
Zavras D et al, 2013;  KaitelidouD, Kouli E.,2012). 
 The health system needs to be capable of using evidence and monitoring effects to 
ensure the effectiveness of actions undertaken, to allow policy refinement and 
knowledge development about other actions and the impacts they might yield. 
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 Little attention has also been paid to investigating and measuring equity in the use of 
health care among the elderly in a systematic way, since they are the consumers who, 
though they receive high health services (Allin S. and Mossialos E., 2005). Although 
there is a plethora of indicators of outcomes, evidence-based interventions are not 
sufficient for addressing health care inequalities.  
 In Greece, there are no clear policy frameworks relating to health inequalities in health 
and health care (CHRODIS JA, 2014). Equality in health is mentioned in a number of 
recent documents
5
, usually in terms of access to care, but it is described in the narrow 
sense of geographical distribution of services and financial obstacles, with little mention 
of other factors affecting access to services or health in general.  
Overall, the aforementioned challenges – inefficiencies of the Greek NHS that aims at 
offering a universal and equal healthcare, the fragmented inefficient welfare state with the 
non-exist LTC or elderly care, in conjunction with: the demographic ageing; the new 
challenges of the continuing economic crisis; the limited or incomplete evidence in the 
inequalities in health care use among the increasing older population in Greece; and the 
need for a clear understanding of inequalities in health care use in order to transform the 
NHS system for serving its foundation principles of equity in access and universality - are 
my main motivation for this thesis.   
Under this framework, the following paragraphs highlight the nonsystematic approach that 
Greece has investigated the existence of barriers to access and inequalities in using health 
care focused on the general population and the older population with an incomplete way. 
1.10 Evidence for inequity in utilization of health care in Greece 
Therefore, we collect, organize and appraize existing evidence according to the following 
search and selection strategy for a systematic review.  
(A) Search and selection strategy for systematic literature review 
A systematic literature review was conducted. Literature published in English before 
August 2016 was searched via three possible sources:1) four electronic databases 
(MEDLINE (PubMed), Scopus, IBSS; Global Health); 2) Grey literature was searched 
using a targeted search of London School of Economics – LSE Library Collections and 3) 
references in selected articles. The search was developed combining terms referring to 
outcome: “health care utilization”; exposure: “income-inequalities”, “socio-demographic 
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inequalities”, “regional inequalities”, “Out of pocket payments” and participants: “older 
population”, “general population”. Search terms included combination of the keywords in 
the systematic search, as presented in Table 1.1. Titles and abstracts of all references 
identified in the search were screened applying exclusion and inclusion criteria according 
to the definitions of the concepts of the systematic search and the type of study, as 
presented in Table 1.1. The lists of references of the resulting studies were checked to 
ensure that all relevant articles were included in the search. The findings of the studies 
included in this review were synthesized in a narrative format, and the data were extracted 
using a customized template including the items: author, year, source of data, method, 
subject, exposure, result/outcome, measure of outcome, as displayed in Appendix - Tables 
1.2 - 1.5. Only studies in English language based on evaluation of primary data were 
considered. Overall, 1,573 papers were found, and 24 papers were found via bibliographic 
search in reference lists of eligible articles, resulting in a total of 1,597 studies. After 
exclusion of 982 studies not focusing on Greece, 615 studies remained. Out of these 
studies for Greece, 557 studies not focusing on health care use but mainly on medical and 
health status issues were excluded and 58 studies remained containing relevant information 
concerning the factors displayed at Table 1.1. Overall, out of these 58 studies included, are 
9 longitudinal and 41 cross-sectional surveys. Seventeen (17) studies use econometric 
estimation methods for measuring inequalities and 29 studies are purely descriptive out of 
which 18 studies concern determinants of health care use or unmet health care needs. Our 
review is structured as in the following paragraphs. 
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Table 1.1: Search and selection strategy for systematic literature review: Keywords and selection criteria 
Concept Keywords Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria 
Outcome/ result: “health 
care utilization” 
“"health care use"[All Fields] OR “Access” [All Fields] OR "hospital 
care"[All Fields] OR "inpatient care"[All Fields] OR "GP"[All Fields] 
OR “Any medical care” [All Fields] OR “any physician” [All Fields] OR 
"specialist" [All Fields] OR “Family doctor” [All Fields] OR 
"outpatient"[All Fields] OR “Primary Health Care”[All Fields] OR 
“EOPYY” [All Fields] OR "Dental care"[All Fields] OR “social 
insurance fund” [All Fields] AND “Greece” 
Studies estimating the outcomes Excluded: studies not centred on 
the outcome of interest (i.e.health 
status, health risk behaviours, 
cognitive impairment etc) 
Outcome/ result: 
“inequalities” 
"inequalities" [All Fields] OR “inequities” [All Fields] OR “variances” 
[All Fields] OR “disparities” [All Fields] OR “discrepancies” [All 
Fields]  
Studies estimating the outcomes Excluded: studies not centred on 
the outcome of interest 
Participant: “Older 
population”  
"old population" [All Fields] OR "elderly"[All Fields] OR “old age” [All 
Fields] OR “aged 50” [All Fields] OR “aged 60” [All Fields] OR 
“ageing”  
Studies focused on older population; Studies on 
general population with estimates of health care use 
provided for selected old age groups 
Excluded: studies not focused on 
older or general adult population 
Participant: “General 
population” 
“Adults” OR “population not elderly” OR “Not old ages” Studies with estimates of health care use on general 
population  
Excluded: studies not focused on 
older or general adult population 
Exposure: “income-
inequalities” 
“income-inequality” OR “income” OR “determinants of health care”  Analysis considering any of these factors Macro level analysis 
Exposure: “socio-
demographic inequalities” 
“socioeconomic factors” OR “socioeconomic determinants” OR  
“socioeconomic position” OR “education” OR “housing tenure” OR 
“household” OR “social insurance” OR “private insurance” OR “sex” 
OR” gender” OR “marital status” 
Analysis considering any of these factors Macro level analysis 
Exposure: “regional 
inequalities” 
"rural"[All Fields] OR "Urban" [All Fields] OR “region of 
residence” [All Fields] OR “regional variances” [All Fields] OR 
“geographical discrepancies” [All Fields] OR  "rural"[All Fields] 
OR "Urban"[All Fields] OR “geographical proximity” 
Analysis considering any of these factors Macro level analysis 
Exposure: “OOPPs” “out of pocket payments"[All Fields] OR “informal payments” 
OR “direct payments"[All Fields] OR “financial barrier” 
Analysis considering any of these factors Macro level analysis 
Type of study  English, quantitative studies, qualitative 
studies, reviews 
Conference abstracts, 
reports and editorials 
40 
 
(B) Systematic literature review results  
We identify in total, evidence of 58 studies for inequity and variations in utilization of 
health care in Greece focused on the general population (41 studies) and older population 
(17 studies) in the following directions:  
(a) Overall, fourteen (14) comparative studies conducted at an EU-level with the 
participation of Greece, focused on general population which are distinguished between: 
(ai) income-related inequity studies in health care (8 studies) using data mainly of the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and (aii) financial and other barriers 
(cost sharing, geographical proximity, waiting times etc) to access (6 studies) in health 
care and unmet medical needs; and  
(b) Overall, twenty five (27) Greek studies conducted in Greece –in a nationwide (21 
studies), regional (2 studies) and urban (4 studies) settings - that examine determinants 
of health care use including income or socioeconomic status (SES) in the general 
population as well as the responsiveness of the Greek health care system and unmet 
medical needs. 
(c) We also detect few (17 studies) at EU-level comparative studies with the participation 
of Greece for older population, in their analysis.  
The design, methods, measures and main findings of these comparative and Greek studies 
for the general and the older population in Greece are displayed in Tables 1.2 to 1.5 in the 
Appendix. The following paragraphs include summarized the main findings of our 
systematic review and highlight the approach that Greece has investigated the existence 
of barriers to access and inequalities in using health care focused on the general 
population and the incomplete way for investigating inequalities among the older 
population. 
1.10.1 Inequity in GP/HCC physician visit 
It is worth mentioning that when we interpret findings of income-related equity in 
GP/HCC physician visits, it is important to keep in mind that given that there is 
undersupply of GPs in HCCs and oversupply of specialists, individuals in Greece usually 
refer to different specialists for their health problems according to their need. Moreover, in 
some cases, people consult a single provider – specialist regularly (or not often a GP at 
HCCs) and they consider him as their “personal” or “family” doctor. Therefore, in reality 
the question of GP/HCC physician or SHIF physician visits may be answered as a 
specialist visit, indicating caution in the interpretation of the findings.  
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1. We identify evidence for pro-poor and weak pro-poor inequity in probability of GP or 
HCC physician visit: 
(a) Few EU comparative studies of European Community Household Panel  (ECHP) 
with the participation of Greece that indicate pro-poor inequity: (i) studies with 
pooled analysis of 1994-2001 ECHP data for Greece of Bago d’Uvaa T., et al 
(2009, 2007); Bago d’Uvaa T. & Jones A. (2009); (ii) studies of Van Doorslaer et 
al, 2006; and  Van Doorslaer & Masseria (2004) using data of the ECHP 2000 for 
Greece, that found pro-poor inequity for the probability of GP visit.  
(b) Studies by Greek researchers: (i) a recent cross-sectional nationwide survey study 
of Zavras D et al, (2014) based on examined determinants of PHC services in 
Greece during 2006 using WHO methodology for assessing PHC (Üstün et al., 
2001) and found that people with lower income report increased PHC services; (ii) 
two other cross-sectional nationwide mail surveys conducted in Greece 2001 - 2002 
of Geitona et al, (2007) and Kyriopoulos et al (2002) that examined the 
determinants of PHC and hospital care utilization and found that the number of 
PHC visits is affected by income only for poor population, whereas they are mail 
studies with significant limitations on design method. 
(c) Urban setting and regional studies by Greek researchers: (i) a regional study in 
Thessaly has been carried out (North Greece) and found pro poor inequity in PHC 
visits (Lahana  E. et al, 2011); (ii) a cross-sectional urban study in the broader 
Athens area of Pappa E. and Niakas D. (2006) - for determinants of health care use-  
finds pro-poor inequity for SHIF physician visits; (iii) a cross-sectional urban 
setting study of Sissouras A, Karokis A et al (1996) in the third largest urban area 
of Patras’, within the Phase II framework (1993-1997) programme of W.H.O. 
European Healthy Cities, that indicated more conditional SHIF visits from those in 
lower SES, although these local studies have small sample. 
(d) Elderly population study of Majo M. & Van Soest A. (2012) based on SHARE 
Wave1 data of 2004 that GP visits reveal pro-poor income related inequity. 
2. On the other hand, there is evidence for slightly pro-rich inequity in probability of GP or 
HCC physician visit: 
(a) EU comparative studies of ECHP with the participation of Greece that indicate pro-
rich inequity:  (i) two studies of Van Doorslaer et al (2004; 2002) using ECHP 1996 
data for Greece that found slightly pro-rich inequity for the probability of GP visit; 
(ii) a recent study based on ECHP data concluded that in Greece higher SES users 
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report average total number of GP and specialist visits three times larger than that of 
the lower SES users (i.e. predicted total number of GP users is 1:3.06) (Bago d’Uvaa 
T. & Jones A., 2009);  
(b) Studies by Greek researchers: a nationwide study that finds pro-rich family 
physician visit but once family physicians are not established in Greece - due to 
inexistence of GPs- individuals may consider a specialist as their “personal” or 
“family” doctor. Thus, the results should be treated in caution (Tountas et al, 2011). 
(c) Elderly population study of Allin S. & Masseria C., (2006) based on SHARE data 
indicated that GP visits are slightly positively associated with income. 
1.10.2 Inequity in outpatient visit (or any medical visit) 
Given that “any medical consultation” by definition includes emergency and outpatient 
visits and excludes dentist visits and inpatient nights”, in our review for evidence of 
inequity in outpatient visit, we include results of studies for any medical visit provided in 
the wider PHC framework, as well.  
1. We identify evidence for no clear association of income with outpatient visits:  
(a) Studies by Greek researchers: (i) two studies for the general population evaluating 
cases treated in the emergency department of a Greek general hospital -that reported 
increased outpatient visits not associated with income - and revealed that almost one 
in three patients in specific surgical specialties could have been managed by a GP, as 
could 40% of orthopaedic cases (Marinos et al., 2009; Vasileiou et al., 2009); (ii) two 
studies that found no association of socioeconomic characteristics with informal 
payments in public hospitals for inpatient or outpatient admissions (Siskou et al, 
2008; Liaropoulos et al, 2008). 
(b) Urban setting study in Athens for the general population, that doesn’t find any 
income association for outpatient care (Pappa E. & Niakas D., 2006). 
(c) Elderly population studies of: (i) Majo M. & Van Soest A. (2012) based on SHARE 
data indicating that outpatient care does not increase with income.  
2. On the other hand, there is evidence for pro-poor inequity in outpatient visits by the 
cross-sectional urban setting study of Sissouras A, Karokis A et al (1996) in Patras’ the 
third largest urban area, within the Phase II framework (1993-1997) programme of 
W.H.O. European Healthy Cities, that indicated more conditional outpatient visits from 
those in lower SES (pro poor) – mainly for having diagnostic tests and medication 
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prescribing. However, this is an older study conducted before the NHS-ESY reforms of 
2001. 
3. Moreover there is evidence of slightly pro-rich inequity for any physician visit for older 
population based on comparative SHARE Wave 1 data for Greece (Allin S. & Masseria 
C., 2006). 
1.10.3 Inequity in specialist care 
1. We identify evidence of no clear association of individuals’ socioeconomic 
characteristics with specialist care:  
(a) Two nationwide studies by Greek researchers of no association of individuals’ SES 
characteristics with specialist private visit as an inpatient or outpatient patient 
(Siskou et al, 2008; Liaropoulos et al, 2008). However, the evidence of Siskou et al 
(2008) for the determinants of private health expenditure on health care use has a 
complicated study design, as they extrapolate usage characteristics of the 
countrywide sample on the 2005 National Household Budget Survey in order to 
arrive at expenditure breakdown of estimates by health care type, and the other is 
telephone survey with design limitations.   
(b) Urban setting study in the broader Athens area that reveals almost no socio-
economic association with specialist visits (Pappa E. & Niakas D., 2006). 
(c) Elderly population studies of: (i) Majo M. & Van Soest A. (2012) based on 
comparative SHARE data indicating no clear association with SES; (ii) There is 
also a small comparative international regional study of Crete Islands (Vadla D et 
al, 2011) that explored demographic and self-rated differences in health care 
(specialist and inpatient) use among elderly in 8 districts in five EU countries in 
2005 and found that the highest proportion of specialist visit (70% vs 40%) and 
hospitalisations (32% vs 20%) were encountered in Greece comparing the other 8 
countries. However, given the small sample of the study, these findings should be 
treated in caution. 
2. We identify evidence of pro-poor inequity for specialist care:  
Nationwide cross-sectional studies by Greek researchers: (i) a Greek study concluded 
that specialist visit is equally distributed among people in lower (pro poor) 
socioeconomic status (SES) than those in middle SES (Tountas et al, 2011); (ii) a study 
of Zavras D et al, (2014) based on examined determinants of PHC services in Greece 
during 2006 using the methodology of the WHO (Üstün et al., 2001) which found that 
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people with lower income (pro-poor) report increased PHC services; (iii) a mail survey 
Geitona et al, (2007) conducted in Greece 2001 - 2002 examined the determinants of 
PHC and hospital care and found that the number of PHC visits is affected by income 
only for poor population (pro-poor). However, it is a mail study with significant 
limitations on design method. 
3. We identify evidence of pro-rich inequity for specialist care: 
(i) Few EU comparative studies of ECHP with the participation of Greece that 
indicate pro-rich inequity: four EU comparative studies including Greece of Van 
Doorslaer, Koolman and Jones (2004) and Van Doorslaer, Koolman and Puffer 
(2002) that measured income-related inequity in specialist care in 1996; Bago 
d’Uvaa T. & Jones A.(2009) and a pooled analysis for 1994-2001 of Bago d’Uvaa 
T. et al (2009) using data of the ECHP for Greece and found significant pro-rich 
inequity for the probability of specialist visit. 
(ii) Nationwide cross-sectional studies by Greek researchers:(i) Few studies that argue 
pro-rich inequity for specialist visits (Tountas et al, 2011; and Mergoupis et al, 
2003; Kyriopoulos et al, 2002), however in Mergoupis et al (2003) study there is no 
distinguish between GPs and specialists and the interpretation of results needs 
caution. (ii) Similarly, another nationwide telephone survey of Souliotis et al (2016) 
for informal payments in health care in 2012, found that more frequent visits to 
private health services (mainly PHC) are reported by persons with higher SES 
profile. 
(iii) Urban setting and regional cross-sectional studies by Greek researchers: (i) a 
regional study in Thessaly in 2006 for determinants of utilisation that indicates pro-
rich specialist care (Lahana E. et al, 2011); similar with the study of Sissouras A, 
Karokis A et al (1996) in Patras’ the third largest urban area, within the Phase II 
framework (1993-1997) programme of W.H.O. European Healthy Cities, that 
indicated pro-rich specialist visits.   
(iv) International comparative elderly population studies of: (i) based on SHARE 
comparative Wave1 data: Allin S. & Masseria C. (2006) that found slightly pro-rich 
inequity; whereas Allin S. et al, (2009) found that in Greece wealth-related 
difference in physician visits was greater than income differences. (ii) There is also 
a regional study of Vadla D1,et al, (2011) that explored variations in the association 
of rural residency within health care use (specialist and inpatient) among elderly in 
8 districts in five EU countries in 2005 conducted by the Primary Healthcare (TTB) 
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European Network, that reveals the highest proportion of specialist visit (70% 
versus 40%) encountered at Crete Islands in Greece comparing to 8 other EU 
countries, but needs caution due to small sample. 
4. We identify evidence of accessibility problems and unmet needs for specialists:  
a) Comparative EU studies including Greece: (i)The evidence of longitudinal EU-
SILK dataset and third wave of EQLife (EQLS) descriptive studies show that 
Greece is the top one country versus EU-27 with accessibility problems for visiting 
a specialist – not financial barrier (Anderson et al, 2012; Eurofound, 2012). (ii) 
Comparing to EU-27, access in Greece has become more difficult due to cost for all 
income groups (bottom and top half of income) increasing inequalities (Eurofound, 
2013). (iii) These findings are different from the first EQLife results by Anderson - 
Eurofound (2004) but similar to EU-SILC. 
b) Comparative EU studies for unmet needs including Greece: (i) EU-SILC 
longitudinal data analysis between 2007 and 2011 found that in Greece, there was a 
statistically significant rise of 43% of respondents reporting unmet need for medical 
treatment due to cost between 2007 and 2011. (ii) In addition, 31% of people 
reporting cost as a barrier is highest in Greece among EU, even though financial 
barrier is not the first reason. People on low income tend to report more enforced 
unmet needs than higher earners (Rodrigues et al, 2013). (iii) Another EU-SILC 
study in 2004 for Greece that found unmet need concentrated among the lower 
income groups (Koolman X, 2007). However, these studies are descriptive with a 
narrow set of health indicators and interpretation needs caution. 
c) Two Greek nationwide studies for unmet needs: (i) a study that reveals unmet needs 
for visiting a family doctor or a specialist due to cost, indicating pro-poor 
inequalities for these visits, even though this study does not distinguish between 
public or private PHC visit (Pappa E. et al, 2013); (ii) Another pooled analysis of 
EU-SILC data from 2007 to 2009, about the determinants of unmet need for 
medical exams indicates that unmet physician visit is not related with income and 
inability to afford care (Kentikelenis et al, 2011). 
1.10.4 Inequity in inpatient admission 
1. We identify evidence of no income-related inequity with inpatient admission:  
a) Two EU comparative studies of ECHP with the participation of Greece of  Van 
Doorslaer, Koolman and Jones (2004) and Van Doorslaer & Masseria (2004) that 
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measured income-related inequity in health care and found no income inequity after 
standardizing for need; 
b) Studies by Greek researchers of literature that argues no-income related inequity 
(Kyriopoulos et al, 2002; Tountas et al, 2011; Geitona et al, 2007; Siskou et al 
2008; a telephone interview survey of Liaropoulos et al, 2008). However, we need 
to treat these findings in caution because of limitations in most studies’ design.  
c) Urban setting and regional cross-sectional studies by Greek researchers: (i) the c 
study of Pappa E. and Niakas D. (2006) in the broader Athens area found that 
hospital admissions were related to need and not to any socio-economic factor; (ii) 
the study of Sissouras A, Karokis A et al (1996) in Patras’ the third largest urban 
area, within the Phase II framework (1993-1997) programme of W.H.O. European 
Healthy Cities, that indicated no-income related inequalities in hospital admissions, 
although they have small sample. 
d) Comparative elderly population studies of: (i) Majo M. C. van Soest A. (2012) and 
Santos-Eggimann B. et al, (2005), based on SHARE comparative survey for older 
population in Greece that explored the determinants of health care use and found a 
negative but very weak association and no income association with inpatient 
admissions, although Eggimann S et al (2005) is descriptive study with 
methodology limitations. (ii) Another regional study of Vadla D1,et al, (2011) that 
explored variations in the association of rural residency within health care use 
(specialist and inpatient) among elderly in 8 districts in five EU countries in 2005 
conducted by the Primary Healthcare (TTB) European Network, and reveals that 
the highest proportion of hospitalisations (32% vs 20%) encountered at Crete 
Islands in Greece comparing to the others, but needs caution due to small sample. 
2. We identify evidence of pro-rich income-related inequity with inpatient admission:  
a) An EU comparative pooled analysis of ECHP 1994-1998 with the participation of 
Greece of Masseria, Koolman & Van Doorslaer, (2004) that found pro-rich inequity 
for inpatient care relevant to non-elective care and relevant to regional disparities 
favoring the densely populated urban areas of Athens and North Greece 
(Thessaloniki); 
b) A study by Greek researchers of Siskou et al (2008) that analyze determinants of 
private health payments by provider and type of service and indicate pro-rich 
inequity for the total number of private inpatient admissions, although it should be 
treated carefully as it has a complicated study design, as they extrapolate usage 
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characteristics of the countrywide sample on the 2005 National Household Budget 
Survey. 
c) A Greek regional cross-sectional study in Thessaly in 2006 of Lahana E. et al 
(2011) that indicates pro-rich inpatient care, but this study has a small sample. 
d) Elderly population study of Allin S. & Masseria C. (2006) based on SHARE 
Wave1 survey for elderly, which found slightly pro-rich inequity in hospital care 
use. 
1.10.5 Inequity in dentist utilization  
1. We identify significant evidence of strong pro-rich inequity in dental care visits:  
a) An EU comparative study with the participation of Greece of ECHP in 2000 of Van 
Doorslaer E. & Masseria C. (2004) and a number of studies by Greek researchers for 
the general population that identify higher dentist and dental care use by individuals 
in high SES (Koletsi-Kounari H. et al, 2011; Pavi E, et al, 2010; Zavras D. et al, 
2004; Souliotis K. et al, 2016; Kyriopoulos et al, 2002). Moreover, it is worth 
mentioning the study of Koletsi-Kounari H. et al, 2007 that explored the evolution of 
private dental health expenditure in Greece by region and income via Household 
Budget Surveys over a decade from 1987-1998 -using CPIndex- and found an 
increase for the annual expenditure per capita of 67.2% for the higher income groups 
(pro-rich). 
b) Elderly population studies of: (i) Majo M. & Van Soest A., 2012; Egimann S. et al, 
2005; Allin S. & Mossialos, 2004 based on comparability SHARE Wave1 data with 
the participation of Greece that identify the significant effect of income in dentist and 
dental care use. (ii) Similarly the study of Listl S. (2011) based on SHARE Wave 2 
data that explored income inequalities in dental care use and preventive treatment by 
50+ and found significant pro-rich inequity in dental care in Greece, and higher 
inequalities for preventive treatment among retired individuals. (iii) An urban-setting 
qualitative study for elderly patients in a Public University Prosthetic Dentistry 
Clinic (Naka O, Anastassiadou V, 2012)that explored determinants of older Greek 
adults' oral health patterns found that that cost and no disease awareness are the most 
frequently mentioned barriers to regular dental visits. In addition, low level of 
income (pro-poor) and lower education are the determinants of public dental care; 
(iv) Moreover, a recent study of Listl S (2012) based on life-course data from 
SHARE (waves 1 to 3) identified pro-higher education inequalities in regular dental 
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attendance throughout the life-course and relatively inelastic until age of 65 years, 
but not thereafter due to age-related inequality decline in Greece.  
2. We also find evidence of no association or pro-poor inequity with dental care use:  
a) Few studies by Greek researchers of: (i) Siskou et al, (2008) found no association 
of income with dental care use; (ii) Two studies indicate lower levels of oral health 
associated with lower income and lower SES (Yfantopoulos et al., 2014; 
Kyriopoulos et al, 2002).  
1.10.6 Evidence of accessibility problems and unmet needs for health care use 
among the older population 
There is evidence of comparative studies:  
a) The first EQLife survey including findings for the elderly that detects no financial 
barrier for using health care in Greece (Anderson, 2004), although it is a descriptive 
study with design limitations due to validity of data for only one year. 
b) A longitudinal EU-SILC study with 2006 to 2011 data for unmet needs including 
Greece, that examined “enforced unmet needs for treatment” caused by barriers 
(expenses, waiting lists or distance), indicating that for the older groups aged 65+, the 
inability to obtain care was increased for all reasons and marked mostly in Greece 
compared to EU27 (Rodrigues et al, 2013), even though the EU-SILK survey is 
hampered by limited health information.  
c) Few studies for elderly about forgone care and household income based on SHARE 
wave 1 data of: (i) Mielck, A. et al, (2009) and  Allin S. & Masseria (2006) which found 
that Greece has the prevalence of highest forgone care in the lowest income group as 
compared with the highest income group, adjusted for age and sex. (ii) Furthermore, 
paradoxically the highest income groups show a higher prevalence in forgoing care than 
the middle-income group (Mielck, A. et al, 2009; Allin S. & Masseria 2009). (iii) In 
addition, Litwin H. &Sapir E.V. (2009) found that  the health services that most 
frequently forgone care include: dental care followed by medications and visits to 
specialists.  
1.10.7  Evidence for regional disparities in utilization of health care  
One determinant which potentially has greater relevance for health policy making is 
regional disparities in use. Literature review identifies geographical region as a significant 
determinant of PHC and hospital utilization. The interregional differences contributions 
have to be interpreted in conjunction with the urban-rural differences, which may be able 
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to capture intra-regional differences. The evidence below reveals regional disparities in 
use of health care for general population, given that evidence for regional variations in use, 
exclusively for older Greek population is almost absent.   
1. There is evidence for regional disparities in use of PHC services. There is evidence for 
less physician visits to NHS rural PHC health services and more private or urban PHC 
and dental services by rural population, whereas there is evidence for increased use of 
Insurance Fund’s (SHIF) PHC and outpatient services by urban population. 
(a) In particular, we identify evidence that the residents of rural regions use in total - 
fewer health care services (PHC, outpatient, inpatient) comparing to urban areas 
(Zavras D et al, 2014; Tountas Y et al, 2011; Oikonomou N., Tountas Y, 2011; 
Lahana E et al, 2011; Marinos G et al, 2009). The cross-sectional nationwide 
survey Hellas Health I underlined that contacts with healthcare professionals (total 
visits) were less for residents of rural areas, given that only 20% of the rural 
population tent to use NHS rural PHC health services (HCCs and rural settings 
(RS) - practices), as their main source of PHC (Tountas Y et al, 2011; Oikonomou 
N., Tountas Y, 2011). This results in the majority (31.8%) of rural residents to be 
“forced” to travel at urban areas to visit a private physician for receiving PHC at 
urban areas and 15.7% to visit a private doctor contracted to SHIF; 15.3 % choose 
to visit hospital outpatient department at urban regions, as well; On the other hand, 
the majority (28.9%) of urban residents visit a private doctor contracted to SHIF or 
the SHIF’s polyclinic (28.1%) for PHC consultation (Tountas Y et al, 2011). In 
addition, the study of Van Doorslaer, Koolman & Pufffer (2002) who used data 
from the ECHP 3d wave (1996) for Greece, found that for GP visits, the impact of 
standardising for regional utilisation differences is small favouring the lower 
income groups, whereas things are quite different for specialist visits. However, 
given that GPs are few in Greece the interpretation of the results needs caution. 
Marinos et al.(2009) study, that evaluated the medical records for patients -with 
mean age 65.5 years - attending the emergency departments (ED) of a big hospital 
in Athens, in 2005 - 2006, pointed out that 20% of ED patients came from a rural 
area, whereas one in every three patients could have been managed in a PHC 
setting. 
(b) In addition, we identify evidence for regional disparities in specialist private 
contacts, favouring rural versus urban areas, as a result of the inadequate NHS rural 
PHC services. 
50 
 
(i) Two EU comparative studies using the ECHP data for Greece (Van Doorslaer, 
Koolman & Pufffer, 2002; and Van Doorslaer and Masseria C.,2004) that 
measure horizontal equity achieved in GPs and specialists’ visits associated with 
regional differences highlighted substantial pro-rich regional contributions for 
specialist visits that reflect discrepancies between better endowed (often the 
capital) regions and more peripheral regions in Greece. 
(ii) Most of the aforementioned nationwide studies reveal that in rural areas, the 
majority of residents are more likely to visit a private practitioner - not 
contracted to any SHIF as their primary source of health care. (Tountas et al, 
2011; Oikonomou N., Tountas Y, 2011; Lahana E et al, 2011; Siskou et al, 
2008; Pappa, E. and Niakas, D.,2006). It is notable - that according to Tountas 
et al, (2011) - 31.8% of rural population uses private doctors required OOPPs - 
not contracted to any SHIF - accessed in bigger urban centers as their primary 
source of health care, and about 65% of rural residents are less likely to be 
admitted to hospitals’ ED, similar to the local study of Lahana et al (2011). 
Similarly, the mail study of Geitona et al, (2007) revealed increased GPs and 
specialists use by rural population comparing to urban, but has design 
limitations. Other study aiming at investigating private health payments by 
provider and type of service, found that the frequency of visiting a private 
doctor in rural areas is higher than in urban areas (Siskou O. et al, 2008). 
(iii) Moreover, a regional survey carried out in 2006 in Thessaly (Lahana E et al, 
2011), the third largest region of the 13 geographic regions of Greece - 
subdivided into four prefectures with a mixed urban and rural environment, 
revealed socioeconomic inter regional disparities on the utilization of PHC and 
hospital care favoring the worse off residents of rural areas who were more 
than two times likely to visit a private practitioner accessed in bigger urban 
centres. About residents in the urban areas, the middle-aged were more likely 
to visit a private doctor and the elderly (65+) to visit a SHIF physician. 
Another comparative regional study for physicians and inpatient visits among 
elderly 70+ was performed in eight districts of five EU countries (Vadla D1,et 
al, 2011). It shows that the older population of Crete Islands reported the 
highest use of private specialist visits (70% vs 40%) and inpatient admissions 
(32% vs 20%) comparing to other EU rural regions. However, as Crete Island 
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is the largest and more populated island with an increased physician rate, it 
should be possibly examined separately from other Islands. 
2. There is slightly contradictory evidence of regional disparities in inpatient admissions: 
(a) Pro-rich regional contributions in inpatient admissions favoring residents of urban 
regions (Van Doorslaer and Masseria, 2004; Geitona et al, 2007; Lahana E et al, 
2011 with a local study): (i) The EU comparative aforementioned study of Van 
Doorslaer and Masseria C. (2004) using the ECHP 2000 data for Greece that found 
slight pro-rich regional contributions with the Athens region (Attica) contributing 
most to the pro-rich pattern. (ii) The mail study of Geitona et al, (2007) found 
regional disparities for inpatient care favouring residents of Peloponnese region 
(covering a mixed urban and rural environment) who report more admissions; and 
(iii) the regional study of Lahana et al (2011) revealed that the wealthier residents 
in urban areas of Thessaly Perfecture had a higher likelihood to be admitted to 
hospitals compared to those with low-income in rural regions. 
(b) On the other hand, there is evidence of no regional disparities for inpatient care 
that is related to health needs and not to socioeconomic factors (Pappa E. and 
Niakas D., 2006; Tountas et al, 2011; Kyriopoulos et al, 2002): (i) According to the 
urban-setting study in the broader region of Athens of Pappa, E. and Niakas, D., 
(2006), visits to hospital ED and hospital admissions were related to health care 
needs, and no SES factor characterized the use of those types of care. (ii) Similarly, 
the study of Tountas et al (2011) found that hospital admissions were not directly 
influenced by demographic and SES factors – including the region of residence. 
They were influenced by health needs. (iii) In addition, an older study of 
Kyriopoulos et al (2002) reveals no regional disparities for health care use in total, 
as well, but it is a mail study with methodology and study design limitations. 
3.  There is also evidence for reporting geographical proximity barriers in access PHC 
health units and inpatient care due to travel distance or transport difficulties. 
(a) The geographical proximity as a barrier to access NHS-ESY PHC is pointed out by 
a number of studies: (i) Alber & Kohler (2004) based on Eurobarometer surveys of 
1999 and 2002 found that Greek people report the most difficulties in access to GPs 
and hospitals in terms of geographical proximity regardless of income differences 
comparing to EU15, though there is a limitation with income data in Eurobarometer 
surveys that need to be treated in caution; (ii) Oikonomidou E. et al, (2010) mail 
study indicates geographical proximity as barrier for old patients to receive care by 
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the rural HCCs and rural settings – (practices) that result in increased number of GP 
home visits to older patients living in thinly populated areas; (iii) Moreover, the 
pooled analysis of EU-SILC data 2007 to 2009, exploring the determinants of 
unmet need for medical care indicates that unmet physician visit is strongly related 
to travel distance or transport difficulties (Kentikelenis et al, 2011). 
(b)  The geographical proximity as a barrier to access hospital care has been 
highlighted by few studies: (i) A descriptive study of Eurofound (2012) on third 
EQLife survey, similar to Anderson (2004) on first EQLife survey, indicated that 
the highest proportion of difficulties in access to hospitals and physicians caused by 
distance barriers, is reported in Greece among the EU27. (ii) Similarly, another 
study conducted during a 2-year period (2006 to 2008) in two large tertiary 
hospitals in Greece (in Athens region and Crete Island that covers a mixed urban 
and rural environment) that examined proximity to health units associated with 
delays in treatment of acute myocardial infarction (AMI) patients, found that AMI 
rural patients located more than 10 km from the nearest hospital had almost 20 
times greater risk of delayed hospital arrival than patients from urban areas 
(Brokalaki et al.,2011). (iii) A recent qualitative WHO study for barriers in access 
to health services using the Tanahashi framework- based on interviews and focus 
groups, revealed persistent regional inequalities in the distribution of health 
resources, posing barriers to access (for total visits) especially for the population of 
remote areas and islands (Economou C, 2015). 
c)   There is also evidence of geographical proximity barrier to dentist visit favoring the 
residents of rural areas that have to travel to seek private dental visits at urban areas 
(Koletsi-Kounari H. et al, 2007; Siskou et al, 2008) and result in no inequity in 
private dental care with increased OOP costs (Zavras et al, 2014). 
1.10.8 OOP payments as financial barrier in health care use 
Greek and international evidence for the OOP payments as financial barrier in health care 
use is limited. We identify 8 studies by Greek researchers for the general population, and 3 
comparative studies based on SHARE survey for the older population in Greece. 
1. OOP and informal expenses burden specialist private visits and outpatient visits via a 
number of nationwide cross-sectional studies by Greek researchers: (i) A recent 
telephone survey of Souliotis et al (2016) for informal payments in health care in 
2012, found that 36% of the sample report OOP and under-the-table payments for 
53 
 
visits to private practitioners and dentists, and 12.2% to providers of PHC in HCCs 
and SHIFs’ centres. (ii) Similarly, the cross-sectional study (Hellas Health I) in 2006, 
found that 39% of the sample paid OOP for visits to health professionals’ contacts 
(Tountas et al, 2011). (iii) Siskou et al (2008) found that one out of three patients uses 
informal payments in order to receive specialist care as inpatient or outpatient in 
public hospitals regardless of their SES characteristics. (iv) In addition, the recent 
qualitative WHO study - based on interviews and focus groups discussions, revealed 
large increases in OOP expenditures for medical prescriptions as well as for unlisted 
drugs and laboratory tests (Economou C, 2015). (v) Moreover, about elderly 
population, a recent EU comparative post-death evidence for older population using 
pooled data of SHARElife survey detected that in 2005, 54% of the Greek sample paid 
OOP for receiving specialist care (Penders Y. et al, 2016). 
2. Moreover, evidence is apparent for regressive relationship in ability to pay OOP for 
receiving specialist care via studies for the fairness and economic impact of informal 
payments: (i) Matsaganis M., Mitrakos T., Tsakloglou P, (2008) found that the top 1% 
of all households accounts for 37.6% of all OOP hospital expenditure, and elderly 
households spent 12% to 13% of their household budget shares on health. (ii) 
ELSTAT’s (2015) analysis of Household Budget Survey for 2014 showed that the 
poor households spend 9% of the family budget on health expenditure higher than the 
corresponding percentage for non-poor households (7%). For study of Grigorakis et al 
(2016; 2014) the average OOPP for health care in 2013 corresponds to 10.86% of 
annual gross income of households. 
3. Considering the elderly evidence for regressive relationship of OOPP for specialist 
care based on SHARE data in Greece: (i) the poorest respondents state making OOP 
three times more than the richest ones, a reversed pattern compared to Italy and Spain 
(Rodridues R. et al, 2013). (ii) Similarly, Holly A. et al (2008); (iii) Bφrsch-Supan A. 
et al, (2005; 2008) found that the poorest spend a higher share of their income on OOP 
health expenditures than the better-off; and (iv) Scheil-Adlung, X. and Bonan, J. 
(2013) found that the poorest in 2003-04 pay OOP 11% of their household income 
versus 1% of the richest.   
4. Findings are apparent for OOP expenses as a financial barrier for inpatient care via 
studies: (i) Studies by Greek researchers who found that OOP and informal payments 
(hidden economic activity) concern the provision of inpatient and outpatient - 
specialist services, primarily to surgeons, so that patients can bypass waiting lists or 
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ensure better quality of service and more attention from doctors (Souliotis et al, 2016; 
Kaitelidou et al, 2013; Kentikelenis A. et al, 2011; Siskou et al, 2008; Liaropoulos et 
al, 2008; Mosialos et al, 2005). (ii) Moreover, the nationwide telephone survey of 
Souliotis et al (2016) for informal payments in health care in 2012, found that 
approximately 32.4% of public hospital admissions accounted for informal payments, 
with main reason (20%) to ensure better care – similar to 24% for private clinics. (iii) 
Another telephone survey in 2008, reported that 36% of public hospitals’patients had 
made at least one informal payment (Liaropoulos, et al., 2008). Moreover, the 
probability of making such payments was 72% greater for people wishing to avoid a 
waiting list than for those following standard admission procedures, and 137% greater 
for patients requiring surgery. 
5. Considering evidence for older and general population facing ruinous OOP 
expenditure: (i) a study by Scheil-Adlung & Bonan (2013) exploring the size and 
determinants of OOPPs using SHARE Wave 1data found that OOP expenditure on 
inpatient care take up a significant share 6.1% of Greek household income from the 
lowest income quintile than 0.5% for highest income quintile. In addition, OOP 
expenditure on total health care results in ruinous OOP expenditure for health care that 
affects 5% of elderly households.(ii) Similarly, Holly A. et al (2008) and Bφrsch-
Supan A. et al, (2005; 2008) found that the poorest Greek spend a higher income share 
on OOP health expenditure on all health care than the better-off. (iii) Similarly, the 
study of Economou, Karabli et al., (2004) of the household expenses via HBSurveys 
data of 1998-99, found that 2.44% of households in Greece face the danger of making 
catastrophic payments for health care.(iv) In addition, the study of Souliotis et al., 
(2016) revealed that 55.8% of those with bad or very bad financial status reported a 
large impact of informal payments on their income and living conditions. 
6. There is also evidence that OOP expenses burden outpatient care to a lower 
magnitude than inpatient admissions via Greek studies: (i) A mail study of Kaitelidou 
et al. (2008) indicated that the probability of making OOPPs was 137% greater for 
patients requiring surgery, with the median payment amount 15% of their aggregate 
monthly outlays. (ii) Other study of Siskou  et al. (2008) and a study for obstetric 
services in four general public hospitals (Kaitelidou, Tsirona et al., 2013) found that 
74.4% of the women made informal payments. (iii) The Transparency International 
survey in Greece with 2013 data, indicates that health care is at the top of the petty 
corruption list in both the public and the private sector (Transparency International, 
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2014). The amount of informal payments in public hospitals accedes from €50 to 
€7000 for surgery; and from €30 to €5000 for a doctor’s payment.  
7. Moreover, we identify findings of regressive trend in OOP amount for inpatient care 
affiliated to the region of residence, via few studies: (i) Souliotis et al (2016) and 
Tountas et al (2011) revealed that residents of areas (rural and urban) other than Attica 
use and pay OOP for private health services more than residents of urban Attica 
(including Athens).  
8. There is also evidence for significant variations in OOP amounts for receiving 
inpatient care affiliated to the SHIF coverage via studies: (i) the distribution of health 
care expenditures is related to the fragmented character of the SHI system favouring 
the Noble SHIFs beneficiaries and revealing a regressive relation (Liaropoulos, 1995; 
NSSG, 2002; INE-GSEE, 2010). (ii) Similarly, a recent study examined how well the 
SHI system protects individuals against catastrophic OOP payments for inpatient care 
in private hospitals contracted with EOPYY in three main urban centres in Greece in 
2013 (Grigorakis et al., 2016; 2014). This study indicated that the SHIF- EOPYY 
covered only 47.3% of the total hospitalization cost; the rest 52.7% was OOP expenses 
with the average OOP amount €1655.24 paid to surgeons; 10% of the sample made 
OOP hospital payments that exceeded one quarter of their annual wage or pension 
income. However, this study included only private hospitals and excluded rural 
population – such as farmers.  
Overall, in Greece, although there is a comprehensive approach that investigates the 
determinants of health care use, there exists a non systematic approach for the inequalities 
and barriers to access. Moreover, the evidence for measuring and exploring income 
inequity in health care among the older population in Greece is by no means 
comprehensive. This short overview concludes that in Greece, similar to most European 
countries, a debate is emerging about whether access to health care is indeed equally 
available to the older people. Our thesis will attempt to complement the existing literature 
by providing new empirical evidence with more sophisticated empirical methods, filling 
this way the gap of the research about Greece.  
1.11 Overview of the thesis 
Overall, the aforementioned evidence indicates that in Greece, there is an incomplete 
approach that investigates the determinants of health care use, the existence of inequalities 
and barriers to access for the general population. The evidence for measuring and 
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exploring income inequity in health care among the older population in Greece is by no 
means comprehensive. Moreover, the above short overview concludes that more than thirty 
years after the establishment of the Greek National Health System (NHS -ESY) in 1983 
due to fragmented coverage, funding and delivering characteristics, a debate is emerging 
about whether access to health care is indeed equally available to all, and especially among 
the older population. This study will attempt to complement the existing literature by 
providing new empirical evidence for Greece. Because of the weaknesses of the system, 
the main hypothesis of my thesis is that the population is expected to face high inequalities 
in health care use, particularly the elderly who are the most constant consumers of health 
services. Inequalities in health care use are expected with regard to: regional disparities in 
health care use caused by inadequate allocation of human and infrastructure resources, 
variations in health care use among different social health insurance funds due to unequal 
health insurance coverage and  resulting  in increased out of pocket payments. The primary 
objective of the thesis is to apply quantitative empirical methods to explore some key 
aspects of equity in the receipt of health care in Greece among the older population, by 
using different survey datasets and methods. We have two nationwide and one urban 
setting datasets to comprehensively examine key aspects of inequalities in the utilisation of 
different types of health care with reference period from 2003 till 2008. The three separate 
datasets - survey tools with a different time reference (2003-2004; 2005 and 2008-2009) 
will provide robust evidence for inequalities in health care use among the older population 
to shed light in the whole pro-crisis period in Greece. This thesis will investigate and 
measure inequalities in Greece for the period from 2003 till 2008 preceding the current 
economic downturn since 2009. This investigation will help health policy-makers to 
examine findings on changes over time relative to NHS-ESY health care and social and 
economic policies that influence inequalities in health care use. Moreover, this new 
evidence will attempt to provide a clear picture of the situation relating to health 
inequalities and the effectiveness and impact of relevant strategies, policy measures and 
practices that are being taken to address it. Such information can motivate action, its social 
determinants and measures that are most likely to contribute to greater health equity in use 
among the elderly in Greece. 
In this context, overall, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the inequalities in heath care 
use among the elderly in the pre crisis period 2003-2008 attempting to provide decision-
makers with insights into how to prioritize healthcare resources and manage the 
performance of the Greek health system in terms of inequity in use and access of health 
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services by those most at risk of vulnerability as the older population, by studying the past 
and compare the pre with post-economic crisis period. The findings of this study may 
contribute to effective planning of health services in Greece in times of economic crisis 
since they provide evidence from the past. The importance of this point lies in the fact that 
much of what we live within the present is a direct result of decisions made in the past 
(Tosh, 2000; Merriman, 2000; Ion and Beer, 2003). Understanding the past is a useful way 
of opening up the possibilities that may exist in the present and the future, especially when 
the economy slows down as in our days. 
Subsequently, the research questions, the data survey tools and the quantitative empirical 
methods we use to explore the main hypothesis of this thesis are described in the next 
chapter.  
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Chapter Two 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
The short overview of the challenges that the Greek health care system faces related to 
inequalities in health care and aging population as displayed in chapter one, demonstrates 
that in Greece- similarly to most European countries, a debate is emerging about whether 
health care access is indeed equally provided to older population, and whether regional 
discrepancies and financial barriers are confronted in the use of health services. In order to 
explore this main objective of our thesis, a more sophisticated statistical methodology is 
crucial. This chapter initially presents an overview of the methodological 
measures/indicators applied in the field of health care inequalities used in the EU and the 
methodology we use to explore the main hypotheses of each survey tool of the thesis. 
Then, we describe the hypotheses, research questions, the survey tools, as well as the 
quantitative empirical methods we use to explore them. 
2.1 Measurement methods of inequalities in health 
We identify a long lasting debate on the most appropriate method of measuring inequalities 
in health (mortality and morbidity) as applied in most EU studies, that range from “simple” 
absolute measures, such as the statistical measure of the “range”, to more complex relative 
measures such as the Gini coefficient, the Index of dissimilarity, the Slope index of 
inequality and the Concentration index (Coolins & Klein, 1980; Le Grand, 1978; 
Mackenbach & Kunst (1997). These measures/ indicators can be very “straightforward” 
and “simple” such as the very well known measure of “range”. Some are related to 
statistical visualized techniques such as logistic regression in the case of the Odds Ratios 
(OR) or simple regression analysis in the case of the Slope Index of Inequality (SII), and 
the Relative Index of Inequality (RII). Statistical models offer more possibilities in terms 
of interpretation of health inequality. They are used to straightforward build and test a 
relation of the measured health inequality with several factors (usually social factors, SES 
variables). On the other hand, they appear rather complex to those researchers who are not 
familiar with statistics. Finally, there are some indices that are more known to the 
researchers involved in measuring inequalities in general, such as the Gini coefficient, and 
the Concentration index (CI). These offer some advantages in the visualization of 
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inequality level, through the Lorenz and the Concentration curve (CC). In general, the 
distribution of health care can be described with various types of statistical measures, such 
as dispersion measures, inequality measures, relative measures such as the coefficients that 
arise from statistical models (see e.g. Regidor E., 2004). We also detect a review for 
measurement of health inequalities – including analysis for inequalities in health care use 
for EC – DG Health and Consumers (Spinakis A. et al, 2011) that concludes to taxonomy 
of indicators (based on pre-selected criteria). These are displayed in Table 2.1 of selected 
summary measures/indicators of inequalities in health including their 
advantages/disadvantages based on Spinakis A. et al (2011), as following. 
(i) Simple measures that are easily interpreted and include: The Range ratio; Index of 
Dissimilarity; Inter- deciles or quintiles ratio (pi/pj) 
(ii) Regression based measures that include: The slope index of inequality (SII); the 
Relative Index of Inequality (RII); and Odds Ratio (OR) 
(iii) More advanced measures that take into account the whole distribution of health and 
usually satisfy many more of certain desirable properties. They include: Coefficient of 
variation (CV); Standard Deviation of the logs (Slog); Gini Coefficient of inequality 
(G); Concentration index (CI); Theil’s Entropy; and Atkinson index. 
It is worth mentioning that different measures can give information about different aspects 
of health inequalities, and the interpretation of health inequality can also be quite different, 
depending on the measure used. The same applies for the analysis of trends in health 
inequalities (see Wagstaff et.al.1991). In addition, the selection of the proper approach 
depends on the objective(s) of the analysis. Usually, in order to have a fuller understanding 
of the health inequalities, it is better to use more than one measure and combine their 
outcomes. 
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Table 2.1: Selected summary measures / indicators of inequalities in health 
Measures/Indicators Character Advantages Disadvantages 
Range 
An absolute/simple 
measure 
 easy to understand and calculate 
 It compares health indicators between top and 
bottom groups in a classification of individuals 
according to a given socio-economic variable. 
 Uses two extreme values of the distribution and fails to 
consider what happens in intermediate socioeconomic 
groups 
 It comes short to account for differences in the relative 
size of the groups and it ignores changes in their size. 
 Difficult for making international comparisons 
Index of 
Dissimilarity 
Individual‐Mean 
differences 
formula 
 Conceptually simple 
 It tries to measure differences between groups 
shares of population and groups shares of health 
 It fails to capture inequality present due to a 
socioeconomic factor, e.g., income 
 
Inter- deciles or 
quintiles ratio 
(pi/pj) 
An absolute/simple 
measure 
 easy to understand and calculate 
 scale independent 
 widely used by the EC 
 Reliable tool for studying trends. 
 Uses only two extreme values of the distribution 
 Unreliable with greatly variable data 
Slope Index of 
inequality (SII) 
A relative/ simple 
regression-based 
measure 
 It reflects the experience in health of all the 
population not only extreme groups; 
 It is sensitive to the distribution of population in 
socioeconomic groups; and 
 It reflects the socioeconomic dimension of health 
within the measurement of inequalities 
 It is sensitive to changes in mean health status 
 The applied modeling technique (regression) needs to 
insert a quantitative variable in order to estimate health 
inequality. This is not a natural approach in the case of 
SES characteristics. 
Relative Index of 
Inequality (RII)  
A relative/ simple 
regression-based 
measure 
 It reflects the experience in health of all the 
population not only extreme groups; 
 It is sensitive to the distribution of population in 
socioeconomic groups; and 
 It reflects the socioeconomic dimension of health 
within the measurement of inequalities 
 It is sensitive to changes in mean health status 
 The applied modeling technique (regression) needs to 
insert a quantitative variable in order to estimate health 
inequality. This is not a natural approach in the case of 
SES characteristics. 
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Odds Ratios 
(OR) 
An absolute/ 
regression based 
measure 
 Very known to the health inequality literature 
 link to logistic regression offers flexible physical 
interpretation and measurement of statistical 
significance 
 Reliable for a trend analysis 
 Less simple in concept, 
 Unable to compare all social categories at once 
Coefficient of 
variation (CV) 
An 
absolute/dispersion 
measure 
 easy to understand and calculate 
 scale independent 
 extensively known statistical dispersion measure 
 standardized measure 
 useful for group comparisons like countries 
 it uses the whole health distribution 
 reliable tool for studying trends 
 It fails to capture inequality present due to a 
socioeconomic factor, e.g., income 
 As a variability measure it works satisfactory with 
aggregate data like mortality 
Standard 
Deviation of the 
logs (Slog) 
An 
absolute/dispersion 
measure 
 easy to understand and calculate 
 scale independent 
 extensively known statistical dispersion measure 
 standardized measure 
 useful for group comparisons like countries 
 it uses the whole health distribution 
 reliable tool for studying trends 
 It fails to capture inequality present due to a 
socioeconomic factor, e.g., income 
 As a variability measure it works satisfactory with 
aggregate data like mortality 
Gini Coefficient 
of inequality (G) 
Individual‐Mean 
differences 
formula 
 Extensively used, familiar to most users 
 Scale invariant  
 Satisfies the transfer principle  
 Uses the whole distribution  
 Offers graphical interpretation of the analyzed 
phenomenon through the Lorenz curve 
 Lacks sensitivity at the extremes of the distribution 
 Decomposability is practical restricted 
 Not sensitive to health gradients e.g. a social variable 
Concentration 
index (CI) 
A relative measure 
 Extensively used for measurement of health 
inequalities  
 Take account of changes in the underlying  
 Population distribution in the social groups over 
the time and use information across the entire 
 Sensitive to the direction of the social gradient in health. 
Could lead to biased results 
 Decomposability is restricted 
 Range restricted for binary health data 
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range of social groups 
 Satisfies the transfer principle 
 Uses the whole distribution 
 Scale invariant 
 Relation to concentration offers flexibility in 
interpretation 
Theil’s Entropy 
An absolute 
measure 
 Theoretically sound tools for the measurement of 
health inequalities 
 Easiness of interpretation  
 Symmetrical measures 
 Satisfies the transfer principle 
 Use the whole distribution 
 Scale invariant (especially with SES variables) 
 Atkinson’s variant offers sensitivity to various 
parts of the distribution 
 The last is linked to welfare economics and 
societal preferences 
 First impression is characterized as complex. Not very 
comprehensive as the simple statistical measures, e.g 
inter-deciles ratio 
 Not very know to the health inequality literature. Lack of 
simplicity to the researchers in the field of health 
inequalities 
Atkinson index 
An absolute 
measure 
 Easiness in interpretation Scale independent 
 uses the whole health distribution, 
 Link to statistical information theory enables the 
possible use of entropy variants. 
 Reliable for a trend analysis 
 Complex in a sense 
 not very much known to health inequality literature 
Source: Adapted from Spinakis A, Anastasiou G, Panousis V, Spiliopoulos K, Palaiologou S, Yfantopoulos J. (2011) Expert review and proposals for measurement 
of health inequalities in the European Union – Full Report. European Commission Directorate General for Health and Consumers. Luxembourg. ISBN 978-92-79-
18528-1
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2.2 Measuring inequity of access to health care 
Moreover, the debate for the most appropriate method of measuring inequalities in health 
services access (most often approximated by utilization) came out through comparisons of 
health-care use and health-care need by Coolins & Klein (1980); by Le Grand (1978) and 
presented in more detail by Mackenbach & Kunst (1997). Since then they have followed 
two directions, summarized by Allin S. et al (2009) and Mackenbach & Kunst (1997) and 
displayed in Table 2.2:  
(a) Regression models method (mainly odds – ratios) 
(b) The Concentration Index – Ecuity method  
 
Table 2.2: Examples of summary measures of socio-economic inequalities in access to 
health care 
Index Interpretation 
Correlation and regression  
Product-moment correlation 
 
Correlation between health care utilization rate 
and socio-economic status (SES) 
Regression on SES Increase in utilization rate per one unit increase  
in SES 
Regression on cumulative percentiles 
(relative index of inequality; Slope 
index of inequality) 
Utilization rate ratio (RI/I) or differences (SII) 
between the least and most advantaged 
person 
Regression on z-values Utilization rate difference between group with lower 
and higher than average morbidity rates (x 0.5) 
Gini-type coefficients  
Pseudo-Gini coefficient 0 = no utilization differences between groups; l = 
all utilization in hands of one person 
Concentration index 0 = no utilization differences associated with SES; -
1/+1 = all utilization in hands of least/most 
advantaged person 
Horizontal inequity index 0 = no utilization differences associated with SES 
after need standardization; -1/+1 = all need 
standardized utilization in hands of least/most 
advantaged person 
Generalized concentration index  Based on CI, but includes also mean distribution of 
health care  
Source: Allin S. et al (2009) adapted from Mackenbach & Kunst (1997) 
2.2.1 The regression models method  
According to this method, we measure the independent effect of socioeconomic measures 
(need and non need variables) on health care use measures that include: the likelihood of 
contact with health services, the volume of health services used or the expenditures 
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incurred. This approach is based on the behavioral model of health service use developed 
by Andersen R. since 1960s and Andersen R. (1995). The behavioral model suggests that 
health-care service use is a function of need factors as well as of individual predisposition 
and ability to use health-care services, which facilitate or impede use, as following:  
(i) an individual’s predisposition to use services (social structure, health beliefs);  
(ii) individual characteristics (income and education); 
(iii)  community level (availability of services); and 
(iv)  the level of need for care  
Therefore, following the standard approach in the empirical literature, the regression 
models method regresses medical care use (yi) on a vector of k medical need indicator 
variables (xk), and a set of p non-need variables (zp) using the equation, assuming a linear 
model: 
(2) ι,p,κ εδγ   jp
p
ik
k
i zxy   
Where iy  are health care use variables (the probability of use; or the volume of health 
services used or the expenditures incurred), (xk) need indicators are proxied by 
demographics (age, gender); health status (SAH, number of chronic medical conditions 
etc); and health limitations (i.e. long term illness etc) and the non- need zp indicators – 
variables (income, higher educational level, marital status, social health insurance fund, 
region of residence etc). In addition, sample weights were used in all computations in order 
to make the results more representative of the country’s population. Robust standard errors 
were also obtained using the Huber/White/sandwich estimator. According to the behavioral 
model of health service use inequity arises when the non - need factors strongly affect the 
use of health care. This approach uses a comprehensive model of utilization with 
explanatory variables convenient for policy-making. Thus, we identify in the literature a 
substantial body of empirical evidence on equity of health care that uses regression models. 
However, the results of the regression method cannot quantify the extent of inequity.  
2.2.2 The Concentration Index (CI) - ECuity method  
This method comes from the literature on income inequality based on the Lorenz curve and 
Gini index of inequality. Similar to the Lorenz curve that describes the distribution of 
income in a population, the concentration curve (CC) for utilization compares the 
cumulative distribution of healthcare use with the cumulative distribution of the population 
rank-ordered by income (Allin S. et al, 2009; O’Donnell et al., 2008; Wagstaff and van 
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Doorslaer, 2000; Kakwani et al., 1997; Wagstaff et al., 1991). Similarly with the Gini 
index that provides a measure of income inequality, the concentration index (CI) is a 
measure of income-related inequality in health care use. The CI is a measure of income-
related inequality in access to health care, to estimate and quantify the level of horizontal 
inequity (HI index) defined as the difference between the degree of income-related 
inequality in actual health care use (CIunadjusted) and the income-related inequality in need-
adjusted use (CIadjusted) and calculated from a regression approach developed by Wagstaff 
and Van Doorslaer in the ECuity project since the 1990s (O’Donnell et al., 2008).  
Figure 1.2 below quantifies the level of horizontal inequity in health care use based on 
concentration curve that calculates inequity (Horizontal Inequity - HI index) by comparing 
the cumulative distribution of utilization (LM) with the cumulative distribution of needs-
adjusted utilization (LN), ranking each individual according to their income level. We 
consider need-adjusted utilisation as the predicted use interpreted as “socio-economic 
inequality in utilization not justified by socio-economic inequalities in need” (Allin S. et al, 
2007). If both the cumulative proportion of health care and the cumulative proportion of 
needs-adjusted utilization are equally distributed across income, the two curves would 
coincide with the diagonal (line of equality) that represents the horizontal inequity index, 
meaning that utilization of health care services is proportional to need. The farther the (LN) 
curve is from the (LM) and from the diagonal, the greater the degree of inequality. The 
value of the horizontal inequity index ranges from −1 to +1. After adjusting for need, when 
the needs-adjusted utilization concentration curve (LN) lies above the health care 
utilization concentration curve (LM), there is horizontal inequity favoring the rich, and the 
measure (HI) has a positive value. This is described as “pro-rich inequity” and actual 
health care utilization is more concentrated among the better-off, on the lower end of the 
income distribution. This implies that individuals on higher income are more likely to visit 
a physician than one would expect on the basis of their reported need. On the contrary, if 
the need concentration curve lies below the medical care concentration curve, there is 
horizontal inequity favoring the worse-off, so the measure has a negative value and this is 
described as “pro-poor” inequity. According to Wagstaff & van Doorslaer (2000), “such 
pro-poor inequity is interpreted as an “over-utilization” among the poorer groups, or it 
could be interpreted as an appropriately higher utilization due to the inability to accurately 
measure the greater health needs among these groups with the data available”. A zero 
inequity index implies that, after controlling for differences in need across income groups, 
all individuals have equal probability of using health services, regardless of income. 
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HI = CIunadjusted  - CIadjusted 
 
Figure 2.1: Concentration curves for utilization (LM) and need (LN) compared to the line 
of equality 
 
Source: Allin S. et al (2009) p. 187 
Moreover CI permits identifying the importance of each variable and calculating the 
contribution of each variable on the overall inequity as a separate component via the 
decomposition method based on the regression approach as developed by (Kakwani, 
Wagstaff et al. 1997; O’Donell et al, 2008; Van Doorslaeer & Masseria C., 2004). The 
important advantages and relevant criticism of CI method are presented below. 
Given that in most empirical studies – similar to our study - the levels of inequity are small 
in magnitude, making difficult to interpret the cumulative proportions and the relevant 
inequity distributions as depicted in the concentration curve figure, Kakwani and 
colleagues have shown that it is possible to compute the index using a convenient” 
regression approach based on an initial health-care demand model for quantifying the 
above CIs, the horizontal inequity index and perform decomposition analysis in five 
successive steps (Kakwani, Wagstaff et al. 1997).  
Overall, the estimation method of  calculating the CIs and the index of horizontal equity 
involves the following five successive steps as developed and presented by Kakwani et al. 
(1997); Wagstaff et al. (1991); Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2000); O’Donnell et al. 
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(2008): (i) Calculation of the CI actual (CI unadjusted) for unadjusted utilization (LM); (ii) 
Estimation of a model of the determinants of health care using the set of need and non-
need related variables; (iii) Obtain the “need- standardized” or  “predicted”  need adjusted 
utilization for each individual in the sample by setting the value of all non-need variables 
at their sample mean in order to calculate the CIneed-adjusted  by employing standard OLS 
models (VanDoorslaer et al., 2004; García and López, 2007); (iv) Calculation of the 
concentration index (CIadjusted) of need-adjusted utilization for the distribution of  need-
adjusted utilization (LN); (v) Calculation of the income related inequity or horizontal 
inequity (HI) as the difference between the concentration indices of unadjusted (LM) and 
needs-adjusted utilization (LN).   
 
Estimation method 
Empirically, the estimation method to calculate the CIs and the HI index based on the 
aforementioned five successive steps could be summarized as following drawn on the 
OECD Health Working Paper No.14 by Van Doorslaer & Masseria C. (2004) p.29-31: 
(i) Calculation of the CI actual (CI unadjusted) for unadjusted utilization (LM)  
(ii) Estimation of  a model of the determinants of health care using the set of need and 
non-need related variables 
[1] ι,p,κ εδγln   jp
p
ik
k
ii zxincy   
where yi denotes the dependent variable (medical care use of individual i in a given 
period): ie probability of inpatient admission for the last 12 months etc. We also 
distinguish between three types of explanatory variables: the (logarithm of) the household 
income of individual i ( iincln ), a set of k need indicator variables ( kx ) including 
demographic and morbidity variables, and p other, non-need variables ( pz ) (ie income, 
education, marital status, household composition, housing tenure, SHIF coverage etc) 
where α , β ,   and p  are parameters and iε  is an error term.  
(iii) Obtain the “need- standardized” or  “predicted”  need adjusted utilization for each 
individual in the sample by setting the value of all non-need variables at their sample 
mean in order to calculate the CIneed-adjusted  by employing standard OLS models 
(VanDoorslaer et al., 2004; García and López, 2007). 
The predicted of “need- standardized” values of use indicate “the amount of medical care 
the individual would have received if s/he had been treated the same as others with the 
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same need characteristics” (Van Doorsaler et Masseria).The need standardization is vital in 
order to measure inequity, if we accept that income is strongly connected to health care 
need. What’s more, the need standardization is what one expects from a policy making, 
since it interprets inequity as the inequality remaining from non-need factors (O’Donnell et 
al, 2008). According to VanDoorslaer et al. (2004) and García and López (2007) we can 
obtain the “need- standardized” or “predicted” utilization [2] Xiyˆ  by employing standard 
OLS models (VanDoorslaer et al., 2004; García and López, 2007), as: 
[2] 
m
p
p
ik
k
x
i zxay   p,km δˆγˆincln βˆˆˆ  
with actual values of the ik
k
x ,kγˆ variables and sample mean values of the ln inc and pz   
variables. 
(iv) Calculation of the concentration index (CIadjusted) of need-adjusted utilization for the 
distribution of need-adjusted utilization (LN). 
(v) Calculation of the income related inequity or horizontal inequity (HI) as the 
difference between the concentration indices of unadjusted (LM) and needs-adjusted 
utilization (LN): 
HI = CIunadjusted  - CIadjusted 
The horizontal inequity or estimates of the (indirectly) need-standardized utilisation, 
IS
iyˆ , 
could be also obtained as the difference between actual and x-expected utilisation, plus the 
sample mean (
my ), assuming a linear model.   
[3] 
mX
ii yyy  ˆyˆ
IS
i  
It is important to note that for the calculations of CIunadjusted and CIadjusted in the above steps 
(i) and (iii) we use, as aforementioned, the simple “convenient covariance” formula as in 
Van Doorslaer & Masseria (2004) and O’Donell et al (2008) 
[4]    ),(cov22
1 iiw
m
i
m
i
n
i im
RyRRyyw
y
C

    
where 
my  is the weighted sample mean of y, covw indicates the weighted 
covariance and Ri is the (representatively positioned) relative fractional rank of the ith 
individual, defined as : 
[5] 
j
i
j jn
ww
2
11
1
1
iR  


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where wi denotes the sampling weight of the ith individual and the sum of wi equals 
the sample size (n). 
In addition, sample weights were used in all computations in order to make the results 
more representative of the country’s population. We also test for statistical significance, 
confidence intervals and robust estimates for CI and its standard errors by running the 
convenient (weighted least squares) regression and using the Huber/White/sandwich 
estimator. We also use the Newey-West variance covariance matrix to correct for 
autocorrelation, as well as heteroscedasticity (Newey, Whitney K & West, Kenneth D, 
1987; Greene W.H., 2000).  
Moreover, it is worth noting the empirical evidence of Hernadez Quevedo C & Jimebez 
Rubio D. (2008) who indicate that calculation of equation of inequity index [3] with non 
linear models instead of OLS techniques – although non linear models have certain 
advantages over standard OLS, “it would involve a re-linearization by using either the 
marginal or average effects of each independent variable treated as fixed parameters and 
evaluated at the mean (or some other parameter)”, and we choose to use marginal effects of 
the variables. In our study, we also use the OLS regression instead of non-linear regression 
to standardize the health care variables and decompose the CIs. 
 
Decomposition of the contribution of need and non-need measures/ variables 
Following, as aforementioned, the concentration index approach enables the 
decomposition of the contribution of need (i.e. SAH, health status variables) and non-need 
(socioeconomic) variables to overall inequality in health care (O, Donell, van Doorslaer, 
Wagstaff et al, 2008). The decomposition method is used to measure whether socio-
economic factors related to income, such as education, residence, employment status and 
complementary insurance coverage, contribute to the overall level of income-related 
inequity (Wagstaff et al. 2003). According to Allin S. et al (2009) “The contribution of 
each variable to inequity is a product of its impact on demand, as measured by its marginal 
effect on utilization multiplied by the mean value of the regressor and divided by the mean 
predicted probability, and its correlation with the income distribution” (p.206). For 
example, a positive contribution of education to dentist pro-rich inequity indicates that 
higher education is associated with both higher income and utilization. 
For calculating the contribution of the variables by the decomposition method we use the 
above approach with OLS estimations, by performing equation [7] .  
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[7]  
my/xγη mkkk   
where using the regression coefficients γk, we obtain the (partial) elasticities (margin effect 
– ME) of medical care use with respect to each determinant k, indicating the percentage 
change in y results from a percentage change in xk. Moreover, y
m
  is the (population 
weighted mean) of y and 
m
kx  is the (population weighted) mean of xk.  
Following the above, Wagstaff, Van Doorslaer and Watanabe, 2003, have shown that the 
total concentration index can then be written as: 
[8] ε,
p
p,kln ηη GCCCCC pzkx
k
incr   k p 
where the first term denotes the partial contribution of income inequality, the 
second the (partial) contribution of the need variables, and the third the (partial) 
contribution of the other variables. The last term is the generalized concentration index of 
the error term ε. We should also mention that we test for statistical significance, confidence 
intervals and robust estimates for standard errors by running the convenient (weighted least 
squares) regression and using the Huber/White/ sandwich estimator. 
2.2.3 Advantages and criticism 
Concentration Index method has many advantages empirically presented in the literature 
(O, Donell, van Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al, 2008; Wagstaff, Paci and van Doorslaer,1991):  
(a)  “seizes” the socioeconomic dimension of health care (and health) inequalities;  
(b) It uses information from the whole income distribution rather than just the extremes;  
(c) It permits visualizing inequalities in use via the concentration curves and identifying 
their extent; 
(d) It permits decomposing the contribution of the various need and non-need components 
(socioeconomic variables) as determinants of inequity and their relative importance 
that drives inequity. 
On the other hand, criticism has been developed for the method of measuring equity, 
summarized as following: 
(a) Inefficiency in the linear models of utilization (OLS) used on the estimation methods 
for the CIs and decomposition analysis due to the count nature of some utilization 
variables (i.e. conditional number of inpatient admissions) (Jones, Rice, Bago d’Uva et 
al.,2007). 
(b) Possible endogeneity derived from the causal impact of health service use on need – 
health care status. 
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(c) For the critical problem (a), in order to restore the mechanics of the decomposition, 
what has been suggested is to turn actual use into propensity to use, as an approximate. 
However, there is strong evidence that horizontal inequity measures (HIs) calculated 
by standard OLS techniques do not differ to those obtained by non linear methods 
(Van Doorslaer et al., 2000; Van Doorslaer & Masseria C., 2004; Hernandez Quevedo 
& Jimenez R, 2009; AllinS. & Hurley, 2009; Jones, Rice, Bago d’Uva et al.,2007). 
Therefore, in our study- similar to others- we use the OLS regression instead of non-
linear regression to standardize the health care variables and decompose the CIs.  
For the critical problem (b) of possible endogeneity among health service use and need-
health status, there is strong empirical evidence that this effect is minimal, provided that 
nearly all empirical studies of HI in health care utilization, when  measuring  need, use a 
combination of demographic and health status indicators such as SAH status, the presence 
of chronic conditions and activity limitations, and not limited need information that may be 
affected by the causal impact of health service use (Bado D’Uva, Jones & Van Doorslaer, 
2007 and O’Donnell et al, 2008).  
2.3 Data and Research Questions 
As aforementioned, because of the weaknesses of the system, the main hypothesis of my 
thesis is that the population is expected to face high inequalities in health care use, 
particularly the elderly who are the most constant consumers of health services. 
Inequalities in health care use are expected with regard to: regional disparities in health 
care use caused by inadequate allocation of human and infrastructure resources, variations 
in health care use among different social health insurance funds due to unequal health 
insurance coverage and  resulting  in increased out of pocket payments. The primary 
objective of the thesis is to apply quantitative empirical methods to explore some key 
aspects of equity in the receipt of health care in Greece among the older population, by 
using different survey datasets and methods. Our survey tools are two nationwide and one 
urban setting datasets to comprehensively examine key aspects of inequalities in the 
utilisation of different types of health care with reference period from 2003 till 2008. The 
three separate datasets - survey tools with a different time reference (2003-2004; 2005; and 
2008-2009) will provide robust evidence for inequalities in health care system among the 
older population to shed light in the whole pro-crisis period (2003-2008) in Greece. Under 
this framework, this thesis consists of three essays and adds to the existing limited 
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literature for older population in Greece, by providing new empirical evidence and 
introducing more sophisticated statistical methodology.  
The first essay uses the sample of individuals 50 years and above from the cross-sectional 
Patra’s Health Interview Survey (Patra’s HIS) - a survey for the general adult population 
conducted in 2005 at Patras’ municipality- the third largest urban area in Greece and the 
regional capital of Western Greece in the north western part of the Peloponnese peninsula. 
The Patra HIS was designed and conducted from June to July 2005, by the research team 
of University of Patras and the Municipality of Patras within the Phase IV framework 
(2003-2008) programme of W.H.O. European Healthy Cities Network based on the 
respective W.H.O. Questionnaire, adapted for Greece that covers a wide variety of health 
status, health care and background topics. The WHO Healthy Cities’ approach seeks to put 
health high on the political and social agenda of cities and to build a strong movement for 
public health at the local level. It strongly emphasizes equity, participatory governance and 
solidarity, intersectoral collaboration and action to address the determinants of health in an 
urban setting level (WHO, 2013). However, although in Greece similar to most EU 
countries, local authorities play an important role in making decisions and implementing 
policy on the social determinants and improving social welfare for citizens in the EU (EC, 
2007), at the same time, in Greece, in the health care sector, regional and prefectural 
authorities are only administratively responsible. The role of regional and local 
governments in health care planning, organization and provision is limited. Moreover, 
given the reference time of the Patra-HIS survey with reference time 2004-05, it will 
permit us to explore the main hypothesis of this thesis, shedding light on the equity issue of 
the first NHS-ESY decentralization reform attempts of 2001-2004 for the region of Patras 
that consists the chair of 6
th
 Regional Health Authority of Peloponnese, Epirus, the Ionian 
Islands and Western Greece. In addition via the information for OOP payments in health 
care, this study allows to evaluate the extent to which social health protection system offers 
adequate protection to the elderly. Therefore, building on the Patra’s HIS, this study aims 
at: (i) exploring income–related inequalities on utilization of health care among the 
population over 50 years old in an urban-setting in Greece and explaining some of the 
contributors (ii) examining the role of out of pocket payment (OOPP) mechanism in health 
care use by the elderly aged over 50, on the basis of fragmented social health insurance 
coverage, and discussing their policy implications. Based on the features of the Greek 
health care system and the existing literature in order to achieve these objectives, we 
address the following empirical research questions (RQs), guided by the following 
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theoretical hypotheses (THs). THs: (i) The inequalities in use of health care are derived 
from the different socioeconomic characteristics of the older population who use the health 
services; (ii) Higher income individuals are more likely to use health care services than 
lower income comparators; (iii) Individuals with “Non Noble” social health insurance 
coverage are more likely to pay OOP for using health care than comparators with “Noble” 
social health insurance coverage. Guided by the THs, we address the following research 
questions (RQs): (i) What is the extent and contributors of inequity in the use of health care 
among people over the age of 50 in an urban-setting level in Greece? (ii) What are the 
determinants of OOPPs as a payment mechanism of the utilization of health care among 
the older population over the age of 50 in Greece?  The Patra’s HIS aims at providing new 
evidence at an urban-setting level and fills the gap in the research for Greece.  
The second essay uses the sample of individuals 50 years and above, from the first wave of 
the nationwide, multidisciplinary longitudinal Survey Greek National Health Interview 
Survey (GNHIS) that embedded the European Health Interview Survey (EHIS) modules for 
the general population (over 15 years), that was conducted by the Greek Statistical 
Authority (ELSTAT) during November and December 2009 with reference time in 2008-
2009.The GNHIS covers a wide variety of health status, health determinants, health care 
and background topics - as launched and implemented in 17 Member States6 driven under 
the coordination of Eurostat, with a periodicity of 5 years, according to the Regulation 
1338/2008 on Community statistics on public health. Therefore, given that GNHIS data are 
the first nationwide, multidisciplinary evidence in Greece focused on health and socio- 
economic issues with reference time in 2008-2009, gives a unique opportunity for our 
sample of individuals 50+ to explore the main hypothesis of this thesis, shedding light on 
the equity issue of the latest regionalization attempt of NHS-ESY in the period 2005-2008 
after 2005 elections and change in government, via the reform attempts of 2005 
(Law3329/2005 and Law3370/2005 for reorganizing public health services); 2006 
(Law3457/2006 on the regulation of pharmaceuticals) and 2007 (Law3580/2007 about the 
creation of a Central Committee of Health Supplies -EPY). These Laws (Law 3370/2005; 
Law 3457/2006; Law 3580/2007) were never or partially implemented. Only the Law 
3329/2005 is still active. This Law3329/2005 is the latest regionalization attempt that 
inactivated most of the 2001 and 2003 Regional Structure of Health Care Services 
                                                          
6 Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech republic, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Cyprus, Latvia, Hungary,Malta, Austria, 
Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. 
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(PeSYPs) legislated measures, renamed the PeSYPs as “Regional Health Administrations - 
RHAs” (DYPEs or YPEs) and reduced RHAs  from 17 to 7 in order to “achieve economies 
of scale”. However, although the Law 3329/2005 is still active, any real decentralization of 
competences or independence from central government for DYPEs (or currently YPEs) to 
develop health services according to the needs of their populations has not yet been 
achieved. The management and control of the health care system still remains with the 
Ministry of Health. Therefore, building on the GNHIS – Wave1, this study aims: (i) to 
explore income–related inequalities on utilisation of health care among the population over 
50 years old in Greece (ii) Among the contributors, to explore national regional 
inequalities in access of health care use by the older population aged over 50 and discuss 
their policy implications. Building on the features of the Greek health care system and the 
existing literature and evidence, in order to achieve these objectives, we address the 
following empirical research questions (RQs), guided by the following theoretical 
hypotheses (THs). THs: (i) The inequalities in use of health care is derived from the 
different socioeconomic characteristics of the older population who use the health services; 
(ii) Individuals on higher income are more likely to use health care services than lower 
income comparators; (iii) Individuals in densely-populated areas are more likely to use 
more health care services than comparators in intermediate and thinly – populated areas. 
Guided by the THs we address the following research questions (RQs): (i) What is the 
extent and contributors of inequity in the use of health care among people over the age of 
50 in Greece? (ii) What is the extent in national regional variations and inequalities in 
accessing health care services among the older population over the age of 50 in Greece?   
 
The third essay uses the Greek sample of the nationwide, multidisciplinary longitudinal 1
st
 
wave of Greek survey of Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) for 
people aged 50 years or over that embedded the SHARE modules focused on health and 
socio- economic issues related to ageing. The specific data tool that was conducted in 
2004/2005 with reference time in 2003- 2004, will permit us to explore the main 
hypothesis of this thesis - that the older population is expected to face high inequalities in 
health care use, shedding light on the equity issue of the NHS-ESY initial decentralisation 
reform of 2001-2004. This NHS-ESY period includes the major reform acts of 2001 (Law 
2889/2001) on the Regional Structure of Health Care Services and reform act of 2003 
(Law 3106/2003) on the Regional Structure of Welfare Services, that divided the country 
into 17 regional health and welfare authorities (PeSYPs). The specific reform – even 
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though partially implemented till today - is a milestone in the development of the ESY at 
the structural level. Building on the multidisciplinary SHARE survey for Greece, this study 
aims at: (i) exploring income–related inequalities on utilisation of health care among the 
population over 50 years old in Greece and explaining some of the contributors (ii) Among 
the contributors, to explore national regional inequalities in access of health care use by the 
older population aged over 50 and (iii) detecting the role of out of pocket payment 
mechanism (OOPP) in health care use by the elderly aged over 50, on the basis of 
fragmented social health insurance coverage and discussion about their policy 
implications. Building on the features of the Greek health care system and the existing 
literature and evidence, in order to achieve these objectives, we address the following 
empirical research questions (RQs), guided by the following theoretical hypotheses (THs). 
THs: (i) The inequalities in use of health care is derived from the different socioeconomic 
characteristics of the older population that uses the health services; (ii) Individuals on 
higher income are more likely to use health care services than lower income comparators; 
(iii) Individuals in densely-populated areas are more likely to use more health care services 
than comparators in intermediate and thinly – populated areas; (iv) Individuals with “Non 
Noble” social health insurance coverage are more likely to pay OOP for using health care 
than comparators with “Noble” social health insurance coverage. Guided by the THs we 
address the following research questions (RQs): (i) what is the extent and contributors of 
inequity in the use of health care among people over the age of 50 in Greece? (ii) What is 
the extent in national regional variations and inequalities in accessing health care services 
among the older population over the age of 50 in Greece? (iii) What are the determinants 
of OOPPs as a payment mechanism of the utilisation of health care among the older 
population over the age of 50 in Greece?   
2.4 Why we select the specific survey tools 
Moreover, in order to explain why we select the specific survey tools and our strategy, we 
need to clarify the following issues related to the availability and survey design of the 
databases in Greece and our thesis’ objective that is to explore health care inequalities for 
the older population aged 50 years and over during the pre crisis period of 2003-2008 
using different survey tools in different times. 
 Given that SHARE survey is exclusively designed for population aged 50+, we decided 
to use data only from Wave1 SHARE with reference time 2003-04 and not Wave 2 due 
to the fact that Wave 2 is focused on re-contacting respondents from the Wave 1 to go 
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into longitudinal dimension by using the same data with Wave 1 for specific variables 
(ie SHI coverage), that is unlike with our thesis’ objective of a cross-sectional study. In 
addition, we decided not to use Wave 3 SHARELIFE data with reference time in 2007-
2008 because SHARELIFE has a different focus than the regular waves and is unrelated 
to our thesis’ objectives. It contains all areas of the respondents’ live histories, ranging 
from childhood conditions, financial history to health and health care history. 
Unfortunately, after Wave 3 SHARELIFE, Greece has not participated in the SHARE 
database Wave 4 (reference time 2009-2010) and Wave 5 (reference time 2011-2012) 
for funding reasons. Therefore, SHARE Wave 1 dataset is the most suitable available 
survey tool for a cross-sectional study exclusively for older population in Greece 
corresponding to our thesis’ objectives. 
 In addition, it is worth mentioning that we address similar or the same research 
questions among the three survey–tools given that we have similar framework for 
examining the same objectives with the same theoretical hypotheses based on the 
available data for each data survey, but with a different reference period. The fact that 
each dataset provides evidence supplementary to the other two datasets, results in a 
robust evidence for inequalities in health care system among the older population to 
shed light in the whole pre-crisis period of 2003-2008 of the NHS-ESY health system in 
Greece. 
 In particular, the sample of older 50+ population of the Patra-HIS survey (reference 
time 2004-05) provides evidence for the degree and extent of inequalities of health care 
use at an urban-setting level shedding light on the equity issue of the NHS-ESY 
decentralization reform attempts of 2001-2004 to supplement the evidence of the first 
nationwide health interview survey GNHIS (reference time 2008-09) that covers the 
NHS-ESY period 2005-2008 and SHARE evidence (2003-04) on a nationwide setting 
exclusively for older population for the NHS-ESY initial decentralisation reform period 
of 2001-2004. 
 Under this framework, the investigation and measurement of inequalities in health care 
use among the older population in Greece for the period from 2003 till 2008 preceding 
the current economic downturn since 2009, will help health policy-makers to examine 
findings on changes over time relative to NHS-ESY health, social and economic 
policies. In this context, our thesis’ evidence of the inequalities in heath care use in the 
pre crisis period 2003-2008 will provide decision-makers with insights into how to 
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prioritize healthcare resources and manage the performance of the Greek health system 
by studying the past and compare the pre with post-economic crisis period. Our findings 
may also contribute to effective planning of health services in Greece in times of 
economic crisis since they provide evidence from the past. The importance of this point 
lies in the fact that much of what we live within the present- especially when the 
economy slows down - is a direct result of decisions made in the past (Tosh, 2000; 
Merriman, 2000; Ion and Beer, 2003).  
2.5 Comparing the Surveys Design and Data 
It is it is worth providing the strengths or advantages and limitations or disadvantages of 
the survey tools of this thesis as an attempt to compare the data, to identify commonalities 
among the surveys and assess their influence - contribution on our research analysis.  
2.5.1 Strengths /Advantages 
 From the survey datasets as presented above, it is clear that all the surveys (the 
nationwide SHARE, GNHIS and the urban-setting PatraHIS) have a very rich set of 
self-reported morbidity measures, which better allow for need variables when 
measuring variations due to non-need factors such as income. They also have a rich set 
of common health services utilisation measures such as: medical contacts, contacts with 
GPs, with specialised physicians, visits to dentists, inpatient and outpatient visits (only 
for SHARE and PatraHIS). Most of them were based on a twelve months recall, except 
in PatraHIS with a three month recall.   
 Moreover, the information of the PatraHIS similar to SHARE survey on SHI fund, 
private health insurance, and OOP payments is very important not only for identifying 
and measuring the inequalities in utilisation of health care, but also because it allows to 
explore in depth the role of the Greek fragmented social health insurance system to the 
inequalities in utilisation of health care. This information gives us the chance to 
examine the relation between the SHIFs and the burden of OOP payments, as well. We 
examine which insurance group bears the greater burden of OOP and informal payments 
to access. 
 Furthermore, the information of the GNHIS on regional variations in health care use and 
SHARE survey on regional variations and OPP payments are important as they permit 
not only to identify the extent of regional disparities, but also to explore the relation 
between the regions of residence, health care services, and the burden of OOP 
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payments. Therefore using the specific information, we have the opportunity to examine 
which region of residence faces the greater OOP expenses for different health care 
services. 
 Another advantage is the fact that all the datasets are household surveys, collecting 
information on all members of respondents’ households, except PatraHIS, which is 
particularly useful in including information of living arrangements in the analysis (ie 
household composition; housing tenure etc), a factor that has been ignored in most of 
the studies that measure health services utilisation among the elderly. In case of Greece, 
there is no such evidence.   
 As far as it concerns income measure, all the survey datasets except PatraHIS have 
accurate income definition. We describe this issue, below. 
2.5.2 Comparing limitations/Weaknesses on data source 
While we think that this research will add considerably to the body of knowledge on the 
equity achievements of the Greek health care system by focusing on specific subpopulation 
as the elderly, it is not without important limitations. Therefore, our findings need to be 
interpreted under the following comparing limitations mainly on data source and 
methodological issues. 
(i) Weaknesses in survey design  
Any attempt to compare the findings of the three surveys needs to be made under the 
scope of the differences in the survey design. GNHIS is a nationwide survey of the 
general population, whereas SHARE is a nationwide survey of the population over 50 
years old. On the other hand, PatraHIS is an urban-setting survey for the general 
population. Moreover, they include measures of health care use and explanatory 
variables with different definition and reference period as well as, they have 
significant differences in income measure which may lead to response variations, as 
we display below.  
 Even though the GNHIS has a rich set of self-reported morbidity, health care use 
and regional location measures, it has no information about the SH Insurance 
coverage and the perceived financial barriers to access leading to a less stronger 
survey tool for measuring inequalities in health care in comparison with the other 
two PatraHIS and SHARE surveys.  
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 On the other hand, the fact that the other two surveys (SHARE and PatraHIS) 
include financial barrier information from different sources leads to inability to 
compare the relevant findings. Furthermore, PatraHIS study includes information 
for OOP expenses about inpatient, outpatient admissions, SHIF physician visit and 
specialist private visit with a rather small number of observations that led to a 
limited analysis. However, SHARE study includes OOPP expenses information for 
inpatient and outpatient visit but with different components than PatraHIS OOPP 
measures.  
 Even though all surveys have rich set of self-reported morbidity, health care use 
and regional location measures (for GNHIS and SHARE), as well as SHARE and 
PatraHIS survey data include information for the financial barrier to access, they 
provide little possibilities to account for potential differentials in quality. However, 
SHARE includes the reference to regional location and barriers to access which are 
one small step in the direction of allowing for such quality differences. 
Common limitations 
(i) Selective survival and its effect on health inequalities  
Due to the fact that this thesis focuses on the older population, it is important that we 
consider the selection effect limitation: the selective survival – that is, people who 
have survived at older ages are healthier than those who have not survived. We would 
expect health inequalities to be reduced with age. We could carry out longitudinal 
analysis to measure this effect considering that it is not possible to measure the extent 
of this effect with cross-sectional surveys, especially with the small PatraHIS urban-
setting survey. 
(ii) Institutionalization of older population and its effect on health care use 
The limitation of exclusion of institutionalized individuals from the survey is similar 
to the majority of the health and socioeconomic surveys. There is an argument that the 
exclusion of institutionalized individuals will underestimate the overall level of 
socioeconomic inequalities in morbidity, provided that an association between poverty 
and institutionalization exists but is not included in the analysis (Arber & Ginn, 1993). 
However, according to the Greek Statistical Authority (2011) “if we subtract from the 
general Greek population the conscripts and the imprisoned, the actual percentage not 
covered by the survey procedure, accounts for 2% of the total population, and in its 
major part concerns economically non-active persons”.  
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(iii) Recall bias 
Self-reported utilization may also be biased due to effects of social desirability or 
recall bias, especially for older age groups. In the three surveys of our study the time 
period varies from “the past 12 months” to “the past 4 weeks”. Some researchers 
believe that self-reporting of physicians visits may be unreliable versus recall for 
hospital visits that is generally better (Barer et al. 1982; Roberts et al. 1996). However, 
there is evidence about the recall of utilisation among older people which proved that 
reporting error was relatively minor for contacts with physician but found greater error 
for the data in the number of visits (Glandon, Counte & Tanceri, 1992; Cleary, 1984). 
2.6 Methodology in our thesis 
Overall, in order to address the research questions in our thesis, we apply both methods as 
aforementioned in paragraph 2.2.: The Regression models (mainly odds – ratios); and the 
Concentration Index – Ecuity method, by following the same steps for each study 
separately.  
1. First, I calculate concentration indices to quantify and decompose income – related 
inequity in the likelihood of using health care, based on the Horizontal Inequity Index 
approach, as developed by Van Doorslaer and colleagues (Van Doorslaer E., Masseria 
C.(2004); van Doorslaer E., Masseria C., Koolman (2006); O’Donnell et al (2008); and 
secondly, in order to increase the credibility of our analysis, we use regression model to 
measure the effect of socioeconomic indicators on the contact likelihood with health 
care services, and adopt the standard method in the empirical literature, by regressing 
medical care use on a vector of medical need indicator variables and a set of non-need 
variables using the equation, assuming a linear model, as displayed in 2.2 methodology 
paragraph. As far as it concerns the estimation method, we need to consider the 
following issues:  
 In the PatraHIS and SHARE study that health care variables included in the analysis, 
have count nature only for probability of use, we run logistic model for the 
probability of use. 
 In the GNHIS study, since the health care use variables have count nature not only 
for probability of use, but also for total and conditional number of use, we run 
logistic model for the probability of use, a generalized negative binomial model for 
total consumption, and a truncated negative binomial model for the conditional 
positive use (Deb & Trivedi, 2006; Masseria C. & Van Doorslaer, 2004).  
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 In addition, sample weights are used in all computations in order to make the results 
more representative of the country’s population. Robust standard errors are also 
obtained using the Huber/White/sandwich estimator.  
2. In order to define and measure the extent of regional inequalities on the likelihood of 
using health care, in GNHIS and SHARE study, we use the results of the inequity 
decomposition method. 
3. In order to identify the determinants and explore the role of OOPP mechanism in health 
care, in PatraHIS and SHARE study, we use the regression model that measures the 
effect of socioeconomic indicators on the likelihood of paying out of pocket (OOP) for 
using health care following the standard approach in the empirical literature, by 
regressing OOP payments on a vector of medical need indicator variables, and a set of 
non-need variables, assuming a linear model. 
 In particular, for the PatraHIS study that the OOP expenses variables have a count 
nature (the probability of facing OOPP for the last inpatient admission, outpatient 
visit, SHIF physician visit and the OOP amount for the last specialist private visit), 
we run logistic model for the probability of facing OOPPs for inpatient, outpatient 
and SHIF physician visit. Moreover, given that for the last specialist private visit we 
have information for the OOP amount, in order to examine the determinants of the 
OOP amount for a specialist private visit we perform logistic analysis in stages: First, 
we perform regression analysis for the likelihood of facing OOP amount for the 
specialist visit (≥1€= yes versus 0€=no) to describe the proportional effect of each 
single variable. Second, for the OOP conditional, positive amount (>0€), we run a 
logistic model for the probability of facing higher (>40€) versus lower (1€-40€) 
median OOP amount (as 40€ is the median OOP amount), to assess to what extent 
OOP conditional payments are more likely to occur within certain subgroups. Third, 
we examine to what extent payments toward specialist private care are related to 
ability to pay as expressed by income, as well as whether OOP amount varies among 
the SHIFs coverage, using both cases of OOP amount (including 0€) and conditional 
amount (>0€).  
 For the SHARE study that the OOP expenses variables have a count nature, (the 
OOP amount for inpatient admission and outpatient visit), in order to examine the 
determinants of the OOP amount, we perform logistic analysis in stages: First, we 
perform regression analysis for the likelihood of facing OOP amount for inpatient 
admissions and outpatient care (≥1€=yes versus 0€=no) to describe the proportional 
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effect of each single variable. Second, we compare higher OOP versus lower OOP 
amount. We perform logistic analysis for the probability of facing OOP conditional 
amount (>0€) dichotomized in OOP conditional median amount of 672.6€ for 
inpatient care and 194.4€ for outpatient care. In particular, we run a logistic model 
for the probability of facing OOP conditional amount >0€ for inpatient care 
dichotomized in (>672.6€) versus (1€-672.6€) where 672.6€ is the median of OOP 
positive amount for inpatient care. We also run a logistic model for the probability of 
facing OOP positive amount >0€ for outpatient care dichotomized in (>194.4€) 
versus (1€-194.4€) where 194.4€ is the median of OOP conditional amount for 
outpatient care. Third, we have the chance to explore to what extent OOP payments 
for inpatient and outpatient care are related to ability to pay as expressed by income, 
as well as whether OOP payments vary in terms of SHIF coverage, and region of 
residence. Therefore, we examine the mean OOP conditional (>0€) amounts by 
income quintile, by SHIF, by degree of urbanization and region of residence. 
Overall, in our analysis, following the standard approach in the empirical literature, the 
need variables are those that ought to affect the use of health care, whereas non-need 
variables are those that should not affect current health care use, as described in conceptual 
framework (Gravelle, Morris, and Sutton, 2006). Therefore, we measure need variables as 
a variety of demographic and morbidity indicators via general self-assessed health status; 
suffering from long term illness (LTI); limited in general activities (GALI); and number of 
chronic conditions (proxied by health status and health limitations) whereas we measure 
non-need indicators via the variables of income, education, marital status, household 
composition, housing tenure, region of residence, degree of urbanization, Social Health 
Insurance Fund (SHIF) coverage. 
2.7 Methodological limitations  
The common methodological limitations that the three analyses face - additional to each 
separate empirical study - are derived from limitations in measurement and limitations by 
the empirical use of CI and decomposition analysis.  
(i) Common difficulty in measuring need for health care 
(ii) Potential Biases for self-reported health status measures 
(iii) Limitations under estimation of income variable/measure 
(iv) Limitations of OOP financial burden variable/measure 
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(v) Difficulty in identifying an accurate measure of socio-economic indicator at older 
age leading to causation and underestimation of differences in health care use 
(vi) Decomposition analysis detects only correlation of health care (health) and 
socioeconomic indicators, not causal relationship 
(i) Common difficulty in measuring need for health care 
The first limitation concerns the fact that there is no broad agreement on the definition of 
“need” in health care that results in difficulty in measuring need for health care. In the 
income-related inequity method, as aforementioned, it is assumed that health status is a 
sufficient proxy for need in the case of individuals whose health is worse than others and 
need more health treatment. There are many potential problems concerning this assumption 
(e.g. Oliver and Mossialos 2004), for instance, the argument that urban residents and old 
people are more likely to underestimate their health status (Oliver and Mossialos 2004; 
Allin et al, 2010). Nevertheless, in our analysis we were able to include more objective 
measures of health status in every study that have affluent information about representing 
need for health care for all essays. 
(ii) Potential Biases for self-reported health status measures 
There are several potential biases in literature for self-reported health status measures that 
should be addressed: 
 Errors in self-reporting have been found to vary systematically across socio-economic 
groups (O’Donnell and Propper 1991), which is consistent with the finding that lower 
socioeconomic groups tend to underreport longstanding illness (Adamson et al. 2003). 
This might lead to underestimation of inequalities across income groups.  
 Research reveals that older people often rate their overall health as good, suggesting a 
bias towards optimism (Dening et al. 1998; Black et al. 1995). Therefore, one must 
interpret the results of the inequity analyses with caution, since all the need-related 
variables were based on self-report. In its defence, several studies have supported the 
validity of self-reported health status, demonstrating significant relationships with other 
measures of health status including physician assessments and utilisation data (Mossey 
and Shapiro 1982; Blaxter 1985) which means that self-assessed health is possibly the 
best available proxy for need for health care. 
(iii)  Limitations with estimation of income variable/measure 
Provided that in this thesis we use three survey datasets in order to quantify and explain 
income-related inequity in the use of health services, the issue of measuring income is 
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fundamental. Thus, when we interpret our findings it is important to take into consideration 
the following issues related to the difference in definition of income variable and the 
relevant modifications we undertake. 
 
Comparing the income definition  
The differences in the income definition among the surveys are focused on the following 
issues:  
(a) Gross versus net income: In PatraHIS and GNHIS surveys, income is taken to 
approximate the concept of monthly net total household income. The latter is derived  
as the sum from any source per equivalent member added up, after tax and social 
security contributions, versus the SHARE income variable taken to approximate the 
concept of annual gross total household income, which derives as the sum over all 
household members of the individual – level values from any  added up source. The 
fact that in PatraHIS income question there is not a sharp distinction between gross 
and net for certain components of income, can lead to response burden.  
(b) Imputed rent: The SHARE income takes into account, owner occupation housing 
(through imputed rent – net of mortgage interest payments) unlike PatraHIS and 
GNHIS, as well as tax and social security contributions (SSC) paid, by using 
information external to the survey. 
(c) PatraHIS income measure weak definition: The PatraHIS income is a categorical 
variable with 11 values/income bands and an open-ended top band, of disposable 
(after tax and social security contributions) household monthly income without 
defining the different components of income. Thus, the PatraHIS categorical income 
may overestimate the level of pro-poor inequity or that of pro-rich inequity. On the 
other hand, GNHIS and SHARE are more accurately measured, given that they define 
different components of income (even capital assets income). GNHIS income is 
defined in two ways: There is both continuous income measure and a categorical 
measure derived from a variable with 10 values –deciles – income bands and an open-
ended top band of disposable (after tax and social security contributions) household 
monthly income. SHARE income is consistently accurately measured regarding, it is 
derived from the sum of different components, some incomes at the individual level 
and some at the household level at a gross annual level from any source added up.  
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It is also important to mention that in order to include the income variable - as it is 
available from the three survey datasets – we have undertaken the following modifications:  
(a) we equalized the household total gross annual income adjusting for the household’s 
size and the age of its members according to the modified OECD scale7. (b) We also 
construct a continuous estimate as a natural logarithm of equalized household total gross 
annual (monthly) income using methodology as suggested by MEA Institute for SHARE 
and suggested by the Eurostat for GNHIS survey. 
Missing information for income 
It is worth noting that the PatraHIS survey has only 5.2% missing data on income; the 
GNHIS survey has 16.5% missing data and SHARE survey has 17.4% non-response rate 
for income information. These high rates of item non-response for income measure are a 
common problem for household surveys that we dealt with. For the two datasets GNHIS 
and SHARE, the missing values are replaced by imputed values (i.e., observed values of 
other respondents that are similar to the respondent considered in certain relevant aspects), 
prepared and disposed centrally by Eurostat for GNHIS and by the MEA Institute for the 
SHARE. For the PatraHIS, given that any unfolding brackets questions are not included 
and the item non-response for income measure is only 5.2%, we made the analysis by 
keeping in mind that the results will not be influenced by this small rate of missing values 
for income variable. 
(i) Limitations with estimation of OOP financial burden variable/measure 
Weaknesses in the use of OOP expenses for the evaluation of progressivity in health care 
finance are derived from the following issues.  
  The examination of all sources of health sector funding- not simply those payments 
that are made exclusively for health care- are required in order to evaluate 
progressivity and development in health care finance. Sources of health care finance 
which should be taken into consideration are: direct taxes, indirect taxes, social 
insurance, private insurance, and OOP payments (O’Donnell O. et al, 2008). 
However, it is unlikely that data for OOP expenses provide complete information on 
household tax and insurance payments. As O’Donnell O. et al (2008) points out 
“income tax payments or social insurance contributions may not be explicitly 
identified, and payments through sales taxes almost certainly will not be reported” 
                                                          
7
 Where equivalised household size is a sum of weights attributed to each member of the household 
according to the modified OECD equivalence scale: 1.0 to the first adult; 0.5 to the second and each 
subsequent person aged 14 and over; 0.3 to each child aged under 14. 
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(p. 188).Several approximation strategies are required. For instance, the distribution 
of the sales tax burden could be calculated by applying product specific tax rates to 
disaggregated data on the pattern of household expenditure. 
 Estimates of OOP payments from survey data are potentially subject to both recall 
bias and small sample bias, due to the fact that paying OOP does not concern a 
systematic behavior. Therefore, OOP expenses could be misreported and measure in 
the wrong way the distribution of payments and their real influence on progressivity 
of health care finance. O’Donnell O. et al (2008) claims that the restriction of the 
aggregate level mismeasurement can be confronted via the application of a macro 
weight that provides the best indication of the relative contribution of OOP to total 
revenues. Nevertheless, estimates of the OOP payments distribution are not biased if 
we verify that reporting of OOP payments is related systematically to ability to pay 
(ATP). 
(ii) Difficulty in identifying an accurate measure of socio-economic indicator at older age  
This limitation concerns the argument of possible causation and underestimation of 
inequalities in health care use for older population due to the difficulty to identify an 
accurate socioeconomic indicator of older population, provided that income and 
activity status are not such significant indicators mainly for those over 65 age, who are 
retired. There is also evidence that education and housing tenure indicators are more 
important than income and activity status (Van Ourti, 2003). There is an argument that 
the inaccurate socioeconomic indicators lead to causation and underestimation of 
inequalities in health care use for older population. However, according to evidence 
from studies having attempted to correct the potential endogeneity of income, the 
effect of income on health neither changes nor becomes significant (Allin et al, 2011; 
Lecluyse and Van Ourti, 2005; Lindahl, 2005; Meer et al., 2003).   
(iii) Decomposition analysis detects only correlation of health care (health) and 
socioeconomic indicators and not causal relationship 
This limitation concerns the argument that, although decomposition analysis detects 
the association of the distribution of health care (health) and socioeconomic indicators, 
it detects only correlation and not causal relationship between health care and 
socioeconomic factors i.e. health care and education. For instance, income and 
education are determinants of ill health and hence of use of health care services. In 
addition, there is evidence that the relationship between health care and SES may be 
bidirectional and the two processes are not mutually exclusive, leading to difficulty to 
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disentangle a causal relationship (Costa-Font and Hernandez-Quevedo, 2012; Allin S. 
et al, 2009). A suggested way which could possibly disentangle causation and 
selection is the carrying out of a longitudinal analysis (Allin S. et al, 2009).  
Overall, the empirical findings of these essays provide useful tools for understanding, 
exploring and measuring inequalities in the use of health care among the older population 
in Greece. In addition, this thesis goes further than the existing studies of equity by 
discussing the policy context in which inequalities in use arise.  
Moreover, under the aforementioned framework, the investigation and measurement of 
inequalities in health care use in Greece for the period from 2003 till 2008 preceding the 
current economic downturn since 2009, will help health policy-makers to prioritize 
healthcare resources and manage the performance of the Greek health system in terms of 
inequity in use and access of health services by those most at risk of vulnerability as the 
older population. The findings of this study provide evidence for studying the past and 
compare the pre with post-economic crisis period. The importance of this point lies in the 
fact that understanding the past is a useful way of opening up the possibilities that may 
exist in the present and the future, especially when the economy slows down as in our days 
(Ion and Beer, 2003). The fact that older people have the same access to NHS-ESY 
healthcare provisions as the rest of the population, and in order to examine whether the 
provision of health care services could be a source of inequalities in utilisation, we need, 
after presenting the health and socioeconomic profile of the Greek elderly, to describe the 
features of the Greek health care system.   
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Chapter Three 
 
3. The Health Care System and Ageing Population in Greece 
 
As aforementioned, the fact that older people have the same access to healthcare provisions 
as the rest of the population and in order to describe the way that health care services are 
provided to the Greek elderly as a source of inequalities in utilisation, we need to describe 
the features of the Greek health care system. However, first, after the geography 
characteristics of Greece, we display the health and socioeconomic profile of ageing 
population, given that inequities in older people’s health and well-being relate to a 
considerable extent to accumulation of advantage and disadvantage that takes place across 
their life-course (WHO, 2014). Therefore, in order to explore the cumulative effect of 
underlying social determinants on inequities in health care use among older people, it 
would be helpful to elaborate on the health and socioeconomic profile and well-being of 
Greek older adults. It is also important to present briefly how the profile of the elderly is 
interacted with the available elderly care and Long Term Care (LTC) provided in Greece. 
Following this information, we display the main characteristics of the Greek health care 
system.   
 
Geography 
Greece is located in south-eastern Europe. About 80% of the country is mountainous or 
hilly. Greece features a vast number of islands, between 1,200 and 6,000, out of which 169 
are inhabited. Greece consists of 13 administrative regions (peripheries), nine of which 
belong to mainland Greece and four insular. These regions correspond to the NUTS 2 level 
as in Figure 3.1 and comprise of 76 prefectures and 1034 municipalities with a high 
coefficient of variation (2.6) in population size. The total population of Greece was 
approximately 10.8 million in 2011 according to the last Census of 2011 (National 
Statistics Authority, 2014). In fact, rural population is 38.5% of total population in 2011, 
whereas 45% of the total population accommodates in the urban regions of Attiki - the 
metropolitan region of Athens. Athens is the nation's capital and largest city with 3.8 
million inhabitants (35% of total population) and Thessaloniki in Central Macedonia is the 
second biggest urban region of (with 10% of inhabitants). There are large differences 
among the NUTS II regions in terms of development level and regional economic 
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structures, reflected in varying employment structures and inequalities in regional GDP per 
capita. The poorest regions with the lowest regional GDP per capita are Epirus, Western 
Greece and Thessaly and those with the lowest Gross Value Added are North Aegean, 
Epirus and Ionian Islands and East Macedonia & Thrace (Table 3.8). On the other hand, 
the richest ones include Attika (Athens) and Central Macedonia (Thessaloniki), according 
to the National Accounts as presented by the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT, 
2014).  
Figure 3.1: Political Map of Greece with 13 administrative regions (peripheries) in NUTS 
2 level 
 
http://www.mapsofworld.com/greece/greece-political-map.html 
It is used with permission of MapsofWorld.com.
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3.1 Demographic determinants and health profile - challenges of Greek elderly  
In this section, first, we present the demographic, epidemiological and health risk factors 
that define the general state of health of the Greek elderly. As individuals age, non 
communicable diseases become the leading causes of morbidity, disability and mortality, 
and multiple morbidities become more common.  
The ageing of Greece’s population reflects a combination of declining birth rates, 
increasing life expectancy due to increasing survival in older age and falling fertility rates, 
leading to rapidly increase the percentage of ageing population. This increase may reflect a 
mixture of better health care, public-health initiatives and the differences in the lives that 
people lived earlier during their life course (WHO , 2015). 
According to all international and Greek data, the Greek population is a rapidly ageing 
population, as the population aged 65 years and over has dramatically increased over the 
last decade, both in size and as a percentage of the total population. In 2014, the share of 
those aged 65 or over accounts for more than one-fifth of the total population (OECD, 
2016). Greece has the fourth highest proportion (20.5%) of elderly population over 65 as a 
% of the total population, above OECD 34 (15.9%) and OECD 42 countries (12.1%) and 
the EU28 (18.2%). Moreover, 5.7% of the Greek population is over 80 years near the EU 
average (5.1%), and approximately 25.3% of Greek population is aged less than 25 – 
below the EU 28 average (27.1%). At the same time, it is expected that that there will be a 
considerable increase in the share of the proportion over 65 – that is predicted to rise to 
around 25.6% by the year 2030 (EU28: 23.9%) and an unexpected growth of the share of 
people aged 80+ in the Greek population from 5.7% to 15.2% i.e. to more than double in 
the period 2013-2060 (EU-28: 5.1%-11.8%), with most of the growth happening after 2030 
(EU Ageing Report. 2012). The demographic change and the rapid growth of ageing lead 
to additional demands for health and long-term care services8 and create new challenges, 
especially during the period of the crisis with the cuts in expenditure. 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 According to EU Ageing projections “Under an assumption of no policy change the Ageing Report scenario suggests 
that public expenditure as share of GDP would rise from 1.4% to 2.8% (EU-27: 1.8%-3.6%)” (EU. 2014 p. 123).  
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Table 3.1: Key demographic facts for Greece from OECD Health Statistics 2014 
  
Greece OECD 
average 
Rank 
among 
OECD 
  2012   2000 2012 2000 countries* 
Health status              
Life expectancy at birth (years) 80.7 
 
78.2 80.2 77.1  20 out of 34 
Life expectancy at birth. men (years)  78.0 
 
75.5 77.5 74.0  20 out of 34 
Life expectancy at birth. women (years)  83.4 
 
80.9 82.8 80.2  17 out of 34 
Life expectancy at 65. men (years)  18.1 
 
16.2 17.7 15.6  16 out of 34 
Life expectancy at 65. women (years)  21.0 
 
18.7 20.9 19.1  20 out of 34 
Mortality from cardiovascular diseases  
(age-standardised rates per 100 000 pop.)  343.6 (2011) 532.8 296.4 428.5  8 out of 34 
Mortality from cancer 
(age-standardised rates per 100 000 pop.)  193.5 (2011) 213.9 213.1 242.5  27 out of 34 
Source: OECD – Health Statistics 2014 
 
 
Health status Profile 
In a nutshell, the data displayed at Figures 3.2 – 3.4 and Tables 3.3 – 3.6 indicate that most 
health outcomes in Greece are fairly favorable in international comparison, even though 
improvements (ie healthy life expectancy) have slowed recently. Cardiovascular diseases 
and cancers are the two main causes of death. Moreover, from 2005 to 2012 the healthy life 
expectancy for men and women decreased by 1.1 and 2.7 years, respectively. In particular 
as in Figure 3.3, there is a significant decrease in healthy life years (HLYs) for males 50+ 
leading to the crucial question of whether projected gains in longevity are accompanied by 
increases in illness, disability, vulnerability and thus higher use of services, that is crucial 
for policy development in terms of demands for health, long-term and social care (WHO, 
2015). Given the complexity of these changes, comparable information on morbidity is 
more limited and confusing than for mortality, as the primary sources of data are diverse, 
conflicting, include registries, surveillance systems, hospital records, and their 
interpretation is controversial in the Greek system. As a result, till the 1
st
 National Health 
Survey in Greece conducted by National Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) in 2009 and 
2014, primary sources of data for burden of disease especially for older population in 
Greece are incomplete and diverse, based mainly on factors affecting health status for the 
general population, and cannot be displayed. 
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Table 3.2: Background Statistics for older population in Greece (EL) 
Demography 
Elderly population as 
% of total population
(1)
 
2013 2030 2045 2060 P.p change (2013-2060) 
Total M F Total M F Total M F Total M F Total M F 
65+ 20.1 18.2 21.9 25.6 23.0 28.0 32.5 29.8 35.1 33.1 30.6 35.5 13.0 12.4 13.6 
80+ 5.7 4.7 6.6 8.0 6.7 9.3 11.2 9.3 13.0 15.2 13.1 17.3 9.5 8.4 10.7 
85+ 2.4 1.9 2.9 4.0 3.2 4.7 6.0 4.8 7.1 8.9 7.3 10.5 6.5 5.4 7.6 
80+/65+ 28.3 25.9 30.2 31.4 29.3 33.1 34.3 31.2 36.9 46.0 42.7 48.7 17.7 16.8 18.5 
85+/65+ 11.9 10.2 13.2 15.6 14.0 16.8 18.4 16.0 20.3 26.9 23.7 29.5 15.0 13.5 16.3 
Elderly population as 
% of total population
(1)
 
EU-28 
2013 2030 2045 2060 P.p change (2013-2060) 
Total M F Total M F Total M F Total M F Total M F 
65+ 18.2 15.8 20.5 23.9 21.5 26.2 27.6 25.2 30.0 28.4 26.0 30.7 10.2 10.2 10.2 
80+ 5.1 3.6 6.4 7.1 5.6 8.5 10.0 8.2 11.7 11.8 9.8 13.7 6.7 6.2 7.3 
85+ 2.3 1.5 3.2 3.5 2.5 4.4 5.3 4.0 6.5 7.0 5.5 8.5 4.7 4.0 5.3 
80+/65+ 27.8 22.9 31.4 29.7 26.2 32.5 36.1 32.5 39.0 41.5 37.7 44.5 13.7 14.8 13.1 
85+/65+ 12.9 9.3 15.5 14.5 11.8 16.7 19.2 16.0 21.8 24.6 21.1 27.6 11.7 11.8 12.1 
Old-age depedency 
ratios % 
(2)
 
Greece EU-28 
2013 2060 P.p 2013 2060 P.p change 
Total M F Total M F Total M F Total M F Total M F Total M F 
20-64 33.4 29.7 37.0 67.1 60.0 74.6 33.7 30.2 37.6 29.9 25.4 34.4 55.3 49.2 61.6 25.3 23.7 27.2 
20-69 22.7 19.8 25.5 50.5 44.6 56.6 27.8 24.8 31.1 19.9 16.2 23.5 39.9 34.7 45.2 19.9 18.5 21.6 
Health status 
Life expectancy
 (3)
 Greece (EL) EU-27 
2010 2060 Change (years) 2010 2060 Change (years) 
M F M F M F M F M F M F 
years of Birth 77.8 82.8 84.9 88.3 7.1 5.5 76.7 82.5 84.6 89.1 7.9 6.5 
years at 65 17.9 20.2 22.6 24.6 4.7 4.4 17.2 20.7 22.4 25.6 5.2 4.9 
Healthy life expectancy 2005 2012 Change (years) 2005 2012(EU-28)* Change (years) 
M F M F M F M F M F M F 
years at 65 9.7 10.0 8.6 7.3 -1.1 -2.7 8.6 8.9 8.4 8.5 -0.2 -0.4 
Healthly life expectancy 
as % of the life 
expectancy
(4)
 
2005 2012 P.p change 2005 2011(EU-28)* P.p change 
M F M F M F M F M F M F 
at 65 (%) 56.7% 52.1% 47.7% 34.6% -9.00 -17.5 52.1% 44.5% 48.8% 40.4% -3.8 -4.1 
Expentiture on long-term care 
Total public expenditure on 
long-term care as % GP(5) 
2010 2060 P.p change 2010 2060 P.p 
1.4  2.8  1.4 1.8 3.6 1.7 
Source: EC (2015) Ageing Report
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However, we reproduce estimates from the Global Burden of disease (GBD) project
9
 that 
during the last decade in Greece the decline in HLYs is related with increased disability-
adjusted life-years (DALYs).In particular, Table 3.3 shows a summary measure (by GBD 
project) that combines the impact of illness, disability and mortality on population health and 
identifies the leading 25 causes of healthy life lost due to disability in Greece in 1990 versus 
2010, ordered by the absolute number of DALYs, ranked from left to right with greatest 
burden on the left. The numbers indicate the rank for each cause in terms of age-standardized 
DALY rates, with 1 as the best performance and 15 as the worst. The top five leading causes 
of years lived in disabilities (YLDs) in Greece - based on 1990 versus 2010 data - are low 
back pain, major depressive disorder, falls, neck pain, and other musculoskeletal disorders. 
Moreover, Greece does not perform well for some indicators of risk factors to health. The 
highest burden of disease in Greece is caused by tobacco smoking, followed by high blood 
pressure and dietary risks. There is a prevalence of inactivity for exercise, sports and other 
physical activity and obesity rate among older adults over 55 years higher than EU average. 
Moreover, there is a significant increase in HIV incidences- more than 2.5 times since 2010. 
These risk factors contribute to premature mortality accompanied by an increased prevalence 
of disease, as well. Nevertheless, WHO documentation since 1996 and up to the last Special 
Eurobarometer survey of 2014, indicate the healthcare system is still significantly unable to 
meet the Greek population’s expectations, given that 74% of Greek respondents declare that 
healthcare quality in Greece is “total bad” (versus 27% of EU28) and 73% that it is worse 
than that of other EU28 Member States (WHO, 1996; Eurobarometer, 2014).  
Figure 3.2 Crude death rate in Greece, 2003-2015 (age-standardized death rate per 
100,000 population), Eurostat 
 
Source: ELSTAT and Eurostat, data derived 14/07/2016. 
                                                          
9
 In GBD project in 2013 conducted by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) at the Univ. of 
Washington, healthy life years (HLYs) are related with the increased disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs) during the 
last decade in Greece. 
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Figure 3.3 Healthy life years (HLYs) in absolute value at 50+ males in Greece, 2004-2014 
 
Source: Eurostat. Data derived 14/07/2016. 
 
Table 3.3 : Ranking of leading age-standardised rates of disability adjusted life years 
(DALYs) in Greece, 1990 vs 2010 
Ranking of leading age-standardised rates of DALYs in 1990 
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Table 3.4 : Persons (Count and %) reporting health problem or disability by type of main problem and 
selected older age group 45+ in Greece, 2014   
  
Total 45-64 years old 65+ years old 
  Count % Count  % Count  % 
Problems with arms or hands (which includes arthritis or rheumatism) 47,64 2.9 14,019 3.0 26,66 2.7 
Problems with legs or feet (which includes arthritis or rheumatism) 235,807 14.2 56,529 11.9 159,344 16.1 
Problems with back or neck (which includes arthritis or rheumatism) 92,458 5.6 38,111 8.0 37,67 3.8 
Difficulty in seeing (with glasses or contact lenses if worn) 75,507 4.5 17,511 3.7 39,343 4.0 
Difficulties in hearing (with hearing aids or grommets. if used) 20,508 1.2 3,813 0.8 13,665 1.4 
Speech impediment 4,61 0.3 1,643 0.3 987 0.1 
Skin conditions. including severe disfigurement. allergies 24,928 1.5 8,551 1.8 4,08 0.4 
Chest or breathing problems. includes asthma and bronchitis 104,853 6.3 26,383 5.6 69,044 7.0 
Heart, blood pressure or circulation problems 598,743 36.0 161,853 34.2 415,771 42.0 
Stomach, liver,kidney or digestive problems 90,883 5.5 28,445 6.0 52,141 5.3 
Diabetes 107,309 6.5 29,404 6.2 71,925 7.3 
Epilepsy (include fits) 6,789 0.4 2,325 0.5 1,717 0.2 
Mental. nervous or emotional problems 92,867 5.6 30,25 6.4 26,438 2.7 
Other progressive illnesses (which include cancers NOS. MS. HIV. 
Parkinson's disease) 
56,933 3.4 17,796 3.8 30,555 3.1 
Other longstanding health problems 101,939 6.1 37,051 7.8 40,398 4.1 
Source: ELSTAT, 2014 
 
Figure 3.4: Prevalence of chronic diseases/conditions: Distribution (%) of population aged 
45+ suffering from chronic conditions by age group, 2014 
 
Source: ELSTAT, 2014 
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         Table 3.5 :Top 10 risk factors and associated burden of disease (2013) 
Risk Factors 
Disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs -
average rate per 100.000population) 
Female 
 High systolic blood pressure 3726 
High body mass index 2948 
Dietary risks  2765 
Tobacco smoke 2194 
High fasting plasma glucose 1980 
Low glomerural filtration rate 1613 
High total cholesterol 1345 
Low physical activity 1074 
Air population  793 
Alcohol and drug use 518 
Male 
 Tobacco smoke 6193 
High systolic blood pressure 4525 
Dietary risks  4229 
High body mass index 3344 
High fasting plasma glucose 2147 
Alcohol and drug use 2135 
High total cholesterol 2103 
Low glomerural filtration rate 1416 
Air population  1322 
Low physical activity 1164 
          Source: GBD (2013) Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 
 
Table 3.6: Health determinants and behaviour of population over 45+ years by age group in 
Greece, ELSTAT 2014 
  
Age Groups 
45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
Smoke daily 37.20% 28.40% 14.90% 6.30% 
Have never smoked 40.20% 44.70% 55.20% 68.30% 
Daily or almost daily consumption of alcholic drinks 6.20% 10.70% 11.40% 10.60% 
From Friday to Saturday they consume alcoholic drinks the 2 of 
the 3 days  
30.60% 31.70% 28.00% 19.60% 
Do not carry out sports, fitness or recreational physical activities 79.80% 84.20% 91.50% 97.40% 
Carry out sports, fitness or recreational physical activities 1-4 
days per week 
14.00% 11.20% 4.90% 0.80% 
BMI - Underweight men 0.3% 1% 0.9% 0.4% 
BMI- Normal Weight - men 24.8% 24.1% 24.5% 28.9% 
BMI - Overweight - men 51.2% 50.3% 51.9% 54.6% 
BMI - Obese -men 23.7% 24.6% 22.7% 16.1% 
BMI -Underweight - women 2% 0.7% 0.6% 2% 
BMI - Normal Weight - women 44% 35.8% 29.8% 33.2% 
BMI - Overweight - women 35.4% 40% 41.8% 45.2% 
BMI - Obese - women 18.6% 23.5% 27.8% 19.6% 
Source: ELSTAT (2016) 
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3.2 Socioeconomic profile of the older population 
3.2.1 The Framework: A fragmented and ineffective welfare state under successive 
reforms as the origin of the Greek health care system 
In sum, considering the Greek social protection system that defines the socioeconomic 
profile of older population, it is characterized, since its onset on 1950s, by fragmentation of 
the social security funds, a highly inefficient social welfare system where social care 
services represent one of the most neglected areas that were developed under a complete 
lack of a rational planning considering the complex needs of their potential users (ie 
elderly) (Karamesini & Moukanou E, 2007; Petmesidou & Mossialos 2006; Amitsis, 
2001).The social care services still are developed to provide support mainly to the most 
disadvantaged or vulnerable who are also in economic hardship via “social assistance in 
the limited sense” (Stathopoulos, 1996) or “social services in the narrow sense” (Amitsis, 
2001) and informal care, with the fundamental role of the family. Despite the successive 
reforms, the social expenditure still remains concentrated on old-age mainly pensions 
driven by demographic factors, and healthcare expenditure, while non-pension social 
transfers, such as social benefits, form a smaller proportion of the Greek social 
expenditure. Overall, public expenditure on pensions keep increasing as percentage of 
GDP from 2003 till 2014 - higher than the EU average, while the poverty profile has been 
shifting significantly. In the fragmented Greek welfare state, the social benefits have a 
limited redistributive effect. Moreover, the inefficiency of the system is related to the 
paradox that - since 1990s and 2000s until the crisis and up to 2011- despite the noticeable 
trend of convergence of per capita social expenditure, in Greece though social needs 
enormously increased (ie high unemployment rate), per capita (total) social spending did 
not improve as fast as per GDP and public social spending in real terms were plunged by 
about 18%. Successive pension reform laws were introduced before the economic crisis till 
2016. Due to significant delays in implementing the reforms approved in 2010 and 2012 
that speeded up since the second half of 2015, challenges still remain as the gross 
replacement rates still are above the OECD average (OECD, 2015). 
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Table 3.7 : Structure of  Esspros social expenditure in Greece 2001- 2012 (%), ELSTAT 
Functions  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Sickness 25.9% 26.3% 26.5% 26.5% 27.8% 28.7% 28.1% 29.0% 29.1% 29.2% 25.9% 21.4% 
Disability 5.0% 5.2% 5.1% 5.0% 4.9% 4.7% 4.9% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7% 4.9% 4.5% 
Old age 48.3% 47.3% 47.5% 47.4% 47.8% 43.2% 43.6% 42.4% 41.4% 42.3% 44.0% 51.3% 
Survivors 3.3% 3.4% 3.3% 3.5% 3.4% 8.1% 8.4% 8.3% 8.2% 7.8% 8.1% 8.0% 
Family 6.7% 7.0% 7.3% 6.9% 6.4% 6.2% 6.2% 6.3% 6.7% 6.4% 6.2% 5.5% 
Unemployment 5.7% 6.1% 5.7% 5.9% 5.1% 4.6% 4.5% 5.1% 5.9% 6.1% 7.4% 6.3% 
Housing 2.8% 2.4% 2.3% 2.3% 2.2% 2.2% 2.0% 2.0% 1.8% 1.4% 1.2% 0.8% 
Social exclusion 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.4% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.2% 2.1% 2.2% 2.3% 2.1% 
Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) (2015) Living conditions in Greece. 31 December 2015 
 
3.2.2 Socioeconomic profile, poverty and income inequality, living arrangements 
and life circumstances of the older population 
It is worth mentioning that in Greece till recently there has been a lack of solid, systematic 
statistical data for older population. The following Tables 3.8–3.16, Figures 3.5 -3.8, Chart 
3.1 with data retrieved by ELSTAT and Eurostat, present the trends of economic profile, 
pensions and living arrangements of older people, as key determinants with implications in 
terms of demand for LTC, for elderly care, for social expenditure for the ageing population 
and policy making. In elaborating these data, we draw the following information and 
implications: 
 During the entire period prior economic crisis from 2003 and up to 2012, incomes of 
elderly 65+ increase on a stable rate, but are on average lower than those of the total 
population. Comparing with EU27, although pension expenditure was always higher than 
EU-27, the Greek elderly income was always lower than EU27 elderly. 
 Since the beginning of economic crisis, the successive reforms and new regulations 
have led to drastic cuts in pensions that significantly reduced present day retirees’ pension-
income (by about 40% to 50% for certain pension income categories) (Petmesidou, 2014), 
that corresponds to more than twice lower versus EU27. It is estimated to reduce future 
retirees’ income more than 50%.  
 About poverty and income inequality of elderly, we derive the following:  
 The combined at-risk-of-poverty and/or social exclusion (AROPE) aggregate rate 
for total population was 32.9% in 2003 reached to 34.6% in 2012 (over 3.5 million 
people in Greece; EU-27:24.8%), then kept increasing to 35.7% in 2015. The stable 
increase of this indicator is very serious. In addition, women and residents of 
Epirus, North Aegean, Ionian Islands, and Thrace face higher risk of AROPE. 
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 However, since 2003 there was a significant decline in poverty rate for older and 
retired population of 65+ comparing to the total population, given that older people 
on low incomes, though not fully protected, suffered lower income losses than other 
groups, due to: increase in social expenditure as a percentage of GDP (2005: 
24.9%, 2010:29.1%); lower cuts in pensions; increases in minimum pensions and 
the Social Solidarity Pension Supplement (EKAS) (Petmesidou, 2014). 
 About inequality, Gini index, deprivation and the S80/S20 income quintile ratio for 
65+ has persistently been higher in Greece versus EU-27. The wealthiest 20% of 
the 65+ population has a 6.4 times higher income than the poorest 20% in 2003, 
then it felt till 2011, increased to 6.6 times in 2012 and remained stable. 
 About the labour and employment status of elderly  it was higher than EU MS up until 
2003, whereas over the last decade till 2014, the employment rate of people aged 55 to 
64 has significantly declined in Greece by 5.8%, versus most OECD, EU-28 and EU-
19 MS that increased (8.3%). Since 2014, Greece belongs to the cluster with the worst 
performers in terms of both poverty results and employment and to the cluster with 
low employment and low social outcomes among EU-MS (Chart 3.1). 
 About household composition, it is much more common for older people to live with a 
partner plus other people (children or other constellations) mainly in rural areas, 
whereas the single households of elderly are constituted by females in rural areas. 
 About social contacts, elderly similar to total population in Greece tend to be among 
the most ‘social’, on a daily and weekly basis contacts, significantly higher than EU27 
according to pro-crisis data. This higher intensity of contacts with relatives arises from 
the strong cultural tradition of family support in Greece for its older members.  
 However, during crisis, recent indicators of social interaction show inverse shares, 
given that a high percentage (16%) of 50+ declared not to have anyone to rely on in 
case of need, twice below the EU28 average, with increased isolation for the oldest.  
 The majority of Greeks 50+ years in 2013 reported a medium level of satisfaction with 
their personal relationships, and high regional variations lower than the EU28.  
 About marital status, almost 60% of Greece’s population 50-59 is married, with the 
majority of the older elderly being females widowed, as expected. 
 For housing tenure, over than three quarters (75.6 %) of the Greek population live in 
an owner -occupied home, higher rate than EU-18 and EU-27 population.  
 About the highest educational level, overall for persons 50+ age is Primary school 
ISCED1, and the second level is higher secondary level ISCED 3. By age groups, the 
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majority group 50-59 has graduated from university ISCED5, whereas those who have 
not graduated from High School ISCED3 add up to 52%. Illiteracy and early drop-out 
in the entire Greek population constitutes in total 9% and refers almost exclusively to 
persons 70+ years old. Moreover, about life-long educational chances, there are very 
few offers for further education focusing on the elderly in Greece. 
 
Figure 3.5 :Mean equivelanced of 65+ age versus total population in 2003-2015 in Greece 
 
Source: Eurostat and ELSTAT (2016) Income and Living conditions database retrieved at 01/07/2016 
 
 
Figure 3.6 :Mean equivelanced net annual income of 65+ population in 2003-2015 in 
Greece and EU27 
 
 
Source: Eurostat and ELSTAT (2016) Income and Living conditions database retrieved at 01/07/2016 
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Figure 3.7: Trends in Poverty and social exclusion of total age groups versus 65+ age in 
Greece, 2003-2015 
 
Source: Eurostat (2016) and ELSTAT Income and Living conditions database retrieved at 01/07/2016 
 
Figure 3.8: At-risk-of-poverty rate (AROPE) by poverty threshold for 65+ population in 
Greece and EU27 from 2003 till 2015, Eurostat 
 
Source: Eurostat (2016) and ELSTAT Income and Living conditions database retrieved at 01/07/2016 
 
Table 3.8 :Trends of  Regional variations among people at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion (AROPE) by NUTS1 regions in Greece 2004-2015 (% of total population) 
 Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Greece - total 30.9 29.4 29.3 28.3 28.1 27.6 27.7 31.0 34.6 35.7 36.0 35.7 
North Greece
1 
(including 
Thessaloniki) 36.5 34.4 34.6 33.5 32.6 33.6 32.2 34.2 36.8 37.0 36.7 35.6 
Central Greece
2
  35.0 35.6 35.1 31.7 32.3 31.4 32.0 34.2 39.7 37.7 40.6 40.4 
Attiki (including 
Athens) 24.0 21.2 21.8 22.7 22.4 21.2 23.1 29.1 30.6 34.0 31.6 31.5 
Aegean Islands & 
Kriti 32.9 32.4 27.6 27.5 26.2 26.6 23.9 21.3 31.3 33.7 39.4 39.4 
Source: Eurostat data.07/06/2016. http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/setupDownloads.do  
Note1: North Greece includes: Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, Central Macedonia (and Thessaloniki), Western 
Macedonia, Epirus; Note 2: Central Greece includes: Thessaly, Ionian Islands, Western Greece, Central Greece, 
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Table 3.9: Poverty rate, and inequality of income distribution among the Greek elderly and total age in selected years 2003-2015,Greece & EU27 
    2003 2005 2008 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
  Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Total Total Total Total Total Male Female Total Male Female 
At risk-of-poverty (65+) (cut-off 
point: 60% of median equivalised 
income after social transfers) (% of 
total population) 
Greece 29.4% 27.2% 31.2% 27.9% 25.2% 30.0% 22.3%  21.4%  23.6%  17.2%  15.1%  14.9%  13.3%  16.1%  13.7%  11.9%  15.2%  
EU-27        18.8% 15.8% 21.0% 18.9%  17.9%  15.8%  14.5%  13.7%  13.7%  11.2%  15.7%       
At risk-of-poverty (75+) (cut-off 
point: 60% of median equivalised 
income after social transfers) (% of 
total population) 
Greece 36.0% 36.2% 35.8% 32.7% 32.4% 32.9% 28% 23.9%  27.5%  20% 17.2%  16.1%  12.3%  19% 15.1%  11.2%  18.1%  
EU-27        21.7% 18.7% 23.6% 21.4%  20.4%  17.8%  15.7%  14.8%  15.1%  11.6%  17.6%        
At risk-of-poverty for pensioners 
(65+) (% of total retired population) 
Greece 32.3% 27.4% 38.3% 29.0% 24.8% 34.1% 22.9%  21% 22.4%  15.7%  13.4%  13.1%  11.9%  14.6%  12% 10.4%  14% 
EU-27        17.0% 15.5% 18.3% 17.7%  16.8%  14.7%  13.5%  13% 13.1%  11.1%  15%      
Poverty or/and social exclusion - 
AROPE (65+) (% of total population) 
Greece 42.8% 38.7% 46.0% 37.9% 33.7% 41.3% 28.1%  26.8%  29.3%  23.5%  23.1%  23% 21% 24.7%  22.8%  20.4%  24.7%  
EU-27        25.5% 21.6% 28.4% 23.3%  21.7%  20.3%  19.2%  18.1%  17.7%  14.5%  20.1%       
Relative median income ratio (65+) - 
compared to persons less than 65 yrs 
Greece 0.79 0.81 0.78 0.79 0.83 0.78 0.86  0.86  0.81  1.01  1.04  1.00 1.03  0.98  1.04  1.09  1.01  
EU-27        0.86 0.89 0.84 0.85  0.87  0.9  0.92  0.93  0.94  0.98  0.91       
Several Material Depreviation 65+ 
(% of total population) 
Greece       19.4% 15.3% 22.7% 14.8%  12.1%  13.1%  14.3%  13.7%  15.5%  13.8%  16.9%  15.2%  13.7%  16.5%  
EU-27        10.0% 8.2% 11.3% 7.5%  6.8%  7.2%  7.5%  6.8%  6.2%  4.9%  7.1%  6.3%  5.3%  7.1%  
Relative Poverty Gap - Median at 
risk of poverty gap (65+) (cut-off 
point: 60% of median equivalised 
income) (% of the threshold) 
Greece 27.6% 25.4% 28.0% 23.7% 22.0% 24.7% 20.8%  14.7%  21.1%  14.8%  13.7%  17.3%  18.5%  16.8%  17.3%  18.9%  15.5%  
EU-27        17.8% 17.6% 18.0% 17.1%  16.7%  16.8%  16.1%  15.9%  16.5%  16.3%  16.8%        
Inequality of income distribution 
S80/S20 (income quintile share 
ratio) for retired 65+ 
Greece 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.0 4.9 5.1 4.5  4.1  4.5  4.5  3.9  4.1  4.2 4.0 4.1  4.2 3.9 
EU-27        4.1 4.1 4.0 4.2  4.1  4.1  4.0 3.9  4.1  4.1  4.0       
At risk-of-poverty (Total Age) (cut-
off point: 60% of median 
equivalised income after social 
transfers) (% of total population) 
Greece 20.7% 19,90% 21,40% 19,60% 18.3% 20.9% 20.1% 19.7% 21.4% 23.1% 23.1% 22.1% 22.2% 22.0% 21.40% 21.5% 21.2% 
EU-27        16.5% 15.7% 17.1% 16.5% 16.4% 16.8% 16.8% 16.7% 17.2% 16.7% 17.7%       
Poverty or/and social exclusion - 
AROPE (Total age)  
Greece 32.9% 31.1% 34.7% 29.4% 27.1% 31.6% 28.1% 27.6% 31.0% 34.6% 35.7% 36.0% 35.3% 36.7% 35.7% 34.8% 36.6% 
EU-27    25.8% 24.5% 27.1% 23.7% 23.3% 24.2% 24.7% 24.5% 24.4% 23.5% 25.2%    
Inequality of income distribution 
S80/S20 for total population 
Greece 6.4 6.4 6.3 5.8 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.8 6.0 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.6 6.3 6.5 6.8 6.2 
Gini coefficient of equivalised 
disposable income (%) 
Greece 34.7%   33.2%   33.4% 33.1% 33.5% 34.3% 34.4% 34.5%   34.2%   
EU-27    30.6%   31.0% 30.6% 30.8% 30.4% 30.5% 30.9%      
Source: Eurostat data accessed on 03/07/2016 - http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/. Note: The indicators are defined in Annex 
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Table 3.10: Labour market – employment status of older people 
  GREECE EU-27 3 BEST MS 
   2000 2009 2009 2009 
 
Employment rate women aged 55-64 (%) 24.3 27.7 37.8 61.4 
 
Employment rate men aged 55-64 (%) 55.2 57.7 54.8 70.4 
 
Employment rate women aged 55-59(%) 30 36.3 51.4 75.5 
 
Employment rate men aged 55-59 (%) 69.2 71 69.1 83 
 
Employment rate women aged 60-64 (%) 20.3 19.6 22.8 47 
 
Employment rate men aged 60-64 (%) 44.6 43.7 38.5 59.6 
 
Employment rate women aged 65-69 (%) 6.5 5.8 7.4 20.6 
 
Employment rate men aged 65-69 (%) 16.8 15.2 13.2 28.3 
 
Average exit age from the labour market women (years) 
 
61 60.8 64 2008 
Average exit age from the labour market men (years) 
 
61.9 62 34.7 2008 
Inactive for health reasons population aged 50-64 (%) 4.7 7.4 21 48.4 
 
Internet use population aged 55-64 (%)   10 44 75 2010 
Source: EC (2011) Demography report 2010 – Older, more numerous and diverse Europeans.  
DG  Social Employment, Affairs & Inclusion  
 
Figure 3.9 : Employment and social outcomes (and AROPE) of older people in 2012, 
clusters of countries, EC(2016) p.329 
 
Sources: EC (2016) Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2015 p.329 - based on Labour market 
and Labour force survey (LFS) statistics and EU-SILC  
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Table 3.11 :Size of households with members aged 65+ in total Greece in 2011 versus 
2001 and urban/rural variations, ELSTAT 2014 
  Total No of households with 
members age 65+  
No of members 65+ in households 
  0 1 2 3 4 5+ 
2011 
No of Households 2,613,662 989,370 520,357 10,446 624 81 
Percent share of Households 63.2% 23.9% 12.6% 0.3% 0% 0% 
Members 65+  0 989,370 1,040,714 31,338 2,496 435 
Percent share of members 65+ 0% 47.9% 50.41% 1.52% 0.1% 0% 
Total No of households with members age 65+ : 
1,520,878 or 36.7% of total households  
Members 65+: 2,064,353  or 19.5% of total 
population 
  Total No of households with 
members age 65+  
No of members 65+ in households 
  0 1 2 3 4 5+ 
2001 
No of Households 2,381,650 846,603 434,574 10,742 721 91 
Percent share of Households 64.8% 23% 11.8% 0.3% 0% 0% 
Members 65+  0 846,603 869,148 32,226 2,884 482 
Percent share of members 65+ 0% 48.3% 49.6% 1.8% 0% 0% 
Percent share of Households 
with members 65+ in urban 
areas- total: 73.95% 
69.44% 20.79% 9.53% 0.22% 0.01% 0.00% 
Percent share of Households 
with members 65+ in rural 
areas - total: 26.05% 
51.69% 29.42% 18.35% 0.50% 0.04% 0.00% 
Total No of households with members age 65+ : 
1,292,731 or 35.2% of total households  
Members 65+: 2,064,353  or 17% of total 
population 
Source: ELSTAT (2014) 2011 and 2001, Population and Housing Census – Demographic characteristics –  
 
Table 3.12: Living arrangements of people aged 65+ years (% of population), EU-SILC, 
2007 
 Living alone No partner, living 
with other people 
Living with just a 
partner 
Living with a partner, plus 
other people 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Greece 7.9 28.7 4.1 21.7 53.6 33.4 34.4 16.3 
EU25 19.5 42.1 4.7 13.5 60.5 37.3 15.3 7.0 
NMS 18.6 43.0 7.9 24.7 50.8 23.8 22.8 8.5 
Source: Iacovou M. & Skew A.in Atkinson A. & Marlier E. (2010) Income and living conditions in Europe. 
Eurostat. 2010  
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Table 3.13 :Frequency of contacts with relatives and friends (Total population by gender 
and share (%) of the population 65+), Eurostat, 2006 
Frequency of contacts with relatives  Frequency of contacts with friends 
 
Frequency of 
contacts 
TOTAL Female Male 
aged 
65+ 
TOTAL Female Male 
aged 
65+ 
Greece 
No relatives / friends 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.1 1.3 0.8 3.5 
Daily 48 52.1 43.6 50.9 48.5 46.6 50.5 30.6 
Every week (not every 
day) 
30.7 29.6 31.9 27.4 31.1 31.2 31.1 31.8 
Several times a month 
(not every week) 
11.8 10 13.7 10.1 11.1 12 10.1 15.7 
Once a month 5.3 4.8 5.9 5.5 4 4.3 3.6 7.7 
At least once a year 
(less than once a 
month) 
3 2.5 3.6 4.1 2.1 2.1 2 4.7 
Never 1.1 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.2 2.4 1.9 6 
EU27 
No relatives/friends 0.5s 0.5s 0.5s 0.7s 1.9s 2.2s 1.6s 4.3s 
Daily 22.7s 26.8s 18.1s 23.5s 21s 20.5s 21.7s 10.5s 
Every week (not every 
day) 
41.9s 43.1s 40.6s 40.5s 36.3s 37.4s 34.9s 29.8s 
Several times a month 
(not every week) 
16.7s 15.3s 18.3s 15.8s 18.9s 19.2s 18.6s 20.2s 
Once a month 8.6s 7s 10.3s 7.8s 9s 8.8s 9.2s 10.9s 
At least once a year 
(less than once a 
month) 5.5s 4.3s 6.9s 5.9s 5.7s 5.3s 6.2s 9.5s 
Never 4.2s 3s 5.4s 5.8s 7.1s 6.5s 7.8s 14.8s 
Note Flag: s for Eurostat estimate. Source: Eurostat 2006 ad-hoc module “Social participation” data retrieved, 02/08/2016 
 
Table 3.14 :Resident population of adults 50+ by age group and marital status. ELSTAT 
2014 (Number of older adults 50+ and % of total population) 
  
TOTAL - older adults 
50+ 
Single 
Married, under 
registered 
partnership and 
separated 
Widowed and 
Widowed from 
registered 
partnership 
Divorced and 
Divorced from 
registered 
partnership 
Age group 
50+ 
Number (N) 
of older 
adults 50+ 
% of total 
populatio
n  
N % N % N % N % 
50-59 1.391.854 12.87% 107.188 2.54% 1.124.690 59.14% 67.844 31.34% 92.132 46.43% 
60-69 1.134.045 10.48% 57.888 1.37% 888.654 34.46% 138.447 19.44% 49.056 21.71% 
70-79 1.017.242 9.40% 41.580 098% 675.256 18.82% 277.383 35.09% 23.023 6.94% 
80+ 583.334 5.39% 23.388 055% 247.656 5.99% 305.825 37.28% 6.465 1.95% 
Total 
population 
10.816.286 
  
4.227.476 
  
5.436.265 
  
820.527 
  
332.018 
  
Source: ELSTAT 2011 Population and Housing Census - revision of 20/03/2014 
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Table 3.15 Distribution (%) of population by housing tenure status in 2007-2014 
(Greece & EU) 
Housing Tenure 
Owner (with mortgage or loan & 
no outstanding mortgage or 
housing loan) 
Tenant (Rent at market 
price & rent at reduced 
price or free) 
  Greece EU 18 EU27 Greece EU 18 EU27 
2007 75.6 71.2 72.9 24.4 28.8 27.1 
2008 76.7 71.5 73.3 23.3 28.5 26.7 
2009 76.4 71.6 73.2 23.6 28.4 26.8 
2010 77.2 66.6 70.5 22.8 33.4 29.5 
2011 75.9 66.7 70.4 24.1 33.3 29.6 
2012 75.9 67 70.5 24.1 33 29.5 
2013 75.8 66.6 69.9 24.2 33.4 30.1 
2014 74 66.7 69.9 26 33.3 30.1 
 
Source: Eurostat and ELSTAT, data extracted on 24/6/16 
 
Table 3.16 :Educational level of adults 50+ by age group and educational level. 2011 
 (% of total population) 
Age 
Groups 
TOTAL - 
older 50+ 
ISCED 0: 
No 
education 
+ Pre-
school 
education 
ISCED1: 
primary 
education 
ISCED2: 
Lower 
secondary 
education 
ISCED3: 
Higher 
secondary 
education 
ISCED4: Post 
secondary. 
non-university 
education 
ISCED5: 
University 
education 
ISCED6: 
Post 
Graduate 
studies 
% of total 
population  
% % % % % % % 
50-59 13.73% 1.85% 15.54% 14.70% 13.84% 13.77% 16.27% 12.11% 
60-69 11.18% 2.67% 20.52% 8.84% 7.26% 7.07% 8.90% 6.39% 
70-79 10.03% 9.68% 21.63% 5.87% 4.39% 3.23% 4.49% 2.75% 
80+ 5.75% 7.81% 13.36% 2.45% 1.84% 1.07% 1.73% 0.95% 
Total   9% 29% 14% 25% 6% 15% 2% 
    Source: ELSTAT - Hellenic Statistical Authority 2011 Population Census, own calculations, data 
extracted on 24/6/16, www.statistics.gr 
3.3 Overview of the health care system  
Since 1980s, the Greek health system is characterized by a mix of public and private 
funding and service delivery incorporating principles of different organizational patterns 
where in practice a National Health Service – system (NHS - ESY) coexists with a social 
health insurance system via a major unified social health insurance fund (EOPYY: 
National Organisation for Health Care Provision) and few other social health insurance 
Funds (SHIFs), with an expanding private sector to a lesser extent. Health has been 
constitutionally guaranteed in the Greek constitution. Entitlement to NHS services is on the 
basis of citizenship (excluding illegal immigrants). Entitlement to social health insurance 
Funds (SHIFs) services is on the basis of occupational status and insurance contributions, 
whereas the membership of a SHIF is compulsory for all employees. 
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3.3.1 Historical overview and reform attempts of the health care system  
This section briefly presents the major reform attempts of the Greek health care system 
during its historic evolution till today. Table 3.17 presents the most important reform 
initiatives introduced between 2001 and 2014 and indicates the extent to which they have 
been implemented. 
Before NHS (ESY) establishment (up to 1983) 
The health system before the establishment of the NHS – ESY in 1983, comprised of a 
large number (more than 300) of social security organisations that provided health services 
packages as well as pension upon retirement. They were established and operated (till 
today) on the basis of occupational status and were characterized by significant 
discrepancies in funding and provision.  
NHS (ESY) establishment in 1983 
In 1983, under Law 1397/1983, Greece established a national health service - system (NHS 
-ESY) in order to reform the old fragmented health care system. The Law was based on the 
principle that all citizens, irrespective of their socioeconomic status or location of 
residence, should have equal rights to access to healthcare services. Its aim was to expand 
coverage and reduce inequities, particularly in finance, access and resource allocation 
(Mossialos E. et al, 2005). The main priorities of the NHS – ESY were to exercise control 
over the private sector, to increase public health resources, to decentralize and 
administratively reorganize the health system, to develop regional capacities for the 
provision of health services and even unify SHIFs into a single purchasing body.  
Reform attempts after ESY establishment in 1983 till today 
 We examine the historical evolution of the Greek NHS in 3 periods (1983-1999; 2000-
2010; 2010 till today). During these periods from 1983 up today, five major reforms of 
NHS – ESY were undertaken: 
 The first period of 1983-1999 (Law 1397/1983: National Health System (E.S.Y.); 
Law2071/1992: Modernisation and Organisation of the Health System; Law 2194/1994: 
Re-establishment of the national health system and other provisions; Law 2519/1997: 
Development and modernization of the national health system- in relation to PHC, the 
establishment of GPs, PHC networks, payment of doctors on a capitation basis were 
foreseen;- is characterized by an effort to expand public primary health care (PHC) in 
rural areas with the creation of about 200 rural and semi-urban PHC centres (HCCs) . 
  The period 2000-2010 is characterized by “200 points of reform” proposed and a 
number of initiatives undertaken through: the NHS-ESY reform of 2001-2004 (via the 
major reform acts of 2001 Law 2889/2001 on the Regional Structure of Health Care 
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Services and reform act of 2003 Law 3106/2003 on the Regional Structure of Welfare 
Services) that divided the country into 17 regional health and welfare authorities 
(PeSYPs). ESY hospitals became decentralized subsidiary units of each PeSYP. They 
also initiated the regionalization of the system, new management structures and new 
employment conditions for hospital doctors, prospective reimbursement (Law 
2955/2001 for supplies of hospitals), modernization of public health services (Law 
3172/2003) and reorganization of primary health care (Law 3235/2004), which was 
partially implemented and abolished after 2005 elections and change in government
10
. 
The NHS-ESY reform of 2005-2008, via the following reform acts of 2005, 2006 and 
2007. Law 3329/2005 inactivated most of the 2001 and 2003 Regional Structure of 
Health Care Services (PeSYPs) legislated measures, renamed the PeSYPs as “Regional 
Health Administrations - RHAs” (DYPEs or YPE) and reduced RHAs  from 17 to 7 in 
order to “achieve economies of scale”. Consequently, any real decentralization of 
competences or independence from central government for DYPEs to develop their 
health services according to the needs of their populations has not been achieved. The 
management and control of the health care system remain with the Ministry (ESCG, 
2005). The other important laws of this period – that were partially or are still in the 
process of implementation include: Law 3370/2005 for reorganizing public health 
services; Law 3457/2006 on the regulation of pharmaceuticals; and Law 3580/2007 
about the creation of a Central Committee of Health Supplies (EPY).  The specific 
reforms – even though partially implemented till today - are a milestone in the 
development of the ESY. 
 The period since 2010 till today is characterized by the Law 3852/2010 to establish a 
new architecture of 13 regions and reduction of municipalities to 370 - known as the 
“Kallikratis” Plan - and about health care, to provide for the PHC competences of 
DYPEs to be transferred to municipalities, which is not fully implemented yet. In 
addition, a series of initiatives have been launched and partially implemented based on 
the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that Greece signed with 
creditors IMF/EU/ECB. They include: The financial independence of SHIFunds (Law 
3863/2010); Establishment of EOPYY “the National Health Services Organisation” 
(Law 3918/2011); Partial merge of public hospitals; Establishment of a National Health 
Network for Primary Care (PEDY) in 2014 not yet fully implemented. Other reform 
initiatives include: containment of pharmaceutical expenditure with a diffusion of 
                                                          
10
 Two other Laws (3172/2003) on public health and Law 3235/2004 on primary health care were abolished 
after the elections of 2004. 
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generics; improvement in the governance of ESY, in the management of hospital 
procurement and in the cost-accounting system of public hospitals; better control of 
prescriptions (through e-prescribing & e-referrals); and revision of the system of 
compensation of health providers and pharmacists.  
3.3.2 Major and successful reform attempts 
Overall, via the aforementioned reforms after the establishment of NHS, two major reform 
attempts have changed the organizational model and the structure of the health care sector 
in Greece, as following: (i) the regional organization of the ESY and modernization of 
hospital management principles, (ii) the establishment of the unified health fund (EOPYY) 
that merges the four biggest health insurance funds (IKA, OAEE, OPAD, OGA).  
(i) Regional organization of the NHS-ESY – decentralization process  
As mentioned above in…., the period since the onset of ESY (Law 1397/1983), three (3) 
major initiatives of regional organization of ESY have been established:  
 The Laws 2889/2001 & Law 3106/2003 that divided the country into 17 regional 
health and welfare authorities (PeSYPs). ESY hospitals became decentralized 
subsidiary units of each PeSYP. Following, the Law 3329/2005 inactivated most of 
the 2001 and 2003 legislated measures, renamed the PeSYPs as “Regional Health 
Administrations - RHAs” (DYPEs or YPE) and reduced RHAs  from 17 to 7 in order 
to “achieve economies of scale” (Figure 2.2.). 
 More recently, the Law 3852/2010 (known as the “Kallikratis” Plan) established a 
new structure for 13 administrative regions and 370 municipalities. It was planned 
that till 2012, the PHC competences of seven (7) DYPEs to be transferred to 
municipalities (Figure 2.3). However, this initiative has not been implemented, yet. 
However, following these major decentralization reform attempts of the regional 
authorities, only theoretically enjoy real independence for planning and co–ordinating 
regional resource allocation. Since their establishment, PESYs renamed DYPEs and YPEs 
still operate as another bureaucratic organisation that play an advisory role for the MoH 
and supervise implementation of its policy (Econ. & Soc. Council of Greece, 2005). Table 
3.18 and Figures 3.9 and 3.10 present the Regional Health Administrations/ Authorities 
division (7 DYPE/YPEs/ RHAs) and the administrative division of Greece in 13 NUTS2 
Units according to the legislation from 2001 till today. 
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(ii) Establishment of EOPYY “National Organization for Healthcare Provision” – 
Unification of major SHIFs 
The fragmentation of health care system due to the multiplicity of sickness funds and 
the absence of a fully pooling mechanism is still one of the main problems of the 
system that exists before the establishment of NHS, despite several reform attempts:  
 The 2001 reform attempt failure (Law 2889/2001)  to establish an Organization for 
the Management of Health Care Financial Resources (ODIPY) by unifying five 
largest social health insurance funds (SHIFs) and create an internal market. 
 Only under the Law 3655/2008, the largest 30 funds were merged into 13 
SHIFunds, with the following establishment of the financial and accounting 
independence of health funds, under Law 3863/2010. 
 The establishment of EOPYY (“the National Organization for Healthcare 
Provision”) by merging the healthcare sectors of the four largest social insurance 
funds (IKA SHIF; OAEE SHIF; OPAD & OGA SHIF)
11
 under the fiscal 
adjustment requirements via Law 3918/2011. However, EOPYY was initially 
expected to coordinate primary care between the different institutions and providers 
(SHIFs and NHS-ESY), to manage and control the funding, and regulate 
contracting with all health care providers and set efficiency standards with the 
broader goal to have bargaining power in the market for drugs and services 
(Petmezidou, 2012; and OECD 2011). 
 More recently, under the Law 4238/2014, EOPYY was planned to transfer its 
responsibility for PHC provision to RHAs (YPEs) and be converted to a single 
purchaser of health services, although in 2015, EOPYY does not fully operate as a 
single purchaser, yet.  
Overall, the Greek healthcare system the last thirty years is in a continuous process of 
structural and organizational changes. However, most of the health care reforms have been 
only partially implemented, or not at all. As Mossialos et al (2005) point out “the inability 
to bring about change in the Greek health system is a consequence of the prevailing 
political conditions, unresolved conflict between political parties and economic interests, 
substantial resistance by the medical status quo and the inability of the public health system 
bureaucracy to introduce managerial reforms” (p.S152). 
                                                          
11 Non Noble IKA blue- collar employees covers 50.3% of the population; Non Noble OGA for farmers people in 
agriculture (covers 19.5%); Noble OAEE for the self–employed and small businesses covering 12.9% and Noble OPAD 
for civil cervants covering 11.7% of the population. 
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Table 3.17: Major health care reform laws  2001-2014 
Law  Content Implementation 
2889/2001 Decentralization of the health care system and the introduction of 
autonomous hospital management 
Implemented (but 
hospital reforms later 
reversed)  
2920/2001 Creation of SEYYP Implemented 
2955/ 2001 Creation of a new legislative framework for hospital procurements Partially implemented 
3029/2002  
 
Reform of the social security system. Among other things, the law 
establishes the framework for the creation and operation of professional 
insurance funds for supplementary insurance coverage. 
Implemented 
3106/2003  Reorganization of welfare services with decentralization and better 
management 
Implemented 
3172/2003 Reorganization and modernization of services relating to public health Not implemented 
3235/2004  Changes to primary health care services, including the introduction of 
family doctors, the transformation of polyclinics owned by social 
insurance funds into urban health centres, and the establishment of new 
services for home care, post-hospital care and rehabilitation 
Not implemented 
3329/2005  
 
Changes to the regional administration of the ESY and to hospital 
management, reversing the 2001 reform that had professionalized senior 
management structures 
Implemented 
3370/2005  Reorganization of public health services: establishment at the Ministry of 
Health and Social Solidarity of: (a) the General Secretariat for Public 
Health, (b) the General Directorate for Public Health, (c) the Health 
Coordination Command Centre, (d) the National Public Health Council 
and (e) the Body of Public Health Officials. Reorganization of the 
Hellenic Centre for Infectious Diseases Control 
Implemented 
3457/2006  Reform of pharmaceutical care, abolishing the positive list and 
introducing recovery prices 
Implemented 
3580/2007  Centralization of procurement procedures for public hospitals  In the process of 
Implementation 
3655/2008 Merge the 30 social insurance funds into 13 major funds and merge health 
insurance funds and health branches.  
Implemented 
3852/2010     New Architecture of Local Government and Decentralized 
Administration – The Kallikratis Plan - Transferring the health care 
competences of DYPEs to the new  municipalities 
Not implemented 
3863/2010 Pension reform law established the financial and accounting 
independence of health funds 
In the process of 
Implementation 
3918/2011 Establishment of  a unified health fund (EOPYY) “the National Health 
Services Organisation” that merges the four biggest health insurance 
funds – IKA, OAEE, OPAD & OGA 
Partially implemented 
(not equalized 
contribution rates) 
4025/2011 Create of the map of welfare organisations for merging a number of 
health and welfare centres 
Implemented – partially 
implemented 
4052/2012 Reform of hospital organisations for merging hospital facilities In the process of 
Implementation – 
partially implemented 
4238/2014 Restructuring the primary healthcare system by establishing the primary 
national health network - creation of Electronic Health Records for all 
Greek citizens 
Not implemented 
Source: Based on Economou C. (2010) p.138.  
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Table 3.18 Administrative and Regional Health Authorities Division (including population 
distribution) 
17 Regional 
health 
and welfare 
authorities 
(PeSYPs) (Law 
2889/01) 
 7 Regional health 
Administrations (YPE 
or DYPE) 
(Law 3329/05) 
Population  
Distribution 
(2012) 
Administrative 
Division 
- 13 Units NUTS2 
structure (NUTS 
Statistical Regions 
of Europe – Law   
3852/2010 ) 
Population  
Distributio
n 
(2012) 
1. Eastern 
Macedonia & 
Thrace 
610.254 1
st
 RHA –1st YPE 
Attica (& Athens)  
3.068.694 1. Eastern 
Macedonia & 
Thrace 
611.067 
2. A’ Central 
Macedonia 
786.963 2
nd
 RHA  - 2
nd
 YPE 
Piraeus &    
Aegean Islands 
1.359.244 2. Central 
Macedonia 
1.871.952 
3. B’ Central 
Macedonia 
1.074.954 3d RHA – 3d YPE 
Macedonia (& 
Thessaloniki) 
1.972.123 3. Western 
Macedonia 
301.522 
4. Western 
Macedonia 
302.750 4
th
 RHA – 4th YPE 
Macedonia &  
Thrace (& 
Thessaloniki) 
811.983 4. Epirus 353.820 
5. North Aegean 204.158 5
th
 RHA – 5th YPE 
Thessaly & Central   
Greece 
1.359.217 5. Thessaly 753.888 
6. Epirus 352.420 6
th
 RHA – 6th YPE 
Peloponnese & 
Ionian Islands & 
Epirus & Western 
Greece 
1.791.628 6. Ionian Islands 212.984 
7. Ionian Islands 214.274 7
th
 RHA – 7th YPE 
Crete 
601.131 7. Western Greece 740.506 
8. Thessaly 754.393   8. Central Greece 605.329 
9. Western Greece 739.118   9. Attica 3.761.810 
10. Central Greece 607.855   10. Peloponnesus 638.942 
11. A’ Attiki 1.062.945   11. North Aegean 206.121 
12. B’ Attiki 1.509.417   12. South Aegean 302.686 
13. C’ Attiki 1.189.448   13. Crete 601.131 
14. Peloponnesus 632.955     
15. A South 
Aegean 
111.181     
16. B South 
Aegean 
190.564     
17. Crete 601.159     
Source: Law 2889/2001- PESYPs; Law 3329/2005- DYPE; EC (2003) Regulation EC No 1059 & 
Eurostat (2007) - NUTS2 Regions & Law 3852/2010 
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Figure 3.10: Seven (7) Regional Health Administrations(DYPEs/YPEs) 
 
1
st
 RHA –1st YPE Attica (& Athens)  
2
nd
 RHA  - 2
nd
 YPE Piraeus & Aegean Islands 
3d RHA – 3d YPE Macedonia (& Thessaloniki) 
4
th
 RHA – 4th YPE Macedonia & Thrace (& Thessaloniki) 
5
th
 RHA – 5th YPE Thessaly & Central Greece 
6
th
 RHA – 6th YPE Peloponnese & Ionian Islands & Epirus & Western Greece 
7
th
 RHA – 7th YPE Crete 
 
http://www.esdy.edu.gr/files/009_Oikonomikon_Ygeias.pdf   
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Figure 3.11: Administrative Division - 13  Units NUTS2 structure (Nomenclature of 
territorial units for statistics - NUTS Statistical Regions of Europe) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat-Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) Statistical Regions of    
Europe 
3.4 The current Greek health care system – Provision of services 
The Greek health system is characterized by a multiplicity and complexity in: (a) 
organisation; (b) funding and (c) service delivery where a National Health Service – 
system (NHS - ESY) coexists with a social health insurance system and private sector to a 
lesser extent. Figure 3.11 illustrates the funding and provision structure of health care in 
Greece up to 2012 including the establishment of EOPYY according to Mossialos et al 
(2005) chart. First we present the three subsystems that provide inpatient and primary 
health services. The financing of the health system is presented in paragraph 3.5.  
1. Eastern Macedonia & 
Thrace 
2. Central Macedonia  
3. Western Macedonia  
4. Epirus  
5. Thessaly   
6. Ionian Islands  
7. Western Greece  
8. Central Greece 
9. Attica 
10. Peloponnesus  
11. North Aegean 
12. South Aegean 
13. Crete 
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Overall, it is worth mentioning that, health care provision is mainly focused on hospital-
based acute care with the preventive and primary care been underdeveloped until recently.  
3.4.1 Inpatient care 
Inpatient (secondary and tertiary) care is provided via three legal entities- settings:   
(a) NHS-ESY Hospitals - financed by MoH state budget and SHIFs revenues - with about 
32058 beds (31/12/2014) that operate under the co-ordination of seven (7) regional 
RHAs or DYPES/YPEs
12
 administered by MoH.  They include the following types: 
(i) 120 public hospital facilities: (93 general divided into 7 subgroups according to bed 
capacity- including 17 with less than 100 beds in isolated areas; 19 specialized ESY 
hospitals more than 400 beds in large urban areas including 5 prior SHIF IKA 
hospitals merged to ESY since 2012; and 8 teaching University hospitals that 
provide tertiary inpatient and outpatient care staffed by permanent personnel 
reimbursed by salary.   
(ii) About 210 primary health care centres–HCCs in rural and few HCCs in semi-urban 
areas and other rural posts in thinly-populated areas administered by NHS-ESY 
hospitals that provide outpatient care covering about 25% of the Greek total 
population. 
(iii) 15 non NHS-ESY military hospitals administered by Ministry of Defense, 2 
prisoners’ hospitals administered by Ministry of Justice, and 3 “special status 
hospitals” – ex legal entities co-operating with ESY under special contraction, that 
in 2014 were absorbed in ESY. 
(b) Non NHS-ESY hospitals connected with ESY that include: 15 military hospitals 
administered by Ministry of Defense; 2 prisoners’ hospitals administered by Ministry 
of Justice; and 3 “special status hospitals” –ex legal entities of private law under 
special contraction with ESY, which in 2014 were absorbed in NHS-ESY. They have 
a total capacity of about 4500 beds or about 7% of total hospital beds (Economou et al, 
2010). 
According to OECD (2014) as presented below in detail, these two groups of general 
and specialized hospitals have a total capacity of 38115 beds for 2010 – that is, 69.6% 
of total hospital beds. All public hospitals have also outpatient departments, which 
operate on a rotation basis, as well as, they operate emergency services that 
                                                          
12
 Table 3.18 and Figures 3.9 and 3.10 present the Regional Health Administrations/ Authorities division (7 
DYPE/RHAs) and the administrative division of Greece in 13 NUTS2 Units according to the legislation introduced 
from 2001 till today. 
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complement the functions of the National Centre for Emergency Care (EKAV) 
(Economou, 2010). 
(c)  Private Health Clinics (for profit and not for profit) 
In February 2014 there were 161 private health clinics (MoH, 2014) comprised of: 
private for-profit clinics; private non-profit clinics; private psychiatric clinics; private 
rehabilitation Centers; and supplier of disability non-profit clinics – with 26% of total 
bed capacity for 2010 (Economou, 2010). They consist of two types:  
(i) Clinics with small size of less than 150 beds contracted with EOPYY and SHIFs 
that during the last years they were gradually reduced due to their low 
reimbursement rates for hospitalization by EOPYY or SHIFs.  
(ii) Few hospitals and clinics with up to 400 beds with a high degree of concentration 
mainly in capital Athens and Thessaloniki, offering high-quality services to 
private patients and those with private insurance, holding a higher share of the 
Greek private hospital market (Boutsioli, 2007). However, despite the rapid 
growth of the private sector during the last decade, public hospitals are used more 
than private hospitals by the population mainly due to almost free provision to 
insured population and better reputation of public specialized hospitals than 
private ones.   
Therefore, the above figures of beds capacity, rates of hospital activities and the occupancy 
rate indicate that the last decade beyond better clinical practices, there has been a trend to 
increase productivity in hospitals.  
It is worth noting that since 1990s, there is evidence via applying data envelope analyses 
(DEA) method that significant inefficiencies exist in relation to the performance of 
hospitals. The DEA analyses revealed variation in performance (technical inefficiency) 
across hospital departments (mainly cardiology and general surgery), and across ESY 
hospitals favoring the urban, the general and tertiary teaching hospitals resulting in 
increased ALOS and increased hospital spending (Giokas D, 2001; Aletras V., 1999; 
Athanassopoulos A. et al, 1999; Athanassopoulos A. & Gounaris C., 2001; Prezerakos P., 
1999; Polyzos, 2001, NSPH, 2012). However, there is evidence that NHS-ESY small 
hospitals (with less than 40 beds) and medium in size hospitals (250 to 400 beds) in urban 
areas operated more efficiently than larger general hospitals (Prezerakos P., 1999; Polyzos 
N., 2002; NSPH, 2012; Polyzos. N, 2013). Similar findings are identified by a recent study 
of Xenos P., NektariosM, ConstantopoulosA, Yfantopoulos J (2016) that examined the 
efficiency of 112 Greek public hospitals in 2009 by applying two models of DEA, 
augmented by bootstrapping techniques in the efficiency and found that the majority of the 
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NHS-ESY hospitals (30.4%) score between 0.51 and 0.7, while less than a quarter (23.2%) 
are fully efficient, indicating that, despite the difficulties in the healthcare sector in Greece, 
certain NHS-ESY hospitals are leading the way to high productivity and efficiency, 
whereas the less productive, inefficient hospitals were almost 10%. Moreover, another 
study with DEA analysis for 117 NHS hospital data of 2009 – 2011 found that middle 
hospitals in urban centres of all YPEs except 6
th
 YPE (Peloponnese & Ionian Islands & 
Epirus & Western Greece)
13
 and 7
th
 YPE (Crete), as well as small-sized hospital in all 
YPEs except 2
nd
 YPE (Piraeus & Aegean Islands) demonstrated improvement (per 
technical efficiency) over 80% leading to significant spending-cuts (Polyzos. N, 2013). On 
the other hand, they found that there is demand for efficiency interventions primarily for 
the large hospitals of the 2
nd 
YPE (Piraeus & Aegean Islands) and 4
th
 YPE (Central & East 
Macedonia & Thrace) as they still remain below the national average of technical 
efficiency (Polyzos, 2013; NSPH, 2012, )
14
. Similar findings of were presented by another 
previous study based on the UK Resource Allocation Working Party Method (Mitropoulos 
& Sissouras, 2000). 
 
3.4.2 Primary Care  
Overall, primary medical care (PHC) is provided in a fragmented - bureaucratic way with 
a physician-driven organizational structure by a mix of public and private health care 
services via four subsystems. The structure of PHC units (EOPYY ex IKA SHIF units; 
NHS-ESY HCCs and regional offices; outpatient ESY departments; and private units) as 
well as the estimated PHC personnel in total and by structure is presented in Table 3.19. 
Official quantification of the personnel separated in public and private structure is not 
provided by MoH and Greek Statistics Authority, indicating the inadequacies and gaps in 
the medical and statistical information sources. 
(a)  In NHS - ESY facilities via: 
(i) ESY hospital outpatient departments that provide PC specialist services in urban 
areas (70% of the population) within three frameworks: (a) in emergency ESY 
departments (EKAV) for free; (b) in morning outpatient clinics on an appointment 
basis for free since 01/04/2015;(c) in afternoon outpatient clinics provided by 
                                                          
13
 It is worth mentioning that Epirus and Western Greece regions that are included in 6th YPE (Peloponnese 
& Ionian Islands & Epirus & Western Greece) are the poorest Greek regions with the lowest 
regional GDP per capita. 
14
 But, these results should be treated with caution since the consequences of the cost savings cannot be 
interpreted with the same way across hospitals with differences in operation procedures that may permit 
flexibility and allow some hospitals to operate below capacity. 
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doctors working in the hospital on a private, appointment-only basis (with non-
reimbursable €25 for doctors in rural hospitals to €90 in university-affiliated 
hospitals). 
(ii) 220 Health care centres (HCCs) established under the decentralization reform: 
mainly in rural areas (covering 30% of the population) administered by ESY 
hospitals- for free since 01/04/2015 (till then it was free only for OGA SHIF and 
agricultural beneficiaries); few HCCs in semi-urban areas; and about 1530 
regional offices - rural posts of untrained physicians in thinly-populated areas 
administered by HCCs. The HCCs were planned to: provide a wide range of 
services from prevention, diagnosis, cure, prescribing, to short-day 
hospitalization, dental care, rehabilitation and family planning; to improve access 
to care for inhabitants in remote areas; and to act as gatekeepers and referees 
between primary and secondary health care, as well. However, despite the 
growing demand for HCCs, the majority of HCCs play a subordinate role as they 
are inadequately staffed mainly due to: oversupply of specialists but irrationally 
allocated (1400 or 40%); significant undersupply of GPs (500 GPs or 14%) and 
2113 nurses; and 1630 rural untrained physicians for regional offices; inadequate 
medical technology infrastructure; absent of managerial autonomy; and inefficient 
allocation of resources between isolated regions versus less rural areas with 
transportation difficulties especially for the elderly population (Karakolias E. & 
Polyzos N., 2014). According to estimates, there is a lack of one-third of HCCs 
personnel (Economou, 2010). All these weaknesses lead to inefficient and 
problematic operation of HCCs that were evidenced by evaluation of HCCs with 
the method of DEA analyses that revealed significant inefficiencies and 
geographical disparities in HCCs’ performance (Sissouras, Mitropoulos & 
Gounaris, 2000). 
(b)  Through social health insurance system 
Following successive merge efforts, thirteen (13) SHIFs used to provide health 
services to their insures, characterized by significant variations in regulation, 
contribution rates, coverage, health care benefits package and conditions for access
15
. 
Since 2012, the major SHIFs are merged in EOPYY – a unified SHIF covering the 
95% of the insured population - that is self-managed but under the jurisdiction of MoH 
                                                          
15 In terms of coverage and benefits, the SHIFs have been officially classified as “Noble” SHIFs (for civil servants, bank 
officers, public utility employees, lawyers, doctors etc) versus “Non Noble” SHIFs (for blue-collars employees and for 
farmers). 
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and MoF. Social health insurance sector provides primary and specialist health 
services via the patterns:  
(i) Till 2012, public primary and specialist care was provided via a health care 
nationwide network of 350 PHC medical facilities owned and financed by IKA -
blue collars Fund, mainly located in urban areas covering 50.3% of the population 
and in rural areas covering 25%, and staffed with salaried physicians. Since 2012, 
the network of IKA units is operating under EOPYY. Till March 2014, the 
EOPYY’s PHC units (ex IKA) were stuffed with about 5.500 specialists and 500 
GPs, most of them on a full- time or contracted on a part-time salaried basis with 
the allowance to work privately to their practices, as well. Since 2014, under 
legislation for the establishment of a National Health Network for Primary Care 
network (PEDY), the part-time staffed physicians were forced away from EOPYY 
and the management of EOPYY units was expected to be transferred gradually to 
the RHAs and ESY. However, two years later, the issue of ceasing part-time 
physician contracts has not been legally finalized. Therefore, all the above events 
have resulted unfortunately in limited utilisation of EOPYY PHC units and 
“move” to private health care services.  
(ii) As a consequence, only in theory, EOPYY (ex IKA SHIF) delivers a wide range 
of PHC services. Evidemce provided by the IKA’s Statistic Department showed 
that IKA’s PHC services were concentrated to prescribing (60% of cases); 
referrals to secondary health care services; and high-cost examinations mainly for 
elderly people (IKA, 2011). Similarly, assessment of ex IKA units’ performance, 
showed that only units with adequate technological infrastructure for medical tests 
are efficient (Zavras et al, 2002) even though being more efficient than NHS-ESY 
HCCs (Kontodimopoulos et al., 2007).  
(iii) Via private physician consultations with own practices, or private diagnostic 
centers or hospitals providing services under contract to EOPYY or other SHIFs 
that do not have own facilities, on a fee-for-service retrospective basis, with 
variations among SHIFs in the level of coverage, freedom of choice of PHC 
providers (including private providers), access to specialists and access to private 
hospitals. In December 2013, there were about 5060 specialists, 420 GPs, 2400 
diagnostic laboratories and polyclinics contracted with EOPYY for PHC services 
(Table 3.19).
16
  
                                                          
16
 It is worth mentioning that till the merge of major SHIFs to EOPYY each physician could contract with every SHIF 
separately leading to multiple contracts for each physician. Till 2012, ie OPAD (public sector employees) have 
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(iv) via free choice for few Noble SHIFs not merged to EOPYY (ie Banks’ personnel, 
Utilities personnel, Engineers etc), of whatever public or private professionals the 
insured individuals wish to consult. Patients pay the fee demanded by the doctor 
and are reimbursed retrospectively with a preset amount by their SHIF. 
 (c) Through municipalities that provide PHC services within own facilities usually 
focused on specific population groups such as:  uninsured persons, immigrants and 
elderly.  
(d) Through the private sector via: outpatient physicians’ own practices; diagnostic 
centres; and outpatient department in private hospitals contracted on a fee-for-service 
basis with NHS-ESY, EOPYY and other SHIFs, or directly to patients privately by 
OOP payments or private insurance. It is estimated that private practices and 
laboratories (contracted and not contracted with NHS-ESY or EOPYY) are still more 
than 25000 in 2016. 
The above analysis highlights the fragmented and weak physician-driven organizational 
structure of the PHC system that obstructs its efficiency and “forces” the patients to private 
care. 
 Therefore, the private health care sector plays an important role in the provision of health 
services, although it does not have any direct involvement in the planning, financing and 
regulation of the public system (Economou, 2010). The private sector provides services 
via: a) General and maternity profit-making hospitals; b) A significant number of private 
diagnostic centers; c) Independent physician (mainly specialist) practices ; d) A significant 
number of private hospitals and clinics, which are either contracted by EOPYY or paid 
directly by the patient. e) Rehabilitation Care Centers (physiotherapists etc.) and geriatric 
homes. All these services are financed either by EOPYY (or other SHIFs) on a contract 
basis or by the private insurance system (mainly supplementary insurance) or paid directly 
by the patient on a private basis (out of pocket payments and informal payments). 
Overall, it is worth mentioning that due to the fragmented character mainly of the primary 
health care (PHC) system, elderly population uses NHS-ESY for receiving inpatient care 
and outpatient care and less Social Health Insurance system via EOPYY (PEDY-ex IKA 
SHIF) and other SHIFs and NHS-ESY Health Care Centres for receiving PHC. It is 
apparent that the elderly population is “forced” to private physicians for receiving PHC. In 
case that they choose the Social health insurance system for PHC the elderly are “forced” 
to make OOP and informal payments with important financial impact. Therefore, we could 
                                                                                                                                                                                
contracts with about 20.000 physicians, OAEE-self employed Fund  with 3.500 physicians and  OIKOS NAUTOU (for 
seamen) with 3.100 physicians. 
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claim that PHC seems to be provided in a private framework, even via the Social health 
insurance structures. 
3.4.3 Dental Care 
Dental care is characterized by limited coverage provided in a fragmented way via:  
(i) Through the social health insurance system that covers a limited range of services 
within the following frameworks:  
a) Via a limited number of full-time dentists working in EOPYY own facilities (ex IKA 
SHIF) with limited quality and responsiveness; and about 1000 part-time dentists on 
contract with EOPYY, reimbursed under a small fixed amount. It is worth 
mentioning that other Non Noble SHIFs provided limited or even no coverage for 
dental care (ie. OGA SHIF covers only children up to 18 years). 
b) On the other hand, there are still significant differences in dental care services 
provided favoring few Noble SHIFs (out of EOPYY: ie Bank employees) that still 
provide a wide range of services (from preventive dental services to even 
orthodontics) within own facilities or under contract with private dentists paid by the 
patients and reimbursed retrospectively a fixed amount by their SHIF. 
(ii) Through ESY via: (a) HCCs that provide limited preventive dental services for Non 
Noble OGA beneficiaries under the age of 18 and (b) few outpatient dentist 
departments of ESY hospitals that provide limited dental services. 
(iii) Through the private sector via: a high number of dentists paid directly by the patients 
or partially covered by private health insurance.  
The fact that dental care is provided within a fragmented way and is characterized by 
poor social health insurance coverage, in combination with the oversupply of private 
dentists lead to extended use of private dental care with high dental care expenditure, 
especially OOPPs and informal payments. According to available estimates, the dental 
care is the predominant field for direct payments, with high cost-sharing over 30% of 
total OOP expenditure for financing dental treatment (Economou C., 2010; Siskou et 
al, 2008). There is also evidence of regressive interregional variations of the financial 
barrier for dental services favoring the residents of rural areas than residents of urban 
areas (Koletsi-Kounari H. et al, 2007). As Economou (2010) and Mosialos et al (2005) 
point out “the private sector, and out-of-pocket payments made by patients, act as a 
substitute for the gaps in insurance coverage of dental treatment”.  
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Table 3.19: Manpower and units of Greek Primary Health care at NHS - ESY (not in 
outpatient departments) and EOPPY-based on Karakolias E. & Polyzos N. (2014) 
and Ministry of Health - (2013) ESY.net data 
Assigned to Payment 
method - 
relationship 
PROFESSIONALS Number Per 1000 
population 
  NHS-ESY staff at HCCs and regional offices   
NHS (salaried) GPs at health centers- HCCs and regional offices 500 0.046 
NHS (salaried) Specialists at health centers - HCCs and regional offices 1400 0.129 
NHS (salaried) Resident and rural physicians (non-specialists) 1630 0.151 
  NHS – ESY subtotal physicians (HCCs and regional 
offices 
3530 0.326 
NHS (salaried) Nurses at health centers - HCCs and regional offices 2113 0.195 
NHS (salaried) Other staff at HCCs and regional offices 2325 0.215 
  Total NHS-ESY staff at HCCs and regional offices 7968 0.736 
  EOPYY’s staff   
EOPYY (contractual) Independent GPs 420 0.039 
EOPYY (salaried) GPs at EOPPY’s units 500 0.046 
  EOPYY’s subtotal GPs 920 0.085 
EOPYY (contractual) Independent specialists 5066 0.468 
EOPYY (salaried) Specialists at EOPPY’s units 5589 0.517 
  EOPYY’s subtotal specialists 10655 0.985 
  EOPYY’s subtotal physicians 11575 1.07 
EOPYY (salaried) Nurses at EOPYY’s units 2841 0.263 
EOPYY (salaried) Other staff EOPYY’s units 1373 0.127 
EOPYY (contractual) Physiotherapists and other health professionals 2125 0.196 
  Total EOPYY’s staff  17914 1.656 
  Total professionals (excluding physicians) 10,777 0.996 
  Total NHS & EOPYY physicians  15,105 1.396 
  Total professionals 25,882 2.393 
  UNITS Number  
EOPYY (contractual) Diagnostic laboratories (80% solo and 20% group 
practice) 
2402 0.222 
EOPYY (contractual) Rehabilitation and recovery centers 40 0.004 
EOPYY (contractual) Daycare centers 33 0.003 
EOPYY (contractual) Polyclinics 36 0.003 
EOPYY (property) EOPYY’s units (polyclinics and medical offices) 400 0.037 
  Other  0.000 
NHS (property) Health centers - HCCs (simple in rural areas, few in 
urban and few in special purpose) 
220 0.020 
NHS (property) Regional offices (simple, multi and special purpose) 1530 0.141 
NHS (property) Public hospitals outpatient clinics 131 0.012 
NHS  Private hospitals outpatient clinics 162 0.015 
  Total units 4954 0.458 
Source: Karakolias E. & Polyzos N. (2014) based on Ministry of Health (2013)  ESY.net unpublished data 
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3.5 Long Term Care and Elderly Care in Greece  
As mentioned in chapter one, defining long-term care (LTC) and specifying what 
constitutes elderly care in Greece is a complex task, given that no universal statutory 
scheme for LTC exists. Elderly care combines social care and health services, and 
distinguishing them is complex and not always a straightforward process (EC, 2014; 
Karamesini & Moukanou E, 2007). One of the major confusions in this respect derives 
from the provision of elderly residential care by the same institutions which cater for 
people with chronic diseases. In general, LTC in Greece is based on a mixed in cash and in 
kind system comprising informal and formal care (Figure 3.12).  
3.5.1 LTC services provided 
The Greek system of LTC provides public services by the MoH via social welfare 
institutions, the SIFs and EOPYY through public institutions, NGOs (via the Church of 
Greece), private non-profitable organizations and private profitable organizations 
contracted with MoH and EOPYY. However, the formal home care arrangements provided 
are limited. LTC is also traditionally provided by family members. EOPYY and SIFs 
provide disability pensions and benefits (in cash and in kind) by social welfare institutions 
to three categories of people, legal residents of the country, depending on their invalidity 
levels (of 50%, 67% or 80%) and the type of chronic illness they suffer: (a) the elderly 
with high level of dependency (b) people with chronic illness or incapacity and (c) people 
with mental health problems. There are two types of Formal LTC: the institutional/ 
residential care and the community and home care. In 2010: 12% of people aged 15+ in 
need of long-term care were in institutional care, 28% in home care, and 60% either had no 
access to care or were looked after by informal carers (EC, 2014). The LTC services for 
aging population are provided through specific settings of close and open care units, as in 
Table 3.20. These schemes are financed mainly by EU funding that results in insecure 
funding that gives priority to serve the needs of isolated and poorer dependent elderly. 
 
Table 3.20 : Structure of LTC (care for elderly & invalid individuals) 
In cash    
In Kind 
Informal care 
private 
For profit 
Formal professional care 
Not-for-profit 
Public  
  
 
 
125 
 
Table 3.21 Formal Elderly care services Provision in Greece (Benefits in Kind) 
Scheme 
Public Private 
OPEN-DAY CARE/COMMUNITY – HOME CARE 
Local 
Authorities 
YPEs 
Social Security 
Fund (EOPYY 
ex IKA) 
NGOs 
Non-Profit 
(Voluntary) 
For-Profit 
First Social Aid (Network) - 
"Tele Assistance" programs 
(free of charge) 
X X X X X  
Open Care Centres 
("KAPI") free of charge & 
"Friendship Clubs" (only 
in Athens -5€ annually fees) 
X      
Home Help  (free of charge) X X X 
X (ie 
Hellenic 
Red 
Cross) 
X X 
Daily Care Centres + 
Health Care Centres (in 
Urban Areas)  
X X  X 
X  (ie by the 
Hellenic 
Association of 
Gerontology 
and Geriatrics) 
 
Centres of Social Support 
and Training of Persons 
With Disabilities 
X X  X X  
Centres of Physical & 
Social Rehabilitation 
(KAFKA) 
 
X (since 
2011) 
    
Family -   mostly women 
relatives (unpaid) &  migrant 
women carers (paid through 
pensions and/or family 
resources 
    X  
Other - Social Tourism / 
Therapeutic Spa- Means 
Tested 
  X    
 INSTITUTIONAL/RESIDENTIAL CARE 
Nursing Homes for the 
Chronically ill  (fees 
according to means) 
Few X  
X 
“Elderly 
Care 
Units” 
X “Elderly 
Care Units” 
X “Elderly 
Care 
Units” 
Chronic Disease Clinics  X  X  X 
Rehabilitation Centres  X    X 
Mental Health Hospitals  X    X 
Source: Own calculations based on National Legislation 
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3.5.2 Professional LTC workers - Informal Carers and the role of the family in 
ageing in Greece: intergenerational solidarity 
Overall, in Greece there are no official data available for professional LTC workers. The 
OECD and ELSTAT data in 2014 show that Greece has a density of 19.25 workers per 
1,000 population - that is one of the lowest rates among OECD countries
17
. From these, the 
professionally active caring personnel has a density of 0.84 carers per 1,000 population by 
far the lowest among the OECD countries –resulting in “an alarming shortage of nursing 
and (formal) care personnel in Greece” (EC, 2014 Report.125). There are no available data 
on the total number of informal carers, given the fact that no formal process of registering 
(and certifying) informal carers is in place. Most of informal carers are relatives (mainly 
wives, daughters and other female relatives), or paid workers (female legal or illegal 
immigrants, though the crisis has rendered paid help unaffordable). Data retrieved from 
OECD Health at a Glance 2011 (drawing upon the SHARE project), Rodrigues R. et al, 
2012;  Hoffmann & Rodrigues, 2010 calculations’ for informal carers in Greece, and the 
EUROFAMCARE study for services supporting family carers in six EU members in 2003-
04 as in Lamura et al.(2008); Mestheneos E, Triantafillou J.(2005), indicate:  
 Intensity of informal care in the oldest age group or inter-generational solidarity is more 
than six times higher in Greece than other EU countries. 
 In 2007 nearly 9% of people 50+ years in Greece (about 80% of those being females) 
provided services of informal care (OECD-16 countries average 11.7%). 
 Informal carers are predominantly women - daughters, daughters-in law or wives, even 
for the oldest age group (75 years and over) differently from most EU. 
 About 70% of total migrants employed as informal LTC carers are employed in home 
care, with often, an undeclared, less regulated and professionalized position on labour 
market, whereas training and counselling rarely exist in Greece, except those by NGOs. 
Therefore, the provision of elderly and LTC services relies more on home care and less to 
institutional care (EC, 2014). The family seems to be the main provider of elderly care. In 
Greece - similar to most South European countries - there is a primary responsibility of the 
family for the financial and practical support of dependants devolves (mainly spouses and 
children), with the state commitment taking a supplementary role, either when the family is 
unable to provide support - through social welfare schemes or, more recently, in policies 
                                                          
17
 Retrieved on 24/07/2016 from the OECD Health Database, at 
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=HEALTH_STAT# 
 
 
 
127 
 
for the provision of direct small financial to informal family carers in the minor sense of 
some tax concessions
18
. There is a legal provision for the responsibility of the family 
specified in the Greek Constitution of 1975, and amended in 1986 and 2001 (Triantafillou 
J.et al, 2010). It is the existing social, political, and religious beliefs, as well as the 
prevailing social norms, that mainly determine the relations of the family members among 
themselves and their respective obligations to each other. Family still plays a very 
important role in the protection of its poor and older members. The younger people respect 
their elders and still accept them in certain roles. The customary family care of the elderly 
is still strong, and if necessary, children take care of their old parents at all stages of illness. 
Moreover, till recently, it was considered socially unacceptable to “abandon” a parent to an 
institution mainly due to cultural norms (Emke-Poulopoulou I, 1999). However, a number 
of developments have changed the traditional family elderly care model resulting in 
“family care deficit” that result in to provide care for the elderly in private residential 
homes or  by paid elderly care at home. 
3.5.3 The main weaknesses of the existing formal LTC services 
Overall, they could by summarized as following: 
 The existing formal LTC services based on means-testing criteria are addressed to the 
neediest, indigent people and do not guarantee universal coverage. 
 LTC services are characterized by: insufficient number of beds with uneven regional 
distribution with ambiguous and low quality of services, concentrated mainly in urban 
areas (EETA, 2011; EC, 2008); low rates paid by social insurance; insecure funding 
based on EU and a shrinking public budget leading to a growing private sector. 
 Access to services is primarily focused on hospital acute services and clinical care, 
resulting in a system that still is fragmented but oriented towards acute health care 
settings. Therefore, the interaction between health and LTC does not constitute an area 
of significant policy concern and only seldom addressed, as they are out of the interest 
of the medically centered health system. As a result, it is very difficult to balance 
between health and social care.  
 The lack of LTC as an individual sector has important organizational, financial (via 
taxation, social security contributions, voluntary private insurance or OOPPs), and 
delivery (home care or institutional) implications.  
                                                          
18
 It is also worth noting that till 2000s, care for the elderly in Greece was characterized -officially- as a 
“family affair” by the Ministry of Health (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1999). 
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 Similarly, there is a lack of data on care outside the public systems, on quality, care 
outcomes, value for public money, as well as a lack of overall evaluation.  
These difficulties and the combination of health and social care complicate the tasks of 
collecting and comparing data on LTC, especially regarding coverage.  
Following, the above challenges and the current crisis create a serious risk that in coming 
years, Greece - similar to other EU-MS, will not be able to meet the fast-growing demand 
for effective, responsive and good-quality LTC and elderly care services. As a lot of 
researchers point out the current severe economic crisis leaves little room for an expansion 
of public provision. This will leave families to carry a heavy burden of care responsibilities 
alone and unsupported, and put the health, dignity and quality of life of frail older people at 
risk while also challenging the sustainability of the public budgets (EC, 2014). However, it 
could be an opportunity for improving coordination of existing schemes, that provides 
benefits in cash and in kind, redefining the links between formal and informal care and 
developing support for carers (EC, 2014; Petmesidou, 2014). Moreover, Greece could 
follow the example of “other countries that -despite scarce resources, are addressing the 
challenge of translating research findings on chronic diseases and ageing into policy and 
practice, through multisectoral programmes for prevention and control, primary 
intervention and a system of integrated health and social care” (p.138) (Triantafillou J, 
Mestheneos E., 2013). Nevertheless, Greek policy makers have to realise that this is the 
opportunity to make substantial reforms towards integrated health and social care (WHO, 
2015d; WHO, 2012).  
 
3.6 Financing and Expenditure of health system 
The health care system is financed by a mix of public and private resources. Public 
resources are based on taxes (direct tax and indirect tax revenues as defined in the state 
budget) and social insurance contributions by employees and employers. The third source 
of financing is private expenditure, mainly in the form of out-of-pocket (OOP) payments 
and less supplemental private health insurance.Before we present health expenditure trends 
and funding sources, it is important to note that for a long time, Greece had not adopted the 
OECD system of health accounts, resulting in scattered information and deficiencies in the 
breakdown of aggregate expenditure and continuous revisions of data. Only recently, in 
2014, the MoH in cooperation with National Statistics Authority and Eurostat adopted the 
WHO system of health accounts and revised old data.  
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3.6.1 Health Expenditure trends  
Tables 3.21 and Figure 3.13 indicate that health care expenditure has increased 
substantially over the last two decades (up to 2010) in per capita US$ PPP and as a share of 
GDP. Greece is ranked among the ten highest health spenders of the OECD group. The 
proportion of total health expenditure has risen from 6.6% in 1990 to 9.7% in 2008, 10.1 in 
2010 and 9.3% of GDP in 2012. However, after years of continuous growth of per annum, 
Greece saw double-digit percentage reductions in health expenditure in both 2010 and 
2012, leaving the overall level of expenditure around 25% below its peak in 2008 (OECD, 
2014) due to significant reduction in total health spending, similar to other countries.  
Therefore, health spending accounted for 9.3% of GDP in Greece in 2012, equal to the 
OECD average, but below the median of the EU average (10.1%) for first time after years 
(Figure 3.13). Yet, Greece’s per capita GDP in public health expenditure is one of the 
lowest in OECD (26 out of OECD 34 countries). On the other hand, despite the significant 
reduction in total expenditure, Greece still has one of the largest shares of private health 
expenditure (mainly OOP expenses) among EU and OECD countries, given that it 
constitutes 34% of total health expenditure
19
, and private funding recorded the largest 
share of revenues even in the current period of austerity
20
. Furthermore, pharmaceutical 
spending, in line with a number of other countries, indicates a significant reduction, but 
still significantly above OECD-34 average.  
Examining the expenditure of different categories of health service provision as % of total 
current expenditure on health care in 2012 , as well as examining the breakdown of public 
and private health expenditure by type of care over the period 2009 -2012 (Tables 3.22 & 
3.23 and Figures 3.14 and 3.15) we observe that the public health care system is hospital-
centred versus the private sector that is focused on primary care. Greece is ranked as the 
first highest spender on inpatient care (47% including day care) among the EU23 countries 
and above the OECD-27 average in 2011. Spending is followed by medical goods 
(pharmaceutical) spending (27%) and outpatient care (22%) whereas long-term care (LTC) 
spending of 1% is significantly low, given that LTC has not been statutory established yet, 
as mentioned above. Over the period 2009-2012, there is a continuous increase of 
expenditure in hospital care provided by both the public and private sector. Public 
expenditure exceeds private expenditure in the hospital sector and in pharmaceutical sector 
                                                          
19
 This share ranks Greece as the fourth highest private spender on health after Mexico and the United States. 
20
 Increases in private expenditure may be explained by the undersupply of diagnostics and technology in the public 
sector, disorganised primary care, increasing informal payments in the public sector, and limited coverage of dental care 
(Economou, 2010). 
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till 2011, whereas primary care (including dental care) is provided mainly by the private 
sector. In 2012, there was a decrease in outpatient care expenditure, both public and 
private, due to the significant reductions in total health expenditure. Similar trend exists for 
pharmaceutical expenditures. It is also worth noting that the increased share of outpatient 
care expenditure is further documented by analyses of the recent household budgets 
surveys (National Statistical Service, 2014), as mentioned below. 
 
Table 3.22: Trends in health care expenditure, 2000-2008 
 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Health expenditure per 
capita (US$ PPP) 
1453 2357 2612 2727 3004 2936 2585 2322 2346 
Total health expenditure as % 
GDP  
7.88 9.66 9.75 9.81 10.13 10.04 9.38 8.99 9.27 
Public Health Expenditure as 
% Total Health Expenditure  
60.01 59.29 61.20 59.57 64.73 69.48 67.85 66.07 67.51 
Private health expenditure as 
% Total Health Expenditure 
39.99 36.81 34.84 36.73 36.99 30.52 32.15 33.93 32.49 
Social Security as % public 
health expenditure  
45.93 50.34 51.56 52.45 52.45 61.04 60.09 64.02 64.02 
Out of pocket payments as % 
private health expenditure  
85.93 94.61 94.36 94.09 94.09 93.16 90.96 91.32 91.32 
Out of pocket expenditure as  
% Total Health Expenditure 
34.36 34.83 32.87 34.56 34.81 28.43 29.24 30.99 29.67 
Private insurance as % private 
health expenditure  
5.50 5.39 5.64 5.91 5.91 6.13 8.01 8.40 8.40 
Government (Public) Health 
Expenditure  as % of  Total 
Government (Public) 
expenditure 
10.12 12.84 13.18 12.30 12.96 12.93 12.38 11.43 11.43 
Source: WHO 2014 and ELSTAT 2014 
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Figure 3.13: Annual average growth rates in per capita health expenditure, real terms, 
2000 to 2011 (or nearest year) 
 
Annual average growth rate (%) 
 
CPI used as deflator. Source: OECD Health Statistics 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health-data-en. 
 
Table 3.23: Current health expenditure by functions as % of total current expenditure on 
health care in Greece, EU23 and OECD 27 
 Greece (2012) EU 23 (2012) OECD 27 (2011) 
Inpatient care* 47.0 31.0 29.0 
Outpatient care** 22.0 31.0 33.0 
Long-term care 1.0 10.0 12.0 
Medical goods (pharmaceuticals & 
other) 
27.0 23.0 20.0 
Prevention and administration  4.0 6.0 6.0 
Note: Countries are ranked by curative-rehabilitative care as a share of current expenditure on health. 
* Refers to curative-rehabilitative care in inpatient and day care settings. 
** Includes home-care and ancillary services. 
Source: OECD Health Statistics 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health-data-en. 
 
Figure 3.14: Current health expenditure by function as % of total expenditure on health 
care in Greece and EU 
 
Source: OECD Health Statistics 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health-data-en. 
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Table 3.24: Composition of health care expenditure by type of care and public - private 
mix in Greece as % of total expenditure on health care, 2009-2012 based on 
WHO - NHAs data 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Type of care Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Public 
sector  
Private 
sector  
Hospitals 49% 21% 49% 24% 52% 27% 59% 31% 
Primary Care 14% 56% 14% 51% 14% 47% 12% 38% 
Pharmaceutical 34% 21% 35% 23% 32% 24% 27% 29% 
Other 3% 2% 3% 2% 3% 2% 3% 2% 
Source: WHO - National Health Accounts data 2009-2012, WHO & ELSTAT (2013)  
 
 
Figure 3.15: Composition of health care expenditure by type of care and public - private 
mix in Greece, 2012 
 
Source: WHO - National Health Accounts data 2009-2012, WHO & ELSTAT (2013) 
3.6.2 Sources of finance 
By examining in detail the sources of finance of the health care system over the period 
2000-2012 in Tables 3.21, 3.24, 3.25 we observe that the main source of funding is public 
based on taxation and social insurance contributions. More concretely, in 2011, health care 
in Greece was funded through the following sources (Hellenic General Accounting Office, 
2012): 
(i) The central government budget by general taxation (via direct and indirect tax 
revenues) constitutes 24.0% of total expenditure, of which 40.1% were direct taxes on 
income and 59.9% were indirect tax revenues on goods and services
21
.  
(ii) Social insurance funds (SHIFs) revenues (mainly EOPYY’s revenues after 2012) 
constitute 42.0% of total expenditure, derived by employers and employees 
                                                          
21 The state budget covers funding of NHS – ESY infrastructure (hospitals, HCCs) and social health insurance system 
(SHIFs, EOPYY), the expenses of uninsured population, medical education etc. 
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contributions (varied among SHIFs), annual national budget subsidies and other SHIFs 
resources
22
. These data indicate also that the Greek NHS is financed mainly by social 
contributions and less by taxation, which is controversially to the basic principle of the 
NHS financing system. 
iii) Supplemental private insurance constitutes 3.0% as the third source of revenues and 
plays only a minor role in Greece. 
iv)  Out of pocket payments (OOPPs) constitute 31.0% of total expenditure, which are the 
highest among EU countries. OOPPs are formal and informal and stem from user-
charges, direct payments and informal payments. The high proportion of OOP 
payments and mainly informal payments could be a serious barrier to access health 
care as we examine in detail, below. 
Given that the public health care system is hospital-centred, it is worth mentioning that 
NHS-ESY public hospitals are financed 70% from the public budget (general taxation) and 
cover approximately 80% of all health services, while the remaining 30 percent of public 
hospitals’ expenses are covered on a DRG basis since 2014 (or by per diem payments till 
2013) from EOPYY for the services that ESY hospitals provide to EOPYY beneficiaries.  
Moreover, considering financing of LTC and elderly care “the estimation of the total cost 
of LTC is difficult to calculate both in the public and private sector due to the complexity 
of the funding system, differences in benefits provided by social security funds and the 
informal payments” (Mastroyiannakis T. et al, 2010, p16). It is very difficult to balance 
between paid care and family care; between institutional and home care; and to balance the 
mix of public, private and insurance financing. As a result, separate budget for LTC and 
distinct financial health LTC and social spending data for LTC is still not applicable for 
Greece and not comparative, as the social LTC expenditures are lumped in with health 
LTC. However, estimates for the EC (2012) Ageing Report, calculate the expenditure for 
LTC in Greece to be approximately 1.4% of GDP (ECFIN, 2009; EC, 2014). Considering 
sources of funding formal care, according to EC (2014) in 2010, public spending on 
institutional care was estimated to be negligible (0.13% of GDP; EU-27 average: 0.80%), 
while spending on home care and cash benefits estimated to 1.27% (EU-27 average: 1%). 
It is obvious that Greece is a low-spending country with high percentage of limitations in 
                                                          
22
 Since 2012, the resources of EOPYY are derived from: contributions of insured - employer - retired in their SHIFs, 
from pharmaceutical rebates, clawback mechanism in private clinics, asset management, as well as from the annual 
national budget subsidy (0.4% of GDP). 
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daily activities of over-75s (69.2% for 75+ and 41.4% for 65-74 years based on EC (2014 
and EUSILC 2013). 
 
Table 3.25: Health care Expenditure Trend by source of financing in Greece     (percentage 
% of expenditure) 2009-2012 (Eurostat, 2014) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
General Government 27.0 26.7 28.1 28.7 
Social Security Funds 42.4 41.0 40,1 39.3 
Total Public Current Expenditures 
(% total expenditure on health) 
69.5 
 
67.7 68.3 68.0 
Private Insurance 1.9 2.6 2.7 3.0 
Private OOPPayments Expenditure 28.4 29.4 28.8 28.8 
Total Private Current Expenditures 30.5 32.3 31.5 31.9 
Other Expenditures (Church, NGOs etc) 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.14 
Source: ELSTAT & Eurostat, 2014 
 
Table 3.26 Expenditure on health by sources of financing in Greece, 2011 (% contribution 
of current expenditure) - OECD (2013) 
 2011 OECD 34 countries 
General Government 24.0 35.0 
Social Security  42.0 37.0 
Total Public Current Expenditures 
(% total expenditure on health) 
66.0 72.0 
Private Insurance    3.0   6.0 
Private OOPPayments 31.0 20.0 
Total Private Current Expenditures 34.0 26.0 
Source: OECD Health Statistics 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health-data-en. 
3.6.3 Out-of-pocket payments (OOPPs)  
OOPPs are formal and informal and stem from user-charges, direct payments and informal 
payments, as following: 
i. Varied formal user-charges (fixed rates and flat co-payments) on pharmaceuticals, on 
laboratory-diagnostic tests, per hospital and HCCs, outpatient visits, on dental care, 
specific medical procedures etc as structured in Table 3.26. These user-charges and co-
payments are considered to be low except those on pharmaceuticals that vary depending 
on the severity of chronic disease and patient’s income status; 
ii. Direct payments for using services not covered by SHIFs mainly for dental visits or for 
private (primary and specialist) medical visits for a 2
nd 
opinion. It is worth mentioning 
that limited or even no coverage of dental care by Non Noble SHIFs or partial coverage 
by private insurance, makes dental care the predominant field for direct payments. High 
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cost -sharing for financing dental treatment is estimated over 30% of total OOP 
expenditure (Economou C., 2010; Siskou et al, 2008). 
iii. Informal payments (hidden economic activity) that represent a high proportion of 
OOPPs.  
OOPPs for health care cause a heavy burden on individual and household incomes. 
According to recent OECD data, during the period of significant reduction in health 
spending in 2011, the share of household consumption allocated to OOP medical spending 
represents 3.8% in Greece –the sixth highest percentage of OOP payment comparing to 
OECD-34 average (2.9%) (OECD, 2013). Furthermore, according to Household Budget 
surveys since 1980s there is a marked increase of family health expenditure as percentage 
of total private consumption, from 4.8% in 1974, to 6.8% in 1998 and 9.0% in 2013 
(National Statistical Department, 1996; ELSTAT., 2014). 
Table 3.27: User charges (as in 2014) 
Categories of goods and services  User charges – Flat copayments 
Public hospital outpatient departments and 
health care centres (HCCs) visits 
Flat copayment of €5 
Afternoon NHS- ESY Hospitals outpatient 
visits 
Flat rates: From €25 (for MDs in rural small hospitals) 
to €90 (for Prof. MDs in University Hospitals. 
Pharmaceuticals 1€ participation fee per medical prescription 
Public hospital extra medical care (e.g. 
rooms with better hotel facilities or other 
health care services) 
Direct payments not reimbursed by SHIF 
Private visits to primary care physicians and 
diagnostic centers  
a) Private visits for a 2
nd 
medical opinion without 
reimbursement by SHIFs, or 
b) Private visits reimbursed retrospectively with a fixed 
amount (smaller than market price) by few Noble 
SHIFs. 
 User charges – Fixed Rates 
Preventive medicine  0% 
Laboratory –diagnostic tests  15 - 30% 
Dental care services up to 40% 
Orthodontic care  0% for children (up to 13–14 years old) covered by few 
Noble SHIFs 
Health consumable materials  25% 
Costed medical procedures  20% or 45% 
Physiotherapy  0% (annual ceiling) 
Speech therapy  0% (monthly ceiling) 
Psychotherapy  0% (monthly ceiling) 
Additional care and therapeutics  25% 
Nursing in private hospitals  5% or 10% 
Pharmaceuticals  Almost uniform for all SHIFs in 2014:  25%-30% with 
exception: 
a) Low-income pensioners and specific chronic 
diseases (ie cardiovascular): 10% 
b) Severe chronic diseases: 0% contribution 
c) For inpatient care: 0% contribution 
Source: EOPYY (2013)Instructions to Beneficiaries. EOPYY, Athens; 2013 (in Greek) 
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3.6.4 Informal payments 
Although the provision of NHS-ESY services is free of charge, there is Greek evidence 
that informal payments (hidden economic activity) in health care concern the provision of 
inpatient and outpatient - specialist services and payments to physicians, primarily 
surgeons so that patients can bypass waiting lists or ensure better quality of service and 
more attention from doctors (Kaitelidou et al, 2013; Kentikelenis A. et al, 2011; Siskou et 
al, 2008; Liaropoulos et al, 2008; Mosialos et al, 2005). As a lot of authors have pointed 
out, given the incomprehensive and uneven development of health coverage, and the lack 
of a rational pricing and remuneration policy, informal payments were developed as 
complement to public funding (Brian -Abel Smith et al,1994; Mosialos et al, 2005; 
Liaropoulos et al, 2008). Informal payments are related with tax evasion and “black 
economy” and constitute a serious problem of the Greek health care financing system as 
they represent one of the main sources of the regressive redistributive effects of the tax 
system in Greece. In addition to these studies, there is evidence of informal payments in 
the Greek hospitals (public and private) over the period 2007 to 2013, by the Transparency 
Int’l Office in Greece. According to the relevant Report, informal payments are 
significantly increased over 2007-2010, whereas in 2011 -2013 a decline can be easily 
observed (Table 3.27). It also worth noting that, informal payments’ percentages are 
significantly different between the public and private hospitals. Public hospitals report 
higher percentages in surgeries, as well for having faster access, whereas higher 
percentages are more prominent in the amount of informal payments, as expected. It is 
worth mentioning that among the theoretical frameworks that were developed for 
explanations of informal payments, the Greek researchers (Souliotis K et al, 2016; 
Yfantopoulos J.,2014; Siskou et al, 2008; Liaropoulos et al, 2008) claim that the theoretical 
concept that could explain better the persistence of informal payments in Greece, is the 
‘‘alternative politics’’ described by Cohen et al. (2004) – related to the “culture” of 
informal payments in Greek public sector in general. According to the concept of 
‘‘alternative politics’’ the informal payments can be attributed to a variety of structural 
inadequacies and weaknesses in the organization, operation and the financing of health 
services – that are derived by the broader ‘‘culture’’ of informal payments that 
characterizes the Greek public sector in general, and used as an alternative means of 
improving public product and service provision. In particular, a current study by 
Yfantopoulos J. (2013) on a pooled cross section-time series analysis the period 1958-
2011, revealed that overall, more than one quarter to one third of Greek economic activities 
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have been either unrecorded or hidden from official statistics – valued from 24.66%(sd.± 
2.8) to 30.13% of the GDP with a significant percentage attributed to health care. 
Similarly, the current study of Souliotis K et al (2016) that explored informal payments for 
2012 found about €1.5 billion or 0.8. % of GDP to account for a hidden economy in the 
health sector, leading to more than €0.5 billion in tax evasion, similar to an older study for 
the hidden economy of 0.9 % of GDP in 2005 (Siskou O. et al, 2008).  
Overall, the high proportion OOP and mainly informal payments for health care is a 
serious issue, as it undermines the constitutional guarantee of free access to health services 
and causes a heavy burden in individual and household income
23
. It also increases 
inequities in the distribution of the burden of financing health services among social 
groups, as the older population. Therefore, OOP and informal payments could be a serious 
barrier to access that impacts negatively on households’ living conditions, especially 
during the current fiscal economic crisis that containment of health care expenditure has 
become imperative, putting additional pressure on healthcare systems (Souliotis K. et al, 
2016; Economou C., 2015). It is also worth noting the results of a recent cross-sectional 
nationwide telephone survey in 2012 for exploring informal payments by Souliotis K et al 
(2016) that performed an analysis of household budget surveys from 2008-2012 and 
revealed the substantial increase of household payments to public hospitals as a percentage 
of total household health expenditure, which has risen by 86 % (from 4.2 % in 2008 to 7.8 
% in 2012) (Souliotis K et al, 2016). In addition, as far as it concerns the older population, 
this burden is increased if we consider the fact that as LTC for elderly is not statutory 
available and the state expenditure is less than 0.3% of GDP, other costs are likely to arise 
from the inappropriate use of acute health-care services, that include OOPPs to fund a 
large portion of LTC resulting in significant adverse impact on the disposable income of 
older people and their families. Thus, although government expenditures on long-term care 
may appear to be low, these are likely to have been shifted, at least in part, to the health 
sector (EC, 2014). A core policy issue is how these costs can be equitably shared across 
societies. 
                                                          
23
 According to Household Budget surveys since 1980s there is a marked increase of family health 
expenditure as percentage of total private consumption, from 4.8% in 1974, to 6.8% in 1998 and 9.0% in 
2013 (National Statistical Department, 1996; ELSTAT., 2014). 
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Table 3.28: Percentage of informal payments and corruption in Greece in the years 2007-2013 in 
the healthcare sector (Transparency International Greece, 2014) 
Years Hospitals 
(% by the 
total of 
services 
/categories 
examined 
for 
corruption) 
Hospitals 
(% by the 
corruption 
instances/ 
cases) 
Surgery 
(% by the 
corruption 
instances/ 
cases) 
Informal 
payments 
to the 
physician 
(% by the 
corruption 
instances/ 
cases) 
Informal 
payments 
to receive 
better 
quality 
services 
(% by the 
corruption 
instances/ 
cases) 
Informal 
payments 
to receive 
faster 
access (% 
by the 
corruption 
instances/ 
cases) 
301€-
1000€ 
(amount 
of 
informal 
payments 
by % of 
people 
who were 
asked to 
pay) 
301€-
1000€ 
(amount 
of 
informal 
payments 
of % of 
people 
who 
answered 
payment 
of specific 
amount) 
Public Hospital sector 
2007 2.9 34.2 56.3 2.3 4.7 0.0 28.4 42.0 
2008 3.3 34.5 61.5 3.0 3.0 0.5 32.5 50.4 
2009 3.1 33.5 65.8 4.2 1.6 1.1 29.5 44.4 
2010 2.5 35.4 61.9 6.5 0.0 0.6 36.1 49.6 
2011 3.1 41.9 60.6 3.0 4.0 10.0 36.9 45.8 
2012 2.8 45.0 45.8 8.2 13.1 17.5 33.2 40.0 
2013  50.0 32.4 7.7     
Private health sector (hospitals/doctors/private medical practices) 
  Hospitals & 
Clinics 
      
2007  19.9 42 2.5  3.7 13.6  
2008  22.8 46.8 0  2.1 13.8  
2009  19.2 61.3 1.1  0.0 29  
2010  22.5 47.1 4.7  1.2 22.4  
2011  21.1 54.3 2.2  5.1 26.8  
2012  19.4 39.1 8.7  14.8 34.1  
2013  17.4 34.2 15.8  22.4   
Source: Transparency International Greece, 2014 
 
3.6.5 Budgeting process in the public health sector 
According to the current budgeting process, the annual budgets of NHS-ESY and EOPYY 
with imposing ceiling are set by MoH and MoF for covering annual expenditures and 
paying suppliers as well as EOPYY for paying ESY and other private providers for the 
care that their beneficiaries receive. The budget ceilings are set on past performance – on a 
historical and political negotiation basis and not on actual needs of the population. In 
addition, EOPYY and SHIF’s budgets depend on demand of their beneficiaries that is 
unpredictable and imposing a ceiling is not feasible. Therefore, ESY hospitals and EOPYY 
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exceed their total health budget and result in deficits. Hospitals exceed the initial budget 
due to delays in hospitals’ reimbursement from EOPYY; overestimation of the DRGs-
KEN prices; or EOPYY exceeds the initial budget due to transfer of previous deficits of 
the SHIFs merged; the under-financing and low-liquidity problems due to the economic 
crisis; potential revenue shortfall; and supplier induced demand. As a consequence, the 
successive deficits of EOPYY and public hospitals result in delay payments to their 
suppliers and in a vicious cycle of deficits that need additional ex post subsidies by the 
MoH24.Therefore, the MoH by providing successive subsidies, contributes to the inefficient 
management of hospital supplies.  
3.6.6 The role of EOPYY within the health care financing 
Following failure to establish an Organization for the Management of Health Care 
Financial Resources (ODIPY) that would act as a third party payer and purchaser for 
primary and hospital services, EOPYY’s establishment in 2011 (law 3918/2011) is 
characterized as “the most promising reform of the last decades in Greek health insurance” 
(Polyzos et al, 2014; Niakas, 2013). EOPYY (“the National Organization for Healthcare 
Provision”) unified the healthcare sectors of the four largest social insurance funds (IKA 
SHIF; OAEE SHIF; OPAD & OGA SHIF) covering over 95% of the insured population
25
. 
EOPYY is self-managed but under the jurisdiction of MoH and MoF. It has multiple 
missions: To provide health services to its beneficiaries registered to the merging SHIFs; to 
coordinate PHC between the different providers;  to act as a unique buyer of medicines and 
health care, regulate contracting with all health care providers with the broader goal to 
have bargaining power in the market  in order to increase competition between hospitals 
and PHC providers (Petmezidou, 2012; and OECD 2011, p.77). Under the current Law 
2438/2014 EOPYY is planned, to transfer the responsibility for PHC provision to RHAs, 
to separate its purchasing and provider functions and become a sole purchaser with 
monopsony power, in order to place pressure on providers to improve efficiency and drive 
the prices down. However, the multipayer system still exists, the law is partially 
implemented, the monitoring systems are poor, and the operation of an internal market is 
absent. Therefore, given the fact that every year EOPYY creates successive deficits, 
                                                          
24
 Outstanding debts of ESY hospitals, military hospitals and EOPYY were calculated more than 1 billion€ in the end of 
2014. EOPYY’s deficit was 374 million€ in the end of September 2014 (EOPYY, 01/10/2014). Furthermore, Greek 
hospitals received 493 million€ grants from state budget during 2014, as well as 400 million€ grants from previous 
years (MoH,01/10/2014). 
25
 Non Noble IKA blue- collar employees covers 50.3% of the population; Non Noble OGA for farmers people in 
agriculture (covers 19.5%); Noble OAEE for the self–employed and small businesses covering 12.9% and Noble OPAD 
for civil cervants covering 11.7% of the population. 
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EOPYY’s performance in 2012–2014 doesn’t seem to have met the expectations of Greek 
society and Greek state yet (Polyzos et al, 2014; Niakas, 2013).  
3.6.7 Payment and remuneration system 
The payment methods for health care providers (ESY, EOPYY and health professionals) 
are presented in Tables 3.28 and 3.29. There is criticism and evidence that the retrospective 
reimbursement system of providers does not offer incentives for improving productivity 
and effectiveness.  
(a) From the side of hospitals and EOPYY units: (i) Hospitals and SHIFs - EOPYY do not 
have incentives to stay within their initial budgets; (ii) The method diagnosis-related 
groups (DRGs - KEN) costs’ framework of 2011 is used in an adequate way for 
reimbursing hospitals for services provided years ago without assessment. This 
inefficiency leads to the overestimation of the DRGs-KEN prices and increased costs. 
(b) From the side of health professionals: NHS-ESY and EOPYY full-time physicians are 
paid on low salary, and the contracted physicians are reimbursed on a low fee-for-
service basis with a limited number of visits per month, regardless their specialty and 
their performance. These methods do not have efficiency-promoting incentives. 
Physicians are indirectly encouraged to induce unnecessary demand for health care 
services, as well as, to ask for informal additional payment. 
3.6.8 Procurement System 
In terms of the public procurement system, till recently, each hospital was responsible for 
purchasing its own supplies (medical products, medicines and devices) usually without a 
prior tender under the guide of MoH. However, these procedures were not always 
transparent and did not achieve economies of scale. Supplies were bought at a higher price 
than market price. Since the 2007 reform, centralized public procurement procedure has 
been adopted via the establishment of a Central Committee of Health Supplies (EPY) and 
the establishment of a National Registry of Medical Devices (EKAPTY ex EKEVYL) 
under the jurisdiction of MoH, to help the central committee (EPY) to unify tenders via 
certification and control of the quality on medical devices. However, EKAPTY does not 
undertake systematic HTAs, and the new procurement system has been introduced slowly. 
A national integrated health technology assessment (HTA) system has not been established 
yet. 
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Table 3.29: Payment methods by type of provider 
Health providers  Payment method Payer 
ESY hospitals  
 
– Fixed budgets and subsidies 
– DRGs (Per diem fees till 2013) 
– Fixed payment per case-mix group 
   (e.g cardiovascular surgeries) 
– Fee for service for diagnostic tests and afternoon 
outpatient clinics (fees are determined by a fixed 
price index)  
– State budget 
– EOPYY & Social insurance funds 
– Private insurance 
– Household budgets 
 
Rural health centres  
(HCCs) 
Annual budgets State budget 
Army hospitals – Annual budgets 
– Per diem fees 
– Fee for service 
– Ministry of Defence 
– EOPYY & Social insurance funds 
Profit-making private 
hospitals 
– DRGs (Per diem fees till 2013) 
– Fixed payment per case-mix group 
   (e.g. cardiovascular surgeries) 
– Fee for service for diagnostic tests, surgical 
procedures and outpatient services 
– EOPYY & Social insurance funds 
– Private insurance 
– Household budgets 
– Donations by philanthropic 
   and other sources 
Private hospitals –  DRGs , (Per diem fees (freely determined) till 
2013) 
– Fee for service for diagnostic tests,      surgical 
procedures and outpatient services (freely 
determined) 
– Fixed payment per case-mix group 
   (e.g. cardiovascular surgeries)  
– Private insurance 
– EOPYY & Social insurance funds 
– Household budgets 
 
Private diagnostic 
centres 
Fee for service and group contracts – Household budgets 
– EOPYY & Social insurance funds 
Source: Economou (2010) 
Table 3.30: Payment of health professionals 
Health care personnel category Payment method 
ESY hospital doctors –Monthly salary 
– Fee-for-service payments for the physician’s 
contribution to afternoon outpatient clinics 
– Informal payments 
Private hospital doctors – Monthly salary 
– Fee for service 
– Extra “bonuses” 
Private doctors contracted with EOPYY & other 
Social insurance funds 
–Fee for service for a maximum number of visits 
per month 
– Capitation fees (in some cases) 
– Informal payments 
Source: Economou (2010) 
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3.7 Physical and human resources  
3.7.1 Main characteristics of physical and human resources 
Tables 3.30 to 3.34 summarize the number of human resources and infrastructure (hospital 
beds) from 2000 till 2011, based on OECD and ELSTAT -Eurostat database. Table 3.34 
and figures 3.16 to 3.18 illustrate regional allocation of resources by NUT2 regions and 
interregional patients’ flow, as well. Examining these numbers we can observe major 
efforts to make health care services more efficient, especially in the public hospital sector 
that absorbs about 70% of total health care spending.  
 
Hospital sector 
According to OECD data, in 2009, there were 313 hospitals in Greece providing a total of 
54704 beds that were increased since 2000 and reduced following economic crisis in 2010 
and 2011 (53773), comprised of: 69.6% of beds belonging to the NHS - ESY; 2.6% for 
non-for profit private and 27.6% for profit private hospitals, as presented by type in 
paragraph 3.4 above. This total number of 54704 beds is equivalent to a ratio of 4.9 beds 
per 1000 inhabitants in 2011, compared to the EU28 (5.3). About intensive care, we have 
3% of hospital capacity in ICUs, whereas the WHO recommends 8-12% as the “proper 
capacity”26 (Greek society of ICUS, 2005). There is a significant decrease in psychiatric 
beds from 1980 till today, as well. In addition, there is an increase in hospital occupancy 
rates from 66% in 1980 to 73% in 2005 and 73.4% in 2011 lower compared to EU and 
OECD average of 78.2%. The average length of stay (ALOS) for acute treatment hospitals 
has declined from 10.2 days in 1980 to 5.4 days in 2008 and has been accompanied by an 
increase in hospital discharges from 160.7 per 1000 population in 2000 to 198.5 in 2008 
similar to EU average.  
 
Medical Equipment 
About medical equipment, Greece with 33.9 Computed Tomography (CT) scanners and 
23.4 Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) per million population in 2011, is still ranked 
first among other 27 EU countries (20.0 for CT and 10.5 for MRI). Hence, the fact that 
MoH has not developed yet any formula for setting standards or national strategy in 
installing performance monitoring of health technology equipment has resulted in 
                                                          
26
 According to 2014 data of Greek Society of Intensive Care, there are in total 578 beds in IC units fully equipped, 
whereas 103 beds or 18% remain closed due to lack of personnel.  
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distribution not based on actual needs, in increased consumption and weak controlled 
supply of expensive biomedical equipment, mainly outside public hospitals. In particular, 
70.6% (for 2009 and 2013) of MRI and 67.4% (for 2009) and 51.4% (for 2013) of CT 
scanners belong to the private sector (diagnostic centers and hospitals) (Mossialos et al, 
2005; Economou, 2010). Therefore, the above figures of beds capacity, as well as the rates 
of hospital activities and the occupancy rate indicate that the last decade beyond better 
clinical practices, there has been a trend to increase productivity in hospitals.  
 
Human resources 
As far as it concerns human resources, it is worth mentioning that official quantification of 
the personnel separated in public and private structure are not provided by MoH and 
ELSTAT. Only aggregated data are officially provided, as in Tables 3.32 to 3.34 that 
summarize the number of health care personnel in total and by category per 1000 
population from 1990 till 2011, as well as regional allocation of health personnel by NUT2 
regions.  
Comparisons with other EU and OECD countries reveal the oversupply of doctors, dentists 
and pharmacists and the under-supply of nurses. Greece has the highest ratio of doctors 
(6.2) almost twice than OECD (3.2) and EU28 (3.4) average, of specialists (3.6) and 
dentists (1.3) per 1000 inhabitants and ranked 4
th
 in ratio of pharmacists. Conversely, 
Greece has the lowest ratios of GPs (0.3) and nurses (3.6)  per 1000 inhabitants in 2011 
less than half the EU average (8.0). The ratio of nurses to physicians is 0.57 is also the 
lowest in EU28 (2.33), due to the oversupply of doctors and nurse shortage. These ratios 
are similar with the composition of primary health care (PHC) workforce of NHS-ESY and 
EOPYY as estimated in table 3.34 and presented analytically in paragraph 3.4.2 above. 
3.7.2 Regional allocation of human resources and hospital beds  
If we examine Eurostat data on NUTS2 regional allocation of hospital beds and health 
professionals per 100,000 population (Table 3.34 and Figures 3.17 & 3.18), we observe 
major regional variations. Concretely, 62.7% of hospital beds and 65.8% of physicians are 
concentrated in the two most crowded regions of the country 43.6% (49.3% for physicians) 
in Attika/Athens - the capital and 19.1% (16.5% for physicians) in Central 
Macedonia/Thessaloniki) and in other urban areas with general and tertiary teaching 
hospitals. It is also worth mentioning that private beds are also unevenly distributed among 
regions, as most of them (two-thirds) are concentrated in Attiki and Central Macedonia – 
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Thessaloniki similar with public hospital beds (ICAP, 2006). On the other hand, the 
regions with the lowest density in hospital beds (Central Greece, Ionian Islands and North 
Aegean Islands) do not have half of the national average (484.8 beds). Central Greece with 
189.4 beds has a ratio of 0.40 of the national average. Similarly, as far as it concerns 
regional allocation of physicians, the regions with the lowest density in doctors (Western 
Macedonia, Ionian Islands and North Aegean Islands) do not have half of the national 
average (614.4 doctors). Western Macedonia has 4.5 lower density of physicians than the 
national average. About the allocation of nurses, Central Greece with the lowest density in 
nurses (144) has 0.40 nurses of the national average of 354 nurses. Furthermore, in 
accordance with European studies for regional disparities, the above data indicate that 
Greece has the highest density of practicing physicians and the highest variation across 
regions, compared to OECD and EU countries (EC, 2008) as in Figure 3.18. For Greece, 
interregional disparities (within Greece) are greater than intra-regional disparities (among 
countries). Moreover, there is irrational geographical distribution even in the contracted 
PHC physicians, that results in a significant lack of specific categories of specialists in 
most rural areas except five large urban regions
27
 (Law 3918/2011), given that the majority 
of contracted physicians (62%) are located in the two most crowded regions of the country 
(Athens and Thessaloniki) (Karakolias E & Polyzos N., 2014). Overall, the aforementioned 
data and ratios indicate that less privileged regions lack adequate hospital infrastructure 
and personnel. The regions with the lowest density of resources are the poorest regions in 
Greece
28
 (Central Greece; Western Greece; Ionian Islands and North Aegean Islands) with 
highly mountainous and isolated areas. As a consequence, we observe high percentages of 
uncontrollable interregional flows of patients. According to the “Health and Welfare Map” 
data as estimated by National School of Public Health in 2011, (Figure 3.19), patients 
prefer to travel from rural and isolated areas (ie mountainous as in poor regions of Epirus, 
Central Greece and islands) to urban areas such as to Athens (33.2%) or to areas with large 
university hospitals (in Thessaloniki 42.6% or in Ioannina- Epirus 66.3%) offering 
expensive and high-technology services or visiting private providers (NSPH, 2012). This 
issue is important due to the geographical peculiarity of the regions and substantial 
                                                          
27 The five most populous specialties corresponding to 63% of total PHC physicians include: Internal medicine, 
cardiology, obstetric-gynecology, general practice and orthopedics (Karakolias E & Polyzos N., 2014). 
28 The poorest regions with the lowest regional GDP per capita are Epirus, Western Greece and Thessaly and those with 
the lowest Gross Value Added are North Aegean, Epirus and Ionian Islands and East Macedonia & Thrace, according 
to the National Accounts by the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT, 2014).  
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transportation difficulties in financial and psychological terms, especially for the elderly, 
given that there is a greater concentration of older people in rural areas that contribute to an 
increase in the need for health care as a lot of authors have pointed out (Mosialos et al al, 
2005; Economou, 2010, Altanis P et al, 2008, Petmesidou M, 2006).  
Overall, it is obvious that as a lot of authors have mentioned “Greece has chosen the most 
expensive way to produce care: through hospitals rather than outpatient care, through 
specialists rather GPs, through doctors rather than nurses and through diagnostic 
expenditures rather than clinical attention” (Mossialos et al, 2005; Economou & Giorno, 
2009; Niakas D., 2013).  
 
Table 3.31: Total Hospital Beds 2000 - 2011 (OECD, Europe Health at a Glance, 2014) 
    
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total Number 51500 52276 51781 51762 51871 52511 53701 53888 53652 54704 54012 53773 
Per 1000 population 4.72 4.77 4.71 4.7 4.69 4.73 4.83 4.83 4.8 4.89 4.84 4.83 
Hospital employment-to-bed 
ratio (head counts) 
1.52 1.54 1.63 1.66 1.65 1.61 1.59 1.57 1.59 1.59 .. .. 
Nurse-to-bed ratio (head 
counts) 
0.62 0.66 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.73 .. .. 
Curative 
(acute) care 
Beds 
Number 40874 42058 41623 42069 41969 42884 43965 44244 44417 45729 .. .. 
Per 1 000 
population 
3.74 3.84 3.79 3.82 3.8 3.87 3.95 3.96 3.97 4.09 .. .. 
Psychiatric 
care Beds 
Number 10626 10218 10158 9693 9902 9627 9736 9644 9235 8975 .. .. 
Per 1 000 
population 
0.97 0.93 0.92 0.88 0.9 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.83 0.8 .. .. 
Beds in 
public 
hospitals 
Number 35730 36186 36142 35814 35808 36554 37053 37574 37027 38115 .. .. 
Per 1 000 
population 
3.27 3.3 3.29 3.25 3.24 3.3 3.33 3.37 3.31 3.41 .. .. 
Beds in not-
for profit 
private 
hospitals 
Number 629 1052 1179 1420 1548 1568 1566 1607 1597 1465 .. .. 
Per 1 000 
population 
0.06 0.1 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 .. .. 
Beds in for 
profit 
private 
hospitals  
Number 15141 15038 14460 14528 14515 14389 15082 14707 15028 15124 .. .. 
Per 1 000 
population 
1.39 1.37 1.32 1.32 1.31 1.3 1.36 1.32 1.34 1.35 .. .. 
Source: Source: OECD Health at a Glance, 2014 (Database) 
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Table 3.32: Hospital beds in total and by function per 1000 population, 2000, 2005 & 2011 
 
Table 3.33: Health care personnel per 1000 population, 1990-2011 
 1990 1995 2000 2004 2006 2009 2011 
Practising physicians 3.40 3.86 4.33 4.88 5.35 6.17 6.24 
Practising GPs n/a n/a 0.25 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.3 
Practising specialists 2.19 2.58 3.09 3.29 3.39 3.51 3.63 
Practising dentists 0.99 1.00 1.13 1.20 1.27 1.32 1.31 
Practising pharmacists 0.74 0.79 0.82 0.86 0.88 0.96 1.08 
Practising nurses 3.43 3.59 2.72b 3.27 3.21 3.33 n/a 
Source: Source: OECD Health at a Glance, 2014 (Database) 
 
Table 3.34: Health care resources in Greece from OECD and EU Health Statistics 2011 versus 2000 
 Greece OECD 
average 
EU 
average 
Rank among 
OECD 
Rank among EU 
  2011 2000 2011 2000 2011 2000 countries* countries* 
Health care resources          
Number of doctors (per 1000 
population) 
6.2 4.3 3.2 2.7 3.4 3.1 1 out of 34 1 out of 28 
Number of nurses (per 1000 
population) 
3.3 (2009) 2.7 8.8 7.5 8.0 6.7 32 out of 34 28 out of 28 
Pharmacists (per 1000 population) 1.08 0.86 
(2004) 
      
Hospital beds (per 1000 population) 4.9 (2009) 4.7 4.8 5.6 5.2 6.3 14 out of 34 17 out of 28 
Computed Tomography (CT) 
scanners (per million population) 
33.89 (2013) 25.2 
(2005) 
23.6  20  6 out of 29 1 out of 27 
CT scanners in hospital 16.4    15.8    
CT scanners outside hospital 17.4    4.2    
Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(MRI) units (per million population) 
23.4 (2013) 13.2 
(2005) 
13.3  10.5  4  out of 28 2 out of 27 
MRI units in hospital 6.8    6.7    
MRI units outside hospital 16.5    4.5    
Source: OECD (2014) Health at a Glance; Europe Health at a Glance  - *Note: Countries are ranked in descending order of values 
   Greece  EU15 EU28 EU28 
 1980 2000 2005 2011 2000 2005 2011 
Hospital total beds  6.2 4.72 4.73 4.9 (2011) 6.3 5.8 5.2 
Curative (Acute) care - beds:  4.9 3.7 3.8 4.1 (2009)  4.4 (2002) 3.9 3.6 
Psychiatric Beds:   0.9 0.8 0.8 (2009) 0.76 0.68 0.61 
Curative care – occupancy rate   
(% available beds): 
66.0% 70.2% 73.4% 73.4% (2008) 65.0%  78.2*% 
Curative care – ALOS  (days): 10.2 6.2 5.6 5.4 (2008)    
Hospital discharges 117.6 160.7 188.09 198.5 (2008) 174.5 173.3 172.8 
Average length of stay (ALOS) - 
number of days - all causes 
13.3 8.4 7.6 6.6 (2008) 9.6  7.8 
Source: OECD Health Statistics 2014; Eurostat Statistics Database; WHO European Health for All Database. 
*: OECD23 
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Table 3.35: Regional Allocation of Health workforce and Hospital Beds by NUTS 2 regions in 
2009, 2010, 2011 (Per 100,000 inhabitants) 
 Medical doctors Nurses & 
midwives 
Dentists Hospital Beds 
GEO/TIME 2009 2010 2011 2009 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 
Greece 611.82 612.56 614.47 353.92 130.94 129.66 128.45 477.4 484.8 
Eastern Macedonia & 
Thrace 
456.26 
(4.01%) 
485.52 
(4.25%) 
491.84 
(4.29%) 
308.07 
(4.68%) 
92.64 
(3.80%) 
92.85 
(3.84%) 
91.17 
(3.80%) 
383.64 
(4.34%) 
371.4 
(4.12%) 
Central Macedonia 
(Thessaloniki) 
571.94 
(16.15%) 
582.33 
(16.44%) 
585.31 
(16.48%) 
390.22 
(19.05%) 
132.28 
(17.46%) 
130.10 
(17.35%) 
123.68 
(16.66%) 
536.1 
(19.39%) 
535.8 
(19.10%) 
Western Macedonia 282.14 
(1.20%) 
279.37 
(1.18%) 
278.64 
(1.17%) 
256.21 
(1.88%) 
93.48 
(1.85%) 
90.51 
(1.81%) 
93.79 
(1.89%) 
435.0 
(2.38%) 
438.7 
(2.35%) 
Thessaly 480.04 
(5.12%) 
482.91 
(5.13%) 
483.68 
(5.12%) 
357.89 
(6.60%) 
116.58 
(5.81%) 
116.34 
(5.84%) 
113.64 
(5.75%) 
537.6 
(7.38%) 
556.3 
(7.48%) 
Epirus 603.41 
(3.12%) 
586.63 
(3.03%) 
558.32 
(2.85%) 
484.41 
(4.33%) 
102.76 
(2.48%) 
98.28 
(2.40%) 
100.0 
(2.45%) 
481.5 
(3.17%) 
476.8 
(3.11%) 
Ionian Islands 385.02 
(1.30%) 
378.86 
(1.28%) 
364.70 
(1.23%) 
219.76 
(1.28%) 
69.96 
(1.10%) 
69.97 
(1.12%) 
73.45 
(1.18%) 
325.6 
(1.40%) 
323.2 
(1.38%) 
Western Greece 466.04 
(5.02%) 
511.14 
(5.50%) 
515.26 
(5.52%) 
268.25 
(5.00%) 
88.88 
(4.47%) 
88.25 
(4.49%) 
87.11 
(4.46%) 
311.1 
(4.29%) 
311.4 
(4.23%) 
Central Greece 320.89 
(2.58%) 
304.97 
(2.44%) 
306.22 
(2.44%) 
144.12 
(2.00%) 
88.75 
(3.33%) 
84.40 
(3.19%) 
87.70 
(3.35%) 
188.2 
(1.95%) 
189.4 
(1.92%) 
Peloponnesus 375.91 
(3.22%) 
374.76 
(3.19%) 
383.90 
(3.25%) 
225.82 
(3.35%) 
98.37 
(3.94%) 
94.83 
(3.82%) 
99.71 
(4.04%) 
302.5 
(3.34%) 
314.7 
(3.40%) 
Attica (Athens) 845.41 
(50,20%) 
828.87 
(49.21%) 
833.61 
(49.36%) 
425.39 
(43.67%) 
174.26 
(48.35%) 
173.60 
(48.69%) 
172.00 
(48,72%) 
571.4 
(43.40%) 
582.2 
(43.62%) 
North Aegean 375.77 
(1.09%) 
411.44 
(1.19%) 
405.94 
(1.17%) 
246.35 
(1.23%) 
78.95 
(1.07%) 
77.58 
(1.06%) 
80.79 
(1.11%) 
343.8 
(1.28%) 
345.3 
(1.26%) 
South Aegean 330.26 
(1.47%) 
347.40 
(1.55%) 
357.90 
(1.61%) 
196.47 
(1.52%) 
88.33 
(1.84%) 
88.79 
(1.88%) 
94.69 
(2.03%) 
410.3 
(2.34%) 
484.8 
(2.73%) 
Crete 623.79 
(5.51%) 
633.11 
(5.60%) 
622.20 
(5.50%) 
354.42 
(5.42%) 
108.64 
(4.49%) 
108.21 
(4.52%) 
107.44 
(4.55%) 
472.1 
(5.35%) 
474.0 
(5.29%) 
Bold & italics:the highest number; Bold: the lowest number;  
Source of data: Eurostat. Last update:27/1/2015 - Extracted on: 30/1/2015 
 
Figure 3.16 - 3.18: Percentage (%) distribution of hospital beds (2009) and Physicians (2011) 
by NUTS 2 level - 13 regions (Per 100.000 inhabitants)Figure 3.16 Distribution of 
hospital beds by NUTS2 regions, 2009Figure 3.17 Distribution of Physicians by NUTS2 regions, 2009 
 
Source:ELSTAT, Eurostat, 2014 
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Figure 3.18: Physicians density in predominantly urban and rural regions, selected 
countries, 2011 (or nearest year) 
 
Source: OECD Regions at a Glance 2013. 
 
 
Figure 3.19: Interregional patient flow 
 
Interregional patient flow (outside Prefectures): 
 <10% normal flow; 11%- 15%: allowed;16% - 25%: to be examined;>26%: unacceptable 
Source: National School of Public Health (2012) Greek “Health and Welfare Map” – Interregional patient flow 
(outside prefectures) - http://www.esdy.edu.gr/files/009_Oikonomikon_Ygeias.pdf 
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3.8 Weaknesses/ Challenges of the Greek Health Care System: Efficiency and Equity 
The Greek healthcare system at least the last twenty years is a continuous process of 
"transition" and ongoing structural and organizational changes. Despite successive 
legislation, administrative interventions, and significant investment in human and material 
resources, the healthcare system is characterized by a multiplicity and complexity in its 
organization, in the financing of health services, and particularly in the daily provision of 
health care that undermine the efficiency of the health care system as well as the issue of 
equity. These weaknesses and challenges of the Greek health care system are summarized 
in Table 2.23 below. 
Efficiency 
The aforementioned figures and evidence via DEA method of increased productivity of 
hospitals, increased resources of the health care system, as well as the increased level of 
spending, together with the variation in occupancy and performance among ESY hospitals 
in different regions, the relative decline in performance of PHC units, suggest that the 
availability of beds and resources is not a problem. A number of factors limit the efficiency 
of hospitals and primary health care units, as following.  
3.8.1 Highly centralized decision-making and reduced autonomy of Regional Health 
Authorities – unsuccessful decentralization 
The regulation and administration of healthcare services is centralized and dispersed 
throughout the government:  
 MoH has the primary responsibility for planning, implementing and monitoring national 
health policy. MoH is responsible for the regulation of NHS-ESY and EOPYY (with 
MoL) for planning resource allocation and monitoring their activities as providers and 
purchasers of health care. It also r regulates the private health sector. The Ministry of 
Labour (MoL) is responsible for the management of the Social Health Insurance Funds 
(SHIFs) that merge to EOPYY. Other Ministries are also involved: Ministry of 
Development, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Education etc. In particular, Ministry of 
Development is responsible with MoH for the procurement system applied, calls for 
tenders, and for the pricing policy of medicinal products
29
.  
                                                          
29 Other Ministries involved are: Ministry of National Defence for the management of military hospitals; the Ministry of 
Education for the training of physicians in NHS University hospitals; even the Ministry of Mercantile Marine responsible 
for the Mariners’ health insurance fund, and other public bodies related with the other SHIFs. 
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 Despite the establishment and operation of Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) in 2001 
as PESYPs and since 2005 as Regional Health Administrations (DYPE – YPE), there is 
limited decentralization of competences from the central government of the MoH. The 
regional authorities, only theoretically enjoy real independence for planning and co–
ordinating regional resource allocation given that the capital investment, recruitment 
policy and all the financial transactions of DYPE have to be approved by the Ministry 
of Health (MoH) (WHO/EURO, 2006). Neither DYPE nor the NHS-ESY hospitals have 
the authority to negotiate with EOPYY in setting prices for the services they provide, as 
well. Since their establishment in 2005 till today, DYPEs operate as another 
bureaucratic organisation that play an advisory role for the MoH and supervise 
implementation of its policy (Economic and Social Council of Greece, 2005).  
 
3.8.2 Fragmented structure, bureaucratic organization of the health care system 
and lack of coordination 
 The public healthcare system has a fragmented structure between the NHS-ESY, 
EOPYY and other SHIFs and bureaucratic organization due to the existence of different 
subsystems and organizational models involved in administering the supply of services 
and manage day-to-day operations without the existence of a coordination mechanism. 
(Mossialos et al, 2005; Petmesidou 2006; Featherstone and Tinios 2006; Economou, 
2010; WHO, 2006; OECD, 1992).  
 A statutory link between NHS-ESY and EOPYY – SHIFs in order to coordinate 
common policies is absent. A statutory link is necessary, given that regulations and 
development of ESY (prices, services etc) has an impact on EOPYY and the SHIFs as 
potential purchasers, whereas any changes in EOPYY and SHIFs’ regulations 
(coverage, provision, funding) has impact on ESY as a major health care provider.  
 Furthermore, the PHC sector faces problematic coordination on two levels: (a) poor 
coordination among the large number of PHC providers with services varied in quality 
and extent; and (b) poor coordination between PHC providers and hospital doctors, due 
to the absence of a clearly defined referral system and low gatekeeping mechanism 
based on GPs. Lack of coordination results in significant weakness of incontinuity of 
care. 
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3.8.3 Deficient allocation of economic, human and technical resources in multiple 
levels 
Over thirty years after the establishment of the NHS in 1983, the Greek NHS still faces 
significant difficulties in allocating resources rationally in multiple levels in funding and 
provision of services.  
3.8.3.1 Inefficient allocation of funding  
Implications of a multi-payer system - EOPYY as a “peculiar monopsony” 
As aforementioned, one of the main objectives of the successive reform attempts and the 
establishment of EOPYY in 2011 was to separate the purchasing and provider functions; 
EOPYY to act as a third party payer and single purchaser for primary and hospital services, 
with the broader goal to have bargaining power. Thus, EOPYY would create a monopsony 
purchasing system in order to increase both efficiency and competition between hospitals 
and PHC providers and change providers incentives to increase productivity. However, in 
practice, EOPYY by unifying the four major SHIFs turned into a “peculiar monopsony”, 
given that it is the major purchaser of health services covering over 95% of the insured 
population, and at the same time it is a PHC provider owning 350 PHC units (of ex IKA 
SHIF). EOPYY has not been transformed to a unified national insurance body, either. 
Therefore, given the fact that every year EOPYY creates successive deficits, EOPYY’s 
performance in 2012–2014 doesn’t seem to have met the expectations of Greek society and 
Greek government, yet (Polyzos et al, 2014; Niakas, 2013).  
Inefficient centralized budgeting process - based on historical and political criteria- 
results in a vicious circle of deficits  
As aforementioned, the annual budgets of NHS-ESY and EOPYY with imposing ceiling 
are set on past performance – on a historical and political negotiation basis and not on the 
population needs. In reality, for number organizational and financial reasons, as well as 
due to the fragmented system and absence of pooling of resources at the regional level, 
health expenditure usually exceeds the budget limits and results in successive deficits for 
EOPYY and ESY hospitals which delay payments to their suppliers and need additional ex 
post subsidies by the MoH. 
Retrospective payment and remuneration system not related to performance that does 
not provide efficiency-promoting incentives 
The retrospective reimbursement system of providers does not offer incentives to providers 
for improving productivity and effectiveness. Given that ESY hospitals and EOPYY 
receive successive subsidies for their deficits by the state budget, there is no incentive to 
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stay within their initial budget and pay their suppliers on time. About physicians, the fact 
that MoH reimburses physicians with low salaries regardless their specialty and their 
performance - encourages physicians to induce unnecessary demand for health care 
services, as well as, to ask for informal additional payment. 
Ineffective purchasing management of supplies due to absence of national HTA 
assessment system and extensive complex ties between the private and public sector  
Given the growth of new medical technology in private sector, the NHS and EOPYY 
purchase high-technology services required from private providers on a contractual basis. 
However, the absence of a national health technology assessment (HTA) agency to 
undertake systematic HTAs and economic evaluation (only a National registry has been 
established) has resulted in increased consumption and weak controlled supply of 
expensive biomedical equipment via the private sector. Since the 2007 reform, a 
centralized public procurement system was slowly introduced with the help of a National 
Registry of Medical Devices and is expected to improve the efficiency of the system. 
Therefore, an integrated and better monitored public procurement system is developing 
very slowly.  
3.8.3.2 Irrational resource allocation mechanisms in provision 
Irrational regional allocation of human resources and infrastructure  
According to the aforementioned data of regional allocation of resources (mainly personnel 
and infrastructure) and findings of DEA analyses evaluating hospital and few PHC units’ 
performance, it is obvious that the majority of resources (public and private) are 
concentrated in the two most crowded regions of the country (Athens and Thessaloniki) 
and the less privileged regions lack adequate hospital infrastructure and specific categories 
of specialized physicians. A number of factors limit the efficient and effective 
geographical distribution of infrastructure and human resources, as following.  
i. The limited success of decentralization process especially in the sector of allocating 
resources, together with the limited managerial and financial autonomy of regional 
authorities DYPEs, hospitals, HCCs and EOPYY to develop their own policies and 
make priorities without the approval of MoH, considers an obstacle to increasing 
efficiency. 
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ii. Given the absence of a systematic mapping of the health condition of the population30, 
and the absence of pooling of health resources at regional level, the policy of allocating 
resources is made not on a rational basis (actual needs, clinical outcomes or outputs) but 
most times on historical basis and under political pressure (ie in order to create 
economic activity in regions and serve political needs). 
iii. There is significant staff shortage (ie nurses or GPs) and under-functioning of many 
public health units and services mainly to rural and isolated areas, due to: the  hiring 
restrictions imposed for budgetary reasons; the absence of any policy and incentives for 
attracting and retaining health personnel to rural areas, in combination with the NHS-
ESY and EOPYY staff’s status as low paid civil servants. 
Misallocation of resources and underutilization of hospital beds lead to interregional 
patient flows 
The inefficient geographical distribution of infrastructure and human resources in 
combination with the lack of staff leads to underutilization of hospital beds that affects 
negatively hospitals’ operation on: a) either full or some “closing down” of entire hospital 
departments especially in hospitals outside Athens (ie on islands during the summer or 
during the weekends); or b) full or some “closing down” of Intensive Care Units (ICUs) 
fully equipped due to lack of staff and especially nurses,
31
 leading to either flows of 
patients to other hospitals or “renting” IC beds from the private sector with inflated costs. 
Therefore, certain regions are incapable of meeting the health needs of their population, 
resulting in a flow of patients to the major urban centers of Athens and Thessaloniki or to 
areas with large university hospitals (ie Ioannina- Epirus) offering expensive and high-
technology services or visiting private providers. However, the uncontrollable interregional 
flows to the ESY hospitals in urban areas exacerbate their demand pressure and the waiting 
lists (NSPH, 2012). 
3.8.3.3 Mismanagement of resources   
 Absence of referral system and low quality services provided in PHC units lead to 
private sector, to demand pressure on ESY hospitals and waiting lists 
 The provision of PHC services is negatively affected by the following characteristics: 
(a) the fragmented structure of PHC; (b) the lack of co-ordination among PHC services; 
                                                          
30
 Following successive reform attempts the “Health and Welfare Map” project was developed from 2010 till 2011 and financed by 
European Social Fund (ESF). After 2011 there is no other development.  
31
 According to current data of Greek Society of Intensive Care Medicine ,103 beds or 18% of total (578) bed capacity in 
ICUs of the Greek NHS-ESY remain closed even though they are fully equipped, due to lack of nurses. ti 
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(c) the lack of family physicians; (d) the lack of GPs and the absence of referral system. 
These weaknesses in the provision of PHC in combination with the aforementioned 
problem of irrational allocation of resources lead to inefficient with low quality services 
provided in PHC units. As a consequence, patients choose to visit private providers or 
visit the outpatient facilities of NHS-ESY hospitals as a first PHC contact, exacerbating 
their demand pressure.  
 The demand pressure of ESY hospitals results in long waiting lists. Despite the lack of 
official statistics, there is evidence 
32,33
 that there are long waiting lists for specific 
hospitals and interventions (mainly for surgery interventions and specialist care for 
certain types of care) especially in the urban areas, that lead patients either to seek care 
in the private sector or to face informal payments in order to bypass the waiting list by 
the characterization of a patient as an “emergency case” (Liaropoulos et al, 2008), 
placing at a disadvantage the vulnerable populations that do not have the ability to pay. 
 Slow introduction of information management system in combination with an 
inadequate financial management system lead to inefficient control and monitoring 
system 
 Due to slow introduction of health information systems and accounting system there 
were inadequate high-quality statistical techniques and systematic reporting methods on 
health services performance. Till recently accounting system was on a cash rather than 
transaction basis. Since 2011 there is a gradual development of information system and 
double-entry accounting system that helps improving data collections and assessment of 
hospitals.  
 Furthermore, the control of public health spending is still exercised by a bureaucratic 
and too centralized way by the MoH that doesn’t improve efficiency. Only recently in 
2014, an integrated cost accounting system is partially implemented (on a pilot basis) 
for few hospitals to monitor and assess the financial position and efficiency of hospitals. 
It has not been applied to outpatient services (ie HCCs), yet. Medical protocols have 
been also slowly adapted since 2013 to control and monitor the PHC physician 
prescribing behavior (via e-prescribing and e-referrals), not to improve PHC operation. 
                                                          
32
 Based on SHARE database survey for elderly, Mojon-Azzi and Mojon (2007) have estimated that 31.8% of 
elderly in Greece declared waiting waiting longer than three months for cataract surgery versus 17.9% in 
Germany and in the Netherlands. 
33
 There is evidence of waiting time of five months for an outpatient neurological visit and three months for 
radiotherapy or a surgery in certain Athens hospitals to treat a malignant tumour (Tanner, 2008). 
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However, this information is very important in order to avoid unnecessary duplication 
of acts, exams and prescriptions. 
 There are no systematic records and disease registries to coordinate PHC with hospital 
care and produce incidence rate data, as well as systematic data concerning the use of 
outpatient services (ie HCCs). These registries will permit better co-ordination of care 
for persons with chronic disease. The introduction of an electronic medical file for each 
patient although adopted has never been issued, as well. 
 
Equity - Implications for inequity in access 
3.8.4 The Funding system is highly regressive  
The public funding of the health sector and NHS-ESY via general taxation is progressive 
only in theory. In practice, the public funding has a regressive character that 
disproportionately burdens lower socioeconomic groups, as following:   
i. General taxation in the state budget is characterized by heavy reliance on indirect 
taxation on goods and services (ratio of indirect to direct taxes equals to 1.44 for 2011) 
that doesn’t  achieve any beneficial income redistribution (Hellenic General Accounting 
Office, 2012; Kaplanoglou & Newbery, 2003; Matsagganis, 2010; Mossialos et al, 
2005). 
ii. There is widespread tax evasion. It has been estimated that income under-reporting in 
Greece is estimated at 10%, resulting in a 26% shortfall in tax receipts (Matsaganis M. 
& Flevotomou M. ,2010). Furthermore, there is evidence that there are different 
opportunities for tax evasion presented to different occupations favoring farming at 53% 
(including individuals insured in Non Noble OGA SHIF) and self-employment insured 
in OAEE SHIF (24%).  The hidden - black economy in the health care sector was 
estimated at approximately €1.5 billion (14% of total health expenditure in 1999) 
(Tatsos, 2001), as well. In terms of region of residence, tax evasion is most pronounced 
in Southern Greece - Central, Western and Peloponnese (16%) and least so in Attika- 
Greater Athens (less than 6%). Furthermore, the hidden - black economy in the health 
care sector was estimated at approximately €1.5 billion (14% of total health expenditure 
in 1999) (Tatsos, 2001). 
iii. Despite the unification of the large SHIFs in EOPYY, the social security contributions 
have not been equalized yet and do not enhance progressivity
34
. They are distributed in 
                                                          
34
 Since 2014, contribution rates are similar across Non Noble IKA- blue collars, Noble OAEE-professionals & self 
employed , Noble OPAD- civil servants (at 7.25%:); yet Noble SHIF NAT for seamen is calculated at 5.75%; other Noble 
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favour of employees and pensioners of the wealthier population groups in Noble SHIFs 
(especially civil servants, bank and utilities’ employees) who contribute with lower rates 
(Economou C, 2012; Petmesidou, 2012). In addition to the unequal rates, some 
occupational groups in Noble SHIFs used to supplement their own contribution by 
third-party taxes – essentially earmarked levies (Bronchi, 2001), constituting “a serious 
policy issue” (Matsagganis, 1998). 
iv. There is also significant social security contribution evasion in Greece at the equivalent 
of 15–20% of the total income of most SHIFs, and 30% in the case of Non Noble IKA. 
This issue compromises fairness, as well (European Industrial Relations Observatory, 
2004). 
v. Private medical insurance and especially out-of-pocket payments (OOPPs) that 
constitute formal and informal patient contributions to medical costs are clearly 
regressive, provided that the relative burden is higher for the poor. There is longitudinal 
and cross-sectional evidence of household budget surveys from 1981 till 2010 that 
private health care expenditure increased for all socio-economic groups, but the relative 
and absolute increase among low income groups was higher than middle-to high income 
families35 (INE-GSEE, 2010; National Statistical Service, 2002; Matsaganis M. & 
Mitrakos T., 1999) and for low-income elderly households (with household budget 
shares of over 11%) (Matsagganis et al, 2008). They have also reported that the 
distribution of health care expenditures showed a U or J shape across age cohorts 
revealing important inequalities (ELSTAT., 2014; Matsagganis et al, 2008; Matsaganis 
& Mitrakos, 1999). Therefore, the continuous dependence on indirect taxation, coupled 
with the high level of private expenditure in the form of official and informal direct 
payments and unequal social health insurance contributions that favour the wealthier 
population groups, suggests that the financing system is regressive, compromising 
fairness.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
Funds at 5.25%; and the lower rate of Non Noble OGA – farmers  is 2.25% for insurees after 1993, while those insured 
under OGA- farmers before 1993 pay no contributions. For pensioners, the contribution rates for sickness range from 4% 
of IKA SHIF, 5% for banking employees Noble SHIFs, 3% for utilities employees Noble SHIFs to no contribution (0%) 
for OGA SHIF pensioners. 
35
 Longitudinal analysis of  Household Budget Surveys (between 1981 and 1994),  other HBS(2004-2005), and HBS 
(between 2008 and 2010). 
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3.8.5 Geographical inequities in distribution of human resources and health 
infrastructure 
Geographical inequities are one of the main problems of the system. According to the 
aforementioned detailed regional allocation of hospital beds and health professionals and 
findings of DEA analyses, wide discrepancies are apparent. The aforementioned data 
indicate that for Greece, interregional disparities (urban versus rural & isolated areas 
within Greece) are greater than intra-regional disparities (among countries). The majority 
of hospital beds and physicians are concentrated in the two most crowded regions of the 
country (Attiki/Athens and Central Macedonia/Thessaloniki).  On the other hand, the 
regions with the lowest density of human resources and infrastructure (hospital beds) are 
Central Greece, Western Greece, Ionian and North Aegean Islands. This issue is important 
due to the geographical peculiarity of the numerous islands and the fact that there is a 
greater concentration of older people in rural areas that contribute to an increase in the 
need for health care. Naturally, these territorial inequalities result in high interregional 
patient flows from rural to urban areas -  according to evidence of the Health and Welfare 
Map as presented above - with substantial travel costs, both in financial and psychological 
terms. 
 
3.8.6 Differences among SHIF in coverage, benefits and services provided  
Most insurance funds, separately or merged in EOPYY, provide coverage for primary, 
secondary and pharmaceutical care, as well as some funds cover diagnostic and laboratory 
tests. The multiplicity of SHIFs (till recently) give rise to fairness issue because of 
qualitative and quantitative differences in the range of entitlements, the level of coverage, 
freedom of choice of primary care providers (including private providers), access to 
specialists and access to private hospitals, irrespective of their contribution rates. 
(Economou C.,2010; Petmetzidou, 2008). This variation is related with the classification of 
“Noble” SHIFs (OPAD for civil servants, bank officers, public utility employees, lawyers, 
doctors etc) versus “Non Noble” SHIFs (IKA for blue-collars employees and OGA for 
farmers).  
 In terms of coverage and benefits, Noble Funds provide to their beneficiaries the most 
comprehensive benefit packages and wider freedom of choice of medical services and 
providers than Non-Noble SHIFs (ie IKA SHIF; or OGA). For instance, the second 
largest Non-Noble Farmers OGA SHIF provides the least benefits and the minimum 
freedom of choice.  OGA SHIF offers primary care services in rural ESY health 
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centres (HCCs) and outpatient NHS-ESY hospital departments and limited dental care 
in HCCs (only for beneficiaries under the age of 18), whereas any private consultation 
or private hospitalization is not covered.  
 On the other hand, there is a small number of Noble SHIFs (for the banking personnel, 
utilities personnel, engineers etc) that provide to their insured population free choice 
of whatever professionals they wish to consult. Patients pay the fee demanded by the 
doctor and are reimbursed retrospectively with a preset amount by their SHIF.  
 Furthermore, Noble SHIFs provide coverage to a large extent, for inpatient and 
outpatient care (specialized exams) in prestigious private hospitals, versus most Non 
Noble SHIFs that provide to their beneficiaries free access to public hospitals and to 
small private hospitals that usually provide services of poor quality (Tountas et al, 
2005; Kyriopoulos et al, 2001). 
Conclusively, it is important to note that there is no systematic national survey or report 
concerning inequalities of access in Greece. However, different sources of data, as 
presented above, indicate that inequalities exist. They derive from differences in relation to 
the funding of the system (high out-of-pocket and informal payments), uneven regional 
distribution of human resources and health infrastructure and variations in social health 
insurance coverage (stronger till 2012).  
3.9 Conclusion 
Thirty years have passed  since the establishment of the Greek National Health System 
(NHS) in 1983  and   five major reforms have followed (1992, 1997, 2001-4, 2005-7 and 
2011 – today) on universal coverage as an elementary policy goal. However, the Greek 
NHS is still insufficient with regard to organisation, coverage, funding and delivering 
health services. These weaknesses have been caused -to a great extent- by the incomplete 
carrying out of changes and attempts of reform. According to a lot of authors “The most 
significant problem facing health policy in Greece is the gap between declared objectives 
and the enactment and implementation of the legislation” (Economou, 2010 p. 159; 
Mossialos et al, 2005; Petmesidou M.,  2006; Tinios et al, 2011). The Greek health care 
system, as presented above, operates via several subsystems within a different framework 
in terms of organisation and regulation leading to fragmented health care service provision 
and financing. Therefore, the issue whether access to health care is indeed equally 
provided to all is open to debate, especially among the older population.  
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Table 3.36: Weaknesses / Challenges of health care system in Greece 
In terms of Efficiency 
Organisation 1. Highly centralized decision-making  and reduced autonomy of 
Regional Health Authorities – unsuccessful decentralization 
 2. Fragmented structure, bureaucratic organization of the health care 
system and lack of coordination: 
  Lack of link and poor coordination between NHS-ESY and EOPYY 
– SHIFs 
  Problematic coordination in PHC sector: (a) among the large 
number of PHC providers; (b) between PHC providers and hospital 
doctors 
Funding   3.1 Inefficient allocation of funding 
  Multi-payer system with the absence of a strong funding 
coordination mechanism - EOPYY as a “peculiar monopsony” 
  Inefficient centralized budgeting process that results in a vicious 
circle of deficits  
  Retrospective payment and remuneration system – not related to the 
performance that does not provide efficiency-promoting incentives  
  Ineffective purchasing management of supplies due to:  
  absence of national HTA assessment system 
  extensive complex ties between the private and public sector 
Provision  3.2 Irrational resource allocation mechanisms 
  Irrational regional allocation of human resources and infrastructure  
  Misallocation of resources and underutilization of hospital beds 
lead to interregional patient flows 
 3.3 Mismanagement of resources   
  Absence of referral system and low quality services provided in 
PHC units lead to:  
  private sector 
  demand pressure on ESY hospitals 
  waiting lists 
  Inefficient control and monitoring system due to: 
  Slow introduction of information management system  
  an inadequate financial management system 
In terms of Equity  
Funding 1. Regressive Funding Mechanisms due to existence of: 
  Heavy reliance on indirect taxation 
  Widespread tax evasion 
  Uneven social security contributions 
  Social security contribution evasion 
  High out-of-pocket and informal payments (OOPPs) 
Access 2. Geographical inequities in distribution of human resources and 
health infrastructure 
 3. Differences among SHIFs in: coverage, benefits and services 
provided   
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Chapter Four 
 
4. Inequalities in health care use in Greece among the older population in Patra’s 
urban area (PATRAHIS survey) 
4.1 Introduction 
WHO and the Commission on Social Determinants of Health (CSDH) have highlighted the 
particular role of local government and the interplay between local and national 
government in tackling the social determinants of health and equity in health (WHO-
CSDH, 2008). Globally, the CSDH recommended improving the material conditions 
within which people are born, learn, live, work and age and the distribution of 
psychosocial wellbeing within neighbourhoods and communities that are socially cohesive 
and where people can exercise control over their lives36. This firmly places equity in 
health at the heart of urban governance and planning, while many areas for action fall 
outside the health sector. Local authorities face several challenges as they have the 
potential to be key actors in taking practical action on improving the social determinants of 
health, improving social welfare for citizens in the EU, and reducing inequities in health 
(EC, 2007). As Litvack et al. (1998) have shown, reducing central influences and 
promoting local autonomy may lead to more flexible and efficient policies, as local 
authorities are better able to respond to local needs and may have greater knowledge of and 
sensitivity to local problems. Nevertheless, a wider legislative context creates the 
conditions that shape local authorities’ ability to act. According to WHO analysis for the 
urban dimension of the social determinants of health (WHO, 2012), localization, 
decentralization and delegated powers may bring tension between different levels of 
government (vertical conflicts) or among local government agencies (horizontal conflicts). 
Problems in securing alignment of overall national policy objectives with subnational 
interventions and local project objectives may undermine coherence and synergy.  Many 
countries are decentralizing, meaning they are transferring decision-making and spending 
powers from national to local governments. Grady et al. (2011) identified four important 
themes in local implementation of social determinants of health approach to inequities in 
                                                          
36
 The CSDH made recommendations for action in the areas of: early child development and education, the 
built environment and sustainable development, employment arrangements and work conditions, social 
protection, health care systems, health equity in all policies, fair financing, market responsibility, gender 
equity, political empowerment and voice, global governance and monitoring, training and research. 
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health: differences in governance structures and capacity levels; expenditure levels and 
identifying funding; wider legislative framework and accountability. In health systems of 
the urban setting, the difficulty is one of balancing priorities, allocation of resources, and 
personnel issues between central governments and local communities (Campbell & 
Campbell, 2006), as city and community leadership could play a growing role in health 
care (Bossert & Beauvais, 2002). The challenges for health systems in urban settings 
include accessibility to services, which is linked more to inability to pay rather than 
proximity to facilities. Double standards for care (i.e. the rich can afford tertiary hospital 
care and the poor must settle for poor quality and “free” government services) create 
additional barriers to health care. Moreover, social determinants influence the health of 
elderly as one of vulnerable groups (children, elderly and disabled) that more recently, has 
been given prominence in health programmes of EU countries. According to WHO/Global 
Age-Friendly Cities Project (WHO, 2015) the vast majority of older people live in their 
homes and communities, but in environments that have not been designed with their needs 
and capacities in mind. There has been no major systematic review of urban-rural 
differentials of elderly populations, though there are initiatives, e.g. the World Cities 
Project (2007), that attempt to identify issues related to the health, quality of life and social 
services of the elderly in major OECD countries. Therefore, the complex dynamics of 
cities, with their concentration of the poorest and most vulnerable groups, pose an urgent 
challenge to the health community, even within the developed countries (WHO, 2008b). 
Within the framework of growing health equity challenges, the question of how to 
practically implement change at local level is also key to action on the social determinants 
of health and inequities in health. However, the existing literature on implementing action 
to tackle the social determinants of health and inequities in health at local level is relatively 
weak (WHO, 2012d). Traditional quantitative and aggregated data do not include 
community input (opinion and attitude) and participation. Programmes such as the WHO 
Healthy Cities project (WHO, 2013b) have suggested over the last decade that health needs 
assessment should be reoriented from pure monitoring towards identifying and solving 
community health problems using applied research. In this framework, in Greece37, 
similar to most EU countries, subnational governance structures via the regions and 
                                                          
37
 Following the implementation on 1 January 2011 of the Kallikratis Plan, the administrative divisions of 
Greece consist of two main levels: the regions and the municipalities. In addition, a number of decentralized 
administrations overseeing the regions exist as part of the Ministry of the Interior, but are not entities of local 
government. The old prefectures were either abolished and split up or transformed into regional units in 
2011.  
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the municipalities which are the lowest level of government within the organizational 
structure of that country38 – have increasing autonomy for the “administration of their 
local jurisdiction as it pertains to the social, financial, cultural and spiritual interests of its 
citizens” (Greek Municipal and Communal Code, art. 24 and Article 102 of the Greek 
constitution). Moreover, local authority has jurisdiction many of which relates to the social 
determinants of health and health equity39 (housing, environment, water and sanitation, 
community safety and urban and rural development, including employment and business 
development). However, as far as it concerns the health care sector, regional and 
prefectural authorities in Greece are only administratively responsible. The role of regional 
and local governments in health care planning, organization and provision is limited. Only 
some large municipalities run the open care centres for the elderly (KAPIs) as well as, 
implement certain welfare programmes for elderly such as “Home Assistance” and a small 
number of health care centres (HCCs), especially in the greater area of Attica. Moreover, 
the positive steps in this direction over the last few years are in parallel with several 
attempts for decentralization in health care, that has been a key issue since the 
establishment of ESY in 1983 (Law 1397/1983) and especially since 2001 attempts to 
create robust regional health authorities. However, although decentralization of health care 
has been attempted via the establishment of PESYs and following RHAs since 2001, the 
administrative power has been partially passed to them till today. In addition, a significant 
problem is that the boundaries of administrative regions and health region administrations 
were never operated as identical. This issue seriously restricts the possibilities of 
coordination between the two structures and the development of an integrated health and 
social policy. Overall, it is argued that decentralization in health care has been impeded by 
many factors, especially obstruction by opposition from key interest groups, absence of 
policy continuity between governments, the inability to tackle the bureaucratic and highly 
centralized system and lack of political will. As a consequence, the health care system still 
remains fully dependent on the central government even for settling bureaucratic details, 
                                                          
38 The municipalities of Greece (Greek: δήμοι, dimoi) are the lowest level of government within the 
organizational structure of that country.Since the 2011 Kallikratis reform, there are 325 municipalities. 
Thirteen regions form the largest unit of government beneath the State. Within these regions are 74 second-
level areas called regional units. Regional units are then divided into municipalities.   
39
 Article 102 of the Greek constitution outlines the mandate of municipalities and communities and their 
relationship to the larger State: (a) Municipalities and communities exercise administration of local affairs 
independently; (b) Leadership of municipalities and communities is elected by universal and secret ballot; (c) 
The national Greek government supervises local government agencies, but is not to interfere in any local 
initiatives or actions; (d) The State is required to provide funds necessary to fulfill the mandate of local 
government agencies. 
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forming an additional administrative burden for the health ministry (Athanasiadis A, et al, 
2015; Economou, 2010; Mossialos E, 2005). Following Vrangbæk’s typology for 
decentralization in health care, it could be argued that the Greek case is an attempt towards 
vertical de concentration, referring to the transfer of responsibility and power from a 
smaller to a larger number of administrative actors within a formal administrative structure 
(Vrangbæk 2007). Under these challenges– inefficiencies of the Greek NHS and the 
several abandoned decentralization occasions, a debate is emerging whether health care 
access is indeed equally provided to older population at an urban-setting level, and whether 
financial barriers (by paying OOP) are confronted in the use of health services. In addition, 
despite the fact that Greece has adopted a number of WHO and EU recommendations for 
universal and equal access to health care services, there is not any clear policy framework 
relating to inequalities in health care and weak evidence exists on possible reasons that 
prevent access to health care for the older population. Moreover, little attention has been 
paid to investigating and measuring equity in the use of health care among the elderly in an 
urban setting level, since they are the consumers who, though they receive high health 
services, have to deal with unfair use of service among other income groups (Allin S. and 
Mossialos E., 2005). Therefore, access to affordable health care among the elderly, in 
urban settings is a key health equity issue.  
4.2 Research Questions 
Drawing from the aforementioned challenges – inefficiencies of the Greek NHS and the 
several abandoned decentralization occasions, in conjunction with the need for a clear 
understanding of inequalities in health care use among the elderly, the objective of my 
thesis – as aforementioned – is to investigate the inequalities in heath care use among the 
elderly in the pre crisis period 2003-2008. In order to achieve this objective, we use as a 
data tool the cross-sectional Patra’s Health Interview Survey (Patra’s HIS), carried out in 
2005 at Patras’ municipality the third largest urban area – municipality and the regional 
capital of Western Greece, conducted within the Phase IV framework (2003-2008) 
programme of W.H.O. European Healthy Cities approach that embedded the W.H.O. 
European Healthy Cities Survey modules
40
. It is worth mentioning a previous study of 
Sissouras A, Karokis A et al (1996) with similar framework as our PatraHIS study that was 
                                                          
40 It is worth mentioning that Patras’ municipality participated at the Phase II framework (1993-1997) programme of 
W.H.O. European Healthy Cities, as well, conducted by the University of Patras and Municipality of Patras (Patras 
Health Profile; and Patras Health Plan)that resulted in a corresponding study for the utilization of health care services of 
Karokis et al (1996), as we present in the evidence section and discussion paragraph. 
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conducted ten years ago in 1995 in Patras’ within the Phase II framework (1993-1997) 
programme of W.H.O. European Healthy Cities Network Survey, although it was 
conducted ten years ago before the major NHS-ESY decentralization health reform of 
2001. We will compare the older evidence of Patra’s study by Sissouras A, Karokis A et al 
(1996) with our findings in the discussion paragraph underneath. The WHO Healthy 
Cities’ approach seeks to put health high on the political and social agenda of cities and to 
build a strong movement for public health at the local level. Moreover the Patra-HIS 
survey data tool fills the gap in the research in an urban setting in Greece, shedding light 
on the equity issue of the NHS ESY decentralization reform attempts of 2001-2004 for the 
regionalization of the system, in the region of Patras that consists the chair of 6
th
 Regional 
Health Authority (RHA) of Peloponnese, Epirus, the Ionian Islands and Western Greece, in 
terms of the utilization of health services by the older population. The specific period in 
2005 that PatraHIS was conducted, is important given that it includes the first ever 
implementation of the decentralized NHS- ESY in 2001 with the reform acts of 2001 and 
2003 (Law 2889/2001 on the Regional Structure of Health Care Services - PESYPs and 
Law 3106/2003 on the Regional Structure of Welfare Services) that was curtailed. 
Moreover, it includes the major reform of 2005 (Law 3329/2005) that abolished the 
previous legislation and replaced PESYPs with Health Region Administrations (RHAs or 
DYPEs later YPEs) but without any change in the system (Economou, 2010). In addition 
via the information for OOP payments in health care, this study allow us to evaluate the 
extent to which social health protection system offers adequate protection to the elderly. 
Building on the Patra’s HIS, we address the following empirical research questions (RQs), 
guided by the following theoretical hypotheses (THs). THs: (i) The inequalities in use of 
health care are derived from the different socioeconomic characteristics of the older 
population who use the health services; (ii) Higher income individuals are more likely to 
use health care services than lower income comparators; (iii) Individuals with “Non 
Noble” social health insurance coverage are more likely to pay OOP for using health care 
than comparators with “Noble” social health insurance coverage. Guided by the THs, we 
address the following research questions (RQs): (i) What is the extent and contributors of 
inequity in the use of health care among people over the age of 50 in an urban-setting level 
in Greece? (ii) What are the determinants of OOPPs as a payment mechanism of the 
utilization of health care among the older population over the age of 50 in Greece?  
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In addition, it is worth mentioning that we address similar or the same research questions 
of PatraHIS with the other survey–tools given that we have similar framework for 
examining the same objectives with the same theoretical hypotheses based on the available 
data for each data survey, but with a different reference period. The PatraHIS with 
reference time 2004-05 provides evidence for the degree and extent of inequalities of 
health care use at an urban-setting level shedding light on the equity issue of the NHS-ESY 
decentralization reform attempts of 2001-2004 to supplement the evidence of the first 
nationwide health interview survey GNHIS (reference time 2008-09) that covers the NHS-
ESY period 2005-2008 and SHARE evidence (2003-04) on a nationwide setting 
exclusively for older population for the NHS-ESY initial decentralisation period of 2001-
2004. Therefore, the fact that each dataset provides evidence supplementary to the other 
two datasets, results in a robust evidence for inequalities in health care to shed light in the 
whole pre-crisis period of 2003-2008 of the NHS-ESY health system in Greece. 
4.3 Sample and variables  
Our study includes all individuals 50 years or above - born in 1955 or earlier. The resulting 
unbalanced sample involves 680 non-institutionalized individuals above 50 years old or 
older (40% of the total sample of the 1699 individuals). This rate is smaller, however 
comparable to the response rate of the European survey SHARE for the population aged 50 
or over. The respective W.H.O. Questionnaire –adjusted for Greece via 130 questions 
covers a wide variety of topics split into six modules on: health status; estimates of health 
services utilisation and medicines; lifestyle and life habits; the relationship of citizens with 
their city and the services provided by the municipality; lastly, background demographic 
and socio-economic variables. 
As a whole, in our study, the dependent variables were measured by nine separate 
questions. The dependent variables for health care utilization concerning the likelihood of 
a contact, were measured by five separate questions asking the respondent whether he or 
she had an inpatient admission for the last 12 months, whether he/she received outpatient 
care, whether he/she consulted a social health insurance fund (SHIF) physician or a 
specialist privately for the last 3 months, and finally a dentist for the last 5 years (“yes” 
versus “no” as the reference category). There was no information about the number of 
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contacts. The dependent variables for facing OOP expenses
41
 were measured by three 
questions whether the respondent paid any OOP expenses during the last inpatient 
admission within the previous 12 months, the last outpatient visit and the last SHIF 
physician visit the previous 3 months (“yes” versus “no” as the reference category). Facing 
OOP expenses for the last specialist private visit during the previous 3 months is measured 
by the amount of OOP expenses in two categories for the analysis: (i) OOP amount 
including 0€: ≥0€ and (ii) OOP positive amount >0€ dichotomized in (>40€) versus (1€-
40€) where 40€ is the median of OOP positive amount, for comparing higher OOP amount 
(>40€) versus lower OOP amount (1€-40€) for specialist private visit.  
Moreover, two other questions on the insurance coverage of the OOP expenses (with “No” 
as the reference category) were included- only for descriptive reasons. A detailed overview 
of the utilization and OOPPs as dependent variables as well as the explanatory variables 
with the respective questions are displayed in Appendix Table A1.1 and A1.2.  
The explanatory variables used in the models include the following health, demographic 
and socioeconomic factors, based on the standard approach in the empirical literature: Age 
(in four dummies: 80+; 70-79; 60-69; versus 50-59 as reference); gender (male; versus 
female as reference) health status (need) variables associated to physical health include: (i) 
the EQ-5D-3L self-reported health state recorded on the EQ-5D descriptive system of 
health-related quality of life states consisting of five dimensions (mobility, self-care, usual 
activities, pain/discomfort, anxiety/depression) taking one of three levels of responses - 
severity (no problems; some or moderate problems; extreme problems). For the analysis 
we dichotomise the EQ-5D-3L in two categories: “extreme & moderate” versus “no 
problems” as reference category for each one of the five domains42. The main restriction 
of this measure is the possibility of being underestimated due to the fact that the number of 
levels on the scale is limited for chronic disabled respondents. (ii) Self-assessed health 
status - SAH comparing to the last 12 months in three dummies (worse; the same; better” 
as the reference category); (iii) a general SAH measure dichotomised with “Very Good & 
Good” SAH as reference category; (iv) the number of chronic medical conditions in three 
                                                          
41 Out-of-pocket payments represent a high percentage of health expenditure in Greece, accounting for more than half of 
total health expenditure. The figure depicts formal cost-sharing arrangements, direct payments and informal payments, 
with the latter two representing the highest proportion of out-of-pocket payments among EU countries. 
42 The EQ-5D-3L is based on a preference-based Health Related Quality of Life (HRQOL) measure, developed since 
1990 by a multidisciplinary transnational consortium of investigators, been translated into most major languages, 
including Greek, whereas, initial evidence on its applicability and adaptability to the Greek environment has been 
provided (Yfantopoulos J, 2007; Barton, G et al, 2008, The EuroQol group, 1990). More information is available at: 
http://www.euroqol.org/ 
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dummies with "0 chronic medical conditions” as the reference category. (v)The self-
assessed dental health (SADH) dichotomized with “Good” as  reference is included only in 
the analysis for the probability of making a dentist visit. These health status variables 
constitute a proxy for care need. An assumption that underlies this study is that individuals 
with health conditions and poorer SAH have a greater need for health care, an assumption 
that is likely to hold in the majority of cases (Allin S. et al, 2011). Patra HIS income 
measure is derived from a variable with 11 values - income bands with a width of 500€. It 
is the monthly net total household income derived as the sum from any source per 
equivalent member added up, after tax and social security contributions. Any taxes and 
social contributions that have been paid, are deducted from this sum. We adjust household 
income to reflect differences in a household's size and composition by applying the 
modified OECD scale
43
. For the regression analysis on the whole data set, the equalized 
income variable was calculated using quintiles leading to five (5) income categories, with 
the 5th richest quintile: “More than ≥901€” and the 1st Poorest quintile with range “1 up to 
375€” as the reference category. Similarly, in order to quantify the effect of income on 
health service utilization by calculating and decomposing inequity (HI), we also construct 
a continuous estimate of monthly net total household income equivalised (as a Logarithm 
of Income Level). Moreover, variables other than need and income are included in the 
model, following the standard approach in the empirical literature: The highest educational 
qualification is included based on the standard coding of the ISCED-97 into 6 levels, 
grouped into three (3) categories with  “No/Partial/Completed Primary school (ISCED 1)” 
as the reference category. Marital status was dichotomized with “never married or divorced 
or widowed”, as the reference category; the household composition dichotomized with 
“living alone” as the reference category; the housing tenure information dichotomized into 
“homeowner” versus “Not owner: tenant/subtenant/ rent free” as the reference category. 
The information for Social Health Insurance Fund (SHIF) information is derived from a 
question with 7 categories of insurance funds
44
. In order to examine in detail the role of the 
fragmented Social Health Insurance system on health care utilisation, we categorised these 
4 SHIFs groups into three (3) broad groups of more generous “noble” versus “non  noble” 
                                                          
43
 Where equivalised household size is a sum of weights attributed to each member of the household according to the 
modified OECD equivalence scale: 1.0 to the first adult; 0.5 to the second and each subsequent person aged 14 and over; 
0.3 to each child aged under 14. 
44
 Originally, in the questionnaire are included 7 categories of social insurance funds [0IKA (Social Security Institution); 
1.OGA (Organization of Argicultural Insurance); 2.OAEE (Fund for Self - Employed); 3.OPAD (Civic Servants, 
employees of municipalities); Various bank employees funds 5.Public utilities: telecoms, electricity, trains, metro; 6. 
Other SHIF (engineers; lawyers; health professions; seamen etc) 7. no insurance]. 
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funds, based on more “official” classification45, as following: (i)“Non Noble IKA-SHIF” 
or “Social Security Institution” (IKA blue-collar and white-collar employees) that is the 
largest fund covering 50% of the population; (ii) “Non Noble Farmers OGA-SHIF” (OGA-
Organization of Agricultural Insurance Rural Sector) the second largest fund covering 20% 
of the population involved in agriculture and (iii) “Noble SHIFs” (including all other 
SHIFs: Civil Servants, Self-Employed, Bank Employees, Health Professions etc); with the 
“Non Noble IKA-SHIF” as the reference category46. The information for Voluntary 
(Complementary) Health Insurance (VHI) Coverage is dichotomized (Yes/No) with No as 
the reference category.  
4.4 Results  
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
The description of the sample is displayed in Tables 4.1 to 4.5 below. The Mean age of the 
sample is 63.5 years, with 47% report suffering from “moderate and extreme” self-assessed 
pain or discomfort, with 2.1 mean number of chronic conditions diagnosed out of 14 listed, 
and 43.4% of the sample declare “Less than good” (fair bad or very bad) SAH a percentage 
similar to other studies for the older population (Crespo-Cebada E., 2012) and slightly 
higher than that observed to the Greek studies for the general population, as well as, 20.5% 
declare “worst” SAH comparing to last 12 months and 50.9% declare “Less than good” 
SAdental health. Moreover, the mean monthly net total household income of the sample 
equalised is 738.49€ representative of a low to middle-income household of older 
population in an urban-setting in Greece in 2005. Considering the SHIF coverage of the 
sample, the majority (54%) has Non-Noble IKA SHIF coverage, 30.3% has Noble SHIFs 
coverage and only 9.6% has Non Noble Farmers OGA SHIF coverage, as expected, 
provided that our survey is urban-setting and OGA SHIF covers mainly population 
involved in agriculture. Only 3.2% have VHI coverage. Overall, about health care use 
measures, 14.9% (101 individuals) report having inpatient admission, similar to other 
studies for the general population. The majority (60.9%) of the sample report visiting a 
SHIF physician, 32.4% an outpatient visit, as well as a high rate of 22% of the sample 
report specialist private visit, somehow higher than Greek urban-setting study for general 
                                                          
45
 They are based on more “official” classification as established by experts, trade unions, authorities such as Labor 
Institute of Greek Workers’ Confederation - INE G.S.E.E. Observatory (Koutsampelas C., Tsakloglou P., 2010; 
Economou, C. & Giorno C, 2009; Mossialos, E. et al, 2005; Tountas, Y. et al, 2005) 
46 
Non-Noble IKA SHIF was the largest fund covering 50% of the population, namely employees and workers in the 
private sector. The second largest fund was OGA, covering 20% of the population involved in agriculture.  
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population (Pappa E. & Niakas, 2006) and slightly lower than Greek nationwide studies for 
the general population (Tountas et al, 2011; Geitona et al, 2011). It is worth mentioning 
that the main reason for visiting a SHIF physician, as presented in Table 4.3 below, is for 
prescribing medicines (55.8%) and only 11.6% of the individuals make a visit due to 
medical symptoms, whereas for a regular medical visit (36.5%) and for a checkup (24.3%) 
older individuals visit a specialist privately. This evidence reveals imbalances and 
inefficiencies in primary health care services provided. Moreover, when suffering from a 
medical symptom, the majority (41.3%) chooses to make an outpatient visit. Our data 
distinguish between public and private inpatient admissions, but only 3 individuals report 
private admission, similar to current evidence. As distribution of health care use by SHIF 
coverage is concerned, it is worth noting that, even though Non Noble OGA beneficiaries 
are few in our sample, they contribute more to both inpatient  and outpatient care as well as 
specialist private visits than the other SHIFs in a higher percentage (Table 4.4). Noble 
SHIF beneficiaries report the higher percentage of dental care and Non Noble IKA 
beneficiaries report the higher percentage of SHIF physician visit, as investigated in detail 
below. More detailed information about health care utilisation of the sample is presented in 
the Appendix. Moreover, considering OOP payments as a barrier to health care, Table 4.5  
presents the proportion of the sample paying OOP for using health care use, OOP 
payments for specialist private visits (83.2%) and outpatient care (24.6%) contributing 
more to medical expenditures across the health care types, revealing important inequalities 
as discussed below. The high proportion of 83.2% of the older population that pays OOP 
for specialist visit is similar to most countries except in the European south (Börsch-Supan 
A. et al, 2005). On the contrary, payments for inpatient admissions and SHIF physician 
visit stand for very small parts of the financial burden related to medical expenditures.  
 
 
Table 4.1 Need and non-need socioeconomic characteristics of the sample 
Demographics Count (N) 
unweighted  
N % 
unweighted 
Age 80+ 56  8.2% 
Age 70 – 79 142  20.9% 
Age 60 – 69 203  29.9% 
Ref/ Age 50-59  279  41.0% 
Mean Age in years 63.5 (SD: 10.0) 
Male                                                                                                                                                         301  44.3% 
ref/ Female 379  55.7% 
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Health Status   
EQ-5D Health Status  Sah Mobility "Extreme & Moderate Problems"  191 28% 
ref/ Mobility "No Problems" 489 71.9% 
Sah Self – Care"Extreme & Moderate Problems” 53 7.8% 
ref/ Self – Care "No Problems" 627 92.2% 
Usual Activities “Extreme & Moderate Problems" 89 13.1% 
ref/ Usual Activities "No Problems" 591 86.9% 
Pain/ Discomfort "Extreme & Moderate Problems" 320 47% 
ref/ Pain/ Discomfort" No Problems" 360 52.9% 
Anxiety/Depression "Extreme & Moderate Problems"  404 59.4% 
ref/ Anxiety/Depression"No Problems" 276 40.6% 
SAH - last 12 months “Worst” 139 20.5% 
“The Same” last 12m 459 67.6% 
ref/"Better" last 12m   81 11.9% 
SAH “Less than Good” (fair, bad and very bad) health 293 43.4% 
ref/“Very Good & Good” health 382 65.6% 
SA Dental Health “Less than Good” (fair, bad) 407 59.9% 
ref/“Good” SADH 273 40.1% 
Number of Chronic Conditions “More than 2 conditions” 355 52.2% 
“1 chronic medical condition”  165 24.3% 
 ref/“ 0 chronic medical conditions” 160 23.5% 
Mean number of chronic conditions out of 14 listed 2.1 (SD:2.1) 
Marital status    
Married (& registered partnership) 509 74.9% 
ref/never married &widowed &divorced) 171 25.1% 
Education   
More than secondary School (ISCED 4+5+6) 77 11.5% 
Secondary School (partial & completed) (ISCED 2 + 3) 253 37.8% 
ref/No & Primary School (partial &completed) (No + ISCED 1) 340 50.7% 
Housing Tenure   
"Owner"  582 85.6% 
ref/ “Not Owners” (tenant / subtenant/rent free)   96  14.4% 
Household Composition    
"Living in Couple & Other"   582 85.6% 
Ref/ "Living Alone"   98 14.4% 
Monthly Net Total Household Income Equivalised per adult   
Ln Continuous – N 645 95% 
Mean Income (€) 738.49€  
SD 482.95  
5th richest quintile with range - Inc5: (range 901€ and above) 121 17.8% 
4th quintile with range- Inc4: (range 751€ - 900€) 112 16.5% 
3d middle quintile with range:  - Inc3: (range 501€ - 750€) 125 18.4% 
2nd poor quintile -Inc2: (range 375€ -500€) 151 22.2% 
ref./1st poorest quintile: 1€ up to 375€ 136 20% 
Social Health Insurance Fund (SHIF) coverage   
“Noble SHIFunds"  206 30.3% 
“Non Noble OGA-SHIF”    64   9.4% 
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ref/“Non Noble IKA" 367    54.0% 
Voluntary (Complementary) Health Insurance   
VHI Coverage (Yes) 22  3.2% 
ref/ No VHI Coverage 658 96.8% 
 
 
Table 4.2:  Health care utilization of the sample: percentage of contacts during the last 
contact 
Type of care Percentage of visit (yes) 
 (%) N 
Inpatient night admissions (last 12 months)  14.9 % 101 
Outpatient day admissions (last 3 months) 32.4% 123 
SHIF physician visit (last 3 months) 60.9% 414 
Specialist private visit (last 3 months)  21.8% 148 
Dental visit (last 5 years)
 
57.1% 388 
*Note: For specialist private visit the percentage concerns OOP amount paid during the last visit (not the probability) 
 
Table 4.3: Reason for visiting a physician 
 
Disease or medical 
symptom 
Regular, scheduled visit 
/ Doctor referral 
Check up & results Drugs prescribing 
(last 3 months) % N % N % N % N 
Outpatient  41.3 50 from 121 23.2 26 from 121 19.8 24 from 121 7.4 9 from 121 
SHIF Physician  11.6 48 from 414 19 79 from 414 13.0 54 from 414 55.8  231 from 414 
Specialist Private 30.4 45 from 148 36.5 54 from 148 24.3 36 from 148 8.1 12 from 148 
 
Table 4.4 Distribution of health care utilisation by SHIFunds 
 
Noble SHIFs Non Noble OGA Non Noble IKA 
 
 % N  % N  % N 
Inpatient night admissions (last 12 months)  9.8 23/235 21.9 14/64 17.4 64/367 
Outpatient day admissions (last 3 
months) 
17.9 42/235 20.3 13/64 18.0 66/367 
SHIF physician visit (last 3 months) 56.2 132/235 51.6 33/64 67.8 249/367 
Specialist private visit (last 3 months)  20.0 47/235 32.8 21/64 21.3 78/367 
Dental visit (last 5 years) 69.8 164/235 47.6 30/63 51.5 189/367 
 
Table 4.5 Percentage of OOP expenses >0€ by health care type during the last contact 
Type of care Percentage of elderly facing OOP expenses >0€ 
 (%) N 
Inpatient night admissions (last 12 months)  18.6% 19 from 101 
Outpatient day admissions (last 3 months) 24.6% 30 from 122 
SHIF physician visit (last 3 months) 4.6% 19 from 414 
Specialist private visit (last 3 months)
 *
  83.2% 119 from 148 
Dental visit (last 5 years)
 
  
*Note: For specialist private visit the percentage concerns OOP amount paid during the last visit (not the probability)
 
 
172 
 
4.4.2 Concentration Index Method Results  
Tables 4.4.1summarizes the                            and the                  for the probability 
of health care use and the inequity index. The negative concentration indices for actual use 
indicate the presence of pro-poor inequality, except the positive                for the probability 
of specialist visits and dentist visits indicating pro-rich inequality, which means, higher income 
individuals are more likely to contact a specialist and visit a dentist than lower income 
individuals. The negative                  are mainly due to differences in need factors, which 
also show a pro-poor distribution except for probability of dentist visits. As aforementioned, the 
range of the horizontal index inequity is from -1 to 1. A positive (negative) value indicates a 
pro-rich (pro-poor) inequality. The magnitude of the HI inequity index reflects the strength of 
the relationship between income and the specific health care variable. For example, if we 
consider the 0.009 HI index of outpatient visits that demonstrates a pro-rich inequality, the 
0.007 index of SHIF physician visit indicates a less pronounced pro-rich inequality. Overall, as 
displayed in Table 4.6 and Figures 4.1 and 4.2, after controlling for the unequal need 
distributions: 
 Inequity in the delivery of health care is distributed among better off. It is distributed 
significantly pro-rich for the probability of specialist and pro-rich for dentist visits. 
 Inequity is distributed among less advantaged- pro-poor - for the probability of inpatient 
admissions.  
 Moreover, a parallel gradient – tendency is apparent for outpatient visit and SHIF physician 
visits. A weak relationship of income with the probability of outpatient and SHIF physician 
visits exists. The magnitude of HI index is very small for the probability of outpatient visits 
and SHIF physician visits (very slightly positive) indicating that income is distributed 
almost equally among individuals for outpatient and SHIF physician visits. All individuals 
have the same probability to make an outpatient and SHIF physician visit, irrespective of 
their income, although the magnitude of HI index reveals a more pronounced pro-rich 
inequality for outpatient admissions, as displayed in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.  
 
 
173 
 
Table 4.6:  Overall Income – related inequity (HI) in probability of using health care 
  Inpatient 
admission
1 
Outpatient 
visit
2
 
SHIF physician 
visit
2
 
Specialist 
private visit
2
 
Dentist 
visit 
3
 
CI unadjusted (actual use)  -0.102 -0.033 -0.016 0.102 0.040 
CI adjusted   -0.053 -0.041 -0.023 -0.026 0.020 
HI -0.049 0.009 0.007 0.128 0.020 
Bold:p-value <0.01; bold and italics: p-value<0.05; italics:p-value<0.10 
Note *1: Inpatient probability of admissions concerns “the last 12 months”  
Note *2: Outpatient, SHIF physician and specialist private probability of visit concerns “the last 3 months”  
Note *3: Dentist probability of visit concerns “the last 3 months” 
 
Figure 4.1: Income-inequity in the probability of health care use types in PatraHIS 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Income-inequalities in the probability of health care use types (actual use; 
adjusted for need; HI) in Patra HIS 
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4.4.3 Decomposition Analysis – Sources of inequality by type of care  
The results of the decomposition analyses, as described in Methodology chapter, provide 
indication about the inequity drivers. The contributing factors are displayed in detail in 
Tables 4.7–4.10 and Figures 4.3–4.5 that report the                            decomposition 
for all the health care types. Among other contributors we focus on income and SHIFs 
coverage in accordance with the main objectives of our study. Each Table first shows the 
mean values for the explanatory variables. The second column displays the partial 
concentration index (CI), the extent to which each contributor is distributed across income. 
A negative (positive) sign indicates that the variable has a pro-poor (pro-rich) distribution 
and is prevalent among the lower (higher) income groups. The third column indicates the 
demand elasticity (Marginal Effect - ME) for each contributor. Finally, the last three 
columns of the tables report, respectively, the absolute, the sum and % contributions to 
total income related inequality. The absolute contribution is the product of the elasticity 
(marginal effect) and the partial concentration index for each factor, so it will depend both 
on the impact of each variable on health care use and on its unequal distribution by 
income. A negative (positive) absolute contribution implies that, if only that variant 
determined utilization, then it would be pro-poor (pro-rich).  
The Tables can be interpreted in the following way, using the example of the probability of 
a specialist visit (Table 4.8). The unadjusted                of the probability of a specialist 
visit is positive (0.102), implying that across the income distribution, there is a 
proportional probability of visiting a specialist concentrated among the rich. Once need is 
standardized for, the level of inequity (HI) is 0.128 implying a pro-rich distribution. 
 The contribution of the need factors to inequality are negative (-0.026), indicating that 
individuals with poorer self-assessed health and chronic conditions reduce inequity in 
probability of specialist visit favoring the worse off, pointing out the greatest needs of 
the poor, similar with most of the empirical literature (Scheil-Adlung, X. and Bonan, J., 
2013; Geitona et al, 2007; Lahana et al, 2011). Suffering from chronic medical 
conditions has the most negative contribution - as the most important needs-adjustor, 
followed by general self-assessed health and self-assessed health comparing to the last 
12 months.  
 Gender has a negative (pro-poor) contribution to inequity, quite high, explaining a high 
percentage of inequity. Males seldom make a specialist visit compared to females 
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(Pappa & Niakas, 2006; Souliotis et al, 2016; Tountas et al, 2011; EC, 2005; Geitona et 
al, 2007).  
 Age dummies are concentrated among the lower income groups (negative CI) and only 
the group of older people (80+) is less likely to visit a specialist (Lahana et al, 
2011;Tountas et al, 2011; Scheil-Adlung X, 2013, EC, 2005; Majo et van Soest, 2012). 
This entails a slightly positive contribution to inequality, but in general, age has no 
effect on (almost zero) inequality.  
 About the non-need contributors, the main factor is income (its positive contribution is 
0.125), meaning that more advantaged (higher income earners) are more likely to visit a 
specialist, holding all else constant.  
 The second most important non-need contributor is the SHIF coverage with final 
contribution -0.025 pro-poor, reducing inequity, meaning that the final effect of the 
Noble SHIF dummy (concentrated among the higher income groups – positive CI) and 
the effect of Non-Noble OGA SHIF dummy (concentrated among the lower income 
groups- negative CI) is to reduce overall inequity favoring the less advantaged. It is 
worth mentioning that the negative elasticity (-ME) of Noble SHIFs indicates that 
elderly with Noble SHIF coverage are less likely to visit a specialist, whereas the 
positive ME of Non Noble OGA proves that elderly with Non Noble OGA SHIF 
coverage – worse off (negative CI)- are more likely to make a specialist visit comparing 
to Non Noble IKA SHIF, revealing the systemic inequalities in specialist visit among 
the SHIFs.  
 Higher level of education is the third important non- need contributor with positive 
(pro-rich) effect on inequity of probability of specialist visit. 
 Housing tenure and marital status have a low negative contribution to inequity and VHI 
has a quite low contribution to inequity and household composition has no (zero) effect 
on inequity. Finally, the error term is small (0.0032) implying that there should be only 
some small effects on the probability of visiting a specialist that are related to income 
and not accounted for in the specific utilization model. Overall, Tables 4.7 - 4.10 
indicate: 
 Pro-poor (negative signs) are apparent for the contributions of need variables to 
inequity for all types of care similar to the existing evidence, except the case of 
probability of dental care for which need-adjustment is mainly age standardized. 
 The most important determinants of health services utilization by the elderly are the 
indicators of health care need, mainly the existence of chronic medical conditions, the 
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EQ-5D self-assessed health (SAH) and SAH comparing to last 12 months and less age 
and gender. Only the EQ-5D SAH increases inequity in almost all health care types, 
inpatient admissions, specialist visit and dental care visits, and the SAH comparing to 
last 12 months increases inequity in SHIF physician visit, and reduces in inpatient 
admission.  
 Older individuals till 79 years are more likely to make a SHIF physician and a 
specialist visit, whereas individuals 80+ are less likely to use any health care type. 
Women are significantly more likely to use all health care types, except have an 
inpatient admission. 
 The non-need contributors have a non systemic effect on patterns of health care use 
by income groups. Income itself is not the only contributor, provided that other non-
need contributors i.e. education, or SHIF coverage do not have a consistent effect. 
 The unequal distribution of income contributes in a positive way (pro-rich) to 
inequity in distribution of probability of SHIF physician visit, in specialist and 
dentist visit. 
 Income contributes in a negative way (pro-poor) to distribution of inequity in 
probability of inpatient admissions and probability of outpatient visits, favoring the 
less advantaged.  
 Another important socio-economic characteristic related to both income and health 
care is higher educational level status that explains a high percentage of inequalities 
in almost all health care types, except for inpatient admission that reduces inequity, 
similar to the existing evidence (Tountas et al, 2011; Van Doorslaer et al, 2006; EC, 
2005; Koolman X., 2007; Van Doorsaler & Masseria, 2004; Masseria et al, 2004).  
 Social health insurance fund (SHIF) coverage has a non systemic effect, as well. 
Compared to Non-Noble IKA SHIF, overall, inequalities are apparent for the 
probability of outpatient visits, SHIF physician and dentist visits favoring the better 
off.  
 Compared to Non-Noble IKA SHIF, inequalities are not apparent for probability of 
inpatient admissions, as well as for probability of making a specialist private visit 
favoring the less advantaged, though with a different magnitude among the SHIFs.  
 Examining the effect of each SHIF separately, we found that compared to Non Noble 
IKA, Noble SHIFs strongly increase inequity in probability of outpatient and dentist 
visits favoring the more advantaged, whereas they strongly reduce inequity (pro – 
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poor) in probability of inpatient and slightly reduce inequity in specialist and SHIF 
physician visit. 
 Elderly with Non Noble OGA SHIF coverage are more likely to use all health care 
types except visiting a SHIF physician. Non Noble OGA SHIF has a negative (pro-
poor) contribution to inequity in probability of most health care types, stronger in 
magnitude in specialist visit and weaker in magnitude for probability of (inpatient, 
outpatient and dentist visit) favoring the worse off. OGA SHIF has a more pronounced 
pro-poor contribution to inequity in the probability of specialist visit than the Noble 
SHIFs. On the other hand, OGA SHIF increases strongly inequity only in probability 
of SHIF physician visit favouring the better off, revealing the minimum freedom of 
choice that Non Noble OGA offers to its beneficiaries compared to other Non Noble 
SHIFs.  
 Marital status and housing tenure type have a negative contribution in inequity in 
most health care types with the exception of dentist visits.  
 Household composition has no effect (zero contribution) on inequity in all health care 
types, only a small negative effect on inequity in probability of inpatient admissions.  
 VHI tenure has positive effect only on inequity in probability of outpatient visits with 
a large contribution favoring the more advantaged, and has negative effect (pro-poor) 
on equity in probability of SHIF physician, of specialist and dentist visits, whereas it 
has no effect on inequity in probability of inpatient admissions. Figures 4.3 - 4.5 
present the results of the decomposition analysis, depicting the contribution of non-
need factors to income-related inequity. 
Overall, our findings that the utilization of health services is determined mainly by the 
health needs and by several demographic, socioeconomic and structural factors of the 
healthcare systems are compatible with existing evidence for determinants of health care use 
for the general population (Phelps and Newhouse, 1974; Newhouse and Marquis, 1978; 
Wagstaff, 1986; Kasper, 1986; Feldstein, 1988; McGuire et al., 1988; Marmot and 
Wilkinson, 1999). More specifically, the existence of chronic medical conditions, the EQ-
5D self-assessed health (SAH) and SAH comparing to last 12 months, older age, female 
gender, marital status, education, income, and insurance coverage, are considered as the 
most important determinants of health services use (Tountas et al, 2011, Pappa and Niakas, 
2006; Economou, 2006, Geitona et al., 2007, Alexopoulos and Geitona, 2009, Bíró 
A.,2014). 
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Table 4.7: Detailed Decomposition of inequality in the probability of inpatient admissions and probability of outpatient visits 
  Probability of inpatient admissions Probability of outpatient visits 
  Mean CI ME Contrib. Sum % Contr. Mean CI ME Contrib. Sum % Contr 
CI unadjusted  -0.102       -0.033     
HI index  -0.049 
  
     0.009 
 
  
 
  
 Need  
  
-0.053 -0.053    
  
-0.041 -0.041   
Age (80+ vs 50-59) 0.089 -0.190 -0.010 0.002   -1.91% 0.089 -0.190 -0.009 0.002  -5.13% 
Age (70-79 vs 50-59) 0.216 -0.087 -0.002 0.000  -0.16% 0.216 -0.087 -0.043 0.004  -11.35% 
Age (60-69 vs 50-59) 0.290 -0.005 -0.021 0.000 0.002 -0.11% 0.290 -0.005 0.106 -0.001 0.005 1.66% 
Male vs female 0.441 0.107 0.133 0.014 0.014 -13.96% 0.441 0.107 -0.018 -0.002 -0.002 5.80% 
Mobility:"Extreme & Moderate" vs "No" 0.280 -0.100 0.045 -0.004  4.40% 0.280 -0.100 -0.096 0.010  -29.17% 
 Self – Care: "Extreme & Moderate" vs "No" 0.078 -0.264 -0.018 0.005  -4.64% 0.078 -0.264 0.016 -0.004  12.59% 
Usual Activities :"Extreme & Moderate" vs "No" 0.131 -0.175 0.104 -0.018  17.86% 0.131 -0.175 -0.001 0.000  -0.33% 
Pain/ Discomfort:"Extreme & Moderate" vs "No" 0.480 -0.113 0.314 -0.036  34.87% 0.480 -0.113 -0.028 0.003  -9.82% 
Anxiety/Depression:"Extreme & Moderate" vs"No" 0.593 -0.057 0.028 -0.002 -0.055 1.59% 0.593 -0.057 -0.090 0.005 0.014 -15.71% 
“Worst” vs"Better"SAH - last 12 m 0.206 -0.169 -0.166 0.028  -27.46% 0.206 -0.169 0.083 -0.014  43.03% 
“The Same” vs "Better" SAH - last 12m 0.671 0.044 -0.741 -0.033 -0.005 31.96% 0.671 0.044 -0.019 -0.001 -0.015 2.57% 
SAH “Less than Good” vs “Very Good & Good”  0.446 -0.151 0.050 -0.008 -0.008 7.42% 0.446 -0.151 0.149 -0.022 -0.022 68.63% 
 “2 + chronic conditions” vs "0" 0.533 -0.034 0.058 -0.002  1.91% 0.533 -0.034 0.505 -0.017  51.92% 
“1 chronic condition” vs "0 " 0.241 -0.024 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.01% 0.241 -0.024 0.162 -0.004 -0.021 12.13% 
Non Need variables                 
ln income (x) 6.448 0.047 -0.766 -0.036 -0.036 35.19% 6.448 0.047 -0.274 -0.013 -0.013 39.36% 
"More than secondary" vs "Primary" 0.117 0.540 -0.004 -0.002   2.06% 0.117 0.540 0.006 0.003  -10.10% 
"Secondary" vs "Primary” Education 0.368 0.052 -0.019 -0.001 -0.003 0.97% 0.368 0.052 0.071 0.004 0.007 -11.38% 
Married vs No  0.750 0.021 -0.081 -0.002 -0.002 1.70% 0.750 0.021 -0.107 -0.002 -0.002 7.02% 
Housing Tenure "Owner" vs Not Owners  0.864 0.023 -0.065 -0.001 -0.001 1.46% 0.864 0.023 -0.028 -0.001 -0.001 1.94% 
Household "Couple/Other" vs "Alone" 0.851 -0.001 0.400 -0.001 -0.001 0.52% 0.851 -0.001 0.337 0.000 0.000 1.36% 
“Noble SHIFunds" vs  “Non Noble IKA" 0.350 0.266 -0.050 -0.013  13.03% 0.350 0.266 0.079 0.021  -64.17% 
“Non Noble OGA-SHIF” vs “Non Noble IKA" 0.097 -0.313 0.026 -0.008 -0.021 7.84% 0.097 -0.313 0.014 -0.005 0.016 13.85% 
VHI "yes" vs "no" 0.031 0.474 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.40% 0.031 0.474 0.023 0.011 0.011 -33.49% 
Sum 
   
-0.117 -0.117 114.93% 
   
-0.023 -0.023 71.22% 
Error 
   
0.015   -14.93% 
   
-0.009  28.78% 
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Table 4.8: Detailed Decomposition of inequality in the probability of SHIF physician visit and probability of specialist private visits 
  Probability of SHIF physician visit Probability of private specialist visits 
  Mean CI ME Contrib Sum % Contr. Mean CI ME Contib. Sum % Contr. 
CI unadjusted   -0.016      0.102     
HI index   0.007 
 
  
 
  0.128 
   
  
Need   
  
-0.023 -0.023   
  
-0.026 -0.026   
Age (80+ vs 50-59) 0.089 -0.190 -0.004 0.001  -4.44% 0.089 -0.190 -0.014 0.003  2.70% 
Age (70-79 vs 50-59) 0.216 -0.087 0.019 -0.002  10.10% 0.216 -0.087 0.027 -0.002  -2.35% 
Age (60-69 vs 50-59) 0.290 -0.005 0.029 0.000 -0.001 0.91% 0.290 -0.005 0.051 0.000 0.000 -0.26% 
Male vs female 0.441 0.107 -0.015 -0.002 -0.002 9.58% 0.441 0.107 -0.177 -0.019 -0.019 -18.66% 
Mobility:"Extreme & Moderate" vs "No" 0.280 -0.100 0.056 -0.006  34.09% 0.280 -0.100 -0.038 0.004  3.68% 
 Self – Care: "Extreme & Moderate" vs "No" 0.078 -0.264 0.005 -0.001  8.06% 0.078 -0.264 -0.040 0.010  10.25% 
Usual Activities :"Extreme & Moderate" vs "No" 0.131 -0.175 -0.032 0.006  -34.50% 0.131 -0.175 0.070 -0.012  -12.10% 
Pain/ Discomfort:"Extreme & Moderate" vs No" 0.480 -0.113 0.030 -0.003  21.05% 0.480 -0.113 0.027 -0.003  -3.00% 
Anxiety/Depression: "Extreme & Moderate" vs "No" 0.593 -0.057 0.002 0.000 -0.005 0.82% 0.593 -0.057 -0.048 0.003 0.002 2.70% 
“Worst” vs"Better"SAH - last 12 m 0.206 -0.169 0.015 -0.003  15.61% 0.206 -0.169 0.066 -0.011  -10.96% 
“The Same” vs "Better" SAH - last 12m 0.671 0.044 0.097 0.004 0.002 -26.25% 0.671 0.044 0.147 0.006 -0.005 6.35% 
SAH “Less than Good” vs “Very Good & Good”  0.446 -0.151 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -3.05% 0.446 -0.151 -0.043 0.006 0.006 6.31% 
 “2 + chronic conditions” vs "0" 0.533 -0.034 0.431 -0.014  88.84% 0.533 -0.034 0.286 -0.010  -9.45% 
 “1 chronic condition” vs "0 " 0.241 -0.024 0.150 -0.004 -0.018 22.43% 0.241 -0.024 0.052 -0.001 -0.011 -1.24% 
Non Need variables                
ln income (x) 6.448 0.047 0.037 0.002 0.002 -10.66% 6.448 0.047 2.672 0.125 0.125 123.17% 
"More than secondary" vs "Primary" 0.117 0.540 0.012 0.007  -41.20% 0.117 0.540 0.018 0.010  9.34% 
"Secondary" vs "Primary" Education 0.368 0.052 0.007 0.000 0.007 -2.28% 0.368 0.052 0.013 0.001 0.010 0.67% 
Married vs No  0.750 0.021 -0.027 -0.001 -0.001 3.52% 0.750 0.021 -0.105 -0.002 -0.002 -2.22% 
Housing Tenure "Owner" vs Not Owners  0.864 0.023 -0.053 -0.001 -0.001 7.35% 0.864 0.023 -0.353 -0.008 -0.008 -7.90% 
Household "Couple/Other" vs "Alone" 0.851 -0.001 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.10% 0.851 -0.001 0.345 0.000 0.000 -0.45% 
“Noble SHIFunds" vs  “Non Noble IKA" 0.350 0.266 -0.029 -0.008  47.67% 0.350 0.266 -0.025 -0.007  -6.61% 
“Non Noble OGA-SHIF” vs “Non Noble IKA" 0.097 -0.313 -0.033 0.010 0.003 -63.08% 0.097 -0.313 0.060 -0.019 -0.025 -18.44% 
VHI "yes" vs "no" 0.031 0.474 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 5.49% 0.031 0.474 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -2.70% 
Sum   
  
-0.015 -0.015 90.15% 
   
0.070 0.070 68.84% 
Error   
  
-0.002  9.85% 
   
0.032  31.16% 
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Table 4.9: Detailed Decomposition of inequality in the probability of dentist visit 
  Probability of dentist visit 
  Mean CI  ME Contrib. Sum % Contrib. 
CI unadjusted   0.040         
HI index   0.016         
Need       
Age (80+ vs 50-59) 0.088 -0.181 -0.034 0.006   15.37% 
Age (70-79 vs 50-59) 0.216 -0.089 -0.059 0.005   12.95% 
Age (60-69 vs 50-59) 0.291 -0.006 -0.017 0.000 0.011 0.27% 
Male vs female 0.442 0.106 -0.086 -0.009 -0.009 -22.85% 
Mobility:"Extreme & Moderate" vs "No" 0.279 -0.097 -0.038 0.004   9.18% 
 Self – Care: "Extreme & Moderate" vs "No" 0.078 -0.265 -0.016 0.004   10.67% 
Usual Activities :"Extreme & Moderate" vs "No" 0.131 -0.177 0.007 -0.001   -3.20% 
Pain/ Discomfort:"Extreme & Moderate" vs "No" 0.479 -0.112 0.004 0.000   -1.17% 
Anxiety/Depression: "Extreme & Moderate" vs "No" 0.593 -0.057 0.037 -0.002 0.004 -5.30% 
“Worst” vs"Better"SAH - last 12 m 0.205 -0.166 0.007 -0.001   -2.79% 
“The Same” vs "Better" SAH - last 12m 0.672 0.043 0.030 0.001 0.000 3.24% 
SAH “Less than Good” vs “Very Good & Good”  0.445 -0.150 -0.055 0.008 0.008 20.68% 
SADental Health “Less than Good vs Good” 0.596 -0.069 -0.085 0.006 0.006 14.76% 
 “2 + chronic conditions” vs "0" 0.532 -0.033 0.026 -0.001   -2.08% 
 “1 chronic condition” vs "0 " 0.242 -0.026 0.013 0.000 -0.001 -0.82% 
Non Need variables         
 
  
ln income (x) 6.449 0.047 0.428 0.020 0.020 50.13% 
"More than secondary" vs "Primary" 0.117 0.539 0.035 0.019   46.93% 
"Secondary" vs "Primary" Education 0.369 0.051 0.113 0.006 0.025 14.32% 
Married vs No  0.752 0.020 0.114 0.002 0.002 5.76% 
Housing Tenure "Owner" vs Not Owners  0.864 0.023 0.049 0.001 0.001 2.82% 
Household "Couple/Other" vs "Alone" 0.852 -0.003 -0.020 0.000 0.000 0.13% 
“Noble SHIFunds" vs  “Non Noble IKA" 0.351 0.265 0.037 0.010   24.20% 
“Non Noble OGA-SHIF” vs “Non Noble IKA" 0.096 -0.306 0.013 -0.004 0.006 -9.88% 
VHI "yes" vs "no" 0.031 0.473 -0.010 -0.005 -0.005 -11.38% 
Sum 
   
0.069 0.088 171.93% 
Error 
   
-0.029   -71.93% 
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Table 4.10: Overall Decomposition of inequity in inpatient admissions, outpatient visits, SHIF physician visits, specialist visit, dentist visit 
  Probability of  
inpatient admissions 
Probability of  
outpatient visits 
Probability of SHIF 
physician visit 
Probability of  
specialist visit 
Probability of 
dentist visit 
  CIndex   CIndex   CIndex   CIndex   CIndex   
CI unadjusted -0.102   -0.033   -0.016   0.102   0.040   
HI index -0.049   0.009   0.007   0.128   0.016   
Health Status -SAH: 
EQ5D+SAH _last12m+ SADH 
Contrib. to 
Inequality 
% 
Contrib 
Contrib. to 
Inequality 
% 
Contrib. 
Contrib. to 
Inequality 
% 
Contrib. 
Contrib. to 
Inequality 
% 
Contrib. 
Contrib. to 
Inequality 
% 
Contrib 
Need -0.053   -0.041   -0.023   -0.026   
  Age 0.002 -2.17% 0.005 -14.82% -0.001 6.57% 0.000 0.10% 0.011 28.58% 
Gender 0.014 -13.96% -0.002 5.80% -0.002 9.58% -0.019 -18.66% -0.009 -22.85% 
Health Status -SAH: 
EQ5D+SAH _last12m+ SADH  -0.067 58.57% -0.023 71.79% -0.003 15.83% 0.003 3.22% 0.018 46.08% 
Health Status: Chronic 
Conditions -0.002 1.90% -0.021 64.04% -0.018 111.27% -0.011 -10.69% -0.001 -2.90% 
Ln (income) -0.036 35.19% -0.013 39.36% 0.002 -10.66% 0.125 123.17% 0.020 50.13% 
Other Non-Need                 
  Education -0.003 3.04% 0.007 -21.48% 0.007 -43.48% 0.010 10.01% 0.025 61.24%
Marital Status -0.002 1.70% -0.002 7.02% -0.001 3.52% -0.002 -2.22% 0.002 5.76% 
Housing Tenure -0.001 1.46% -0.001 1.94% -0.001 7.35% -0.008 -7.90% 0.001 2.82% 
Household Composition  -0.001 0.52% 0.000 1.36% 0.000 0.10% 0.000 -0.45% 0.000 0.13% 
Social Health Insurance Fund  -0.021 20.87% 0.016 -50.32% 0.003 -15.42% -0.025 -25.05% 0.006 14.32% 
VHI coverage 0.000 0.40% 0.011 -33.49% -0.001 5.49% -0.003 -2.70% -0.005 -11.38% 
Error 0.015 -14.93% -0.009 28.78% -0.002 9.85% 0.032 31.16% -0.029 -71.93% 
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Figure 4.3: Contribution to inequity in the probability of inpatient admission and 
outpatient visit 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Contribution (%) to inequity in the probability of SHIF physician visit and 
specialist visit 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Contribution (%) to inequity in the probability of dentist visit 
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4.4.4 Regression Results – Determinants of use in health care 
 The most important determinants of health services utilization, as presented in Tables 
4.11 and 4.12, are the indicators of health care need and more specifically, the 
presence of chronic conditions and the EQ-5D self-assessed usual activities problems.  
 Income has a significant positive association with the probability of specialist visits, 
similar to other studies. The more advantaged individuals are more likely to make 
specialist and dentist visits than those who are less advantaged.  
 Income level has no association with the probability of inpatient admissions, the 
probability of SHIF physician visits and is insignificantly negatively associated with 
the probability of outpatient visits, related with the fragmented PHC system.  
 Moderate educational level shows a weak negative association with the probability of 
inpatient visits, but it is positively related-to a great extent- with the dentist visits. It 
has no association with the probability of outpatient, SHIF and specialist visit.  
 About the effect of SHIF coverage, compared to Non –Noble IKA, Non-Noble OGA 
has a non-significant positive association with the probability of using all health care 
types and a significant positive association with specialist visit. Older population with 
OGA SHIF coverage is more likely (not significantly) to use all health care types, 
except visiting a SHIF physician given the PHC choices that OGA provides to its 
beneficiaries. 
 Moreover, the OGA SHIF elderly beneficiaries are significantly more likely to make a 
specialist visit compared to Non Noble IKA SHIF beneficiaries.  
 On the other hand, Noble SHIF coverage is not significantly associated with any 
health care type in comparison with Non Noble IKA SHIF. Compared to Non Noble 
IKA coverage, Noble SHIF elderly beneficiaries are less likely to have inpatient 
admissions, to make a specialist and a SHIF physician visit, mainly due to better 
health status, whereas they are non significantly more likely to make an outpatient and 
a dentist visit.  
 “Homeowners” are significantly negatively associated with the specialist private visit. 
 Marital status has a weak positive association with the dentist visit, whereas household 
composition does not have significant association with any health care visit.  
 VHI tenure is negatively associated with the probability of any dentist visit, whereas it 
has a weak significant positive association with the probability of an outpatient visit. 
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Table 4.11: Regression model analysis for probability of inpatient admissions. outpatient 
visits. SHIF physician visits and private specialist based on Patra HIS dataset 
    
Probability 
of inpatient 
admission 
(the last 12 
months) 
Probability 
of 
outpatient 
visit (the 
past 3 
months) 
Probability 
of SHIF 
physician 
visit (the past 
3 months) 
Probability 
of private 
specialist 
visit (the 
past 3 
months) 
 
    SE   SE   SE   SE 
Need                   
Age Age (80+ vs 50-59) 0.86 0.45 0.94 0.46 0.89 0.36 0.88 0.40 
Age (70-79 vs 50-59) 1.00 0.36 0.82 0.28 1.32 0.38 1.19 0.36 
Age (60-69 vs 50-59) 0.87 0.28 1.58 0.43 1.38 0.34 1.29 0.34 
Gender male vs female 1.53 0.42 0.95 0.23 0.90 0.20 0.55 0.13 
EQ-5D Health 
Status Measure 
 Mobility:"Extreme & 
Moderate" vs "No" 1.18 0.37 0.65 0.20 1.98 0.56 0.79 0.22 
 Self – Care: "Extreme & 
Moderate" vs "No" 0.75 0.37 1.25 0.69 1.29 0.64 0.53 0.27 
Usual Activities :"Extreme 
& Moderate" vs "No" 2.01 0.79 1.00 0.43 0.43 0.17 1.95 0.74 
Pain/ Discomfort:"Extreme 
& Moderate" vs "No" 2.61 0.82 0.90 0.24 1.23 0.29 1.07 0.27 
Anxiety/Depression: 
"Extreme & Moderate" vs 
"No" 1.06 0.29 0.81 0.19 1.01 0.21 0.90 0.20 
SAH - last12m  
“Worst” vs"Better"SAH - 
last 12 m 0.43 0.16 1.62 0.64 1.24 0.44 1.59 0.61 
“the Same” vs "Better" 
SAH - last 12m 0.29 0.10 0.93 0.33 1.63 0.48 1.40 0.46 
SAH  
“Less than Good” vs “Very 
Good & Good”  1.14 0.35 1.51 0.40 0.97 0.23 0.91 0.23 
Chronic conditions 
 “2 + chronic conditions” 
vs "0" 1.25 0.50 4.64 1.85 10.28 2.88 2.14 0.67 
 “1 chronic condition” vs 
"0 " 1.12 0.47 3.35 1.38 5.58 1.57 1.36 0.46 
Non Need variables               
Income (5 
Quintiles) 
Income 5 (>901€) 0.56 0.28 0.89 0.35 0.90 0.31 3.14 1.19 
Income  4 (> 751 - 900 €) 1.09 0.43 0.63 0.24 1.07 0.36 3.10 1.09 
Income 3 (> 501 - 750 €) 1.46 0.54 0.98 0.34 0.82 0.26 1.81 0.62 
Income 2 (375 -500 €) 0.92 0.33 0.76 0.25 0.84 0.25 1.47 0.50 
Educational Level 
"More than secondary" vs 
"Primary" 1.06 0.55 1.00 0.44 1.43 0.53 1.17 0.45 
"Secondary" vs "Primary"  0.93 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.07 0.25 1.03 0.25 
Marital status Married vs No  0.96 0.36 0.86 0.29 0.91 0.29 0.85 0.27 
Housing Tenure "Owner" vs Not Owners  0.85 0.30 0.97 0.31 0.81 0.24 0.58 0.17 
Household  "Couple/Other" vs "Alone" 1.90 0.96 1.97 0.88 0.99 0.39 1.43 0.59 
Social Health 
Insurance Fund  
“Noble SHIFunds" vs  
“Non Noble IKA" 0.84 0.27 1.43 0.39 0.75 0.18 0.87 0.23 
“Non Noble OGA-SHIF” 
vs “Non Noble IKA" 1.32 0.51 1.21 0.46 0.34 0.11 2.26 0.75 
VHI "yes" vs "no" 1.01 0.83 2.57 1.52 0.87 0.48 0.68 0.47 
Bold:p-value <0.01; bold and italics: p-value<0.05; italics:p-value<0.10 
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Table 4.12: Regression model analysis for probability of dentist visit based on PatraHIS dataset 
    
Probability of dentist 
visit (the last 5 years) 
 
 
           SE 
Need   
 
  
Age Age (80+ vs 50-59) 0.33 0.14 
Age (70-79 vs 50-59) 0.47 0.12 
Age (60-69 vs 50-59) 0.82 0.19 
Gender male vs female 0.56 0.12 
EQ-5D Health Status 
Measure 
 Mobility:"Extreme & Moderate" vs "No" 0.68 0.17 
 Self – Care: "Extreme & Moderate" vs "No" 0.59 0.29 
Usual Activities :"Extreme & Moderate" vs 
"No" 1.15 0.42 
Pain/ Discomfort:"Extreme & Moderate" vs 
"No" 1.04 0.23 
Anxiety/Depression: "Extreme & Moderate" vs 
"No" 1.20 0.24 
SAH - last12m  
“Worst” vs"Better"SAH - last 12 m 1.09 0.37 
“the Same” vs "Better" SAH - last 12m 1.14 0.32 
SAH  “Less than Good” vs “Very Good & Good”  0.71 0.16 
SADental Health “Less than Good” vs “Good” 0.67 0.13 
Chronic conditions 
 “2 + chronic conditions” vs "0" 1.12 0.30 
 “1 chronic condition” vs "0 " 1.10 0.31 
Non Need variables      
Income (5 Quintiles) 
Income 5 (>901€) 1.40 0.46 
Income  4 (> 751 - 900 €) 1.68 0.52 
Income 3 (> 501 - 750 €) 0.89 0.25 
Income 2 (375 -500 €) 1.22 0.34 
Educational Level 
"More than secondary" vs "Primary" 2.20 0.81 
"Secondary" vs "Primary"  2.25 0.48 
Marital status Married vs No  1.52 0.45 
Housing Tenure "Owner" vs Not Owners  1.19 0.32 
Household  "Couple/Other" vs "Alone" 0.75 0.28 
Social Health Insurance 
Fund (SHIF) 
“Noble SHIFunds" vs  “Non Noble IKA" 1.31 0.30 
“Non Noble OGA-SHIF” vs “Non Noble IKA" 1.45 0.47 
VHI "yes" vs "no" 0.44 0.23 
Bold:p-value <0.01; bold and italics: p-value<0.05; italics:p-value<0.10 
 
  
4.4.5 Regression Results – Determinants of OOPPs in use of health care 
According to the above sample description, OOP payments for specialist private care 
across the health care types, contribute at a higher percentage to medical specialist 
expenditures and less for inpatient care visits and outpatient care. The determinants of the 
probability of paying OOP by health care type are presented in Tables 4.13 and 4.14.  
 Significant associations of explanatory indicators with the probability of facing OOPPs 
are not apparent for inpatient and outpatient care, apart from few need indicators.  
 Only older age is significantly positively associated with the probability of OOPP 
for inpatient admissions. 
 Worse sah is significantly negatively associated with OOPP for outpatient care.  
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 Income is not associated with OOPP for receiving inpatient or outpatient care, 
either. 
 Significant associations of explanatory indicators with the probability of facing OOPPs 
are apparent for the SHIF physician visits and specialist private visits. 
 The Non –Noble Farmers OGA SHIF beneficiaries are significantly less likely to 
face OOP expenses for outpatient care, compared to Non –Noble IKA.  
 About the last SHIF physician visit, significantly more likely to meet OOPPs are:  
 older people with severe self care; and anxiety/depression problems;  
 more advantaged (in income level 4);  
 with secondary educational level and Noble SHIFs coverage  
 On the other hand, significantly less likely to face OOP expenses for SHIF physician 
visits are elderly with health problems such as: “less than good” sah, “worst sah 
comparing to last 12 months”, suffering from 2+ chronic medical symptoms.  
 Therefore, during their last SHIF physician visit, more advantaged individuals and 
Noble SHIF beneficiaries – who tend to be better off- are significantly more likely to 
face OOPPs than less advantaged and the Non Noble IKA beneficiaries, as expected. 
 Moreover, for a specialist private visit, the determinants of the OOP amount including 
0€ and conditional (>0€) OOP amount, (Tables 4.13 and 4.14) indicate that need 
variables are significantly associated with the OOP amount, as expected by the existing 
evidence: 
 All (100%) of the oldest 80+ pay OOP for a specialist visit versus other age groups. 
 A large proportion of females and those reporting extreme pain/discomfort pay OOP.  
 With regard to the income effect, it is worth noting that all (100%) of older poorer 
individuals in lower income quintile 1 pay OOP for a specialist visit, comparing to 
70% of more advantaged in higher income quintile 5.  
 About the SHIF coverage effect, all (100%) Non Noble OGA SHIF beneficiaries -
worse off- face OOPPs comparing to only 59% of the Noble SHIFs beneficiaries 
(Table 4.14). 
 In addition the determinants of the conditional (>0€) OOP for specialist visit comparing 
higher median OOP amount (>40€) versus lower OOP amount (1€ - 40€), indicate that:   
 Younger elderly, with worst sah comparing to the last 12 months, suffering from 
chronic medical conditions as well as homeowners, are significantly less likely to 
pay higher OOP amount (>40€) for making a specialist private visit.  
 Compared to poorest income quintile 1, elderly in other income groups are 
insignificantly less likely to face higher OOP amount (>40€). 
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 Therefore, the poorest elderly in income quintile 1 are insignificantly more likely to 
pay higher OOP amount (>40€), revealing inequalities among income groups. 
 Non Noble Farmers OGA SHIF beneficiaries –less advantaged- are insignificantly 
more likely to pay higher OOP amount for making a specialist visit, whereas Noble 
SHIF beneficiaries –better off - are less likely to pay higher OOP amount (>40€) 
than Non Noble IKA beneficiaries, revealing inequalities in ability to pay in terms of 
SHIF. 
 In order to explore the extent of OOPPs for specialist private visit related to ability to 
pay by income, and by SHIF, we examine the OOP mean amount by income quintile 
(Table 3.15), and by SHIF (Table 3.16) for OOP amount (including 0€) and conditional 
(>0€).  
 In terms of ability to pay, by income quintile (Table 3.15): 
  There is a clear trend that conditional mean OOPP amounts decrease as the income 
level proceeds from poorest to the richest 4
th
 level, revealing a regressive relationship 
in terms of ability to pay. 
 The elderly in the richest 5th income quintile report facing higher conditional/positive 
(>0€) mean OOP amount (70.48€) than those in poorest income quintile (49.26€). 
 In terms of SHIF coverage (Table 3.16): 
 Non Noble OGA SHIF beneficiaries –less advantaged – face the highest conditional 
mean OOP amount for a specialist private visit, slightly higher than the amount paid 
by Non Noble IKA beneficiaries.  
 Noble SHIFs beneficiaries –better off –seem to face significantly lower conditional 
OOP mean amount than the other SHIFs, thus revealing a regressive relationship. 
 Overall, for mean conditional (>0€) OOPP, elderly pay an amount ranking from 
46.57€ to 58.08€ - higher than the median 40€- irrespective of their SHIF. However, 
Noble SHIF beneficiaries pay somewhat higher in magnitude OOP amount. 
 Given that beneficiaries of Non Noble OGA and Non Noble IKA SHIF tend to be 
less advantaged, our findings reveal a regressive relationship in terms of SHIF 
coverage. 
 Consequently, OOP amount is an important barrier against a specialist private visit 
revealing a regressive relationship in terms of ability to pay, and in terms of SHIF 
coverage. These findings are related to the variations in coverage across the different 
SHIFs in financing the fragmented PHC system and the organization of NHS-ESY.  
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Table 4.13: Regression model analysis for probability of paying OOP for inpatient admissions, 
outpatient visits, SHIF physician visits, OOP amount>0 for specialist visit based on 
PatraHIS dataset 
    
Probability 
of OOPP for  
inpatient 
admission 
(yes/no) (the 
last 12 
months) 
Probability 
of OOPP for  
outpatient 
visit (yes/no) 
(the past 3 
months) 
Probability of 
OOPP for  
SHIF physician 
visit (yes/no) 
(the past 3 
months) 
Probability of 
OOP 
amount>0 for 
Specialist 
(>40€ vs 1€-
40€) (the past 
3 months) 
  
 
  
 
SE   SE   SE SE 
Need   
 
              
Age Age (80+ vs 50-59) 1.81 2.49 4.91 6.34 27.39 33.56 0.38 0.60 
Age (70-79 vs 50-59) 6.56 6.82 3.45 3.31 2.47 2.67 0.19 0.17 
Age (60-69 vs 50-59) 2.43 2.42 3.39 2.56 3.19 2.92 0.22 0.16 
Gender Male vs female 0.63 0.49 0.94 0.55 0.39 0.27 1.10 0.74 
EQ-5D 
Health 
Status 
Measure 
 Mobility:"Extreme & 
Moderate" vs "No Problems" 0.23 0.23 1.74 1.47 0.37 0.40 1.19 0.86 
 Self – Care: "Extreme & 
Moderate" vs "No Problems" 0.95 1.12 1.51 1.68 25.16 39.83 0.33 0.53 
Usual Activities :"Extreme & 
Moderate" vs "No Problems" 1.59 1.57 1.35 1.46 1.57 2.06 1.16 1.04 
Pain/ Discomfort:"Extreme & 
Moderate" vs "No Problems" 1.17 1.19 0.73 0.46 2.02 1.44 2.32 1.44 
Anxiety/Depression: "Extreme 
& Moderate" vs "No 
Problems" 1.75 1.46 0.44 0.28 5.10 4.18 2.14 1.26 
SAH - 
last12m  
“Worst” vs "Better"SAH - last 
12 m 
2.05 2.13 0.22 0.23 0.30 0.31 0.05 0.05 
“the Same” vs "Better"SAH - 
last 12m 
1.83 1.67 0.41 0.35 0.17 0.14 0.23 0.21 
SAH  “Less than Good” vs “Very 
Good & Good”  
0.38 0.33 0.33 0.23 0.11 0.13 3.23 2.02 
Chronic 
conditions 
 “2 + chronic conditions” vs "0" 1.56 1.85 3.10 3.57 0.15 0.14 0.27 0.26 
 “1 chronic condition” vs "0 
condit.” 0.52 
0.65 
2.98 3.62 0.34 0.31 0.28 0.26 
Non Need variables            
Income (5 
Quintil.) 
Income 5 (>901€) 0.87 1.36 0.28 0.31 4.13 4.85 0.36 0.33 
Income  4 (> 751 - 900 €) 0.57 0.66 0.82 0.79 6.93 8.14 0.23 0.21 
Income 3 (> 501 - 750 €) 1.14 1.10 0.34 0.33 0.84 0.99 0.27 0.23 
Income 2 (375 -500 €) 0.81 0.76 1.17 0.94 2.33 2.76 0.53 0.40 
Education
al Level 
"More than secondary" vs 
"Primary" "Primary" 
3.59 4.66 1.33 1.44 2.69 2.88 2.27 2.71 
"Secondary" vs "Primary"  1.74 1.39 2.17 1.39 5.22 4.16 0.76 0.50 
Marital  
 
 
 
 
Married vs No  
2.07 2.40 0.53 0.46 0.22 0.21 0.41 0.32 
Housing  "Owner" vs Not Owners  1.96 1.82 1.00 0.84 1.05 0.99 0.14 0.11 
Household  "Couple/Other" vs "Alone" 0.22 0.31 0.76 0.95 4.87 5.29 1.86 1.95 
SHIF “Noble SHIFs" vs “Non Noble 
IKA" 
0.28 0.28 1.27 0.86 3.73 2.79 0.83 0.82 
“Non Noble OGA-SHIF” vs 
“Non Noble IKA" 
0.56 0.55 0.13 0.17 NA   2.69 1.96 
VHI "yes" vs "no" NA   NA   NA   17.0
8 
28.31 
Bold:p-value <0.01; bold and italics: p-value<0.05; italics:p-value<0.10 
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Table 4.14: Univariate analysis for OOP amount for specialist private visit (including 0€:≥0) (yes/no)  
 
N % p-value 
Age 80+ 10/10 100.0 0.034 
Age 70-79  
 
26/31 83.9  
Age 60-69 
 
45/50 90.0  
Age 50-59 38/52 73.1  
Gender Male 39/52 75.0 0.047 
Female 80/91 87.9  
 EQ-5D Mobility:"Extreme & Moderate" 
  
39/42 92.9 0.047 
Mobility""No Problems" 80/101 79.2  
Self – Care"Extreme & Moderate" vs "No Problems" 9/9 100.0 0.225 
Self – Care "No Problems" 110/134 82.1  
Usual Activities"Extreme & Moderate"  
 
23/24 95.8 0.078 
Usual Activities "No Problems" 96/119 80.7  
Pain/ Discomfort "Extreme & Moderate" 70/74 94.6 <0.001 
Pain/ Discomfort "No Problems"  49/69 71.0  
Anxiety/Depression "Extreme & Moderate" 73/85 85.9 0.302 
Anxiety/Depression "No Problems" 46/58 79.3  
“Worst” SAH - last 12 m 30/35 85.7 0.549 
“the Same” SAH - last 12m 78/94 83.0  
"Better"SAH - last 12m 11/14 78.6  
“Less than Good” SAH 
 
61/67 91.0 0.017 
“Very Good & Good” SAH 57/75 76.0  
“2 + chronic medical conditions” 78/93 83.9 0.351 
“1 chronic medical condition” 26/29 89.7  
“0 chronic medical condition” 15/21 71.4  
Income 5 (>901€) 21/30 70.0 0.002 
Income  4 (> 751 - 900 €) 25/31 80.6  
Income 3 (> 501 - 750 €) 20/26 76.9  
Income 2 (375 -500 €) 26/28 92.9  
Income 1(up to 374€) 23/23 100.0  
"More than secondary Educational Level”  8/17 47.1 <0.001 
"Secondary Educational Level” 
 
40/49 81.6  
"Primary Educational Level" 71/77 92.2  
Married 
 
  
86/104 82.7 0.784 
No Married 33/39 84.6  
“Owners” 99/118 83.9 0.758 
“Not Owners” 20/25 80.0  
"Couple/Other"  103/122 84.4 0.351 
“Alone” 16/21 76.2  
“Noble SHIFs”  26/44 59.1 <0.001 
“Non Noble OGA-SHIF”  
 
21/21 100.0  
“Non Noble IKA" 72/76 94.7  
VHI “yes” 3/4 75.0 0.525 
VHI “no”  
 
 
 
116/139 83.5  
Bold:p-value <0.01; bold and italics: p-value<0.05; italics:p-value<0.10;   
The analysis contacted with: Chi-square test; Fisher's exact test; Chi-square test for trend 
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Table 4.15: Mean OOP amount during the last specialist private visit by Income Quintile 
 
 
Table 4.16: Mean OOP amount during the last specialist private visit by SHIF tenure 
Mean OOP positive amount (>0) by SHIF tenure 
Mean OOP amount (≥0) by 
SHIF tenure 
 
Mean (€) SE N Mean (€) SE N 
Noble SHIF 58.08 10.57 26 34.32 7.57 44 
Non Noble OGA 
SHIF 46.57 3.78 21 
46.57 3.78 21 
Non Noble IKA SHIF 47.78 4.08 72 45.26 4.06 76 
 
4.5 Discussion 
The purpose of the present study was to explore income–related inequalities on utilisation 
of health care among the population over 50 years old in an urban-setting in Greece and 
explore the role of out of pocket payment mechanism (OOPP) in health care use as a 
financial barrier to access. Our findings, summarized and the contribution of our study to 
inequity in utilization of health care services by health care type, the role of SHIFs 
coverage variances, and the role of Out of pocket payments (OOPPs) as dimensions of 
inequalities are summarized and discussed underneath, following the comparison with 
existing literature for the general population. 
4.5.1 Inequity in utilization of health care services by health care type 
 The most important determinants of health services utilization by the elderly are the 
existence of chronic medical conditions, the EQ-5D self-assessed health (SAH) and 
SAH comparing to last 12 months and less age and gender. Older individuals till 79 
years are more likely to make a SHIF physician visit and a specialist visit, whereas 
individuals 80+ are less likely to use any health care type. This is not simply due to 
variations in health and functional status. Our findings are related to the aforementioned 
literature that evidence about health care use and treatment is mixed: not all studies have 
Mean OOP positive amount (>0) by Income Quintile 
Mean OOP amount (≥0) by 
Income Quintile 
 
Mean (€) SE N Mean (€) SE N 
Income Quintile 5: 900.01+ 70.48 14.79 21 49.33 11.90 30 
Income Quintile 4: 750.01 – 900.00 39.80 3.55 25 32.10 4.05 31 
Income Quintile 3: 500.01 – 750.00 40.25 3.81 20 30.96 4.47 26 
Income Quintile 2: 375.01 – 500.00 47.12 6.61 26 43.75 6.56 28 
Income Quintile 1: <= 375.00 49.26 4.22 23 49.26 4.22 23 
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found poorer treatment for those in older ages, with patterns varying according to health 
condition and health care outcome considered (WHO, 2013).  In addition, women are 
significantly more likely to use all health care services, except have an inpatient 
admission. An important determinant of this diversity in health-care utilization is 
socioeconomic status. From non need indicators education explains a high percentage of 
inequalities in health care except inpatient admissions, income, insurance coverage, 
marital status and household composition are also considered as important determinants 
of health services use, but not with the same strength for all health care types.  
 Inequity in utilization of health care services by health care type 
 Pro-rich inequity in probability of specialist and dental care is supported. 
 Significant pro-poor inequity is found in probability of inpatient admissions. 
 No significant (slightly pro- rich) income-related inequity is supported for 
probability of outpatient visits and probability of making SHIF physician visits.  
 Income has a large positive effect on inequity – it increases inequity in probability 
of specialist and dentist visit, and slightly increases inequity in probability of SHIF 
physician visits. On the other hand, it has a less pronounced effect on inequity in 
probability of inpatient admissions and outpatient visits, favoring the less 
advantaged.  
4.5.1.1 Inequity in utilization of health care services by health care type: 
Comparison with existing literature   
By attempting to compare our findings for utilization of care among older population with 
the existing evidence mainly for general population, we conclude the following. 
Inequity in inpatient admissions (hospital utilization) 
Overall, our findings of pronounced pro-poor inequity in inpatient admissions, implying 
that inpatient care can meet the needs of older population, are in line with most of the 
aforementioned evidence in Chapter one and Appendix, for the general population:  
a) in line with two comparative EU studies of  Van Doorslaer, Koolman and Jones 
(2004) and Van Doorslaer & Masseria (2004) that measured income-related inequity 
in health care using ECHP data and found no income inequity after standardizing for 
need studies; 
b) in line with almost all Greek literature that argues no-income related inequity 
(Kyriopoulos et al, 2002; Tountas et al, 2011; Geitona et al, 2007; Siskou et al 2008; 
Liaropoulos et al, 2008; and the urban setting study of Pappa E. and Niakas D., 
2006). However, we need to treat these findings in caution because of limitations in 
their study design. For example, the evidence for the determinants of informal 
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payment in public hospitals (Liaropoulos et al, 2008) was a telephone interview 
survey and should be treated in caution. 
c) in line with two urban setting  cross-sectional studies: (i) the study of Pappa E. and 
Niakas D., 2006 in the broader Athens area found that hospital admissions were 
related to need and not to SES factor; (ii) as well as the study of Sissouras A, Karokis 
A et al (1996) in Patras’ the third largest urban area, under the  W.H.O. European 
Healthy Cities Network Survey, that indicated no-income related inequalities in 
hospital admissions. It is important to mention that the specific study had a similar 
framework as our study in PatrasHIS although it was conducted ten years ago before 
the major NHS decentralization healt reform of 2001.    
d) in line with the comparative cross-sectional study of Santos-Eggimann B. et al, 2005 
based on SHARE survey for older population, who explored the determinants of 
health care use and found no income association of Greek elderly with inpatient 
admissions. 
e) On the other hand, our finding is contradictory to: (i) the study of Masseria C., 
Koolman X., Van Doorslaer E., 2004 with a pooled analysis of ECHP from 1994-
1998 in Greece that found significant pro rich inequity for inpatient care relevant to 
non-elective care (ii) the study of Siskou et al (2008) to analyze private health 
payments by provider and type of service, which showed pro-rich total number of 
private inpatient admissions. (iii) A regional cross-sectional study in Thessaly in 
2006 of Lahana E. et al (2011) that indicates pro-rich inpatient care, but this study 
has a small sample and its findings need caution. (iv) Considering the elderly 
evidence: the cross-sectional studies of Majo M. C., van Soest A. (2012) and Allin S. 
& Masseria C. (2006)  based on SHARE survey for elderly which examined the 
relationship between income and health care utilization across countries and found 
slightly pro-rich inequity in hospital care use; (v) the study of Allin S., Masseria C. 
and Mossialos E. (2009) based on SHARE survey that explores income-related 
inequalities in use of health care by wealth versus  income, and found slightly pro-
rich inpatient care. 
Inequity in outpatient visit  
Overall, our finding of no significant (slightly pro- rich) income-related inequity among 
older population in the probability of outpatient visits mainly due to a medical symptom, is 
in line with few existing evidence for the elderly and general population: 
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a) is in line with the results of the urban-setting study in Athens for the general 
population, that doesn’t find any income association  for outpatient care (Pappa E. & 
Niakas D., 2006) 
b) is partly compatible with other Greek evidence for general population of no 
association of SES characteristics with informal payments in public hospitals for 
inpatient or outpatient admissions (Siskou et al, 2008; Liaropoulos et al, 2008); 
Similarly, two studies evaluating cases treated in the ED of a Greek general hospital - 
reported increased outpatient visits not associated with income - and revealed that 
almost one in three patients in specific surgical groups could have been managed by 
a GP (Marinos et al., 2009; Vasileiou et al., 2009). 
c) is in line with the results of a study exclusively for Greek elderly of Majo M. & Van 
Soest A. (2012) based on SHARE data that outpatient care does not increase with 
income.  
d) On the other hand, our finding is not in line with: (i) the cross-sectional urban setting 
study of Sissouras A, Karokis A et al (1996) in Patras’ the third largest urban area, 
within the W.H.O. European Healthy Cities Network Survey, that indicated more 
conditional outpatient visits from those in lower SES (pro poor) – mainly for having 
diagnostic tests and medication prescribing. However, this is a study before the 
NHS-ESY reforms. 
 
Inequity in SHIF physician visit 
With regard to SHIF physician visits, our findings indicate that there is almost no inequity 
(slightly pro –rich) for the probability of making a SHIF physician visit indicating that all 
individuals have the same probability to make a SHIF physician visit, irrespective of their 
income. Furthermore, elderly people visit a SHIF physician mainly for medicines’ 
prescriptions and only a few make a visit due to medical symptoms. The comparison of our 
findings of SHIF physician visits with other international and Greek evidence needs to be 
treated in caution, provided that GPs are only a few and family doctors are not statutory 
established in Greece. Therefore, when individuals refer to SHIF physician, or GP or 
Family doctor, usually refer to different specialists, according to their need. However, none 
of the specialists bear responsibility for the patient as a whole. Therefore, people consult a 
single provider - specialist regularly, and consider him as their “personal” or “family” 
doctor, resulting in difficulty in comparing results for inequity in SHIF physician visits.  
Under this framework, our finding is in line with the results of two cross-sectional urban 
setting studies: (i) of Sissouras A, Karokis A et al (1996) in Patras’ the third largest urban 
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area, within the Phase II framework (1993-1997) programme of W.H.O. European Healthy 
Cities Network Survey, that indicated no-income association with SHIF physician visit. (ii) 
of Pappa E. & Niakas D. (2006) study in Athens for the general population, that found 
women, elderly, less wealthy (pro poor) and individuals with low physical health status 
report more visits to their contracted SHIF physician. 
 
Inequity in specialist care use  
Overall, our finding of a significant pro-rich inequity in probability of making a specialist 
visit, mainly for a regular medical visit and a check up, revealling the inefficiencies in 
PHC services with important policy implications for meeting the needs of older population, 
is in line with most existing evidence for the elderly and general population:  
(i) is in line with four comparative EU studies including Greece of Van Doorslaer, 
Koolman and Jones (2004) and Van Doorslaer, Koolman and Puffer (2002) that 
measured income-related inequity in specialist care in 1996; Bago d’Uvaa T. & 
Jones A.(2009) and Bago d’Uvaa T. et al (2009) that conducted a pooled analysis 
for 1994-2001 using ECHP data for Greece and found significant pro-rich inequity 
for the probability of specialist visit. 
(ii) is in line with Greek literature of Tountas et al, 2011; and Mergoupis et al, 2003; 
Kyriopoulos et al, 2002 that argue pro-rich inequity for specialist visits. Similarly, 
is in line with the nationwide telephone survey of Souliotis et al (2016) for informal 
payments in health care in 2012, that more frequent visits to private health services 
(mainly PHC) are reported by persons with higher SES profile. 
(iii) is in line with regional cross-sectional studies: (a) in Thessaly in 2006 of Lahana E. 
et al (2011) for determinants of utilisation that indicates pro-rich specialist care; (b) 
of Sissouras A, Karokis A et al (1996) in Patras’ the third largest urban area, within 
the W.H.O. European Healthy Cities Network Survey, that indicated pro-rich 
specialist visits.   
(iv) is in line with studies for elderly of Allin S. & Masseria C., 2006 based on SHARE 
wave 1 data and found that wealth-related difference in physician visits was greater 
than income differences in Greek elderly;   
(v)  On the other hand, our finding is contradictory to cross-sectional nationwide 
studies: (i) the study of Zavras D et al, (2014) that explored determinants of PHC 
services in Greece during 2006 using the methodology of the WHO (Üstün et al., 
2001) and found that people with lower income report increased PHC services (ii) 
another mail survey conducted in Greece 2001 - 2002 by Geitona et al, (2007) that 
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examined the determinants of PHC and hospital care utilization and found that the 
number of PHC visits is affected by income only for poor population. However, it 
is a mail study with significant limitations on its design. (iii) few studies with  
evidence of no association of individuals’ SES characteristics with specialist care as 
an inpatient or outpatient  patient for the general population (Tountas et al, 2011; 
Siskou et al, 2008; Liaropoulos et al, 2008), with limitations in design. The 
nationwide study  conducted by Tountas et al, (2011) concluded that specialist visit 
is equally distributed among people in lower socioeconomic status (SES) than those 
in middle SES . Similarly, the regional study of Pappa E. and Niakas D.,(2006) in 
the broader Athens area found that for specialist visits almost no (slightly pro rich) 
SES factor was related; (iv) a study exclusively for elderly of Majo M. & Van Soest 
A. (2012) based on SHARE data, that no clear association with SES is found.  
 
  Inequity in dentist utilization 
Significant pro-rich inequity exists in probability of making a dentist visit.  
(a) Our findings that higher income has been positively associated with dental use as 
expected, are in compliance with:  
(i) other studies for the general population that identify higher dentist and dental care 
use by individuals in high SES (Koletsi-Kounari H. et al, 2011; Pavi E, et al, 
2010; Koletsi-Kounari H. et al, 2007; Zavras D. et al, 2004; Souliotis K. et al, 
2016; Van Doorslaer E. & Masseria C., 2004; Kyriopoulos et al, 2002).  
(ii) A study that explored determinants of older Greek adults' oral health patterns and 
found that that cost and no disease awareness were the most frequently mentioned 
barriers to regular dental visits (Naka O, Anastassiadou V, 2012)  
(iii) for the elderly the studies of Majo M. & Van Soest A., 2012; Egimann S. et al, 
2005; Allin S. & Mossialos, 2004 based on SHARE Wave1 data that identify the 
significant effect of income in dentist and dental care use; and the study of Listl S. 
(2011) based on SHARE Wave 2 data that explored income inequalities in dental 
care use and preventive treatment by 50+ and found significant pro-rich inequity 
in dental care in Greece, and higher inequalities for preventive treatment among 
retired individuals. Moreover, a recent study of Listl S (2012) based on life-course 
data from SHARE (waves 1 to 3) that identified pro-higher education inequalities 
in regular dental attendance throughout the life-course and relatively inelastic 
until age yrs 65+ but not thereafter, due to age-related inequality decline in 
Greece.  
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(b) Our finding is contradictory to: 
 (i) Greek study (Siskou et al, 2008) that found no association of income with dental 
care use;  
(ii) Few studies that indicate lower levels of oral health associated with those in lower 
income and lower SES (Yfantopoulos et al., 2014; Kyriopoulos et al, 2002).  
Overall, we could claim that our evidence shows that for inpatient and specialist care, no 
clear income-related association to inequalities in health care is found, comparing to 
outpatient and dental care that association is clearer. 
4.5.1.2 Inequity in utilization of health care services by health care type:  
Contribution to literature - new evidence and discussion 
Our study contributes to the literature of the distribution of income and other determinants 
in health care inequalities by the older population in the Patra’s urban setting, but also 
explores access to affordable health care, shedding light on the egalitarian equity principle 
of the NHS ESY in terms of the decentralization reform attempts of 2001-2004. By 
introducing more sophisticated statistical methodology, we contribute to literature, given 
that existing evidence for inequalities in health care use in an urban setting is relatively 
weak and not routinely reported. This study constitutes a challenge for the Greek universal 
health system, provided that urbanization is a major public health issue for the 21st 
century, given: the rapid increase of urban population; the frequently insufficient 
infrastructure; and social and economic inequalities in urban areas that result in significant 
health inequalities (Vlahov et al., 2007). Along with urbanization, population ageing has 
been a challenge for the health systems that include accessibility to services, which is 
linked more to inability to pay rather than proximity to facilities. More recently, it is 
recognized that the complex dynamics of cities, with their concentration of the poorest and 
vulnerable groups of people – such as the elderly, pose an urgent challenge to the health 
community, even within the developed world WHO (2008b). Under this framework, our 
findings for the municipality of Patras – the third most populated urban area in Greece - 
contribute to understanding and acknowledgement of the social determinants of health care 
use inequalities, targeting the older population in a local level.  
Overall, our study highlights the multiplicity and complexity of the Greek NHS-ESY 
health care system. In particular, our findings of pro-poor inequity in probability of 
inpatient care are in accordance with the comprehensive inpatient (secondary and tertiary) 
care provided to the entire population through the network of ESY public hospitals, 
especially, in the region of Patras that constitutes the chair of 6
th
 Regional Health Authority 
(6
th
 YPE) of Peloponnese, Epirus, the Ionian Islands and Western Greece. They are also 
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compatible with Greek studies that applied the data envelope analyses (DEA) method to 
evaluate hospital’s performance and demonstrated efficient operation of small and medium 
in size hospitals (250 to 400 beds) in urban areas - versus larger general hospitals -  in 
almost all regions except 6th YPE and 7th YPE for medium size hospitals, and 2
nd
 YPE for 
small hospitals, (Prezerakos P., 1999; Polyzos N., 2002; NSPH, 2012; Polyzos. N, 2013), 
except the large hospitals of the 2
nd 
YPE (Piraeus & Aegean Islands) and 4
th
 YPE (Central 
& East Macedonia & Thrace), as they still remain below the national average of technical 
efficiency (Polyzos, 2012; NSPH, 2012).Similar findings are identified by another recent 
study of Xenos P., NektariosM, ConstantopoulosA, Yfantopoulos J (2016) that examined 
the efficiency of 112 Greek public hospitals in 2009 by applying two models of DEA, 
augmented by bootstrapping techniques in the efficiency and found that the majority of the 
NHS-ESY hospitals (30.4%) score between 0.51 and 0.7, while less than a quarter (23.2%) 
are fully efficient, indicating that, despite the difficulties in the healthcare sector in Greece, 
certain NHS-ESY hospitals are leading the way to high productivity and efficiency, 
whereas the less productive, inefficient hospitals were almost 10%. Furthermore, our 
findings of slightly pro-rich (almost no inequity) in the probability of outpatient; and the 
probability of SHIF physician visit; and significant pro-rich inequity in probability of 
specialist visit; in combination with high OOP expenses mainly for the specialist and 
outpatient visit comply with the way that PHC is provided in the Greek health care system. 
The PHC is provided via multiple subsystems in a fragmented - bureaucratic way with no 
coordination and a physician-driven organizational structure. As  several authors point out, 
despite the fact that HCCs and PEDY- EOPYY units (ex IKA) were established in order to 
provide a wide range of PHC services, in practice, most of the times they result in 
inefficient, low quality services and problematic operation, due to a number of weaknesses: 
the inadequate staffing in GPs and nurses and oversupply of specialists; the inadequate 
medical technology and infrastructure; inefficient allocation of resources between isolated 
regions versus less rural and urban areas; and the inability of HCCs and PEDY- EOPYY 
units (ex IKA) to act as gatekeepers to secondary health care. Given the absence of a 
gatekeeping system, older patients choose to travel to visit private providers or the 
outpatient facilities of NHS-ESY hospitals as a first PHC contact, making their demand 
pressure worse. Nevertheless, by this way, patients tend to ask for care in the private sector 
or confront informal payments intending to avoid the waiting list of ESY outpatient 
facilities. This causes interregional patients’ flow seeking for care and financial handicaps 
for the vulnerable populations- who are unable to pay- and increases access inequity. 
Furthermore, the results of pro-rich inequity in probability of specialist visit in 
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combination with high OOP expenses mainly for the specialist and outpatient visit are 
related to the oversupply of specialists
47
 and the anachronistic retrospective remuneration 
system for the physicians that does not provide efficiency-promoting incentives and 
indirectly encourages physicians to induce unnecessary demand for health care services as 
well as to ask for informal additional payment. It seems that, while access to hospital care 
can be considered universal, the same fails to apply to primary (PHC) and specialist care, 
given the aforementioned weaknesses.  In addition, the finding of significant pro-rich 
dental care is related to the limited coverage of dental care in the public sector and the 
fragmented way which is provided in NHS-ESY and SHIFs facilities (Koletsi-Kounari H. 
et al, 2011; Koletsi-Kounari H. et al, 2007; Zavras D. et al, 2004; Souliotis K. et al, 2016; 
Yfantopoulos et al., 2014; Van Doorslaer E. & Masseria C., 2004; Kyriopoulos et al, 2002; 
Majo M. & Van Soest A., 2012; Egimann S. et al, 2005; Allin S. & Mossialos, 2004). The 
poor social health insurance (SHI) coverage of dental care, in combination with the 
oversupply of private dentists
48
 leads to extended use of private dental care sector with 
high dental care expenditure, especially OOP and informal payments (Koletsi-Kounari H. 
et al, 2011; Siskou et al, 2008). According to ELSTAT (2014) household expenditure on 
outpatient services of all specialties includes around 44.1% for dental services. This relates 
to the fact that, in reality, the Greek population is uninsured for oral health services 
(Economou, 2015). There is also evidence of regressive interregional variations of the 
financial barrier for dental services favoring the residents of rural areas (Koletsi-Kounari 
H. et al, 2007; Siskou et al, 2008). As a lot of authors point out dental provision, the 
private care and OOPPs by patients act as “a substitute for the gaps in insurance coverage 
of dental treatment” (Economou, 2010 p.133; Mossialos et al, 2005). 
Overall, our findings reveal gaps in coverage and provision in PHC and dental care 
services that undermine from the one side the egalitarian principle of NHS-ESY 
established since 1983, of equity in health care delivery: equity of access to available care 
and equality of utilization for equal need – that implies equal entitlements (Whitehead, 
1991; Mooney 1983 &1986); as well as the fundamental policy goal of universal health 
coverage (UHC). Therefore, our study by collecting the above age-disaggregated 
information about older people’s abilities to access health care services can facilitate 
reviews of the existing policies, and services provided in a local level, under the 
                                                          
47
 Compared to other OECD countries, Greece has the highest number (3.9) of physicians specialists and dentists (1.27) 
per 1000 inhabitants and the lowest number of GPs (0.31).  (OECD, 2013; OECD, 2009) and in the same time there are 
pronounced imbalances in the geographical distribution of medical professionals. 
48
 Compared to other OECD countries, Greece has the highest number (1.27) of dentists per 1000 inhabitants (OECD, 
2009) and in the same time there are pronounced imbalances in the geographical distribution of dentists,  with 
approximately 50% of all dentists employed in the greater Athens area. 
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framework of NHS-ESY egalitarian principles. The EU has acknowledged that subnational 
government can make a vital contribution by fostering exchange of good practice and 
measuring progress (EU, 2007). Initially, our urban-setting study addresses the need the 
determinants of health care use of the older population to be included as priorities across 
sectors in local level, as a key factor in eliminating inequalities in health care use. 
Moreover, given the limited role that local authorities in Greece have in health care 
planning, organization and provision, our findings illustrate challenges and opportunities 
for exploring how health and equity are considered in subnational level policy-making. 
These results suggest that policy design by central governance and Ministry of Health 
often fails to reflect the realities of the social, cultural and economic factors affecting the 
lives and assets of people at local level and especially those who have poor resources and 
are hard to reach. The result is interventions with limited impact or, even worse widening 
health gaps within countries (Popay J, 2002). They also point out the need for 
decentralization of responsibilities and accountability for policy and implementation 
actions related to inequalities in health care use. As Litvack et al. (1988) have shown, 
reducing central influences and promoting local autonomy may lead to more flexible and 
efficient policies, as local authorities are better able to respond to local needs, to local 
problems. However, localization, decentralization and delegated powers may bring tension 
between different levels of government (vertical conflicts) or among local government 
agencies (horizontal conflicts). Problems in securing alignment of overall national policy 
objectives with subnational interventions and local project objectives may undermine 
coherence and synergy. A well-established organizational development programme is 
necessary (WHO-CSDH, 2008), with a high level of understanding about, and monitoring 
of local actions to enable wider dissemination if something is seen to be working but also 
to determine whether a change in focus is needed if an intervention is not delivering the 
expected outcome. Therefore, in order local government to respond to local needs, a wider 
legislative context is needed to create the conditions that shape its ability to act. The 
success of this approach is unclear, but what is clear is that positive alignment of policy at 
all levels is critical in achieving the synergy and impact needed to address inequities in 
health and level-up the social gradient (WHO-CSDH, 2008). In addition, broader 
mechanisms related to the social protection system should be developed to identify and 
close gaps in coverage to achieving equitable access, based on key national and 
subnational local policies such as:  
 coordination and coherence of existing social protection schemes in order to built a 
well-designed social safety net based on effective and efficient administration and 
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fiscal sustainability, possibly by the establishment of statutory LTC. 
 involvement of local people and communities in defining the problem of 
inequalities in use and agreeing solutions and implementation approaches.  
 placing more emphasis on local solutions as a key factor in shaping priorities for 
action on social determinants in eliminating inequalities in health care  
 introduction of decentralization of responsibilities and accountability for policy and 
actions to promote monitoring of actions in eliminating inequalities in health care. 
Moreover, we believe that the orientation of the Greek fragmented health system designed 
to provide acute care, to an integrated care system among levels with focus on the needs of 
older population is crucial to promote equitable access to care services and social cohesion. 
4.5.2 Social health insurance fund (SHIF) coverage variances as a determinant of 
inequalities in health care use 
 Inequalities are apparent among the SHIFs in use of most health care types, except the 
probability of inpatient admissions, favoring the less advantaged. 
 Non Noble OGA SHIF has a more pronounced pro-poor contribution to overall inequity 
in the probability of specialist private visit favoring the worse off, than Noble SHIFs, 
revealing an unfair relationship with important policy implications, given the least 
benefits and the minimum freedom of choice of OGA beneficiaries.  
4.5.2.1 Social health insurance fund (SHIF) coverage variances: Comparison with 
existing literature  
Consequently, our findings are in line with the significant differences among health 
insurance organizations regarding the level of coverage (content, procedures and quality) 
and freedom of choice, as they have been confirmed and validated by most Greek and 
foreign experts in health care policy (Mossialos E. et al, 2005; Economou D., 2010; 
Economou C. & Giorno C., 2009; Petmesidou M. & Guillen A.., 2008; Tountas et al, 2011; 
Kyriopoulos et al, 2002). 
4.5.2.2 Social health insurance fund (SHIF) coverage variances: Contribution to 
literature - new evidence and discussion 
Our findings of inequalities among the SHIFs in use of most health care types, contribute 
to the literature to identify gaps among the SHIFs in level of coverage, finance and 
provision of services, resulting in inequalities in use of services. Moreover, our finding of 
pro poor contribution of Non-Noble Farmers OGA SHIF in the probability of specialist 
private visit favoring the worse off, reveals an unfair relationship and has severe financial 
impact for the vulnerable older population insured in OGA SHIF, with important policy 
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implications for the progress on UHC objectives. Our findings contribute to the need for 
more knowledge about what works in SHIFs that have different resource constraints and 
different challenges in order to ensure equitable access. Overall, these inequalities result 
from two issues. First they result from the design of respective fragmented social 
protection system, given that entitlement to social health insurance (SHI) and the 
assignment to a SHIF depend on the occupation of the insured with variations in coverage, 
financing and provision of services. In addition, inequalities in SHIF coverage result from 
the fact that, on average, poorer people covered by Non Noble OGA SHIF, suffer from 
more health problems and hence need more health care. As Economou (2010) indicates, 
historically, although SHIFunds in Greece have played a very important role, especially 
with regard to the coverage, financing and provision of health-care services, their role and 
influence were not equally significant in the planning and regulation of the ESY, despite 
the fact that any development in the ESY impacted directly on them, and any significant 
change in the social insurance field impacted on ESY financing. There was no statutory 
link between these two aspects and no active institutional body to coordinate actions on 
common issues and problems. Our findings are summarized: 
 In particular, despite the fact that Non Noble OGA SHIF is the second largest SHIF that 
covers 20% of the Greek population mainly less advantaged farmer people in 
agriculture, it provides the least benefits and the minimum freedom of choice for PHC 
and hospital care, compared to other Non Noble and Noble SHIFs. OGA SHIF offers 
primary care services in rural ESY health centres (HCCs), regional offices-rural posts, 
and outpatient NHS-ESY hospital departments and limited dental care in HCCs, 
whereas visits to PEDY-EOPYY (ex IKA) PHC units or any private specialist 
consultation contracted or private hospitalization is not covered. Thus, the limited 
services in combination with the low quality, and problematic operation of HCCs due to 
significant staff shortage of GPs, and irrational regional allocation of resources, OGA 
beneficiaries face the long waiting lists in most outpatient ESY departments, and they 
are forced to visit private providers and face high OOP and informal payments in ESY 
sector in order to bypass the waiting list, placing at a disadvantage the vulnerable 
populations that do not have the ability to pay or means of transport to travel to urban 
areas for care (Liaropoulos et al, 2008)
49,50
.This is also strengthened by our findings on 
                                                          
49
  It is calculated that households in rural areas exhibit the highest rate of health care expenditure to their total 
consumption expenditure (8.3 per cent) whereas Athens area has the lowest rate (6.2 per cent) among households in 
Greece (Petmesidou M. & Guillen A.,2008 data obtained from ESYE). 
50
 Out-of-pocket payments represent a high percentage of health expenditure in Greece, accounting for 38% of total 
health expenditure than 21% of EU average for 2010 (OECD, 2012). The figure depicts formal cost-sharing 
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the financial barrier of OOP expenses that OGA beneficiaries face mainly for specialist 
private visits and out-patient care, leading to a regressive relationship in terms of ability 
to pay. 
 On the other hand,  PEDY- ex EOPYY IKA SHIF beneficiaries have more choices for 
receiving specialist care via their own network of 350 urban units, as well as via the 
outpatient ESY departments and the HCCs. 
 Noble SHIFs provide services have all choices for care via: private physicians with own 
practices; via private diagnostic centers, as well as via prestigious private hospitals for 
outpatient and inpatient care under contract to the Noble SHIFs. As a consequence, it is 
obvious that Noble SHIFs beneficiaries face lower levels of informal payments 
comparing to Non Noble SHIFs, indicating the regressive relationship of OOP amount 
with specialist private visit, as it is demonstrated in our findings.  
These inequalities in use of health care among the elderly indicate that social health 
insurance in Greece, as a social determinant of health, does not ensure comprehensive 
coverage of older population against the risk of illness. Our findings that reveal gaps in 
coverage, finance and provision of services, undermine the egalitarian principle of NHS-
ESY established since 1983, of equity in health care delivery that implies equal 
entitlements (Whitehead, 1991; Mooney 1983 &1986). Moreover, the finding of regressive 
relationship of Non-Noble OGA beneficiaries in terms of ability to pay for specialist 
private visits and out-patient care undermine the UHC objectives of financial protection, 
effective coverage and health system performance, as introduced by the WHO Health 
Report 2010 and WHO-CSDH (2013), that all people obtain the health services they need 
(i.e. equity in service use relative to need), as a first step towards a more equitable health 
care system. This is also a matter of serious concern, as it undermines the constitutional 
guarantee of free access to health services, as discussed in the following section for OOP 
expenses barrier. Under this framework of strong inequalities in SHIFs coverage and gaps 
in services provided among SHIFs, in combination with the deep structural and 
multifaceted crisis that Greece faces since 2010, the Greek government has implemented 
reforms in health care system in order to protect accessibility to health care for vulnerable 
groups and reduce public health expenditure. The unification of SHIFunds (IKA, OGA, 
OAEE, OPAD) in one scheme (EOPYY) that was established in 2011 as a sole purchaser 
of health services with the Law 3918/2011 implementing risk-pooling, is in the right 
direction. The unification under EOPYY has produced major benefits for social solidarity 
                                                                                                                                                                                
arrangements, direct payments and informal payments, with the latter two representing the highest proportion of out-of-
pocket payments among EU countries. 
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by establishing a common basic package of health-care services in EOPYY, but there are 
still differences in eligibility conditions. However, in the current austerity-driven context, 
the common package was accompanied by reductions in benefits and by increases in 
copayments and user charges for visits to HCCs and hospital outpatient departments, 
pharmaceuticals and laboratory tests. Following, in spite of the magnitude of the gap in 
coverage created by the crisis, two ministerial decisions in 2014 and a recent Law 
4368/2016 were introduced and only extended coverage of prescription drugs and inpatient 
care to the uninsured (estimated, between 1.5 and 2.5 million people due to 
unemployment) – including vulnerable elderly. Therefore, it seems that the Government 
developed specific mechanisms to support equitable access to needed services for 
vulnerable groups initially limited, slow and ineffective (Economou et al. 2015). We hope 
that even these mechanisms and reforms will be fully implemented, given that the most 
significant problem facing health policy in Greece is the gap between declared objectives 
and the implementation of the legislation. Moreover, we believe that the orientation of the 
Greek fragmented health system designed to provide acute care, to an integrated care 
system among levels focus on the needs of older population is crucial. In addition, the 
establishment of statutory LTC (including policies for coordinating health and social needs 
of the elderly) based on ensuring equitable access to care services will provide a real safety 
net for older people– and their families. It will also help to share the risk of catastrophic 
health-care costs, reduces burdens on families and promotes social cohesion. 
4.5.3 Out of pocket payments (OOPPs) as a barrier in the health care utilisation 
Our findings, summarized, reveal that OOP expenses as a financial barrier contribute to 
inequalities in health care use, however, not for all health care types and with a different 
magnitude among health care types. 
 OOP expenses, as a financial barrier, affect inequalities in PHC use, primarily in 
probability of SHIF physician and specialist private visits and not inpatient and 
outpatient care.  
 The OOP amount is a significant barrier to specialist private visit in terms of ability to 
pay by income revealing a regressive relationship, also in relation with SHIF coverage. 
 Mean conditional OOPP (>0€) amounts for the specialist private visit decreases as 
the income level proceeds from poorest to richest level, revealing a regressive 
relationship 
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 Non Noble OGA SHIF beneficiaries –less advantaged – face the highest 
conditional (>0€) mean OOP amount for a specialist private visit, slightly higher 
than the amount paid by Non Noble IKA beneficiaries.  
 Those with Noble SHIFs coverage seem to face significantly lower OOP mean 
amount than the other SHIFs, revealing a regressive relationship in terms of SHIF 
coverage. 
4.5.3.1 Out of pocket payments (OOPPs): Comparison with existing literature  
Our findings are in line with most of the aforementioned evidence that was analytically 
presented in Chapter one and Appendix. 
a) Our finding that OOP and informal expenses burden specialist private visits and 
outpatient visits of older population to a higher magnitude than inpatient admissions, is 
in line with nationwide cross-sectional studies: (i) the study of Souliotis, Golna et al., 
(2016) that 36% of individuals report under-the-table OOP payments for visits to private 
practitioners and dentists, and 12.2% to providers of PHC in HCCs and SHIFs’centres. 
(ii) Similarly, the study Hellas Health I in 2006of Tountas et al, (2011) found that 39% 
of the sample paid OOP for visits to health professionals. (iii) Similarly, Siskou et al 
(2008) found that one out of three patients uses informal payments in order to receive 
specialist care as inpatient or outpatient in public hospitals regardless of their SES 
characteristics. (iv) In addition, the more recent qualitative WHO study for barriers in 
access to health services - based on interviews and focus groups, revealed large 
increases in OOP expenditures: charges for medical prescriptions as well as unlisted 
drugs and laboratory tests (Economou C, 2015). (v) Moreover, about elderly population, 
a recent EU comparative post-death evidence for older population using pooled data of 
SHARElife survey (in 2005 for Greece) detected that 54% of the sample paid OOP for 
specialist care (Penders Y. et al, 2016) 
b) Our findings that income is not associated with the possibility of paying OOP for 
receiving inpatient, outpatient and specialist private care is in line with the 
aforementioned studies for general and older population presented at Chapter one 
indicating that individuals face OOP and informal payments for receiving specialist care 
as an inpatient or outpatient, irrespective of their socioeconomic characteristics and 
SHIF coverage (Economou, 2015; Gregorakis N. et al, 2014- mainly pro-poor evidence;  
Siskou et al; Liaropoulos et al, 2008; Tountas et al, 2011; Kaitelidou D. et al, 2013 and 
Penders Y. et al, 2016; Matsaganis M., Mitrakos T., Tsakloglou P, 2008). It is worth 
mentioning a current nationwide telephone survey conducted in 2012 by Souliotis, 
Golna et al., (2015) indicating that under-the-table payments were reported for 
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approximately 32.4% of public hospital admissions. Similarly, another telephone 
nationwide survey for exploring informal payments in public hospitals in 2008 found 
that 36% of those treated in public hospitals had made at least one informal payment 
(Liaropoulos, Siskou, Kaitelidou et al., 2008). Moreover, the recent qualitative WHO 
study of Economou C (2015) revealed that certain users view informal OOP payments 
as facilitators for timely access to qualitative services, especially inpatient care. 
c) Moreover, our findings of regressive relationship in ability to pay OOP for receiving 
specialist care are in line with a lot of aforementioned studies for the fairness and 
economic impact of informal payments. Matsaganis M., Mitrakos T., Tsakloglou P, 
(2008) found that the top 1% of all households accounts for 37.6% of all OOP hospital 
expenditure, and elderly households spent 12% to 13% of their household budget shares 
on health. Similarly, according to 2014 Household Budget Survey data the poor 
households’ expenditure on health is 9% of the family budget higher than the 
corresponding percentage for non-poor households (7%) ELSTAT (2015). Similarly, 
Grigorakis et al (2016; 2014) found that the average OOPP for health corresponds to 
10.86% of annual gross income of households.  
d) Considering the elderly evidence based on SHARE data, in Greece the poorest 
respondents state that they make OOP three times more than the richest ones, a reversed 
pattern compared to Italy and Spain (Rodridues R. et al, 2013). Similarly, Holly A. et al 
(2008) and Bφrsch-Supan A. et al, (2005; 2008) found that the poorest spend a higher 
share of their income on OOP health expenditures on all health care than the better-off; 
and Scheil-Adlung, X. and Bonan, J. (2013) found that the poorest pay OOP 11% of 
their household income versus 1% of the rich.   
e) Last, our findings that reveal the regressive relationship of the SHIF coverage with 
health care use, given that the Non Noble OGA SHIF old beneficiaries –less advantaged 
– face the highest OOP mean amount for a specialist private visit than the other SHIFs, 
are in line with other analyses indicating that the distribution of health care expenditures 
is related to the fragmented character of the SHI system favouring the Noble SHIFs 
beneficiaries (Liaropoulos, 1995; NSSG , 2002; INE-GSEE, 2010). It is worth noting 
the study of Grigorakis N. et al (2016;2014) that examined the relationship of OOPPs 
and SHI funding for inpatient care in private hospitals, and found that EOPYY- SHI 
covered only 47.32% of total health expenditure with the remaining 52.68% as OOP. 
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4.5.3.2 Out of pocket payments (OOPPs) as a barrier in the health care utilization: 
new evidence and discussion 
Overall, our findings have a major contribution to literature of the role of OOP payments 
in inequity in use of health care among the older population in an uban setting level. Our 
study gives the opportunity to explore the regressive relationship in ability to pay OOP, as 
well as the fairness and economic impact of OOPPs on the income and living conditions of 
older population. It allows evaluating the extent to which social health protection system –
via SHIFs - offers adequate protection to the elderly against the financial risk of illness in 
urban setting level, an issue that we find gap in the literature. As aforementioned in 
Chapter 3, while population coverage for health care is universal in Greek NHS-ESY and 
there is significant funding in terms of GDP (9,3%), coverage for LTC is scattered and 
OOPPs constitute 31.0% of total expenditure for health care. Despite its regressive nature, 
OOP constitutes a financing mechanism in Greece in addition to tax – and contribution-
based funding. Moreover, this burden is increased if we consider the fact that as LTC for 
elderly is not statutory available and the state expenditure is less than 0.3% of GDP, other 
costs are likely to arise from the inappropriate use of acute health-care services, that 
include OOPPs to fund a large portion of LTC (EC, 2014). Our finding of financial OOP 
expenses barrier, for using health care services that supports the existing literature, 
undermine the constitutionally guaranteed free access to health services, under the main 
egalitarian principle of equity in health care financing whereby individuals’ payments for 
health care should be based on their ability to pay and therefore proportional to their 
income. They also undermine the main principle of UHC that embodies one of the ultimate 
goals of health systems – financial protection, according to WHO The world health report 
2010. This is strengthened by our findings that the poorest elderly and the Non Noble OGA 
SHIF beneficiaries – who tend to be less advantaged- are more likely to pay higher OOP 
amount for making a specialist private visit than the better off and the beneficiaries of 
Noble SHIFs, revealing significant inequalities and a regressive relationship in ability to 
pay that could result in catastrophic payments.  
OOP and informal payments (hidden economic activity) in health care concern the 
provision of inpatient and outpatient - specialist services and payments to physicians, 
primarily surgeons so that patients can bypass waiting lists or ensure better quality of 
service and more attention from doctors (Kaitelidou et al, 2013; Kentikelenis A. et al, 
2011; Siskou et al, 2008; Liaropoulos et al, 2008; Mosialos et al, 2005). In addition, the 
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OOPPs are also supported by the oversupply of specialists
51
 and the anachronistic 
retrospective remuneration system for the physicians that do not provide efficiency-
promoting incentives and indirectly encourage physicians to induce unnecessary demand 
for health care services as well as to ask for informal additional payment. Therefore, given 
the incomprehensive and uneven development of health coverage, and the lack of a rational 
pricing and remuneration policy, informal payments were developed as complement to 
public funding (Brian -Abel Smith et al,1994; Mosialos et al, 2005; Liaropoulos et al, 
2008). Moreover, the persistence of OOP and informal payments in health sector is 
explained by the broader ‘‘culture’’ of informal payments that characterizes the Greek 
public sector in general and is related with tax evasion in the health system (Yfantopoulos 
J.,2014; Souliotis K et al, 2016; Yfantopoulos, 2003; Siskou et al, 2008; Liaropoulos et al, 
2008, Mossialos et al, 2005)
52
,
53
. This issue is explained more in Chapter three and 
Chapter six of SHARE survey results. Moreover, as far as it concerns the elderly, it is 
important to keep in mind some key factors that influence the extent to which OOP 
expenditures on health for elderly are incurred:  
 deficits in financial protection;  
 the lack of a well-designed social safety net and ineffective eligibility criteria for a 
non-statutory LTC that result in arising the inappropriate use of acute health 
services increasing costs;  
 values that till recently consider caring for the elderly as a “family affair” with 
most of the financial burden to fall on the elderly and family;  
 forced private and informal payments due to the absence of a formal workforce; 
 and the fact that, on average, more poor people suffer from health limitations and 
hence need more health care with the impact of related OOP on income to be 
significantly higher for the poor than the rich. 
Overall, this issue is a matter of serious concern, given that as international experience 
shows, OOPPs are not the only important determinant of catastrophic payments. They are 
the biggest issue when all three factors are strong: poverty; restricted access to and use of 
health services – especially when social mechanisms ‘failure to pool financial risks (Xu et 
al., 2003). The implications are very serious if we consider the eight years period of 
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 Compared to other OECD countries, Greece has the highest number (3.9) of physicians specialists and dentists (1.27) 
per 1000 inhabitants and the lowest number of GPs (0.31).  (OECD, 2013; OECD, 2009) and in the same time there are 
pronounced imbalances in the geographical distribution of medical professionals. 
52
 Yfantopoulos J. (2013) on a pooled cross section-time series analysis for the period 1958-2011, revealed that overall, 
more than one quarter to one third of Greek economic activities have been either unrecorded or hidden from official 
statistics – valued from 24.66% (sd.± 2.8) to 30.13% of the GDP.  
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 There is Greek evidence that informal payments (hidden economic activity) in health care represent a high proportion 
of OOPPs. A recent study for 2012 found about €1.5 billion or 0.8. % of GDP to account for a hidden economy in the 
health sector, similar to an older study of 0.9 % of GDP in 2005 (Souliotis K et al, 2016; Siskou O. et al, 2008). 
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economic crisis in Greece since 2008, that are characterized by several cuts in pensions, 
deterioration of the living standards of retirees, raised poverty and the share of the 
population at risk of poverty in combination with the decline in household income, and the 
lack of a well-designed social safety net, as presented at Chapter three
54
. Consequently, 
according to various waves of Flash Eurobarometer surveys (2009b, 2010b, 2010c, 2011 
and 2012), Greece appears among the three countries with the highest proportions (from 
47% to 63%) of respondents finding it more difficult to afford health care. It is worth 
mentioning the significant and alarming result of the aforementioned study of Scheil-
Adlung & Bonan (2013) for the elderly health care use, which revealed that ruinous OOP 
expenditure for health care affects 5% of elderly households in Greece in 2004, as well as 
other Greek studies for the general population revealing substantial increase of household 
payments to public hospitals from 4.2 % in 2008 to 7.8 % in 2012 (Souliotis K et al, 2016). 
Therefore, identifying equitable ways of sharing the burden of care giving is critical. In 
most countries, regardless of how revenue is collected, broad-based risk-pooling or 
targeting resources helps spread the financial costs of long-term care across the whole of 
society. This helps protect poor and marginalized people, and reduces the risk of financial 
catastrophe for older people and their families. Under this framework, the unification of 
SHIFunds (IKA, OGA, OAEE, OPAD) in one scheme (EOPYY) that was established by 
Ministry of Health in 2011 (Law 3918/2011) as a sole purchaser of health services with 
implementing risk-pooling and introducing a common basic package of health-care 
services, is in the right direction, although still exist variations. Following, two ministerial 
decisions in 2014 and a recent Law 4368/2016 that extended coverage of prescription 
drugs and inpatient care to the uninsured (estimated, between 1.5 and 2.5 million people 
due to unemployment) – including vulnerable elderly, are important mechanisms, although 
they do not implement coverage for all the services. It seems that the Government 
developed specific mechanisms to support equitable access to needed services for 
vulnerable groups initially limited, slow and ineffective (Economou et al. 2015). In 
addition, specific mechanisms within and beyond social health protection schemes should 
be developed to address the potential risk of impoverishment of vulnerable groups. Greek 
Ministry of Health needs to identify and close more gaps in coverage and develop effective 
policies targeting the most vulnerable, such as: tailored benefit packages for those most in 
need; and abolishment of co-payments and user fees for the most vulnerable in order to 
limit the burden of OOPPs. Overall, in all schemes and systems, an attempt should be 
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 ELSTAT’s data, as we presented at chapter three, reveal that severe deprivation of elderly in Greece has doubled the 
(average) rates comparing to EU-27 from 2003 (pro crisis) till 2013 (in crisis), and more than double in 2014 and 2015, 
when the austerity measures are implemented 
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make to provide at least essential benefits for the elderly to ensure them access to 
affordable services and financial protection. 
4.6  Conclusion 
The purpose of the present study was to explore income–related inequalities on utilization 
of healthcare among the population over 50 years old in an urban-setting in Greece and 
explore the role of out of pocket payment mechanism (OOPP) in health care use as a 
dimension of inequalities in the utilization of health care services and a financial barrier to 
access. Using the Patra Health Interview Survey (PatraHIS) on the urban setting of Patras 
we have tested the hypotheses: 
(i) The inequalities in use of health care is derived from the different socioeconomic 
characteristics of the older population that uses the health services; 
(ii)  Individuals on higher income are more likely to use health care services than lower 
income comparators;  
(iii) Individuals with “Non Noble” social health insurance coverage are more likely to 
pay OOP for using health care than comparators with “Noble” social health 
insurance coverage. 
Applying different methodological approaches, such as the horizontal inequity index via 
the calculation of  concentration indices (as developed by Van Doorslaer and colleagues) 
and using regression model, we quantify income–related inequity and measure the effect of 
socioeconomic indicators on the likelihood of contact with health care services. Moreover, 
using regression model, we measure the effect of socioeconomic indicators on the 
likelihood of paying OOP for using health care. Our findings support the existence of pro-
rich inequity in probability of specialist and dental care. Significant pro-poor inequity was 
found in probability of inpatient admissions. No significant (slightly pro- rich) income-
related inequity was found for probability in outpatient visits and probability of making 
SHIF physician visits. Income has a large positive effect on inequity – it increases inequity 
in probability of specialist and dentist visit, as well as it slightly increases inequity in 
probability of SHIF physician visits, whereas it has a less pronounced effect on inequity in 
probability of inpatient admissions and probability of outpatient visits, favoring the less 
advantaged. Our findings indicate that income itself is not the only contributor, provided 
that higher educational level status and SHIF coverage do not have a consistent effect and 
explain a high percentage of inequalities in almost all health care types. In addition, by 
decomposing income – related inequity we identify and measure the extent of SHIF 
coverage as one of the main contributors to the overall inequity in the likelihood of using 
health care. Inequalities are apparent among the SHIFs in use of most health care types, 
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except the probability of inpatient admissions. Non Noble OGA SHIF has a more 
pronounced pro-poor contribution to overall inequity in the probability of specialist private 
visit favoring the worse off, than the Noble SHIFs, revealing an unfair relationship with 
important policy implications. Moreover, OOP expenses as a financial barrier contribute to 
inequalities mainly in probability of SHIF physician and specialist private visits and not 
inpatient and outpatient care. The OOP amount is also a significant barrier to specialist 
private visit in terms of ability to pay by income revealing a regressive relationship, as well 
as in terms of SHIF coverage among the older population. The economic crisis might have 
worsened the existing inequity in health care use, especially for the older population. As 
stressed in an OECD report (2011, p. 101) “the real issue in the field of health in Greece is 
not merely to improve control over expenditures but also, and above all, to enhance the 
quality of public medical services”. In line with reduced health care spending (down 30% 
since the start of the crisis), a series of reforms have been launched in the last two years. 
The objective is to enforce fiscal discipline and keep public health expenditure at or below 
6% of GDP. The challenges in maintaining a balance between efficiency, universal access 
and service quality mean it is questionable whether this can be achieved under such harsh 
cuts
55
. Although there is a lack of data regarding health inequalities, especially of the 
elderly, the existing anecdotal evidence indicates a worsening of health conditions. Further 
to the measures implemented so far, efficiency gains can increase by systematically 
tackling fragmentation in the governance and administration of the public health care 
system, especially in primary health care funding and provision of services, in order to 
proceed to a truly national health system.   
It is also worth noting that future prospects for social and economic progress in the EU 
appear to be viewed with ‘uncertainty’ by both policymakers and citizens. According to the 
third EQLife Survey of 2013 “There has been a general decline in optimism across the EU 
in comparison with the 2007 survey; this decline is associated with reduced trust in 
government and the economic situation. “Fears that income insecurity would increase were 
more common among people in the bottom income quartile and especially among older 
people aged 50+.” (Eurofound, 2013 p.150). This study is intended to be an initial 
contribution towards improving knowledge and awareness of equity challenges facing use 
of health care among the elderly Greek population.
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 Cost per patient in public hospitals fell from €3,500 in 2009 to €3,000 in 2010 and €2,500 in 2011 (Ministry of Health, 
2011). However, in the last six months of 2011, only for the entry ticket to hospitals patients paid out-of-their pocket 
about €14 million, while for afternoon visits to public hospital medical doctors out-of-pocket payments rose close to 
€100 million. These indicate a creeping privatisation that is a hotly debated (Petmesidou, 2012).  
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Chapter Five 
 
5. “Inequalities in health care use in Greece among the older population 
– Greek National Health Interview Survey (GNHIS)” 
5.1 Introduction 
According to WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health (WHO-CSDH 2008; 
2013) “significant increases in the numbers of older people in the EU-region mean that 
investigating and understanding the underlying determinants of health and inequities in 
health care among them is an important priority for Europe, the region of the world with 
the largest older population for its overall population size”. Inequities in health and access 
to health care are important issues for the growing older populations of Europe and Greece. 
As WHO-CSDH Review recommends, “building an equitable universal health care system 
should therefore be a priority ambition for all countries in the EU. Neither cost nor social 
exclusion should be a barrier to treatment”. In addition, access to care, is an essential 
element in achieving quality of life and growth, a main objective in the WHO-Europe 
Health 2020 strategic plan (EC, 2014). Similarly, considering ageing population, health 
care systems – via regulation, must take action to ensure that older people are not 
discriminated against within the system, compared with other age groups (WHO -CSDH, 
2013). However, without a clear understanding of the cause of the causes of inequities in 
health, action is likely to be ineffective, project-driven and inappropriately targeted at the 
bottom of the social gradient. Evidence of variations in the mortality, disability and 
subjective health of older people in the EU by social factors, is extensive – and generally 
indicates that the less advantaged have poorer outcomes, especially those aged 75 and 
over, receive less costly and lower-quality treatment than younger patients with the same 
illness (Grundy E et al, 2012). However, in terms of access to health care, there is limited 
evidence of unequal access to various therapies and services by age, gender, education 
level and other SES indicators (WHO-CSDH, 2013). All the relevant working documents 
acknowledge that evidence-based interventions for addressing health inequities in older 
age groups are incomplete. Lack of data presents a significant challenge in addressing 
inequity (Marmot, 2010). The health system needs to be capable of generating and using 
evidence, setting equity-oriented targets and monitoring effects to ensure the effectiveness 
of actions, undertaken. The setting of equity-oriented targets needs to be the result of a 
political process involving all relevant stakeholders, whereas targets require a monitoring 
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framework with sufficient data. Moreover, evaluation and assessment evidence about the 
effects of existing policies is needed to allow policy refinement and knowledge 
development about other actions and the impacts they might yield. Therefore, it is apparent 
that improving health and health equity requires an approach that is based on evidence and 
up-to-date information. As a consequence, measurement of equity of access to health 
services is a core component of health system performance assessments (Economou, 2015; 
Allin, Hernández-Quevedo & Masseria, 2009; Hernández-Quevedo & Papanicolas, 2013; 
OECD, 2004a). This issue is fundamental in Greece given that the establishment of ESY 
since 1983 aims at comprehensive and universal coverage of the population based on the 
egalitarian principle of equity. However, despite success in improving the health of the 
population, the Greek health care system still faces structural problems concerning the 
organization, financing and delivery of services. The health system still functions within an 
outmoded organizational culture dominated by clinical medicine and hospital services, 
without the support of an adequate planning unit or adequate, accessible information on 
health status, utilization of health services or health costs; with a regressive system of 
funding including extensive user charges and informal payments; inefficient allocation of 
resources based on history rather than needs, perverse incentives for providers; a heavy 
reliance on unnecessarily expensive inputs, and without being proactive in addressing the 
health needs of the population through actions in public health and primary health care 
(Economou, 2010). Therefore, from the institutional information of the Greek health care 
system, a debate is emerging about whether access to health care is indeed equally 
available to all, arising from supply-side variation, different entitlements and benefits 
coverage across insurance funds and high informal and direct payments. In addition, 
despite the fact that Greece has adopted a number of WHO and EU recommendations for 
universal and equal access to health care services, there is not any clear policy framework 
relating to inequalities in health care or any serious research on possible reasons that 
prevent access to health care for the general and older population, apart from a National 
Action Plan to ensure access to health services for all the citizens in 2013 by the Ministry 
of Health that has not been implemented (Chrodis JA, 2014). Moreover, little attention has 
been paid to investigating and measuring equity in the use of health care among the 
elderly, since they are the consumers who, though they receive high health services, have 
to deal with unfair use of service among other income groups (Allin S. and Mossialos E., 
2005). 
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5.2 Research Questions 
Drawing from the aforementioned challenges – inefficiencies of the Greek NHS, in order 
to achieve the thesis’ objective, the first wave of the nationwide, multidisciplinary GNHIS 
survey that embedded the European Health Interview Survey (EHIS) modules, with 
reference time in 2008-2009 will permit us to explore the main hypothesis of this thesis - 
that the population is expected to face high inequalities in health care use, particularly the 
elderly -  shedding light on the equity issue of the NHS - ESY reforms of 2005-2008 via 
the acts of 2005, 2006 and 2007, in particular Law 3329/2005. It will permit to explore 
inequalities in NHS-ESY health care after the adoption of Law 3329/2005 that inactivated 
most of the 2001 and 2003 Regional Structure of Health Care Services (PeSYPs) that 
renamed as “Regional Health Administrations - RHAs” (DYPEs or YPE) and reduced 
RHAs  from 17 to 7 in order to “achieve economies of scale”. Consequently, any real 
decentralization of competences or independence from central government for DYPEs to 
develop their health services according to the needs of their populations has not been 
achieved. The management and control of the health care system still remain with the 
Ministry of Health (ESCG, 2005). Building on the GNHIS – Wave1 and the features of the 
Greek health care system, we address the following empirical research questions (RQs), 
guided by the following theoretical hypotheses (THs). THs: (i) The inequalities in use of 
health care is derived from the different socioeconomic characteristics of the older 
population who use the health services; (ii) Individuals on higher income are more likely to 
use health care services than lower income comparators; (iii) Individuals in densely-
populated areas are more likely to use more health care services than comparators in 
intermediate and thinly – populated areas. Guided by the THs we address the following 
research questions (RQs): (i) What is the extent and contributors of inequity in the use of 
health care among people over the age of 50 in Greece? (ii) What is the extent in national 
regional variations and inequalities in accessing health care services among the older 
population over the age of 50 in Greece?   
It is worth mentioning that, as aforementioned in Chapter two, the exploration of GNHIS 
evidence for the period of NHS-ESY reform of 2005-2008 will supplement evidence of the 
other two datasets – survey tools of PatraHIS and SHARE for the period 2001-2004 and 
will result in a robust evidence for inequalities in health care system among the older 
population to shed light in the whole pre-crisis period in Greece. Therefore, the GNHIS 
study will attempt to give a clear understanding of inequalities in health care use, by 
studying the past. Nevertheless, studying the past may contribute to a clearer understanding 
of the present and this may affect the future (Porter, 1995) and the possible ways to 
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transform the NHS-ESY system for serving its foundation egalitarian principles of equity 
in access and universality among the elderly population in Greece. 
5.3 Sample and variables  
Our study includes all individuals aged 50 years or above. The resulting unbalanced sample 
includes 3433 individuals aged 50 years or older (from the 6036 respondents or 56.8% of the 
total sample). This rate is comparable to the response rate of the European survey SHARE for 
the population aged 50 or over. Moreover, to compensate for non response, we used sampling 
weights as provided. The GNHIS via 130 questions and around 340 variables covers a wide 
variety of topics split among four modules on health status; health determinants; health care; 
and background demographic and socio-economic variables. Overall, in our study, the 
dependent variables of health care utilization were measured by nine separate questions: five 
questions for the likelihood of a contact and four questions for the number of contacts. The 
dependent variables for the likelihood of a contact were measured by five separate questions 
asking the respondent whether he or she has been visiting a hospital as inpatient, as outpatient, 
a GP/pathologist, a specialist, and a dentist for the last 12 months. The dependent variables of 
the contacts’ number were measured by four separate questions. The numbers of admissions 
for inpatient / outpatient care have a reference period for the past 12 months, whereas the 
number of contacts for specialist/GP visits has a reference period for the past 4 weeks. For the 
models of the conditional number of contacts, only individuals who report ≥1 visit are 
included. For the models of the total number of contacts individuals with 0 visits are also 
included.  Moreover, in our model, we include only the likelihood of dentist visit and not the 
number of dentist contacts as there was a very small response rate for the specific question. A 
detailed overview of the utilization dependent variables and the respective questions are 
showed in detail in Appendix Table A1. The explanatory variables used in the models include 
the following health, demographic and socioeconomic factors, based on the standard approach 
in the empirical literature: Age (in four dummies: 80+; 70-79; 60-69; versus 50-59 as 
reference); gender (male; versus female as reference) health status (need) variables associated 
to physical health dichotomized: The general SAH measure on self-perceived health (“very 
good and good SAH” as a reference); activity limitations LTI (“no LTI” as reference); GALI 
(“not limited” as reference variable); and the number of chronic medical conditions using 
three dummies (“0 chronic conditions” as the reference category). These health status 
variables constitute the Minimum European Health Module (MEHM)
56
, as a proxy for care 
need. An assumption that underlies this study is that individuals with bad health conditions 
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 Eurostat (2013) European Health Interview Survey (EHIS wave 2)- Methodological 
manual.Methodologies and Working papers. 2013 edition. 
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and poorer SAH have a greater need for health care, an assumption that is likely to be true in 
the majority of cases (Allin S. et al, 2011). GNHIS income measure is derived from a variable 
with 10 values –deciles – income bands. It is the household monthly net income derived as the 
sum from any source per equivalent member added up, after tax and social security 
contributions Any taxes and social contributions- that have been paid- are deducted from this 
sum. We adjust household income to reflect differences in a household’s size and composition 
by applying the modified OECD scale
57
. For the regression analysis on the whole data set, the 
equivalent income variable was calculated using quintiles leading to five (5) income 
categories, with the 5
th
 richest quintile: “More than 1.225.3€” and the 1st Poorest quintile with 
range “1€ - 525.5€” as the reference category. Following, in order to quantify the effect of 
income on health service utilization by calculating and decomposing inequity (HI), we also 
construct a continuous estimate of monthly net total household income equivalised (as a 
Logarithm of Income Level). Moreover, variables other than need and income are included in 
the model, based on the conventional method in the empirical literature, as it is given below: 
The highest educational qualification is included based on the standard coding of the ISCED-
97 into 6 levels, grouped into three (3) categories with  “No/Partial/Completed Primary school 
(ISCED 1)” as the reference category. Marital status was dichotomized with  “never married/ 
widowed & not remarried/divorced & not remarried”, as the reference category and household 
composition was grouped into three categories with “Living alone” as the reference category. 
Region of residence is based on the EU Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 
(NUTS) used to indicate which territorial unit the household is located in. For Greece there 
are 4 units in the NUTS1 level concerning 13 urban and regional areas – economic territories 
that define the variables we include: GR1-North Greece (including Thessaloniki the 2
nd
 more 
densely populated); GR2 - Central Greece (mountainous and thinly populated); GR3-Athens 
(the capital, as the reference category); and GR4- Islands (including Crete the largest very 
mountainous island)
58
. Degree of urbanization is derived from 3 dummies: Thinly-populated 
area; Intermediate area; and Densely-populated area as reference category. There was no 
information about housing tenure. Moreover, despite the fact that variables about the type of 
Social Health Insurance Fund coverage (“Privileged” versus “Non-Privileged”), the payment 
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 Where equivalised household size is a sum of weights attributed to each member of the household 
according to the modified OECD equivalence scale: 1.0 to the first adult; 0.5 to the second and each 
subsequent person aged 14 and over; 0.3 to each child aged under 14. 
58 GR-1North Greece includes: Eastern Macedonia & Thrace (GR11)  & Central Macedonia (Thessaloniki - 
GR12) & Western Macedonia (GR13) & Thessalia (GR14). GR-2 Central Greece includes: Epirus (GR21) & 
Ionian Islands (GR22) & Western Greece (GR23) & Central Greece (GR24) & Peloponnese (GR25).  GR- 3 
Islands
 
includes: North Aegean Islands (GR 41) & South Aegean Islands (GR 42) & Island of Crete (GR 43); 
GR – 4 Athens includes: Athens (GR30). 
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mechanism (OOPPs) and the existence of Voluntary Health Insurance (VHI) were developed 
by the Eurostat Group and included in the GNHIS – Wave 1 questionnaire, the Greek 
National Statistics Authority failed to select the relevant information and not included in the 
GNHIS Wave1 database. A detailed overview of the need and socio-economic explanatory 
variables are showed in detail in Appendix Table A2.   
5.4 Results  
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
The description of the sample is displayed in Tables 5.1 - 5.5 below. The Mean age of the 
sample is 65.43 years, with 66% report suffering from LTI with 1.73 mean number of chronic 
conditions diagnosed out of 21 listed, and 45.9% of the sample declare “Less than good” 
(fairly bad or very bad) SAH, a percentage similar to other studies for the older population 
(Crespo-Cebada E., 2012) and slightly higher than that observed to the Greek studies for the 
general population. Moreover, the mean monthly net total household income of the sample 
equalized is 920.41€, representative of a middle-income household of older population in 
Greece. About the utilization rates, it is worth noting that, although there is significantly 
higher proportion (72.6%) for GP versus specialist visits (51.7%), once there is a contact, 
conditional (≥1) mean number of specialist visits (1.78) is slightly higher – almost equal to 
conditional number of GP visits (1.76), revealing imbalances in primary health care services. 
The distribution of the sample and its utilization rates by degree of urbanization and region of 
residence indicate regional variances as displayed in Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.5. According to 
estimates of the National Statistical Authority (2011), 61.4% of the population lives in urban 
areas and 34.3% in the area of greater Athens. Semi-urban and rural populations comprise 
30% of the Greek population, provided that 80% of the country is mountainous or hilly and 
also that 169 out of 3000 islands are inhabited. In our sample, the youngest group (up to 69 
years) are residents of densely and intermediate populated areas, and residents of Athens-GR2 
and North Greece-GR1 (Thessaloniki), whereas the oldest groups of 70-79 and 80+ are 
residents of thinly populated areas and rural GR2-Central Greece and GR4-Islands (& Crete). 
Considering regional variations in utilization rates, mean number of inpatient admissions is 
similar among areas by degree of urbanization, but it is significantly higher for the residents 
of North Greece- Thessaloniki. Moreover, it is worth noting that residents of thinly-populated 
areas (as well as residents of Central Greece and Islands) use more outpatient and GP health 
care services than residents of the other areas and report significantly lower mean total 
number of visits to specialists (0.33).All the same, when the conditional (≥1) number of visits 
are included, a big increase in the mean number of specialist visits is reported, similar to the 
other areas (1.60). Considering forgo health care, purely for descriptive reasons, only 3.2%  or 
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140 of the respondents claim that forwent hospital care (inpatient or outpatient) whereas, 
8.1% declare forgo specialist care, a proportion
59
 3 times higher. The financial barrier is the 
second main reason to report foregoing specialist care, whereas long waiting list or distance 
problem were reported as no significant barriers to specialist care. These descriptive findings 
are explored in detail in our main analysis, as following. 
Table 5.1 Need and non need socioeconomic characteristics of the sample 
Demographics 
 
Count (N)  non 
weighted  
N % 
weighted 
Age 80+ 545 10.8% 
Age 70 – 79 1,032 24.8% 
Age 60 – 69 943 29.4% 
Ref/ Age 50-59  913 35% 
Mean Age in years 65.43 (SD: 10.37) 
Male 1,231 47.3% 
Ref/ Female 2,202 52.7% 
Health Status   
SAH “Less than good”(fair. bad and very bad) health 1,787 45.9% 
ref/ “very good and good”health 1,645 54.1% 
Long Term Illness (LTI): Suffering  (Yes) 2,436 66% 
ref/(No) LTI 994 34% 
GALI: Been severely limited & limited but not severely (Yes)  1,629 41.4% 
ref./ not limited at all (No) 1,799 58.6% 
Number of Chronic Conditions “More than 2 conditions” 1,703 43.7% 
“1 chronic medical condition” 908 27.9% 
Ref/ “0 Chronic medical Conditions”  822 28.4% 
Mean Number of chronic medical conditions out of 21 listed 1.73 (SD:1.82) 
Marital status    
Married (& registered partnership) 2,198 76.9% 
/ref. single (never married/widowed & 
not remarried /divorced & not remarried) 1,235 23.1% 
Education   
More than secondary School (ISCED 4+5+6) 491 19.3% 
Secondary School (partial & completed) (ISCED 2 + 3) 906 28.1% 
/ref. No & Primary School (partial &completed) (No + ISCED 1) 2,029 52.6% 
Household Size - Total Number of persons in household 
Living in couple (with or without dependent children) 2,230 78.7% 
Other (with or without dependent children) 293 8.6% 
/ref. Living alone (with or without dependent children) 910 12.7% 
Monthly Net Total Household Income Equalized per adult 
Ln Continuous – N 3,171                 (97.38%) 
Mean Income (€) 920.41€  
SD 540.49 
5th richest quintile with range - Inc5: More than 1.225.3€. 674 23.9% 
4th quintile with range- Inc4: 850.4€-1.225.2€  645 21.7% 
3d middle quintile with range:  - Inc3: 683.8€-850.3€ 588 18.4% 
2nd poor quintile: 525.5€ - 683.65€; 762 18.8% 
/ref. 1st poorest quintile: up to 525.5€ 502 17.2% 
Forgo hospital care recommended (inpatient or outpatient) (Yes) 140 3.2% 
Forgo specialist visit (Yes) 303 8.1% 
                                                          
59
 The percentage of 8.1% forgoing specialist care is similar with other international studies for Greece (Allin 
S. & Masseria, 2009; Litwin H. & Sapir E. (2009) 
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Table 5.2: Health care utilization by degree of urbanization: percentage and sample means of total and conditional contacts 
 Densely-populated area Intermediate area Thinly-populated area 
 % (last 12 
months) 
Conditional 
Mean  
Total 
Mean   
% (last 12 
months) 
Conditional 
Mean  
Total Mean   % (last 12 
months) 
Conditional 
Mean  
Total 
Mean   
Inpatient nights *
1
  15.5% 11.35 (1.67) 1.76 (0.30)  13.2% 12.72 (5.64) 1.68 (0.85) 13.8% 11.13 (1.51) 1.50 (0.23) 
Outpatient days *
1
  14.1%   3.19 (0.59) 0.45 (0.09) 15.5% 3.01 (0.56) 0.47 (0.12) 12.5% 5.93 (1.64) 0.73 (0.21) 
GP visits*
2
  72.3%   1.74 (0.15) 0.64 (0.06) 71.5% 1.63 (0.15) 0.66 (0.08) 73.7% 1.81 (0.10) 0.71 (0.05) 
Specialist visits*
2
  57.6%   1.90 (0.13) 0.56 (0.05) 60.3% 1.87 (0.17) 0.67 (0.08) 45.3% 1.60 (0.07) 0.33 (0.02) 
Dental visit *
3 
47.9%   43.9%   36.5%   
Note *1: For inpatient/outpatient admissions percentage of visit, conditional number of visits and total number of visits concern “the last 12 months”  
Note *2: For GP/specialist visits percentage of visit concerns “the last 12 months”, conditional number of visits and total number of visits concern “the past 4 weeks”  
Note *3: Conditional number of dentist monthly visits were only (12) cases  
 
Table 5.3 Health care utilization by region of residence: percentage and sample means of total and conditional contacts 
 Nuts1 North Greece GR1- 
Thessaloniki/ 
Nuts1 Central Greece GR2 Nuts1 Athens GR3 Nuts1 Islands +Crete GR4 
 % Conditional 
Mean 
Total 
Mean   
% Conditional 
Mean 
Total 
Mean   
% Conditional 
Mean 
Total 
Mean   
% Conditional 
Mean 
Total 
Mean   
Inpatient nights *
1
  15.6% 16.97 (2.99) 2.61 (0.56) 13.0% 9.31 (1.34) 1.19 (0.21) 13.8% 8.66 (1.33) 1.19 (0.21) 16.4% 7.29 (1.05) 1.13 (0.22) 
Outpatient days *
1
  15.4% 5.68  (1.71) 0.86 (0.27) 9.0% 4.85 (2.49) 0.43 (0.23) 13.7% 2.89 (0.60) 0.39 (0.09) 17.6% 4.54  (1.28) 0.77 (0.24) 
GP visits*
2
  75.5% 1.71  (0.09) 0.69 (0.05) 67.2% 1.69 (0.08) 0.56 (0.04) 72.4% 1.61 (0.16) 0.59 (0.06) 78.9% 2.46  (0.37) 1.24 (0.20) 
Specialist visits*
2
  55.4% 1.95 (0.16) 0.54 (0.05) 38.5% 1.88 (0.15) 0.33 (0.04) 59.1% 1.70  (0.09) 0.52 (0.04) 45.1% 1.45  (0.13) 0.33 (0.05) 
Dental visit*
3 
33.9%   42.2%   49.0%   40.4%   
Note *1: For inpatient/outpatient admissions percentage of visit, conditional number of visits and total number of visits concern “the last 12 months”  
Note *2: For GP/specialist visits percentage of visit concerns “the last 12 months”, conditional number of visits and total number of visits concern “the past 4 weeks”  
Note *3: Conditional number of dentist monthly visits were only (12) cases  
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Table 5.4 Health care utilization: percentage and sample means of contacts 
Type of care 
Percentage of visit 
(%) 
Conditional (≥1) 
number of visits 
Total number 
of visits 
 
(last 12 
months) 
N Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Inpatient night admissions*
1
  14.4% 528 11.42 (1.21) 1.62 (0.20) 
Outpatient day admissions*
1
  13.5% 477 4.34 (0.76) 0.58 (0.11) 
GP/Family Doctor visits*
2
  72.6% 2,545 1.76 (0.08) 0.67 (0.03) 
Specialist visits*
2
  51.7% 1,795 1.78 (0.07) 0.47 (0.02) 
Dental visit- annual*
3 
41.3% 1,291  
Note *1: For inpatient/outpatient admissions percentage of visit, conditional number of visits and 
total number of visits concern “the last 12 months”  
Note *2: For GP/specialist visits percentage of visit concerns “the last 12 months”, conditional 
number of visits and total number of visits concern “the past 4 weeks”  
Note *3: Conditional number of dentist monthly visits were only (12) cases  
 
Table 5.5 Regional  distribution of the sample 
 
Count (N) non 
weighted 
N % 
weighted 
Degree of urbanisation   
Thinly-populated area 1,757 46.9% 
Intermediate area 371 13.2% 
ref./ Densely-populated area 1,305 39.9% 
Region of residence – Nuts1 level (national level)   
North Greece (GR1) 1,126 30.9% 
Central Greece (GR2) 821 21.8% 
Islands (GR4) 352 9.3% 
ref ./Athens (GR3) 1,134 38% 
 
5.4.2 Concentration Index Method Results  
Tables 5.6 - 5.11 summarize the                            and the                  for all the 
patterns of health care use (total, probability and conditional number of visits) and the 
inequity index. The negative concentration indices for actual use indicate the presence of 
pro-poor inequality, except the positive                for the conditional number of 
outpatient admissions, the probability of specialist visits and dentist visits indicating pro-
rich inequality, meaning that higher income individuals are more likely to report outpatient 
admissions, to contact a specialist and visit a dentist, than lower income individuals. The 
negative concentration indices for                  are mainly due to differences in need 
factors, which also show a pro-poor distribution except probability of dentist visits. 
 
 
220 
 
 
Table 5.6: Income - related inequality in inpatient admissions 
  
Probability   
Total number of 
annual  admissions 
Conditional number 
of annual admissions 
                            -0.1042 -0.2220 -0.1295 
                 -0.0767 -0.0914 -0.0578 
HI -0.0275 -0.1306 -0.0716 
Bold:p-value <0.01; bold and italics: p-value<0.05; italics:p-value<0.10 
 
Table 5.7: Income - related inequality in outpatient admissions 
  
Probability  
Total number of 
annual admissions 
Conditional number 
of annual admissions 
                           -0.0603 -0.0557 0.0198 
             -0.0586 -0.1085 -0.0962 
HI -0.0017 0.0528 0.1160 
Bold:p-value <0.01; bold and italics: p-value<0.05; italics:p-value<0.10 
 
Table 5.8: Income - related inequality in GP visit 
  Probability 
(annual)  
Total number of 
monthly visits  
Conditional number of 
monthly visits  
                           -0.0217 -0.0827 -0.0682 
             -0.0262 -0.0674 -0.0263 
HI 0.0046 -0.0153 -0.0419 
Bold:p-value <0.01; bold and italics: p-value<0.05; italics:p-value<0.10 
 
Table 5.9: Income - related inequality in specialist visit 
  Probability 
(annual)  
Total number of 
monthly visits  
Conditional number 
of monthly visits  
                           0.0236 -0.0216 -0.0388 
             -0.0430 -0.0764 -0.0206 
HI 0.0666 0.0548 -0.0183 
Bold:p-value <0.01; bold and italics: p-value<0.05; italics:p-value<0.10 
 
Table 5.10 Income - related inequality in probability of dentist visit 
  Probability (annual)  
                           0.1175 
             0.0138 
HI 0.1037 
Bold:p-value <0.01; bold and italics: p-value<0.05; italics:p-value<0.10 
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Table 5.11 Overall Income –related inequity (HI) by health care type (all patterns) 
  
Probability   
Total number of 
visits 
Conditional number 
of visits 
Inpatient nights *
1
  -0.0275 -0.1306 -0.0716 
Outpatient days *
1
  -0.0017 0.0528 0.1160 
GP visits*
2
  0.0046 -0.0153 -0.0419 
Specialist visits*
2
  0.0666 0.0548 -0.0183 
Dental visit *
3 
0.1037   
Bold:p-value <0.01; bold and italics: p-value<0.05; italics:p-value<0.10 
Note *1: For inpatient/outpatient admissions probability of visit, conditional number of visits and total number of 
visits concern “the last 12 months”  
Note *2: For GP/specialist visits probability of visit concerns “the last 12 months”, conditional number of visits and 
total number of visits concern “the past 4 weeks”  
Note *3: Conditional number of dentist monthly visits were only (12) cases  
 
Figure 5.1 Equity in all health care use types (probability, total number, conditional 
number of visits) 
 
 ■ Probability ▲ Total visits ♦Conditional visits 
As aforementioned, the range of the horizontal index inequity is from -1 to 1. A positive 
(negative) value indicates a pro-rich (pro-poor) inequality. The magnitude of the HI 
inequity index reflects the strength of the relationship between income and the specific 
health care variable. For example, if we consider the -0.015 HI index of total number of 
GP visits in Table 5.11, that demonstrates a pro-poor inequality, compared to -0.015 HI 
index, the -0.041 index of conditional number of GP visits indicates a more pronounced 
pro-poor inequality. Overall, as displayed in Table 5.11 and Figure 5.1, after controlling 
for the unequal need distributions: 
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 Inequity in the delivery of health care is distributed among better off -significantly pro-
rich - for the conditional number of outpatient admissions, for the probability of 
specialist and dentist visits, and insignificantly pro-rich for the total number of 
outpatient admissions and the total number of specialist visits. 
 Inequity is distributed among less advantaged – significantly pro-poor for total number 
of inpatient visits, and slightly pro-poor for the conditional number and total number of 
GP visits as well as the conditional number of specialist visits.  
 Moreover, a weak relationship of income with the probability of GP and outpatient 
visits exists. The magnitude of HI index is very small for the probability of GP visits 
(very slightly positive) and the probability of outpatient admissions (very slightly 
negative), indicating that income is distributed almost equally among individuals for 
these health care types. Inequity is distributed by need for the probability of GP and 
outpatient visits.  
 For all patterns of inpatient admissions consistent negative “pro-poor” inequity exists, 
although the magnitude of HI index reveals a more pronounced pro-poor inequality for 
the conditional number and total number of inpatient admissions, indicating that less 
advantaged elderly report more inpatient admissions than the more advantaged.  
 For outpatient admissions consistent “pro-rich” inequity exists. Almost no inequity 
exists for the probability of outpatient admission, but when only conditional number of 
visits is included, there is significantly pro-rich inequity.  
 For GP visits, there is a weak in magnitude consistent pro-poor inequity. There is 
almost no inequity (slightly pro rich) for the probability of making a GP visit indicating 
that all individuals have the same probability to make a GP visit, regardless of their 
income. However, when only conditional number (at least once) of GP visits is 
included, there is pro-poor inequity for total number and conditional number of GP 
visits, indicating that when need is equalized, and for at least one visit, GP visits are 
related to need, slightly favoring the poor. 
 As far as specialist visit is concerned, a parallel gradient – tendency with GP visits is 
apparent. There is significant pro-rich inequity in the probability of making a specialist 
visit, but since one visit at least is included, there is a less pronounced pro-rich 
inequality for the total number of specialist visits and pro-poor inequity for conditional 
number of specialist visits favoring the poor. Pro-rich horizontal inequity exists in the 
access to the first visit, determined by the patients' behavior and incentives, but not in 
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the subsequent visits indicated by the physician. This result is in compliance with 
evidence of other country-studies(Leu and Shellhorn, 2004).  
 For the probability of dentist visit there is significant pro-rich inequity. Comparison 
with existing literature for Greece is presented at the discussion section, below. 
5.4.3 Decomposition Analysis – Sources of inequality by type of care  
The contributing factors, as inequity drivers, are displayed in detail in Tables 5.12 – 5.18 
and Figures 5.2–5.6 that report the                            decomposition for all the health 
care types and all patterns. Among other contributors we focus on income and regional 
variables in compliance with the main objectives of our study. Each Table first shows the 
mean values for the explanatory variables. The second column displays the partial 
concentration index (CI), the extent to which each contributor is distributed across income. 
A negative (positive) sign indicates that the variable has a pro-poor (pro-rich) distribution 
and is prevalent among the lower (higher) income groups. The third column indicates the 
demand elasticity (Marginal Effect - ME) for each contributor. Finally, the last three 
columns of the tables report, respectively, the absolute, the sum and % contributions to 
total income related inequality. The absolute contribution is the product of the elasticity 
(marginal effect) and the partial concentration index for each factor. A negative (positive) 
absolute contribution implies that, if only that variant determined utilization, then it would 
be pro-poor (pro-rich). The Tables can be interpreted in the following way, using the 
example of the probability of a specialist visit (Table 5.15). The unadjusted concentration 
index                of the probability of a specialist visit is positive (0.024), implying that 
across the income distribution, there is a proportional probability of visiting a specialist 
concentrated among the rich. Since need is standardized for, the level of inequity (HI) is 
0.067 implying a pro-rich distribution. The contribution of the need factors to inequality 
are negative (-0.043), indicating that individuals with poorer self-assessed health and 
chronic conditions reduce inequity in probability of specialist visit favoring the worse off, 
pointing out the greatest needs of the poor, similar with most of the empirical literature. 
Limitation in general activities (GALI) has the most negative contribution being the most 
important needs-adjustor, followed by self-assessed health and LTI. Gender has almost 
zero contribution to inequality. Age dummies concentrated among the lower income 
groups (negative CI) are less likely to visit a specialist and this result in slightly positive 
contribution (almost zero) – pro - rich inequality. About the non-need contributors, the 
main factor is income (its contribution is 0.037), meaning that more advantaged (higher 
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income earners) are more likely to visit a specialist, holding all the rest constant. The 
second – most important non need contributor is education (0.015) with a positive 
contribution to inequity. The third important non-need contributor is the degree of 
urbanization with final contribution (0.008) slightly pro-rich, meaning that the final effect 
of the dummies of thinly-populated areas (concentrated among the lower income groups- 
negative CI) and intermediate-populated areas is to increase overall inequity favoring the 
more advantaged. Similarly, region of residence has final contribution positive (0.005); this 
means that the final effect of the dummies of North Greece, Central Greece (concentrated 
among the lower income groups) and Islands is to increase inequity favoring the better off. 
Marital status and household composition have a quite lower contribution to inequity. 
Finally, the error term is almost zero (0.0001) implying that there should be only some 
small effect on the probability of visiting a specialist which  are related to income and not 
accounted for in the specific utilization model. Overall, Tables 5.12 - 5.18 reveal: 
 Pro-poor (negative signs) are apparent for the contributions of need variables for all 
types of care similar to the existing evidence, except the case of probability of receiving 
dental care for which need-adjustment is mainly age standardized (Scheil-Adlung, X. 
and Bonan, J., 2013; Geitona et al, 2007; Lahana et al, 2011). 
 The non-need contributors have a non systemic effect on patterns of health care use by 
income groups. Income itself is not the only contributor, provided that other non-need 
contributors i.e. education, or region of residence variable do not have a consistent 
effect. 
 Income contributes in a positive way (pro-rich) to inequity in distribution of 
outpatient admissions (all patterns), in probability of making a specialist, as well as a 
dentist visit favoring the better off.  
 Income contributes negatively (pro-poor) to distribution of inequity in inpatient 
admissions (all patterns), in GP visits (all patterns), in total number and conditional 
number of specialist visits, favoring the less advantaged. 
 Another important socio-economic characteristic related to both income and health care 
is higher educational level status that explains a high percentage of inequalities in 
almost all health care types, except from all patterns of inpatient admissions that reduces 
inequity, similar to the existing evidence (Tountas et al, 2011; Van Doorslaer et al, 
2006; EC, 2005; Koolman X., 2007; Van Doorsaler & Masseria, 2004; Masseria et al, 
2004). 
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 The third important non-need contributor is the degree of urbanization. Compared to 
densely populated areas, inequalities are apparent for all health care types due to the 
positive effect of thinly- populated areas, favoring the better off, as following.  
 Residents of thinly-populated areas - less advantaged - face pro-rich inequalities for 
almost all health care types (inpatient admissions, probability of outpatient 
admissions, total number and conditional number of GP visits, specialist visits all 
patterns), apart from the pro-poor inequalities for probability of GP visits, total 
number and conditional number of outpatient admissions, favoring the less 
advantaged. 
 On the other hand, residents of intermediate-populated areas – who tend to be more 
advantaged - face weak pro-rich inequalities in conditional number of inpatient 
admissions, in probability of outpatient admissions, in probability and total number 
of specialist visits, favoring the better off.  
 If we examine the region of residence effect, compared to region of Attiki-Athens, 
regional disparities are apparent for most health care types, mainly due to the significant 
positive effect of Central Greece on overall inequity – except from inpatient admissions, 
but to a weaker (lower) magnitude than the effect of degree of urbanization.  
 Inequalities are not apparent for inpatient care (for all regions except for Islands at a 
slight degree), total number and conditional number of outpatient admissions (for all 
regions except slightly for Islands), total number and conditional number of 
specialist visits, favoring the less advantaged. Elderly make inpatient, outpatient 
admissions and specialist visits, irrespective of their income and their region of 
residence. 
 Residents of North Greece-Thessaloniki face inequalities in most health care types in 
North Greece, favoring the worse off, but they do not face inequalities in probability 
of specialist and dentist visits. Residents of North Greece are more likely to make 
specialist and dentist visits, irrespective of their income. 
 Residents of Central Greece region –concentrated among less advantaged - face pro-
rich inequity mainly for PHC (GP care, outpatient visits, and probability of specialist 
visits) favoring the better off. They do not face inequalities in all patterns of inpatient 
admissions, as well as, total number and conditional number of specialist visits. 
 On the other hand, Islands region (including Crete) has the weakest effect on overall 
income-related inequity, except for inequity in specialist visit, total number and 
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conditional number of GP visits, favoring the better off. However, for Islands, 
inequalities- though weak in strength (almost zero)- still exist for most services. 
 Overall, residents of thinly populated areas and Central Greece have a non systematic 
effect on inequity in all patterns of GP visits. They are negatively associated with 
conditional number of outpatient, GP and specialist visits favoring the worse off. On the 
other hand, they face pro-rich inequalities in the probability of making an outpatient 
admission and specialist visit favoring the better off, indicating provision of inadequate 
primary care services (GP, outpatient visits, and the probability of specialist visits).  
 Furthermore, all regional variables indicate regional disparities - inequalities in 
specialist care services. There is a significant gradient of regional inequalities in 
specialist care among the older population in North Greece, Central Greece and 
intermediate-populated areas, favoring the better off. 
 In particular, it is worth noting that residents of North Greece, Central Greece and 
intermediate- populated areas, face pro-rich inequity in the probability of making a 
specialist visit, but once the conditional contacts are included, they face a more 
pronounced pro-poor inequality in conditional number of specialist visits, favoring the 
worse off, pointing out that the ineffective primary care services in rural areas “force” 
them to specialist care, privately provided, irrespective of their income level. 
 Marital status has a positive contribution in inequity in most health care types and 
household type factor has a systemic negative (pro-poor) contribution on inequity in 
most health care types, but quite low in magnitude.  
Overall, our findings that the utilization of health services is determined mainly by the 
health needs and by several socioeconomic and structural factors of the healthcare systems 
are compatible with existing evidence for determinants of health care use for the general 
population (Phelps and Newhouse, 1974; Newhouse and Marquis, 1978; Wagstaff, 1986; 
Kasper, 1986; Feldstein, 1988; McGuire et al., 1988; Marmot and Wilkinson, 1999). More 
specifically, activity limitations (GALI) and the self-assessed health (SAH), older age,  
female gender, marital status, higher educational level explains a high percentage of 
inequalities mainly in specialist and dentist visit, except inpatient admissions. Moreover, 
income, and region of residence are considered as the most important determinants of 
health services use (Tountas et al, 2011, Pappa and Niakas, 2006; Economou, 2006, 
Geitona et al., 2007, Alexopoulos and Geitona, 2009, Bíró A. 2014).  
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Table 5.12:Detailed Decomposition of inequality in probability of inpatient admissions, total number and conditional number of inpatient admissions 
  Probability of inpatient admissions Total number of inpatient admissions Conditional number of inpatient admissions 
  Mean CI ME Contrib Sum Mean CI  ME Contrib Sum Mean CI  ME Contr. Sum 
CI unadjusted  -0.104      -0.222        -0.129       
HI index  -0.028     -0.131      -0.072     
Need    -0.077 -0.077      -0.091 -0.091      -0.058 -0.058 
Age (80+ vs 50-59) 0.111 -0.218 0.022 -0.005  0.110 -0.217 -0.026 0.006   0.171 -0.216 -0.038 0.008   
Age (70-79 vs 50-59) 0.254 -0.092 0.043 -0.004  0.253 -0.090 -0.001 0.000   0.325 -0.036 -0.029 0.001   
Age (60-69 vs 50-59) 0.291 0.009 0.021 0.000 -0.009 0.292 0.007 -0.059 0.000 0.005 0.281 0.078 -0.034 -0.003 0.007 
Gender (male vs female) 0.470 0.071 0.177 0.013 0.013 0.470 0.070 0.503 0.035 0.035 0.497 0.045 0.271 0.012 0.012 
SAH   0.470 -0.143 0.164 -0.023 -0.023 0.469 -0.141 0.371 -0.052 -0.052 0.700 -0.133 0.285 -0.038 -0.038 
Long Term Illness (Yes vs No) 0.668 -0.065 -0.034 0.002 0.002 0.667 -0.066 -0.048 0.003 0.003 0.823 -0.056 0.055 -0.003 -0.003 
Gali (Yes) vs No  0.422 -0.140 0.379 -0.053 -0.053 0.421 -0.140 0.554 -0.078 -0.078 0.704 -0.118 0.280 -0.033 -0.033 
 “2 + chronic diseases” vs "0" 0.447 -0.087 0.069 -0.006  0.446 -0.087 0.069 -0.006   0.620 -0.049 0.050 -0.002   
 “1 chronic disease” vs "0" 0.276 0.046 -0.007 0.000 -0.006 0.276 0.047 0.020 0.001 -0.005 0.224 0.001 0.048 0.000 -0.002 
ln income (x) 6.677 0.045 -0.543 -0.024 -0.024 6.678 0.045 -1.192 -0.054 -0.054 6.589 0.042 -0.265 -0.011 -0.011 
Non Need variables                         
"More than secondary" vs 
"Primary" 
0.184 0.478 -0.010 -0.005  0.184 0.476 -0.102 -0.048   0.133 0.484 -0.040 -0.019   
Education - "Secondary" vs 
"Primary"  
0.276 0.125 -0.025 -0.003 -0.008 0.276 0.123 -0.162 -0.020 -0.068 0.215 0.281 -0.072 -0.020 -0.040 
Married vs No Married 0.773 0.032 -0.078 -0.002 -0.002 0.773 0.032 -0.201 -0.006 -0.006 0.727 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000 
"Living in couple"vs "alone" 0.789 0.029 -0.026 -0.001 -0.001 0.788 0.029 0.047 0.001 0.002 0.747 0.054 -0.098 -0.005 -0.004 
"Other" vs  alone" 0.082 0.049 -0.014 -0.001  0.082 0.047 0.014 0.001   0.081 0.031 0.033 0.001   
                
North Greece vs Athens 0.327 -0.103 0.057 -0.006  0.327 -0.102 0.341 -0.035   0.349 -0.131 0.213 -0.028   
Central Greece vs Athens 0.214 -0.077 0.030 -0.002  0.214 -0.076 0.100 -0.008   0.202 -0.178 0.007 -0.001   
Islands +Crete vs Athens 0.095 0.026 0.026 0.001 -0.007 0.094 0.026 0.020 0.001 -0.042 0.105 0.141 0.001 0.000 -0.029 
Thinly populated areas 0.488 -0.123 -0.169 0.021  0.486 -0.121 -0.398 0.048   0.466 -0.113 -0.101 0.011   
Intermediate populated areas  0.130 0.096 -0.034 -0.003 0.017 0.130 0.091 -0.030 -0.003 0.045 0.116 0.037 0.016 0.001 0.012 
Error    -0.001       -0.008        0.000   
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Table 5.13 Detailed Decomposition of inequality in the probability. total number of outpatient visits and conditional number of outpatient visits 
  Probability of outpatient visits Total number of outpatient visits Conditional number of outpatient visits 
  Mean CI  ME Contri Sum Mean CI  ME Contri Sum Mean CI  ME Contri Sum 
CI unadjusted   -0.060         -0.056         0.020       
HI index   -0.002       0.053       0.116     
Need       -0.059 -0.059       -0.109 -0.109       -0.096 -0.096 
Age (80+ vs 50-59) 0.111 -0.219 -0.005 0.001   0.110 -0.214 -0.131 0.028   0.113 -0.208 -0.138 0.029   
Age (70-79 vs 50-59) 0.254 -0.091 0.049 -0.004   0.253 -0.092 -0.137 0.013   0.317 -0.039 -0.254 0.010   
Age (60-69 vs 50-59) 0.291 0.011 0.068 0.001 -0.003 0.292 0.010 0.022 0.000 0.041 0.333 0.066 -0.068 -0.005 0.034 
Gender (male vs female) 0.470 0.071 0.012 0.001 0.001 0.470 0.070 -0.167 -0.012 -0.012 0.439 0.133 -0.068 -0.009 -0.009 
SAH   0.470 -0.142 0.117 -0.017 -0.017 0.469 -0.142 0.538 -0.076 -0.076 0.642 -0.086 0.512 -0.044 -0.044 
Long Term Illness (Yes vs No) 0.668 -0.066 0.050 -0.003 -0.003 0.667 -0.065 0.215 -0.014 -0.014 0.817 -0.054 0.315 -0.017 -0.017 
Gali (Yes) vs No  0.422 -0.140 0.217 -0.030 -0.030 0.421 -0.141 0.596 -0.084 -0.084 0.619 -0.145 0.651 -0.094 -0.094 
 “2 + chronic diseases” vs "0" 0.447 -0.088 0.108 -0.009   0.447 -0.088 -0.466 0.041   0.584 -0.068 -0.694 0.047   
 “1 chronic disease” vs "0 " 0.276 0.045 0.063 0.003 -0.007 0.276 0.047 -0.096 -0.005 0.036 0.271 0.091 -0.139 -0.013 0.034 
ln income (x) 6.677 0.045 0.181 0.008 0.008 6.678 0.045 3.042 0.137 0.137 6.611 0.044 3.458 0.151 0.151 
Non Need variables                               
"More than secondary" vs 
"Primary" 
0.184 0.478 -0.069 -0.033   0.184 0.479 -0.172 -0.082   0.103 0.592 -0.051 -0.030   
Education - "Secondary" vs 
"Primary"  
0.276 0.123 -0.016 -0.002 -0.035 0.276 0.122 -0.146 -0.018 -0.100 0.257 0.202 -0.091 -0.018 -0.048 
Married vs No Married 0.773 0.032 0.258 0.008 0.008 0.773 0.032 0.883 0.028 0.028 0.793 0.047 0.121 0.006 0.006 
"Living in couple"vs "alone" 0.789 0.029 -0.176 -0.005 -0.007 0.789 0.028 -0.342 -0.010 -0.011 0.805 0.042 0.146 0.006 0.007 
"Other" vs  alone" 0.082 0.049 -0.031 -0.002   0.082 0.052 -0.019 -0.001   0.052 0.088 0.008 0.001   
North Greece vs Athens 0.327 -0.103 0.029 -0.003   0.327 -0.103 0.110 -0.011   0.378 -0.059 0.119 -0.007   
Central Greece vs Athens 0.214 -0.079 -0.058 0.005   0.214 -0.076 -0.057 0.004   0.141 -0.260 0.014 -0.004   
Islands +Crete vs Athens 0.095 0.027 0.026 0.001 0.002 0.094 0.024 0.025 0.001 -0.006 0.118 0.099 0.021 0.002 -0.009 
Thinly populated areas 0.488 -0.123 -0.081 0.010   0.487 -0.123 0.141 -0.017   0.458 -0.072 0.131 -0.009   
Intermediate populated areas  0.130 0.097 0.010 0.001 0.011 0.130 0.092 -0.021 -0.002 -0.019 0.154 0.044 -0.080 -0.004 -0.013 
Error       0.010         0.024         0.022   
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Table 5.14 Detailed Decomposition of inequality in the probability of GP visits. total number of GP visits and conditional number of GP visits 
  Probability of GP visits Total number of GP visits Conditional number of GP visits 
  Mean CI  ME Contr Sum Mean CI  ME Contr Sum Mean CI  ME Contr Sum 
CI unadjusted   -0.022         -0.083         -0.068       
HI index   0.005       -0.015       -0.042     
Need       -0.026 -0.026       -0.067 -0.067       -0.026 -0.026 
Age (80+ vs 50-59) 0.109 -0.221 0.005 -0.001   0.110 -0.219 -0.001 0.000   0.133 -0.213 0.005 -0.001   
Age (70-79 vs 50-59) 0.254 -0.089 0.016 -0.001   0.254 -0.089 -0.007 0.001   0.306 -0.068 -0.002 0.000   
Age (60-69 vs 50-59) 0.291 0.007 -0.008 0.000 -0.003 0.292 0.008 -0.035 0.000 0.000 0.259 0.023 0.008 0.000 -0.001 
Gender (male vs female) 0.470 0.071 -0.015 -0.001 -0.001 0.470 0.071 -0.055 -0.004 -0.004 0.440 0.099 -0.052 0.005 -0.005 
SAH   0.470 -0.143 0.017 -0.002 -0.002 0.469 -0.144 0.203 -0.029 -0.029 0.600 -0.118 0.132 -0.016 -0.016 
Long Term Illness (Yes vs No) 0.669 -0.067 0.134 -0.009 -0.009 0.668 -0.067 0.070 -0.005 -0.005 0.798 -0.045 -0.088 0.004 0.004 
Gali (Yes) vs No  0.423 -0.141 0.030 -0.004 -0.004 0.422 -0.142 0.181 -0.026 -0.026 0.554 -0.106 0.122 -0.013 -0.013 
 “2 + chronic diseases” vs "0" 0.448 -0.089 0.106 -0.009   0.448 -0.089 0.063 -0.006   0.574 -0.057 -0.076 -0.004   
“1 chronic disease” vs "0 " 0.275 0.047 0.054 0.002 -0.007 0.275 0.050 0.022 0.001 -0.004 0.261 0.007 0.016 0.000 0.004 
ln income (x) 6.677 0.045 -0.076 -0.003 -0.003 6.677 0.045 -0.826 -0.037 -0.037 6.658 0.044 -1.507 -0.066 -0.066 
Non Need variables                               
"More than secondary" vs 
"Primary" 
0.184 0.475 0.008 0.004   0.183 0.476 0.004 0.002   0.155 0.5 0.009 0.004   
Education - "Secondary" vs 
"Primary"  
0.276 0.126 0.012 0.002 0.005 0.277 0.125 -0.027 -0.003 -0.002 0.258 0.167 -0.027 -0.005 0.000 
Married vs No Married 0.774 0.031 -0.007 0.000 0.000 0.774 0.031 0.277 0.009 0.009 0.760 0.037 0.118 0.004 0.004 
"Living in couple"vs "alone" 0.789 0.028 0.041 0.001 0.001 0.789 0.028 -0.229 -0.006 -0.007 0.774 0.036 -0.067 -0.002 -0.003 
"Other" vs  alone" 0.082 0.051 -0.003 0.000   0.082 0.049 -0.015 -0.001   0.078 0.094 -0.001 0.000   
North Greece vs Athens 0.328 -0.104 -0.005 0.000   0.328 -0.103 0.021 -0.002   0.346 -0.149 0.001 -0.000   
Central Greece vs Athens 0.213 -0.078 -0.021 0.002   0.213 -0.074 -0.013 0.001   0.187 -0.09 -0.001 -0.000   
Islands +Crete vs Athens 0.095 0.029 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.095 0.027 0.084 0.002 0.001 0.122 0.109 0.067 0.007 0.007 
Thinly populated areas 0.488 -0.123 0.016 -0.002   0.488 -0.121 -0.062 0.007   0.501 0.118 -0.072 0.009  
Intermediate populated areas  0.130 0.097 -0.005 0.000 -0.002 0.129 0.093 -0.007 -0.001 0.007 0.131 -0.103 -0.012 -0.001 0.007  
Error       0.002         0.014         0.008   
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Table 5.15 Detailed Decomposition of inequality in the probability of specialist visits, total number and conditional number of specialist visits 
  Probability of specialist visits Total number of specialist visits Conditional number of specialist visits 
  Mean CI  ME Contri Sum Mean CI  ME Contri Sum Mean CI  ME Contri Sum 
CI unadjusted   0.024         -0.022         -0.039       
HI index   0.067       0.055       -0.018     
Need       -0.043 -0.043       -0.076 -0.076       -0.021 -0.021 
Age (80+ vs 50-59) 0.110 -0.216 -0.005 0.001   0.110 -0.217 -0.034 0.007   0.111 -0.169 -0.008 0.001   
Age (70-79 vs 50-59) 0.255 -0.089 -0.024 0.002   0.256 -0.090 -0.039 0.003   0.291 -0.096 -0.037 0.004   
Age (60-69 vs 50-59) 0.292 0.009 0.010 0.000 0.003 0.292 0.013 0.037 0.000 0.011 0.308 0.029 0.019 0.001 0.005 
Gender (male vs female) 0.469 0.070 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.470 0.070 0.054 0.004 0.004 0.459 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SAH   0.471 -0.139 0.088 -0.012 -0.012 0.471 -0.141 0.250 -0.035 -0.035 0.648 -0.124 0.103 -0.013 -0.013 
Long Term Illness (Yes vs No) 0.670 -0.065 0.143 -0.009 -0.009 0.670 -0.066 0.015 -0.001 -0.001 0.818 -0.045 -0.144 0.007 0.007 
Gali (Yes) vs No  0.423 -0.140 0.132 -0.018 -0.018 0.423 -0.140 0.308 -0.043 -0.043 0.601 -0.119 0.155 -0.018 -0.018 
 “2 + chronic diseases” vs "0" 0.450 -0.087 0.093 -0.008   0.450 -0.086 0.162 -0.014   0.602 -0.077 0.037 -0.003   
 “1 chronic disease” vs "0 " 0.276 0.049 0.026 0.001 -0.007 0.276 0.047 0.042 0.002 -0.012 0.246 0.086 0.017 0.001 -0.001 
ln income (x) 6.677 0.045 0.822 0.037 0.037 6.676 0.045 -0.652 -0.029 -0.029 6.684 0.044 -0.896 -0.040 -0.040 
Non Need variables                               
"More than secondary" vs 
"Primary" 
0.183 0.475 0.029 0.014   0.183 0.475 0.090 0.043   0.192 0.446 0.040 0.018   
Education - "Secondary" vs 
"Primary"  
0.277 0.125 0.012 0.002 0.015 0.278 0.125 0.030 0.004 0.046 0.281 0.141 -0.014 -0.002 0.016 
Married vs No Married 0.773 0.031 0.055 0.002 0.002 0.774 0.031 0.183 0.006 0.006 0.774 0.041 0.024 0.001 0.001 
""Living in couple"vs "alone" 0.789 0.028 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.789 0.028 -0.091 -0.003 -0.002 0.784 0.035 0.015 0.001 0.000 
"Other" vs  alone 0.083 0.052 -0.001 0.000   0.083 0.051 0.001 0.000   0.087 0.028 -0.006 0.000   
North Greece vs Athens 0.327 -0.104 -0.010 0.001   0.328 -0.104 0.097 -0.010   0.343 -0.076 0.085 -0.006   
Central Greece vs Athens 0.211 -0.076 -0.055 0.004   0.212 -0.074 0.017 -0.001   0.137 -0.120 0.038 -0.005   
Islands +Crete vs Athens 0.095 0.026 -0.019 0.000 0.005 0.095 0.025 -0.001 0.000 -0.011 0.083 0.109 0.004 0.000 -0.011 
Thinly populated areas 0.486 -0.124 -0.058 0.007  0.486 -0.123 -0.304 0.037  0.379 -0.123 -0.131  0.016   
Intermediate populated areas  0.131 0.097 0.006 0.001  0.008 0.130 0.090 0.014 0.001  0.039 0.173 0.105 -0.008 -0.001  0.015 
Sum       0.023 0.023       -0.029 -0.029       -0.038 -0.038 
Error       0.000         0.007         0.000   
 
 
231 
 
 
Table 5.16 Detailed Decomposition of inequality in probability of dentist visits 
  Probability of dentist visits 
  Mean CI ME Contribution Sum 
CI unadjusted 
 
0.118 
   
HI index 
 
0.104   
 
Need 
   
0.014 0.014 
Age (80+ vs 50-59) 0.108 -0.222 -0.065 0.014 
 
Age (70-79 vs 50-59) 0.253 -0.093 -0.096 0.009 
 
Age (60-69 vs 50-59) 0.293 0.009 -0.041 0.000 0.023 
Gender (male vs female) 0.471 0.071 -0.084 -0.006 -0.006 
SAH   0.468 -0.141 0.028 -0.004 -0.004 
Long Term Illness (Yes vs No) 0.667 -0.063 0.044 -0.003 -0.003 
Limited in General Activities Gali (Yes) vs No  0.420 -0.140 -0.036 0.005 0.005 
 “2 + chronic diseases” vs "0" 0.446 -0.087 0.017 -0.002 
 
 “1 chronic disease” vs "0 " 0.278 0.048 0.000 0.000 -0.002 
ln income (x) 6.679 0.045 1.136 0.051 0.051 
Non Need variables 
     
"More than secondary" vs "Primary" 0.185 0.473 0.080 0.038 
 
Education - "Secondary" vs "Primary"  0.277 0.123 0.050 0.006 0.044 
Married vs No Married 0.773 0.032 0.079 0.003 0.003 
"Living in couple"vs "alone" 0.789 0.028 -0.009 0.000 0.000 
"Other" vs  alone" 0.083 0.050 -0.002 0.000 
 
North Greece vs Athens 0.326 -0.106 -0.077 0.008 
 
Central Greece vs Athens 0.212 -0.078 0.001 0.000 
 
Islands +Crete vs Athens 0.095 0.021 -0.007 0.000 0.008 
Thinly populated areas 0.485 -0.125 -0.026 0.003 
 
Intermediate populated areas  0.130 0.095 -0.005 0.000 0.003 
sum 
   
0.122 0.122 
error 
   
-0.004 
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Table 5.17: Overall Decomposition of inequity in inpatient nights and outpatient visits (all pattens) 
  Probability of  
inpatient nights 
Total inpatient 
nights 
Conditional 
inpatient nights 
Probability of  
outpatient visits 
Total outpatient 
visits 
Conditional 
outpatient visits 
  CIndex   CIndex   CIndex   CIndex   CIndex   CIndex  
CI unadjusted -0.1042   -0.2220   -0.1295   -0.0603   -0.0557   0.0198  
HI index -0.0275   -0.1306   -0.0716   -0.0017   0.0528   0.1160  
 Contrib. to 
Inequality 
% Contrib. Contrib. to 
Inequality 
% 
Contrib. 
Contrib. to 
Inequality 
% 
Contrib. 
Contrib. to 
Inequality 
% Contrib. Contrib. to 
Inequality 
% Contrib. Contrib. to 
Inequality 
% Contrib. 
Need -0.0767   -0.0914   -0.0578   -0.0586   -0.1085   -0.0962  
Age -0.0086 8.25% 0.0053 -2.37% 0.0066 -5.07% -0.0026 4.35% 0.0409 -73.32% 0.0340 171.99% 
Gender 0.0125 -12.04% 0.0352 -15.85% 0.0122 -9.46% 0.0008 -1.40% -0.0116 20.85% -0.0090 -45.43% 
Health Status -SAH -0.0234 22.43% -0.0523 23.56% -0.0381 29.40% -0.0166 27.49% -0.0762 136.73% -0.0441 -223.21% 
Health Status - Health 
Limitations(LTI, Gali, 
Chronic Disease) 
-0.0573 54.96% -0.0795 35.83% -0.0386 29.79% -0.0403 66.79% -0.0616 110.46% -0.0771 -390.40% 
Ln (income) -0.0244 23.46% -0.0536 24.16% -0.0111 8.56% 0.0082 -13.55% 0.1368 -245.47% 0.1513 765.70% 
Other Non-Need -0.0020   -0.0695   -0.0608   -0.0200   -0.1082   -0.0574  
Education -0.0080 7.68% -0.0684 30.81% -0.0396 30.57% -0.0350 58.07% -0.0999 179.28% -0.0483 -244.66% 
Marital Status -0.0025 2.40% -0.0065 2.91% 0.0000 -0.01% 0.0083 -13.76% 0.0279 -50.07% 0.0057 28.98% 
 ("Living in couple" 
vs "Living alone") 
-0.0015 1.40% 0.0020 -0.92% -0.0043 3.29% -0.0066 10.88% -0.0106 19.01% 0.0068 34.39% 
Region of Residence 
(vs Urban- Nuts1 
Athens) 
-0.0075 7.16% -0.0420 18.91% -0.0289 22.35% 0.0023 -3.82% -0.0064 11.48% -0.0086 -43.34% 
Degree of 
urbanisation (vs 
Densely populated 
area) 
0.0174 -16.71% 0.0454 -20.43% 0.0119 -9.21% 0.0110 -18.28% -0.0192 34.51% -0.0130 -65.69% 
Error -0.0011 1.03% -0.0075 3.38% 0.0003 -0.21% 0.0101 -16.76% 0.0242 -43.46% 0.0221 111.67% 
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Table 5.18 Overall Decomposition of inequity in GP and specialist visits (all pattens) 
  Probability of  
any GP visit 
Total GP visits  Conditional GP 
visits 
Probability of  
specialist visit 
Total specialist 
visits 
Conditional 
specialist visits 
  CIndex   CIndex   CIndex   CIndex  CIndex  CIndex  
CI unadjusted -0.0217   -0.0827   -0.0682   0.0236  -0.0216  -0.0388  
HI index 0.0046   -0.0153   -0.0419   0.0666  0.0548  -0.0183  
  Contrib. 
Inequalit. 
% 
Contrib 
Contrib. 
Inequalit. 
% 
Contri 
Contrib. 
Inequal. 
% 
Contrib 
ContribI
nequal 
% 
Contrib 
Contrib. 
Inequal. 
% 
Contrib. 
Contrib. 
Inequalit. 
% 
Contrib 
Need -0.0262   -0.0674   -0.0263   -0.0430  -0.0928  -0.0206  
Age -0.0026 12.21% 0.0005 -0.55% -0.0008 1.12% 0.0032 13.47% 0.0112 -51.99% 0.0053 -13.72% 
Gender -0.0011 5.10% -0.0039 4.67% -0.0052 7.63% 0.0006 2.59% 0.0038 -17.60% 0.0000 0.02% 
Health Status -SAH -0.0025 11.39% -0.0292 35.27% -0.0156 22.88% -0.0122 -51.87% -0.0352 162.95% -0.0127 32.75% 
Health Status - Health 
Limitations(LTI. Gali. 
Chronic Disease) 
-0.0200 92.42% -0.0348 42.07% -0.0479 31.63% -0.0346 -146.71% -0.0562 260.02% -0.0132 33.95% 
Ln (income) -0.0034 15.86% -0.0371 44.90% -0.0664 97.43% 0.0370 156.88% -0.0293 135.42% -0.0397 102.19% 
Other Non-Need 0.0057   0.0080   0.0162   0.0295  0.0769  0.0218  
Education 0.0052 -24.02% -0.0017 2.03% -0.0002 0.31% 0.0153 64.68% 0.0464 -214.35% 0.0158 -40.61% 
Marital Status -0.0002 0.95% 0.0087 -10.53% 0.0044 -6.44% 0.0017 7.31% 0.0058 -26.60% 0.0010 -2.48% 
("Living in a couple" 
vs "Living alone") 
0.0010 -4.56% -0.0072 8.66% -0.0025 3.70% 0.0001 0.38% -0.0025 11.54% 0.0003 -0.86% 
Region of Residence 
(vs Urban- Athens) 
0.0022 -9.96% 0.0011 -1.39% 0.0072 -10.55% 0.0047 20.07% -0.0114 52.54% -0.0106 27.29% 
Degree of 
urbanisation (vs 
Densely populated 
area) 
-0.0024 11.30% 0.0069 -8.32% 0.0073 -10.76% 0.0077 32.68% 0.0386 -178.52% 0.0153 -39.42% 
Error 0.0023 -10.68% 0.0139 -16.83% 0.0084 -12.27% 0.0001 0.53% 0.0072 -33.41% -0.0003 0.88% 
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Figures 5.2 – 5.6: Decomposition of inequality – Contribution to inequity - GNHIS 
Figure 5.2 Decomposition of inequality in inpatient nights - GNHIS (excluding need 
contributions)  
 
 
Figure 5.3 Decomposition to inequity in outpatient visits- GNHIS (excluding need 
variables)   
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Figure 5.4 Contribution to inequity in the GP/Family physician visits- 
GNHIS (excluding need variables) 
 
Figure 5.5 Contribution to inequity in the specialist visits – GNHIS (excluding need 
variables) 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Contribution to inequity in the probability of dentist visits – GNHIS 
(excluding need variables) 
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5.4.4 Regression Results – Determinants of use  
 The most important determinants of health services utilization, as presented in Tables 
5.19 and 5.20, are the indicators of health care need, mainly activity limitations (GALI) 
and the self-assessed health (SAH). Older individuals are more likely to be admitted to 
hospital (inpatient and outpatient visit) and visit a GP, and less likely to visit a specialist 
and a dentist. Women are more likely to use all health care services, except having an 
inpatient admission, and making specialist visits. 
 Our findings are consistent with the results of other studies, as presented below, about 
the effect of income.  
 Income has a positive association with the probability of specialist and dentist visits 
and total and conditional number of outpatient admissions. The more advantaged 
individuals are more likely to visit a specialist and dentists and report more 
outpatient admissions than those who are less advantaged.  
  Income level has negative association with inpatient admissions (all patterns) and 
lower income earners report having total number and conditional number of inpatient 
admissions more times than the better off, revealing pro-poor inequalities. 
 However, income level has no association with the probability of inpatient 
admissions, the probability and total number of GP visits and the total number and 
conditional number of specialist visits, related with the characteristics and 
deficiencies of the Greek health care system, as discussed below. 
 Compared to lower educational level, higher level of education shows a weak negative 
association with the probability and total number of outpatient visits, but it is strongly 
positively related with the probability and total number of specialist visits and the 
probability of dentist visits. It has no association with inpatient and GP care in all 
patterns as well as with the conditional number of specialist visits. 
 Considering the effect of the other factors, degree of urbanization reveals significant 
systematic variations in health care use.  
 Compared to densely-populated areas, residents of thinly-populated areas use less 
health care services in most care types (inpatient admissions–all patterns; probability 
and total number of specialist visits; total and conditional number of GP visits). 
 Residents of thinly-populated areas are insignificantly more likely to make a GP 
visit, but once they make a visit, they report conditional number of GP visits fewer 
times than the densely-populated areas, revealing inadequate GP care services. 
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 On the other hand, residents of intermediate – populated areas are more likely to use 
most health care services, not all services.  
 Considering the effect of region of residence, compared to region of Attiki-Athens, 
residents of North Greece – Thessaloniki GR1 are significantly more likely to use and 
report more health care services than the other regions, especially conditional number of 
specialist visits. They also have less probability to make a dentist visit. 
 On the other hand, interregional and intra-regional disparities are evident among the 
densely populated areas of Athens and Thessaloniki with the thinly-populated areas of 
Central Greece and Islands for the total number of outpatient admissions, for GP and 
specialist visits. Although, residents of Central Greece and Islands – who tend to be 
worse off-are less likely to make a specialist (a GP) visit, they are more likely to report 
more conditional number of specialist visits than residents of Athens. 
 Marital status (“Being married”) has a strong positive association with reporting total 
and conditional outpatient visits, whereas household composition “Other - not in a 
couple” has a negative association with probability and total number of outpatient visit.  
 Furthermore, the respective analysis for the determinants of forgone hospital and 
specialist care -not displayed here - indicates that residents of Central Greece, 
intermediated and thinly-populated areas are insignificantly less likely to forgo hospital 
care. In terms of specialist care, thinly-populated areas and region of Islands (including 
Crete) are insignificantly more likely to report forgo specialist care, similar to the 
aforementioned results.  
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Table 5.19 Regression model analysis for  probability of inpatient admissions (nights), total and conditional number of inpatient admissions and 
probability of specialist visits, total number and conditional number of specialist visits  based on GHIS dataset 
  
Probability of 
inpatient 
admissions 
Total number  
inpatient 
admissions 
Conditional number 
of inpatient 
admissions 
Probability of 
outpatient visits 
Total number 
outpatient visits 
Conditional 
number of 
outpatient visits 
  
 
SE   SE 
 
SE 
 
SE 
 
SE   SE 
Need 
   
  
     
      
Age (80+ vs 50-59) 1.26 0.29 1.59 0.46 1.14 0.27 1.04 0.23 0.54 0.16 0.48 0.26 
Age (70-79 vs 50-59) 1.29 0.26 1.19 0.3 1.05 0.23 1.31 0.27 0.98 0.26 0.76 0.34 
Age (60-69 vs 50-59) 1.16 0.25 1.5 0.38 1.09 0.26 1.37 0.28 1.68 0.49 1.19 0.53 
Gender (male vs female) 1.63 0.23 1.81 0.34 1.58 0.22 1.03 0.14 0.91 0.18 0.76 0.23 
SAH  1.6 0.28 2.21 0.52 1.75 0.29 1.36 0.25 2.12 0.49 3.17 1.44 
Long Term Illness (Yes vs No) 0.94 0.22 1.06 0.28 1.1 0.27 1.17 0.29 1.27 0.32 0.75 0.33 
Gali (Yes) vs No  2.9 0.51 4.72 1.04 1.75 0.34 1.72 0.29 4.08 0.99 4.43 1.91 
 “2 + chronic diseases” vs "0" 1.24 0.3 1.34 0.34 1.11 0.26 1.46 0.38 0.8 0.23 0.21 0.11 
 “1 chronic disease” vs "0 " 1 0.26 1.16 0.3 1.3 0.3 1.5 0.41 1.3 0.38 0.38 0.2 
Non Need variables 
   
  
     
  
  
Income 5  0.76 0.18 0.7 0.22 0.6 0.16 0.92 0.23 1.16 0.46 0.5 0.29 
Income  4  0.98 0.21 1.14 0.33 0.8 0.19 1.26 0.27 2.64 0.8 3.33 1.43 
Income 3  0.84 0.17 0.8 0.22 0.76 0.17 0.91 0.19 1.39 0.41 2.19 1.22 
Income 2  0.86 0.16 0.53 0.12 0.54 0.12 0.89 0.18 0.93 0.24 0.87 0.4 
"More than secondary" vs "Primary" 0.97 0.25 0.87 0.29 0.84 0.21 0.6 0.16 0.38 0.14 0.57 0.28 
"Secondary" vs "Primary"  0.88 0.15 0.88 0.24 0.85 0.18 0.95 0.17 0.96 0.26 1.24 0.57 
Married vs No Married 0.87 0.25 0.84 0.35 0.93 0.29 1.45 0.63 2.41 1.03 5.38 4.57 
"Living in couple"vs "alone" 0.93 0.27 0.61 0.26 0.71 0.23 0.73 0.33 0.52 0.22 0.27 0.23 
"Other" vs  alone" 0.79 0.18 0.83 0.26 1.3 0.34 0.53 0.15 0.54 0.2 2.02 1.98 
North Greece vs Athens 1.21 0.21 1.32 0.33 1.72 0.33 1.08 0.2 1.1 0.26 1.59 0.82 
Central Greece vs Athens 1.15 0.25 0.8 0.21 0.96 0.21 0.65 0.16 0.59 0.19 0.94 0.61 
Islands +Crete vs Athens 1.38 0.36 1.3 0.43 0.94 0.19 1.32 0.29 1.62 0.48 1.33 0.72 
Thinly populated areas 0.66 0.12 0.64 0.13 0.85 0.13 0.82 0.14 0.93 0.21 0.89 0.46 
Intermediate populated areas  0.71 0.16 0.68 0.2 1.1 0.31 1.1 0.23 0.98 0.28 0.72 0.36 
Bold:p-value <0.01; bold and italics: p-value<0.05; italics:p-value<0.10  
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Table 5.20: Regression model analysis for probability of outpatient visits , total number and conditional number of outpatient visits and  
probability of GP visits, total number and conditional number of GP visits, probability of dentist visits  based on GHIS dataset 
  
Probability 
of GP visits 
Total 
number of 
GPvisits 
Conditional 
number of 
GP visits 
Probability 
of specialist 
visits 
Total 
number of 
specialist 
visits 
Conditional  
number of  
specialist 
visits 
Probability of 
dentist visits 
    SE   SE   SE   SE   SE   SE   SE 
Need                             
Age (80+ vs 50-59) 1.25 0.24 0.96 0.16 1.17 0.38 0.91 0.15 0.77 0.13 0.92 0.3 0.29 0.05 
Age (70-79 vs 50-59) 1.37 0.21 0.97 0.13 1.02 0.26 0.8 0.11 0.88 0.13 0.77 0.19 0.5 0.07 
Age (60-69 vs 50-59) 0.89 0.13 0.86 0.11 1.23 0.35 1.09 0.15 1.1 0.16 1.06 0.26 0.79 0.1 
Gender (male vs female) 0.87 0.1 0.9 0.08 0.7 0.13 1.05 0.11 1.07 0.12 0.97 0.19 0.72 0.08 
“Less than Good” (Fair. Bad, Very Bad) SAH  vs 
“Very Good & Good”  
1.19 0.16 1.5 0.18 1.76 0.43 1.56 0.2 1.67 0.23 1.34 0.33 1.11 0.14 
Long Term Illness (Yes vs No) 2.01 0.29 1.24 0.24 0.81 0.28 1.64 0.22 1.21 0.23 0.76 0.25 1.13 0.16 
Limited in General Activities Gali (Yes) vs No  1.42 0.2 1.48 0.2 1.63 0.39 2.09 0.26 1.95 0.27 1.83 0.45 0.85 0.11 
 “2 + chronic diseases” vs "0" 2.37 0.36 1.42 0.23 1 0.3 1.63 0.25 1.47 0.25 0.99 0.31 1.08 0.16 
 “1 chronic disease” vs "0 " 1.86 0.28 1.29 0.23 0.9 0.3 1.25 0.19 1.23 0.24 0.94 0.3 1 0.15 
Non Need variables                             
Income 5 1225.25€ + vs <525.50€ 1.02 0.2 0.98 0.15 0.57 0.18 1.54 0.27 0.95 0.17 0.62 0.21 1.73 0.31 
Income  4 850.33€ - 1225.24€  vs <525.50€ 1 0.19 1.01 0.15 0.73 0.21 1.4 0.23 1.05 0.17 0.66 0.19 1.11 0.19 
Income 3 683.66 - 850.32 vs <525.50€ 0.91 0.17 1.03 0.17 1.37 0.42 1.1 0.18 0.98 0.19 1.03 0.31 1.41 0.24 
Income 2 525.50 - 683.65  vs <525.50€ 1.08 0.2 1.08 0.18 1.12 0.34 1.18 0.19 0.94 0.17 0.82 0.27 1.24 0.21 
"More than secondary" vs "Primary" 1.16 0.22 0.98 0.15 1.22 0.41 1.52 0.28 1.49 0.27 1.54 0.46 2.14 0.37 
Education - "Secondary" vs "Primary"  1.21 0.17 0.89 0.11 0.75 0.2 1.14 0.15 1.09 0.14 0.86 0.2 1.41 0.18 
Married vs No Married 0.97 0.35 1.37 0.3 1.41 0.82 1.19 0.36 1.3 0.33 1.09 0.5 1.22 0.34 
"Living in couple"vs "alone" 1.28 0.45 0.77 0.17 0.73 0.43 1.03 0.31 0.86 0.22 1.02 0.47 1.02 0.28 
"Other" vs  alone" 0.86 0.17 0.85 0.14 0.88 0.33 0.98 0.17 1.07 0.2 0.94 0.3 1.01 0.18 
North Greece vs Athens 0.95 0.14 1.11 0.14 1.45 0.4 0.93 0.13 1.13 0.16 1.54 0.36 0.64 0.09 
Central Greece vs Athens 0.67 0.11 0.97 0.13 1.7 0.5 0.53 0.08 0.93 0.17 1.94 0.6 1.02 0.16 
Islands +Crete vs Athens 1.16 0.26 2.08 0.35 4.41 1.75 0.62 0.12 0.84 0.14 0.88 0.27 0.88 0.17 
Thinly populated areas 1.18   0.82 0.09 0.43 0.12 0.75 0.1 0.57 0.08 0.46 0.11 0.89 0.11 
Intermediate populated areas  0.87   0.87 0.12 0.71 0.22 1.14 0.19 1 0.14 0.97 0.26 0.92 0.16 
Bold:p-value <0.01; bold and italics: p-value<0.05; italics:p-value<0.10  
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5.5 Discussion 
The purpose of the present study was to explore income–related inequalities on utilisation 
of health care among older population aged over 50 in Greece and investigate national 
regional inequalities as one of the main contributors to the overall inequity. Our findings 
and their contribution to inequity in utilization of health care services, as well as the 
exploration of regional disparities in the utilization of health care services are summarized 
and discussed underneath, following the comparison with existing literature. 
5.5.1 Inequity in utilization of health care services by health care type 
 The most important determinants of health services utilization by the elderly are the 
indicators of health care need, mainly the presence of activity limitations (GALI) and 
the self-assessed health (SAH). Older individuals are more likely to be admitted to 
hospital (inpatient and outpatient visit) and visit a GP, and less likely to visit a specialist 
and a dentist. Women are more likely to use all health care services, except have an 
inpatient admission, and probability of specialist visits. From non need indicators, 
higher educational level explains a high percentage of inequalities mainly in specialist 
and dentist visit, except inpatient admissions; income, insurance coverage, marital status 
and household composition are also considered as important determinants of health 
services use, but not with the same strength for all the health care types. 
 Inequity in utilization of health care services by health care type 
 Significant pro-poor inequity was found for inpatient admissions, and slightly pro-
poor inequity for total number and conditional number of GP visits and conditional 
number of specialist visits. 
 Pro-rich inequity in conditional outpatient visits, in probability of specialist visit 
and dentist visit is supported by our findings.  
 Despite pro-rich inequity in the probability of specialist visit, given that the act of a 
first visit is a patient's decision, once at least one visit is included, there is pro-poor 
inequity for conditional number of specialist visits favoring the less advantaged. 
Therefore, inequity is determined by the patients' behavior and incentives and not 
by physicians' attitudes. 
 No significant income-related inequity is apparent for probability of outpatient 
admissions and probability of making GP visits.  
 Income has a large positive effect on inequity – it increases inequity in all types of 
specialist visit, in conditional number of outpatient admissions and probability of 
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dentist visits. On the other hand, it has a less pronounced effect on inequity in 
probability of inpatient admissions and GP visits, favoring the less advantaged.  
5.5.1.1 Inequity in utilization of health care services by health care type: 
Comparison with existing literature  
By attempting to compare our findings for utilization of care among older population with 
the existing evidence mainly for general population, we conclude the following. 
 
Inequity in inpatient admissions (hospital utilization) 
Overall, our findings of a pronounced pro-poor inequity in inpatient admissions, implying 
that inpatient care can meet the needs of older population, are in line with most of the 
aforementioned evidence for the general population:  
a) in line with two EU comparative studies of  Van Doorslaer, Koolman and Jones (2004) 
and Van Doorslaer & Masseria (2004) that measured income-related inequity in health 
care using ECHP data and found no income inequity after standardizing for need; and 
b) in line with almost all Greek literature that argues no-income related inequity for 
inpatient care (Kyriopoulos et al, 2002; Tountas et al, 2011; Geitona et al, 2007; Siskou 
et al 2008; Liaropoulos et al, 2008; and the urban setting study of Pappa E. and Niakas 
D., 2006). However, we need to treat these findings in caution because of limitations in 
their study design. For example, the study of Liaropoulos et al, (2008) was a telephone 
interview survey and its results should be treated in caution. 
c) in line with two urban setting cross-sectional studies: (i) the study of Pappa E. and 
Niakas D., 2006 in the broader Athens area found that hospital admissions were related 
to need and not related with SES factors; (ii) as well as the study of Sissouras A, 
Karokis A et al (1996) in Patras’ the third largest urban area, within the Phase II 
framework (1993-1997) programme of W.H.O. European Healthy Cities Network 
Survey more action-oriented, that indicated no-income related inequalities in hospital 
admissions.  
d) in line with a comparative study of Santos-Eggimann B. et al, 2005 based on SHARE 
Wave 1 survey for older population including Greece, who explored the determinants of 
utilization of health care and found no income association with inpatient admissions. 
e) On the other hand, our finding is contradictory to: (i) the study of Masseria C., 
Koolman X., Van Doorslaer E., 2004 that is a pooled analysis of ECHP from 1994-1998 
in Greece and found significant pro rich inequity for inpatient care relevant to non-
elective care (ii) the study of Siskou et al (2008) to analyze private health payments by 
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provider and type of service, which showed pro-rich inequity for the total number of 
private inpatient admissions. (iii) A regional cross-sectional study in Thessaly in 2006 
of Lahana E. et al (2011) that indicates pro-rich inpatient care, but this study has a small 
sample and its findings are not easily acceptable. (iv) Considering the elderly evidence: 
the cross-sectional studies of Majo M. C., van Soest A. (2012); Allin S. & Masseria C. 
(2006)  based on SHARE survey for elderly which examined the relationship between 
income and health care utilization across countries and Allin S., Masseria C. and 
Mossialos E. (2009) that explore inequalities in use of health care by wealth versus  
income, and found slightly pro-rich inpatient care. 
 
Inequity in outpatient visit  
Our finding of no significant income-related inequity in the probability of outpatient visits 
mainly due to a medical symptom, but once at least one visit is included as a medical 
decision there is pro-rich inequity for conditional number of outpatient visits is partly 
compatible with the following evidence mainly for general population. 
a) Is in line with: (i) the results of the urban-setting study in Athens for the general 
population, that doesn’t find any income association  for outpatient care (Pappa E. & 
Niakas D., 2006); (ii) the results of a study exclusively for elderly of Majo M. & Van 
Soest A. (2012) based on SHARE data that outpatient care does not increase with 
income. 
b) is partly compatible with two studies evaluating cases treated in the ED of a Greek 
general hospital -that reported increased outpatient visits not associated with income - 
and revealed that almost one in three patients in specific surgical groups could have 
been managed by a GP, as could 40% of orthopaedic cases (Marinos et al., 2009; 
Vasileiou et al., 2009); and two other Greek studies that illustrate no association of 
patients’ SES characteristics with informal payments in public hospitals for inpatient or 
outpatient admissions (Siskou et al, 2008; Liaropoulos et al, 2008).  
c) On the other hand, our finding is contradictory to: (i) the urban setting study of 
Sissouras A, Karokis A et al (1996) in Patras’ the third largest urban area, within the 
Phase II framework (1993-1997) programme of W.H.O. European Healthy Cities 
Network Survey, that indicated more conditional outpatient visits from those in lower 
SES (pro poor) – mainly for having diagnostic tests and medication prescribing. The 
fact that study was conducted before the NHS-ESY reforms of 2001 is important for 
considering the dynamics of inequalities in health care use. 
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Inequity in GP care use 
For GP visits our findings indicate that there is a weak in magnitude consistent pro-poor 
inequity. In particular, there is almost no inequity (slightly pro –rich) for the probability of 
making a GP visit as a patient's decision for the first GP visit, indicating that all individuals 
have the same probability to make a GP visit, irrespective of their income, but for the 
subsequent GP visits (conditional number of visits), there is pro-poor inequity for total 
number of GP visits and a more pronounced pro-poor inequality for the conditional 
number of GP visits, as a medical decision. Moreover, we should note that in Greece, 
given that GPs are few, individuals usually refer to different specialists for a first opinion 
for their health problems according to their need, but none of them bear responsibility for 
the patient as a whole. This issue explains the parallel gradient of patient's decision for the 
first visit to specialist (pro-rich probability of visit) and GP visit (no inequity) which turns 
to pro-poor subsequent specialist and GP visits as a medical decision (pro-poor conditional 
number of visits). Moreover, in some cases, people consult a single provider – specialist 
(or fewer GPs at HCCs) regularly and they consider him as their “personal” or “family” 
doctor. Therefore, in reality the question of GP or Family (or EOPYY SHIF) physician 
visit may be answered as a specialist visit. There are difficulties, thus, in comparing 
inequity results for specialists versus GP visits. Our findings are in line with existing 
evidence for general and elderly population: 
(a) The finding in our study is in line with two regional cross-sectional studies: (i) an 
urban setting study of Sissouras A, Karokis A et al (1996) in the third largest urban 
area of Patras’, within the Phase II framework (1993-1997) programme of W.H.O. 
European Healthy Cities Network Survey, that indicated more conditional SHIF visits 
from those in lower SES – almost no inequity. (ii) the regional study of Pappa E. and 
Niakas D. (2006) in the broader Athens area found that SHIF visits are related to pro 
poor SES.  
(b) is comparable with nationwide studies: (i) a study of Van Doorslaer et al (2004; 2002) 
using ECHP data of  1996 for Greece that found slightly pro-rich inequity for the 
probability of GP visit; (ii)  with a recent comparative study based on ECHP data 
concluded that in Greece higher SES users report average total number of GP and 
specialist visits three times larger than that of the lower SES users (i.e. predicted total 
number of GP users is 1:3.06) (Bago d’Uvaa T. & Jones A., 2009); (iii) another study 
that finds pro-rich family physician visit but once family physicians are not established 
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- due to inexistence of GPs- individuals may consider a specialist as their “personal” 
or “family” doctor. Thus, the results should be treated in caution (Tountas et al, 2011).  
(c) Is in line with a study exclusively for elderly(Allin S. & Masseria C., 2006) based on 
SHARE Wave1 data that GP visits are positively associated with income.  
(d) On the other hand, this finding is contradictory to: (i) few EU comparative studies 
including Greece of Bago d’Uvaa T., et al (2009, 2007); Bago d’Uvaa T. & Jones A. 
(2009) that made a pooled analysis for 1994-2001 using ECHP data for Greece; (ii) the 
studies of Van Doorslaer et al, 2006; and  Van Doorslaer & Masseria (2004) using 
data of the ECHP 2000 for Greece, and found pro-poor inequity for the probability of 
GP visit. 
(e) It is contradictory with cross-sectional nationwide studies: (i) a recent study of Zavras 
D et al, (2014) that examined determinants of PHC services in Greece during 2006 
using the methodology of the WHO (Üstün et al., 2001) and found that people with 
lower income report increased PHC services; (ii) another mail study conducted in 
Greece 2001 - 2002 of Geitona et al, (2007) that examined the determinants of PHC 
and hospital care utilization and found that the number of PHC visits is affected by 
income only for poor population, whereas it is a mail study with significant limitations 
on design method. 
(f) Is contradictory with a study exclusively for elderly of Majo M. & Van Soest A. 
(2012) based on SHARE Wave1 data that GP visits reveal pro-poor income related 
inequity. 
 
Inequity in specialist care use  
For specialist visit, a parallel gradient  – tendency  with GP visits is apparent. There is 
significant pro-rich inequity in the probability of the first specialist visit, but once at least 
one visit is included, there is a less pronounced pro-rich inequality for the total number of 
specialist visits and pro-poor inequity for conditional number of specialist visits favoring 
the poor, with important policy implications. Pro-rich horizontal inequity exists in the 
access to the first visit, but not in the subsequent visits indicated by the physician. Given 
that the act of a first visit is a patient's decision, while subsequent visits are a medical 
decision, this result suggests that inequity is determined by the patients' behavior and 
incentives and not by physicians' attitudes.  
(a) Overall, our findings are in line with little evidence for the general and elderly 
population:  
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(i) in line with the older cross-sectional nationwide survey study of Zavras D et al, 
(2014) that examined determinants of PHC services in Greece during 2006 using 
the methodology of the WHO (Üstün et al., 2001) and found increased PHC 
services by pro- lower income groups. 
(ii) in line with another cross-sectional nationwide mail survey conducted in Greece 
2001 - 2002 of Geitona et al, (2007) that examined the determinants of PHC and 
hospital care utilization and found that the number of PHC visits is affected by 
income only for poor population, whereas it is a mail study with significant 
limitations on design method. 
(iii) In line with few nationwide studies with  evidence of no association of 
individuals’ socioeconomic characteristics with specialist care as an inpatient or 
outpatient  patient for the general population (Tountas et al, 2011); and those that 
deal with private health expenditure and informal payments (Siskou et al, 2008; 
Liaropoulos et al, 2008). 
(iv) The nationwide Greek study concluded that specialist visit is equally distributed 
among people in lower socioeconomic status (SES) than those in middle SES 
(Tountas et al, 2011). Similarly, the cross-sectional regional study of Pappa E. and 
Niakas D., 2006 in the broader Athens area found that for specialist visits almost no 
(slightly pro rich) socio-economic factor was related; (iv) a study exclusively for 
elderly of Majo M. & Van Soest A. (2012) based on SHARE data that no clear 
association with SES is found. 
(b) On the other hand, our finding is contradictory to:  
(i) is contradictory to four EU comparative studies including Greece of Van 
Doorslaer, Koolman and Jones (2004) and Van Doorslaer, Koolman and Puffer 
(2002) that measured income-related inequity in specialist care in 1996; Bago 
d’Uvaa T. & Jones A.(2009) and Bago d’Uvaa T. et al (2009) that made a pooled 
analysis for 1994-2001 using data of the ECHP for Greece and found significant 
pro-rich inequity for the probability of specialist visit. 
(ii) Is contradictory to Greek literature of Tountas et al, 2011; and Mergoupis et al, 
2003; Kyriopoulos et al, 2002 that argue pro-rich inequity for specialist visits. 
Similarly, according to nationwide telephone survey of Souliotis et al (2016) for 
informal payments in health care in 2012, it seems that more frequent visits to 
private health services (mainly PHC) are reported by persons with higher SES 
profile. 
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(iii) Is contradictory to urban settings literature of regional cross-sectional study in 
Thessaly in 2006 of Lahana E. et al (2011) for determinants of utilisation that 
indicates pro-rich specialist care, similar with the cross-sectional study of 
Sissouras A, Karokis A et al (1996) in Patras’ the third largest urban area, within 
the Phase II framework (1993-1997) programme of W.H.O. European Healthy 
Cities Network Survey, that indicated pro-rich inequalities in specialist visits.   
(iv) Is contradictory to studies for elderly of Allin S. & Masseria C., 2006 based on 
SHARE data and found slightly pro-rich inequity, whereas Allin S. et al, 2009 
based on SHARE wave 1 found that in Greece wealth-related difference in 
physician visits was greater than income differences.   
 
Inequity in dentist utilization 
Significant pro-rich inequity exists in probability of making a dentist visit, similar with the 
other datasets of the thesis.  
(a) Our findings that higher income has been positively associated with dental use as 
expected, are in compliance with other studies: (i) for the general population that 
identify higher dentist and dental care use by individuals in high SES (Koletsi-Kounari 
H. et al, 2011; Koletsi-Kounari H. et al, 2007; Zavras D. et al, 2004; Souliotis K. et al, 
2016; Van Doorslaer E. & Masseria C., 2004; Kyriopoulos et al, 2002) (ii) A study 
that explored determinants of older Greek adults' oral health patterns found that that 
cost and no disease awareness were the most frequently mentioned barriers to regular 
dental visits (Naka O, Anastassiadou V, 2012) (iii) for the elderly (Majo M. & Van 
Soest A., 2012; Egimann S. et al, 2005; Allin S. & Mossialos, 2004 based on SHARE 
data that identify the significant effect of income in dentist and dental care use; and the 
study of Listl S. (2011) based on SHARE Wave 2 data that explored income 
inequalities in dental care use and preventive treatment by 50+ and found significant 
pro-rich inequity in dental care in Greece, and higher inequalities for preventive 
treatment among retired individuals. (iv) Moreover, a recent study of Listl, S (2012)  
based on life-course data from SHARE (waves 1 to 3) that identified pro-higher 
education inequalities in regular dental attendance throughout the life-course and 
relatively inelastic until age yrs 65+ but not thereafter, due to age-related inequality 
decline in Greece. 
(b) Our finding is contradictory only to (i) a Greek study (Siskou et al, 2008) that found 
no association of income with dental care use. (ii) few studies that indicate lower 
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levels of oral health associated with those in lower income and lower SES 
(Yfantopoulos et al., 2014; Kyriopoulos et al, 2002).  
5.5.1.2 Inequity in utilization of health care services by health care type: 
Contribution to literature - new evidence and discussion 
The findings of this first national health survey GNHIS contributes to the assessment of the 
current situation relevant to inequalities in health care utilization among the older 
population in the country. We can see what is likely to work in its context before mapping 
specific next steps that will be most appropriate. Inequalities in use among individuals are 
partly associated with national health policies that generally have not kept pace (WHO, 
2015; WHO –CSDH, 2013). Given the health dynamics of older age, it might be expected 
that increasing age would be associated with increased health-care utilization for less –
advantaged population, given that the burden of disease is greater in low-resource settings. 
However, evidence by WHO (2015) and WHO– CSDH (2013) indicates that there is a 
disconnect between health-care need and health-care utilization in disadvantaged 
subgroups of older people in high-income countries. Our findings -consistent with the 
aforementioned evidence- show that not only age and chronic conditions determine health 
care use, but the socioeconomic status is a key determinant. Although the need for health 
care is likely to be higher among disadvantaged individuals, we found that among older 
adults with equal levels of need, those in greatest need may be those who use specialist and 
dentist health services least. However, once at least one visit is included as a medical 
decision, there is pro-poor inequity for conditional number of specialist visits favoring the 
less advantaged, and pro-rich inequity for conditional outpatient visits. Inequity is 
determined by the patients' behavior and incentives and not by physicians' attitudes. Thus, 
although population ageing is likely to be associated with increasing health needs, the 
association with the demand for, and utilization of health services is less clear-cut. In all 
countries, one key component of a health-systems response to population ageing must 
therefore be to breakdown the barriers that limit health-care utilization by the older people 
who need it. Under this framework, our study contributes to existing literature by 
introducing more sophisticated statistical methodology in order to examine inequalities in 
the patterns of utilization among the elderly, that likely result from barriers to access due to 
common gaps in the current system and also to explore challenges to reduce these 
inequalities. In particular, our findings of pro-poor inequity in probability of inpatient care 
seem to ensure comprehensive coverage of older population under the framework of the 
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egalitarian principle of Greek NHS-ESY that health is a social good and that all citizens, 
irrespective of their SES or location of residence, should have equal rights to access to 
healthcare services. They imply that the use of inpatient care in the NHS is distributed 
according to need. Our finding highlights the absence of barriers for inpatient admissions 
for older population in compliance with the fundamental policy goal of universal health 
coverage (UHC) and the objectives of effective coverage and health system performance, 
as introduced by the WHO Health Report 2010 and WHO-CSDH (2013), that all people 
obtain the health services they need (i.e. equity in service use relative to need), as a first 
step towards a more equitable health care system. Our data do not distinguish between 
public and private inpatient admissions, though there is evidence that, despite the rapid 
growth of the private sector during the last decade, public hospitals are used more 
frequently than private hospitals (Economou C., 2010). Moreover, the accessible inpatient 
admission for older population is in compliance with the Greek evidence that evaluated the 
relative efficiency of hospital care in the NHS-ESY and found efficiency gains in the 
performance mainly of medium (250 to 400 beds) in size hospitals in urban areas versus 
larger general hospitals - in almost all regions except 6th YPE and 7th YPE for medium 
size hospitals, and 2
nd
 YPE for small hospitals, (Prezerakos P., 1999; Polyzos N., 2002; 
NSPH, 2012; Polyzos. N, 2013), except the large hospitals of the 2
nd 
YPE (Piraeus & 
Aegean Islands) and 4
th
 YPE (Central & East Macedonia & Thrace) (Polyzos, 2013; 
NSPH, 2012). Similarly, Xenos P., NektariosM, ConstantopoulosA, Yfantopoulos J (2016) 
more recently, examined the efficiency of 112 Greek public hospitals in 2009 by applying 
two models of DEA, augmented by bootstrapping techniques in the efficiency and bias-
corrected efficiency scores. Their results show that the majority of the hospitals (30.4%) 
score between 0.51 and 0.7, while less than a quarter (23.2%) are fully efficient, indicating 
that, despite the difficulties in the healthcare sector in Greece, certain public hospitals are 
leading the way to high productivity and efficiency, whereas their “best practices” should 
be adapted by the less productive hospitals that were almost 10% of hospitals as totally 
inefficient.  
Furthermore, our findings of pro-rich inequity in probability of specialist and slightly pro 
rich in the probability of GP visits and pro rich conditional outpatient visits reveal the 
patients’ behavior under the inadequate and inefficient way that PHC (GP care, outpatient 
visits, and probability of specialist visits) is provided in the NHS-ESY. They are also in 
accordance with regional variations - as we present below - in PHC for thinly populated 
areas and Central favoring the better off. They indicate that among older adults with equal 
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levels of need, those in greatest need (pro-poor) may be those who are likely to use 
specialist and GP health services least. These findings reveal gaps in coverage and 
provision in PHC services and undermine the egalitarian principle of NHS-ESY 
established since 1983 of equity in health care delivery: equity of access to available care 
and equality of utilization for equal need – that implies equal entitlements (Whitehead, 
1991; Mooney 1983 &1986); as well as they undermine the fundamental policy goal of 
universal health coverage (UHC). The PHC is provided via multiple subsystems in a 
fragmented - bureaucratic way with no coordination and a physician-driven organizational 
structure. As several authors point out, despite the fact that HCCs and PEDY- EOPYY 
units (ex IKA) were established in order to provide a wide range of PHC services, in 
practice, most of the times they result in inefficient, low quality services and problematic 
operation, due to a number of weaknesses. Given these weaknesses, older population are 
“forced” to make a private physician visit, or to travel to visit private providers in urban 
areas or to visit the outpatient facilities of NHS-ESY hospitals as a first PHC contact, 
making their demand pressure worse resulting most times in high OOP and informal 
payments. This causes interregional patients’ flow seeking for care and financial handicaps 
for the vulnerable populations- who are unable to pay- and increases access inequity.  
In addition, our findings of initial pro-rich inequity in the probability of specialist visit as 
patient's decision for the first visit, which turns to pro poor conditional number of 
specialist visits for the subsequent visits as a medical decision reveal the “enforcement” of 
older population by the inadequate PHC system, to make a private physician visit, or result 
in interregional patients’ flow seeking for care to private providers in urban areas or to 
NHS-ESY hospitals as a first PHC contact, that increases access inequity.  
This finding of pro-poor conditional specialist visits that is in parallel with pro-poor 
conditional GP visits, relevant with the fragmented PHC system that is characterized by 
the lack of GPs in HCCs and other PHC centres (EOPYY-PEDI or ex IKA units) and the 
oversupply of specialists, result in the specialist visits to correspond to GP visits. 
Therefore, among the elderly with equal need, the less advantaged are more likely to make 
a specialist private visit with high OOPPs or have equal probability to visit a GP, 
irrespective of their income level, with important financial handicaps implications. This 
result is also related with the high OOP expenses that older people face for the PHC 
outpatient and private specialists’ visit, as revealed in the other datasets.  
Moreover, the finding of significant pro-rich dental care is related to the limited coverage 
of dental care in the public sector and the fragmented way which is provided in NHS-ESY 
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and SHIFs facilities, similar to the other datasets and the existing literature (Koletsi-
Kounari H. et al, 2011; Koletsi-Kounari H. et al, 2007; Zavras D. et al, 2004; Souliotis K. 
et al, 2016; Yfantopoulos et al., 2014; Van Doorslaer E. & Masseria C., 2004; Kyriopoulos 
et al, 2002; Majo M. & Van Soest A., 2012; Egimann S. et al, 2005; Allin S. & Mossialos, 
2004). The poor social health insurance (SHI) coverage of dental care, in combination with 
the oversupply of private dentists
60
 leads to extended use of private dental care sector with 
high expenditure, especially OOP and informal payments (Koletsi-Kounari H. et al, 2011; 
Siskou et al, 2008). This relates to the fact that, in reality, the Greek population is 
uninsured for oral health services resulting in regressive interregional variations with 
financial barrier for accessing dental services favoring the residents of rural areas that have 
to travel to seek private dental visits at urban areas (Koletsi-Kounari H. et al, 2007; Siskou 
et al, 2008). As many authors point out dental provision, the private care and OOP 
payments by patients act as “a substitute for the gaps in insurance coverage of dental 
treatment” (Economou, 2010 p.133; Mossialos et al, 2005). 
Under this framework of strong inequalities and gaps in PHC services that have been 
worsened during the deep structural and multifaceted crisis that Greece faces since 2010, 
the Greek government has started implementing reforms in health care system in order to 
protect accessibility to health care for vulnerable groups and reduce public health 
expenditure. Initially, the unification of SHIFunds (IKA, OGA, OAEE, OPAD) in one 
scheme (EOPYY) that was established in 2011 as a sole purchaser of health services with 
the Law 3918/2011 implementing risk-pooling, as well as providing a common basic 
package of health-care services in EOPYY, is in the right direction though there are still 
differences in eligibility conditions. However, in the current austerity-driven context, the 
common package was accompanied by reductions in benefits and by increases in 
copayments and user charges for visits to HCCs and hospital outpatient departments, 
pharmaceuticals and laboratory tests, that undermine equity in utilization. Following, in 
order to close the gap in coverage created by the crisis, two ministerial decisions in 2014 
and a recent Law 4368/2016 were introduced and only extended coverage of prescription 
drugs and inpatient care to the uninsured (estimated, between 1.5 and 2.5 million people 
due to unemployment) – including vulnerable elderly. Therefore, it seems that the 
Government developed specific mechanisms to support equitable access to needed services 
for vulnerable groups initially limited, slow and ineffective (Economou et al. 2015). 
                                                          
60
 Compared to other OECD countries, Greece has the highest number (1.27) of dentists per 1000 inhabitants (OECD, 
2009) and in the same time there are pronounced imbalances in the geographical distribution of dentists,  with 
approximately 50% of all dentists employed in the greater Athens area. 
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However, to meet the needs of ageing populations and eliminate inequalities in PHC, 
significant changes are required complementary, in the way the existing NHS-ESY PHC 
system is structured and PHC is delivered, as following.  
 New PHC services and approaches will need to be developed in these settings. The 
existing PHC services will have to be redesigned to deliver the comprehensive and 
coordinated care that has been shown to be more appropriate and more effective.  
 The likely transformation of the PHC health system needs to move away from 
disease-based curative models and towards the provision of older-person- centred 
and integrated care. 
 PHC services have to be better integrated between levels and across specialist 
groupings. Establishment of LTC – with the integration of health and social care 
services, based on ensuring equitable access to care services will provide a real 
safety net for older people– and their families and seems to be crucial. 
 In order to address the new policies and programmes, the governments require to 
make efforts to reach groups that are particularly disadvantaged.  
 The starting point will need to assess health policies and programmes in relation to 
inequalities, from inputs to outcomes, and gauging to what extent these are fair or 
unfair. 
  It is important also to put older people at the centre of health care, including them as 
active participants in care planning and in managing inequalities in health care.  
Although these actions will inevitably require resources, as WHO (2015) highlights 
“they are likely to be a sound investment in society’s future”.  
5.5.2 Regional Variances in health care use:  Contribution to inequalities in health 
care use  
Our findings reveal not only inter-regional disparities but also intra-regional 
disparities in most health care types, summarized, as following:  
(i) Inequalities are apparent for most of health care types except the probability of GP 
visits, mainly due to the strong pro-rich (positive) effect of thinly - populated areas.  
(ii) Residents of thinly-populated areas face pro-rich inequalities for almost all health 
care types, except pro-poor inequity in probability of GP visits. 
(iii) Compared to densely-populated areas and Athens region, thinly populated areas and 
Central Greece face disparities in PHC (GP care, outpatient visits, and probability of 
specialist visits) favoring the better off, indicating the inadequate provision of 
primary care in residents of thinly-populated areas. 
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(iv) Pro-rich inequity is apparent in the probability of specialist visits as patient's decision 
for the first visit for all areas and regions favoring the better off, which turns to pro 
poor conditional number of specialist visits for the subsequent visits as a medical 
decision for older residents of North Greece, Central Greece and intermediate-
populated areas who report more specialist visits than those of the Athens residents 
and densely-populated areas and reduce inequity in favor of worse off, resulting in 
pro-poor inequity for conditional number of specialist visits.  
(v) Regional disparities are not apparent in inpatient admissions, except slightly in 
Islands. 
(vi) Inequalities are not apparent in North Greece in most health care types, favoring the 
worse off, apart from probability of specialist and dentist visits. 
5.5.2.1 Regional Variances in health care use: Comparison with existing literature  
Despite the fact that existing literature for regional variations in health care use in Greece 
concerns only general population we attempt to compare it with our findings for utilization 
of care among older population, as following. Most of our findings are in line with the 
existing evidence that reveals significant regional disparities in health care use favouring 
the residents of rural regions- who are less advantaged. 
(a) Our finding (i) to (iii) are in line with the evidence that the residents of rural regions 
use- in total - fewer health care services (PHC, outpatient and secondary) comparing to 
urban areas (Zavras D et al, 2014; Tountas Y et al, 2011; Oikonomou N., Tountas Y, 
2011; Lahana E et al, 2011; Marinos G et al, 2009); as well as in line with evidence of 
geographical proximity barrier to PHC (including access barrier to SHIFs’ physicians 
and to NHS rural HCCs) (Oikonomidou E. et al, 2010; Alber & Kohler, 2004); in line 
with interregional variations in dental services favoring the residents of rural areas that 
have to travel to seek private dental visits at urban areas (Koletsi-Kounari H. et al, 
2007; Siskou et al, 2008); use less hospital care (Economou C, 2015; Brokalaki et al., 
2011; Eurofound, 2012; Tountas et al, 2011; Kentikelenis et al, 2011; Anderson, 2004; 
Masseria C. et al, 2004;). 
(b) Our finding (ii) that the residents of thinly-populated areas face pro-poor inequalities 
in the probability of GP visits compared to densely-populated areas is in line with the 
study of Geitona et al, (2007) that indicated increased use of GPs by rural population 
(specifically residents of Central Greece and Epirus); it is in line with Van Doorslaer, 
Koolman and Puffer (2002) that indicate slightly pro-poor probability of GP visits 
after standardizing for regional utilization; and it is also contradictory to Oikonomidou 
 
 
253 
 
E. et al, (2010) that reveal geographical proximity as a barrier for old patients to 
receive care by the ESY rural HCCs and rural settings – (practices) that result in 
increased number of GP home visits to older patients in thinly populated areas; It is 
also contradictory to evidence of geographical proximity barrier in access to PHC 
(Economou C, 2015; Brokalaki et al., 2011; Eurofound, 2012; Kentikelenis et al, 
2011; Anderson, 2004; Masseria C. et al, 2004;). 
(c) Our findings (iii) and (iv) that rural residents of thinly and intermediate-populated 
areas face pro-rich inequalities in the probability of specialist visits as patient's 
decision for the first visit, which turns to pro poor conditional number of specialist 
visits for the subsequent visits as a medical decision, are in line with evidence that 
the residents of rural regions report increased utilization of SHIF physicians and 
private specialists’ consultations, accessed in bigger urban centres (Tountas et al, 
2011; Oikonomou N., Tountas Y, 2011; Lahana E et al, 2011; Vadla D. et al, 2011; 
Siskou et al, 2008; Pappa, E. and Niakas, D.,2006, Geitona 2007; Van Doorslaer, 
Koolman & Pufffer,  2002; Van Doorslaer and Masseria C.,2004). Moreover, our 
finding (iv) of pro-poor inequity for the total and conditional number of specialist 
visits favoring the residents of North Greece, Central Greece and intermediate-
populated areas is in line with Geitona et al, (2007) that found increased use of PHC 
(GPs and specialists) by rural population of Central Greece and Epirus.  
(d) Our finding (v) that regional disparities are not apparent in inpatient admissions 
among residents of different regions is in line with restricted evidence in local and 
nationwide studies where inpatient care is related to health needs and not to 
socioeconomic factors (Pappa E. and Niakas D., 2006; Tountas et al, 2011; 
Kyriopoulos et al, 2002). However, it is contradictory to the evidence of pro-rich 
regional inpatient admissions favoring the residents of the urban regions (Van 
Doorslaer and Masseria, 2004; Lahana E et al, 2011 with a local study). It is also 
contradictory to the evidence of geographical proximity barrier in access to inpatient 
care (Economou C, 2015; Brokalaki et al., 2011; Eurofound, 2012; Kentikelenis et al, 
2011; Anderson, 2004; Masseria C. et al, 2004;). 
5.5.2.2 Regional Variances in health care use: Contribution to literature - new 
evidence and discussion 
Our findings have a major contribution to new evidence of regional disparities in inequity 
in use of health care and the contribution of income among the older population in Greece. 
This issue has to be interpreted in conjunction with the urban-rural differences. 
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Understanding what drives geographic variation in utilization has important implications 
for policy, by reorganizing existing services to meet health care objectives, especially for 
the older population. 
First of all, our finding of slight variation in inpatient care among regions, indicate the 
comprehensive inpatient (secondary and tertiary) care provided to the entire population 
through the network of ESY public hospitals that is in compliance with Greek studies that 
applied the data envelope analyses (DEA) method to evaluate hospital’s performance and 
demonstrated efficient operation of small and medium in size hospitals (250 to 400 beds) 
in urban areas - versus larger general hospitals in the capital Athens (2nd YPE) (Prezerakos 
P., 1999; Polyzos N., 2002; NSPH, 2012; Polyzos. N, 2013; NSPH, 2012; Xenos P. et al, 
2016). According to a recent study of Xenos P., Nektarios M, ConstantopoulosA, 
Yfantopoulos J (2016) that examined the efficiency of 112 Greek public hospitals in 2009 
by applying two models of DEA found that the majority of the hospitals (30.4%) score 
between 0.51 and 0.7, while less than a quarter (23.2%) are fully efficient, indicating that, 
despite the difficulties in the healthcare sector in Greece, certain public hospitals are 
leading the way to high productivity and efficiency. The finding of non-apparent regional 
disparities in inpatient admissions is important from policy view. On the other hand, the 
fact that our findings signal either under-utilisation (Central Greece, Islands and the thinly-
populated areas mainly for PHC services), or over-utilisation (mainly North Greece) of 
care, raises questions about the issues of equity, efficiency and the overall health system 
performance. Similarly, the findings of strong pro-rich (positive) effect of thinly populated 
areas- that is less advantaged - for most health care types except the probability of GP visit, 
as well as the pro-poor inequity in conditional specialist visits mainly accessed in urban 
areas related with OOP payments, have important implications for policy making in the 
growth and provision of PHC system in rural and remote areas.  
Overall, the evidence in our study suggests that geographic differences in health care use 
are not consistent with differences in need or patient preferences. Geographic variations in 
health care are explained by both demand and supply-side factors. On the demand side, 
several studies have showed the influence of socio-economic factors to under-use of 
services – ie. strong correlation not only with disease burden but with social deprivation of 
the residents of these regions (OECD 2014; Majeed et al., 2000). In particular, Central 
Greece, Islands, and the thinly-populated areas that report the highest inequalities and 
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disparities in PHC and specialist care account for the poorest regions in Greece
61
 with the 
lowest regional GDP per capita and the highest at-risk-of poverty indicator (AROPE) for 
older population
62
 at NUTS1 level since 2004 till 2015, as in Chapter three (ELSTAT, 
2016). On supply side, it points to the fact that there is unmet need in regions of low 
activity - explained by unequal regional allocation of health infrastructure (ie the number 
of hospital beds per capita indicator) or variations in medical practices (number of 
physicians per capita or number of nurses per capita), as presented at Chapter three. In 
particular, Central Greece, Islands, and the thinly-populated areas that report the highest 
inequalities in PHC and specialist care, have the lowest density in doctors and nurses
63
,
64
 
and consist the poorest regions in Greece with highly mountainous and isolated areas, 
whereas the majority of physicians are concentrated in the two most crowded regions of 
the country (49.3%) in Attika/Athens - the capital and 16.5% in Central Macedonia/ 
Thessaloniki- North Greece that report the lowest inequity in specialist visits. Despite the 
fact that health centers (HCCs) have generally increased in rural areas during the last 
decades, PHC in rural areas is highly deficient because of inadequate staffing (mainly 
GPs), old-fashioned and useless biomedical technology and facilities as well as lack of 
financial and managerial autonomy. This maldistribution is explained by the inefficient 
allocation of resources on the basis of historical precedent and political negotiation and not 
according to health care need. This result in a failure to cover the needs of the population 
in remote areas as well as to develop an integrated PHC network (Gibson et al., 2013; 
Papatheodorou & Moysidou, 2011). Thus, it’s very difficult for the people of these areas-
especially the elderly with greater concentration in rural areas - to have access to adequate 
NHS primary care, “forcing” them to seek private care, which may be expensive. As a 
consequence, we observe high percentages of uncontrollable interregional flows of elderly 
patients to urban areas such as to Athens or to areas with university hospitals, despite 
                                                          
61 The poorest regions with the lowest regional GDP per capita are Epirus, Western Greece and Thessaly and those with 
the lowest Gross Value Added are North Aegean, Epirus and Ionian Islands and East Macedonia & Thrace, according 
to the National Accounts by the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT, 2014).  
62 According to the trends of regional variations of at-risk-of poverty indicator (AROPE) for older population at NUTS1 
level from 2004-2015, the period prior crisis in 2004, the highest poverty is recorded at North Greece and Central 
Greece, whereas in 2015 the highest poverty is noted at Central Greece and the Aegean Islands (& Crete Island). 
63 About regional allocation of physicians, the regions with the lowest density in doctors (Western Macedonia, Ionian 
Islands and North Aegean Islands) less than half of the national average (614.4 doctors). Western Macedonia has 4.5 
lower density of physicians than the national average. About the allocation of nurses, Central Greece with the lowest 
density in nurses (144) has 0.40 nurses of the national average of 354 nurses. 
64 According to Greek Statistics Authority for 2007, the concentration of doctors in the area of greater Athens (Attica) is 
remarkable (7.3 physicians per 1.000 inhabitants), the second in concentration area is Central Macedonia (5.3), Crete 
has 5.4 physicians, whereas the regions of Central Greece (2.7), Western Macedonia (3.2) and the South Aegean 
Islands (3.2) that display the largest scarcities (Economou, 2010). 
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possible transportation problems
65
 (“Health and Welfare Map” – NSPH, 2011). In this 
case, our findings indicate that the Greek health system is not achieving the level of 
performance it should, mainly for PHC, whereas it is not achieving its commitment to 
equity that is at the heart of the universal health coverage (UHC) that has been adopted by 
the Greek NHS – ESY since 1983.  
As WHO-CSDH (2013) points out, in terms of action on the social determinants of 
inequities in health care, many countries are currently reviewing their national and local 
development plans and evaluating or reforming health policies and services with the aim of 
incentivizing actions on social determinants and eliminating geographical and regional 
disparities in health care use through quality improvement in primary care. Given that the 
Greek NHS-ESY is in ongoing reform, the evidence derived by our study -targeting groups 
like the older population -could be included as part of routine intelligence systems to 
inform analysis, reporting and implementation of action, in a regional and multicounty 
framework. These findings give the opportunity for reorganization of existing services or 
for re-direction of resources to meet health care or social objectives related to regional and 
local characteristics, especially for the older population.  
 The health system requires to move away from disease-based curative models and move 
towards the provision of older-person- centred and integrated care, redesigned in a 
subnational level that has been shown to be more effective. 
 The well establishment of LTC – with the integration of health and social care services 
in a local level, will provide a real safety net for older people that seems to be crucial to 
ensure equity in access to health services. 
 The starting point will need to assess health policies and programmes in relation to 
inequalities, from inputs to outcomes, and gauging to what extent these are fair or unfair 
in a local level, by putting older people at the centre of health care, including them as 
active participants in care planning and in managing inequalities in health care 
according to the regional and local needs.  
 Moreover, in order the Government to respond to the issue of undersupply of medical 
staff in thinly-populated areas, given the absence of adequate incentives for staffing, 
should perform a comprehensive regional development policy that aims to distribute 
physicians more evenly across regions.  
                                                          
65
 According to the “Health and Welfare Map” data as estimated by National School of Public Health in 2011, patients 
prefer to travel from rural and isolated areas (ie mountainous as in poor regions of Epirus, Central Greece and islands) 
to urban areas such as to Athens (33.2%) or to areas with large university hospitals (in Thessaloniki 42.6% or in 
Ioannina- Epirus 66.3%) offering expensive and high-technology services or visiting private providers (NSPH, 2012). 
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 First policy responses need to take into account the reasons physicians choose to 
locate in certain regions (organization of service delivery, the income potential and 
working conditions of physicians, the prestige and recognition they derive and finally 
the origin of doctors), according to Ono T. et al (2014) suggestion. 
 Then, strategies that could develop for even human resource distribution, include:  
 to target future physicians (increasing the number of qualified physicians who 
are interested in practice in underserved regions);  
 to target current physicians (via suitable incentive system with not only financial 
incentives but also suitable regulatory measures);  
 to do with less (through expansion of involvement by non-physician providers or 
by service delivery innovations using technology - telemedicine).  
5.6 Conclusion 
The purpose of the present study was to explore income–related inequalities on utilization 
of health care among older population aged over 50 in Greece and investigate national 
regional inequalities as one of the main contributors to the overall inequity. Using the first 
wave of the Greek National Health Interview Survey (GNHIS) we have tested the 
hypotheses: (i) The inequalities in use of health care is derived from the different 
socioeconomic characteristics of the older population that uses  health services; (ii) 
Individuals on higher income are more likely to use health care services than lower income 
comparators; (iii) Individuals in densely-populated areas are more likely to use more health 
care services than comparators in intermediate and thinly – populated areas. Applying 
different methodological approaches, such as the horizontal inequity index approach by 
calculating concentration indices (as developed by Van Doorslaer and colleagues) and 
using regression model, we quantify income – related inequity and measure the effect of 
socioeconomic indicators on the likelihood of contact with health care services. Our 
findings support the existence of significant pro-rich inequity in outpatient admissions, in 
probability and total number of specialist visit. Moreover, significant pro-poor inequity 
was found for inpatient admissions, and slightly pro-poor inequity for total number and 
conditional number of GP visits and conditional number of specialist visits. No significant 
income-related inequity could be found for probability of outpatient admissions and 
probability of making GP visits. Our findings indicate that income itself is not the only 
contributor, provided  that higher educational level status and regional factors do not have 
a consistent effect and explain the high percentage of inequalities in almost all health care 
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types. In addition, by decomposing income – related inequity we identify and measure the 
extent of regional inequalities as one of the main contributors to the overall inequity in the 
likelihood of using health care. Our findings indicate intra and interregional variations in 
most of health care services that contribute to a large extent to the overall inequity. 
Compared to densely-populated areas and Athens region, thinly-populated areas and 
Central Greece exacerbate the use of most health care services for the older population. 
Residents of thinly-populated areas face pro-rich inequalities for almost all health care 
types (inpatient admissions, outpatient and specialist care), except probability of GP visits. 
Compared to Athens region, regional disparities -inequalities are apparent for most health 
care types except inpatient care (slightly for Islands). Moreover, we find regional 
variations in primary health care for thinly populated areas and Central Greece (GP care, 
outpatient visits, and probability of specialist visits) favoring the better off. Although we 
find territorial disparities for all areas and regions in the probability of specialist care use 
favoring the better off, once the positive contacts of specialist visits are included, older 
residents of North Greece, Central Greece and intermediate-populated areas report total 
number and conditional number of specialist visits more times than residents of Athens and 
densely-populated areas reducing inequity in favor of worse off, “forcing” older residents 
to specialist care, irrespective of the income level of the individuals. Geographical barriers 
may partly explain our findings of regional disparities. The economic crisis may have risen 
the existing inequity of the health care use, especially for the older population. The recent 
Eurofound report in “Access to healthcare in times of crisis”, indicates that inability to 
obtain health care increased most for older people. Moreover, an analysis before (2006)  
and after crisis (2011), of EU-SILC data in the EU27 ‘enforced unmet needs’ because of 
costs, waiting lists or distance, for those aged 65 and over, concluded  that inability to 
obtain care has been increased, and this increase concerns mainly Greece (from 9.4% to 
13.2%) and Italy versus EU27 increase (from 3.5% in 2006 to 4.7% in 2011) (Rodrigues et 
al, 2013; Kentikelenis et al, 2014 comparing 2007 and 2011). There are significant policy 
actions that stem from our study findings. These help to identify the extent of inequalities 
in health care use among the older population and transfer the findings to policy makers by 
relating the identified socio-economic and geographical variations in health care use with 
the characteristics of the older population in Greece. Our findings prove the solutions for 
diminishing  inequalities in health care use cannot be simple and universal. There’s no 
doubt that the impact of the various health care efforts for reform on the older population 
up to now needs evaluation. Policy documents and National Action Plans still target to 
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broaden population health determinants such as the demographic expansion of the older 
groups, their living situation and challenges of poverty at old age. Future reforms might 
concentrate on reducing inequalities in NHS health care services use among the vulnerable 
group of older population by targeted policy responses and improving the Greek NHS 
performance. Moreover, they could focus on integrating health and social protection 
services based on the specific needs of older people who use health care. 
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Chapter Six 
 
6. “Inequalities in health care use in Greece among the older population – Survey of 
Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE)” 
6.1 Introduction 
The Commission, in its 2009 communication, underlined the existence of large gaps in 
health among the EU Member States and invited the Governments of the Member States to 
develop targeted policies for reducing inequalities in health. In a similar effort, the WHO 
targeted the reduction of health inequalities both within and between countries by 
launching the programmes “Health for All by the year 2000” and “Closing the Gap” in 
2008, followed by the WHO - Europe 2020 strategic plan (EC, 2014) till the more recent 
WHO global strategy on people-centred and universal health coverage (WHO, 2015b; 
2016), as presented at Chapter one. The relevant WHO report reached to the conclusion 
that health inequalities should be a major concern of governmental policies in all countries 
and that it is a matter of social justice to combat poverty and health inequalities, 
particularly among the most disadvantaged and vulnerable. This approach is derived from 
the egalitarian view of access to health care that suggests a publicly financed system where 
“equal opportunity of access for those in equal need would be the determining rule” 
independently “of who is paying for the care.…. The success criterion in the egalitarian 
system is the level and distribution of health in the community” (Williams, 1993). In this 
respect, according to Europe 2020 strategic plan for reducing inequalities in health (EC, 
2014), it is recommended that – among others- action is needed on social determinants to 
improve average health and reduce health inequities within each country. Moreover, 
adequate monitoring and review is necessary to ensure accountability and transparency and 
provide evidence that action has been taken. Moreover, the challenges and policy 
instruments of Ageing and Health Equity framework that have been introduced since 2002 
with the UN Political declaration and Madrid international plan of action on ageing (UN, 
2002), followed by the WHO-CSDH policy framework on adopting the life-course model 
in order to “ensure access to health and social care” till the recent WHO’s World Report on 
Ageing and Health (WHO, 2008; 2013; 2015) identify the importance of health equity in 
older age. Health equity in older age is important both in its own right and flags several 
key issues that include among other “promoting health and well-being throughout life; and 
ensuring universal and equal access to health-care services to reduce health inequities at 
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older age”. However, the existing evidence indicates that although the health dynamics of 
older age are related to increased needs for health care, the association with the demand 
for, and utilization of, health services is less clear-cut. There are few key barriers 
/challenges- related to current ineffective public-health approaches to population ageing- 
that need to be overcome, if improved access to effective health care intervention is the 
most important determinant of health, especially for vulnerable groups, such as the elderly 
(WHO, 2015). These challenges were presented in the Conceptual Framework section. 
Moreover, evidence about health care use and treatment quality is mixed: not all studies 
have found poorer treatment for those in older ages, with patterns varying according to 
health condition and health care outcomes considered (Grundy E et al, 2012). Evidence 
also suggests that once individual - demand effects have been isolated, cross-cohort and 
country differences in the prevalence of regular care use are partly associated with national 
health policies. Results indicate that supply side factors ie physician density has a 
significant impact on utilization of most health services over the life-course. Nevertheless, 
the commitment of governments to the adoption of systematic plans for their older 
populations, including health equity policy and the monitoring of the effectiveness of 
measures, particularly from the perspective of older people, has remained problematic 
(Triantafillou & Mestheneos, 2013). At least one significant reason for this is the lack of 
systematic data making it impossible to record advances in policy implementation or any 
real measure of its effectiveness. Fewer analyses have been undertaken of health inequities 
among older people than in younger age groups. As a consequence, measurement of equity 
of access to health services is not used adequately to assess the health system performance. 
In Greece, similar to other European countries, as aforementioned, health and protection of 
older population are consolidated in the Greek Constitution as social rights and the 
founding law of the egalitarian Greek NHS -ESY in 1983 with the aim to expand coverage 
and reduce inequities, particularly in finance, access and resource allocation, despite the 
fact that after four decades still faces structural problems. Moreover, considering the health 
care needs of the rapidly increasing older population in Greece, there is no universal 
statutory scheme for LTC in Greece and integrated health and social care still remains a 
neglected subject. This issue results in the under- development of public services for 
elderly that consists also a potential source of inequalities in utilization of health care 
among the elderly in Greece. In the meantime, Greece has adopted all the aforementioned 
international and EU recommendations for the determinants of health equity in a life-
course perspective, as well as for universal and equal access to health care services, but 
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without any clear policy framework relating to inequalities in health and health care in 
Greek health system (Chrodis JA, 2014). Moreover, little attention has also been paid to 
investigating and measuring equity in the use of health care among the elderly, since they 
are the consumers who, though they receive high health services, with unfair use of service 
among income groups (Allin S. and Mossialos E., 2005). Therefore, more collection and 
sharing of learning in a consistently way “as part of routine intelligence systems” is 
needed, on measuring social determinants of inequities in health care and on how to 
effectively implement programmes to tackle them, especially for the fundamental 
egalitarian principles of Greek NHS -ESY that it should be: comprehensive, equal, with 
universal coverage, of high quality and free of charge at the point of delivery.  
6.2 Research Questions 
Drawing from the aforementioned challenges – inefficiencies of the Greek NHS-ESY, in 
conjunction with the effects of demographic ageing and the need for a clear understanding 
of inequalities in health care use among the elderly, by using  the nationwide, 
multidisciplinary 1
st
 wave of Greek SHARE for people aged 50 years or over, we have the 
opportunity to provide new empirical comprehensive evidence, to achieve the thesis’ main 
objective and  thus filling the gap in the research for Greece. Given that the reference time 
of SHARE study is 2003-04, we have also the opportunity to explore inequalities in health 
care use in elderly by shedding light on the equity issue of the NHS-ESY reform of 2001-
2004 (via the major reform acts of 2001 Law 2889/2001 on the Regional Structure of 
Health Care Services and reform act of 2003 Law 3106/2003 on the Regional Structure of 
Welfare Services) that divided the country into 17 regional health and welfare authorities 
(PeSYPs). Building on the features of the Greek health care system and the existing 
literature and evidence, in order to achieve these objectives, we address the following 
empirical research questions (RQs), guided by the following theoretical hypotheses (THs). 
THs: (i) The inequalities in use of health care is derived from the different socioeconomic 
characteristics of the older population that uses the health services; (ii) Individuals on 
higher income are more likely to use health care services than lower income comparators; 
(iii) Individuals in densely-populated areas are more likely to use more health care services 
than comparators in intermediate and thinly – populated areas; (iv) Individuals with “Non 
Noble” social health insurance coverage are more likely to pay OOP for using health care 
than comparators with “Noble” social health insurance coverage. Guided by the THs we 
address the following research questions (RQs): (i) what is the extent and contributors of 
inequity in the use of health care among people over the age of 50 in Greece? (ii) What is 
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the extent in national regional variations and inequalities in accessing health care services 
among the older population over the age of 50 in Greece? (iii) What are the determinants 
of OOPPs as a payment mechanism of the utilisation of health care among the older 
population over the age of 50 in Greece?   
It is worth mentioning that by the SHARE survey tool, we address similar research 
questions with the other survey – tools as in Chapters four and five, given that we have a 
similar framework for examining the same objectives with the same theoretical hypotheses, 
but for exclusively the older population aged 50+ in Greece, in the period of NHS-ESY 
reform of 2001-2004 in a nationwide setting. Our exploration of SHARE evidence – 
exclusively for the older population in Greece - to supplement evidence of the other two 
datasets – survey tools of PatraHIS on an urban setting and GNHIS evidence on a 
nationwide setting for the period of NHS-ESY reform of 2005-2008 and result in a robust 
evidence for inequalities in health care system among the older population to shed light in 
the whole pro-crisis period in Greece. This evidence will attempt to give a clear 
understanding of inequalities in health care use in order to transform the NHS system for 
serving its foundation principles of equity in access and universality among the elderly 
population in Greece. In addition, we should keep in mind that research which examines 
past experience empowers policy analysis that should be focused on the future (Klarman, 
1980) in the current long crisis period, since 2009. Nevertheless, studying the past may 
contribute to a clearer understanding of the present and this may affect the future (Porter, 
1995). 
6.3 Sample and variables  
In our research we will include data from the 1st wave of the survey in 2004 with reference 
time in 2003 - 2004 (Wave1 – release 2.6.0).66 The household response rate for Greece in 
Wave 1 was 60.2% and the individual response rate (within household) was 91.8%. In our 
study, the dependent variables were measured by eight separate questions: six questions 
for health care use and two questions for the amount of out of pocket expenses (OOPPs). 
The dependent variables for health care utilisation concern the likelihood and number of 
contacts and were measured by six separate questions asking the respondent: (i) about the 
number of any medical contact the past 12 months; (ii) among those who reported at least 
one medical visit, the number of any GP/HCC physician visit. However, provided that 
HCC are staffed mainly by specialists and few GPs due to absence of GPs in Greek health 
                                                          
66 SHARE (2013) The Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe. Release Guide 2.6.0 of waves 1 & 2. November, 29th 2013.   
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system, in reality any visit at HCC may be answered as a specialist visit and this is a data 
limitation of SHARE study; (iii) among those who reported at least one medical visit 
whether he or she consulted any specialist. There is no information about the number of 
specialist visits and this is a data limitation; (iv) among all respondents, whether he or she 
had an inpatient admission (yes/no); (v) the number of inpatient nights; and (vi) whether he 
or she had a dentist visit (yes/no). There is also limited information about outpatient 
surgery (whether he or she had an outpatient surgery and the number of times of having 
outpatient surgery) and we use this variable only for descriptive reasons. In particular, we 
measure use of health care during the past 12 months derived by the above variables, as 
following: 
(1) About any medical consultation,  excluding dentist visits and inpatient nights, but 
including emergency and outpatient visits – for the whole sample -we measure:  
(1a.)  The likelihood of any medical consultation (yes/no) (Yes= ≥1 versus No=0 as 
the reference) 
(1b.)  The mean conditional (≥1) number of any medical consultations, and 
separately 
(2) Among individuals who reported at least once consultation (≥1) in the previous 
variable of any medical visit, we measure: 
(2a.) The likelihood of any GP or health center (HCC) physician visit (yes/no) (Yes= 
≥1 versus No=0 as the reference) and 
(2b.) The mean conditional (≥1) number of GP/HCC physician visit.  
(2c.) The likelihood of any specialist visit (yes/no) (Yes= ≥1 versus No=0 as the 
reference). 
(3) About the inpatient admissions in the past 12 months– for the whole sample -we 
measure:  
 (3a.)  The likelihood of inpatient admissions (yes/no) (Yes= ≥1 versus No=0 as the 
reference). 
(3b) Among individuals who reported inpatient admissions, the mean conditional 
(≥1) number of inpatient nights. 
(4) The likelihood of any dentist visits (yes/no) (Yes= ≥1 versus No=0 as the reference). 
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The dependent variables for facing OOP expenses
67
 are measured by two questions for 
the amount of OOP expenses for inpatient and outpatient care
68
, based on a twelve 
months recall in the following two categories for the analysis for each question:  
(5a) Among the individuals who reported having inpatient admission, the OOP amount for 
inpatient care with two categories: (i) OOP amount including 0€: yes/no (yes≥1€ vs 
no:0€) and (ii) OOP positive conditional amount >0€ dichotomized in (>672.6€) 
versus (1€-672.6€) where 672.6€ is the median of OOP conditional amount for 
inpatient care, comparing higher OOP amount (>672.6€) versus lower OOP amount 
(1€-672.6€).  
(5b) Among all the sample irrespective of receiving or not receiving care, the OOP amount 
for all outpatient care received (for all health professionals including dentists, for all 
labs, exams or therapies –except for drugs and alternative medicine) with two 
categories for the analysis: (i) OOP amount including 0€: yes/no (yes≥1€  vs no:0€) 
and (ii) OOP positive conditional amount >0€ dichotomized in (>194.4€) versus (1€-
194.4€) where 194.4€ is the median of OOP positive amount for outpatient care, 
comparing higher OOP amount (>194.4€) versus lower OOP amount (1€-194.4€).  
A detailed overview of the utilization and OOPP dependent variables, as well as the 
explanatory variables with the respective questions is displayed in Appendix Table A1.1 
and A1.2. The explanatory variables used in the models include the following health, 
demographic and socioeconomic factors, based on the standard approach in the empirical 
literature: Age (in four dummies: 80+; 70-79; 60-69; versus 50-59 as reference); gender 
(male; versus female as reference) health status (need) variables associated to physical 
health include: (i) a general SAH measure dichotomised with “Very Good & Good” SAH 
as reference category; (ii) activity limitations LTI (“no LTI” as reference); (iii) GALI (“not 
limited” as reference variable); and (iv) the number of chronic medical conditions using 
three dummies ("0 chronic conditions” as the reference category). These health status 
variables constitute a proxy for care need. An assumption that underlies this study is that 
individuals with health conditions and poorer SAH have a greater need for health care, an 
assumption that is likely to hold in the majority of cases (Allin S. et al, 2011). SHARE 
                                                          
67 Out-of-pocket payments represent a high percentage of health expenditure in Greece, accounting for more than half of total health 
expenditure. The figure depicts formal cost-sharing arrangements, direct payments and informal payments, with the latter two 
representing the highest proportion of out-of-pocket payments among EU countries. 
68 The OOP amount means: “Not counting health insurance premiums or reimbursements from employers, by OOP expenses we mean 
everything that is not paid by the insurance company, if you first pay but later get it reimbursed, this is not OOP expenses, if the 
insurance company pays first, but later charges you, this is OOP expenses” (SHARE wave1 Questionnaire). 
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Wave 1 income is derived from the sum of different components, some incomes at the 
individual level and some at the household level at a gross level. It is the household total 
gross annual income received the previous year (2003) derived as the sum over all 
household members of the individual – level values from any source added up, from 
employment, from  self - employment or work for a family business; income from (public 
or private) pensions or invalidity or unemployment benefits; income from alimony or other 
private regular payments, income from long term care, sum of the gross incomes of other 
household members and other benefits, capital assets income (income from bank accounts, 
from bonds, from stocks or shares and from mutual funds), rent payments received, plus 
imputed rents, all of them calculated, generated, imputed according to the methodology, as 
suggested by the MEA Institute
69 
and described in SHARE release guide 2.6.0. We 
equalized the household total gross annual income adjusting for the household’s size and 
the age of its members according to the modified OECD scale
70
. For the logistic regression 
analysis on the whole data set, the equalized household total gross annual income variable 
was calculated using quintiles leading to five (5) income categories, with the 5th richest 
quintile: “More than 16,045.66€. €” and the 1st poorest quintile with range “0€ – 4,928€” 
as the reference category. Following, in order to quantify the effect of income on health 
service utilization by calculating and decomposing inequity (HI), we also construct a 
continuous estimate as a natural logarithm of equalized household total gross annual 
income. It is also worth mentioning that imputation procedures for missing values were 
applied in SHARE survey in 69 demographic and economic variables in Wave 1 by the 
MEA Institute for SHARE with a multiple imputation procedure using an “iterative 
conditional specification approach” similar to many other household surveys (Christelis 
D.,2011; Börsch-Supan A. et al, 2005). Imputations for missing values of OOPP amount 
concerning outpatient care were applied by the MEA Institute
71
 using basic socio-
economic characteristics, dummy variables for participation, missing values and bracket 
values as described in Börsch-Supan A. et al (2005) and Christelis D. (2011). 
Moreover, variables other than need and income, are included in the model, following the 
standard approach in the empirical literature: (vi) The highest educational qualification is 
                                                          
69 Börsch-Supan A. et al (2005) The Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe – Methodology. 
Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA), 2005. 
70 Where equivalised household size is a sum of weights attributed to each member of the household 
according to the modified OECD equivalence scale: 1.0 to the first adult; 0.5 to the second and each 
subsequent person aged 14 and over; 0.3 to each child aged under 14. 
71 Börsch-Supan A. et al (2005) The Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe – Methodology. Mannheim 
Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA), 2005. 
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included based on the standard coding of the ISCED-97 into 6 levels, grouped into three 
(3) categories with  “No/Partial/Completed Primary school (ISCED 1)” as the reference 
category. (vii) Marital status was dichotomized with “never married or divorced or 
widowed”, as the reference category; (viii) the household composition dichotomized with 
“living alone” as the reference category; (ix) the housing tenure information dichotomized 
into “homeowner” versus “Not owner: tenant/subtenant/ rent free” as the reference 
category. (x) Region of residence is based on the EU Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics (NUTS) used to indicate in which territorial unit the household is located. For 
Greece there are 4 units in the NUTS1 level concerning 13 NUTS2 urban and regional 
areas – economic territories that define the variables we include: GR1-North Greece 
(including Thessaloniki the 2nd more densely populated); GR2 - Central Greece 
(mountainous and thinly populated); GR3-Attika (Athens the capital, as the reference 
category); and GR4-Islands (thinly populated, including Crete the largest mountainous 
island)72. Degree of urbanisation is derived from 3 dummies: Thinly-populated area; 
Intermediate area; and Densely-populated area as reference category. The information for 
Social Health Insurance Fund (SHIF) information is derived from a question with 11 
categories of insurance funds (9 Social Health Insurance Funds – SHIFs; Other; and No 
SHIF)
 73
. In order to examine in detail the role of the fragmented Social Health Insurance 
system, we sorted these 9 SHIFs groups into three (3) broad groups of more generous 
“noble” versus “non noble” funds, based on more “official” classification74, as following: 
(i)“Non Noble IKA-SHIF” or “Social Security Institution” (IKA blue-collar and white-
collar employees), that is the largest fund covering 50% of the population; (ii) “Non Noble 
Farmers OGA-SHIF” (OGA-Organization of Agricultural Insurance Rural Sector) the 
second largest fund covering 20% of the population involved in agriculture and (iii) 
“Noble SHIFs” (including all other SHIFs: Civil Servants, Self-Employed, Bank 
                                                          
72 GR-1North Greece includes: Eastern Macedonia & Thrace (GR11)  & Central Macedonia (Thessaloniki - GR12) & 
Western Macedonia (GR13) & Thessalia (GR14). GR-2 Central Greece includes: Epirus (GR21) & Ionian Islands 
(GR22) & Western Greece (GR23) & Central Greece (GR24) & Peloponnese (GR25);  GR – 3 Athens includes: 
Athens (GR30); GR- 4 Islands includes: North Aegean Islands (GR41) & South Aegean Islands (GR42) & Island of 
Crete   (GR43).   
73 Originally, in the questionnaire are included 7 categories of social insurance funds [0IKA (Social Security 
Institution); 1.OGA (Organization of Argicultural Insurance); 2.OAEE (Fund for Self - Employed); 3.OPAD (Civic 
Servants, employees of municipalities); Various bank employees funds 5.Public utilities: telecoms, electricity, trains, 
metro; 6. Other SHIF (engineers; lawyers; health professions; seamen etc) 7. no insurance.  
74 They are based on more “official” classification as established by experts, trade unions, authorities such as Labor 
Institute of Greek Workers’ Confederation - INE G.S.E.E. Observatory (Koutsampelas C., Tsakloglou P., 2010; 
Economou, C. & Giorno C, 2009; Mossialos, E. et al, 2005; Tountas, Y. et al, 2005). 
75 The majority 61.4% of the population lives in urban areas and 34.3% in the area of greater Athens. Semi-urban and 
rural populations comprise 30% of the Greek population, provided that 80% of the country is mountainous or hilly, as 
well as 169 from 3000 islands are inhabited, according to the estimates of National Statistical Authority (2011). 
 
 
 
268 
 
Employees, Health Professions etc); with the “Non Noble IKA-SHIF” as the reference 
category
.
. The information for Voluntary (Complementary) Health Insurance (VHI) 
Coverage is not used as the positive sample is very small (88 individuals with VHI tenure 
versus 2571 without VHI).  
6.4 Results  
6.4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
The description of the sample is displayed in Tables 6.1 – 6.7. The mean age of the sample 
is 64.77 years, with 37.8% report suffering from LTI, 30.99% from GALI, with 1.46 mean 
number of chronic conditions diagnosed out of 10 listed, and 37.60% of the sample declare 
“Less than good” (fair, bad or very bad) SAH a percentage similar to other studies for the 
older population (Crespo-Cebada E., 2012) and slightly higher than that observed in the 
Greek studies for the general population. Moreover, the mean annual gross total household 
income of the sample equalised is 11,468.31€ representative of a low to middle-income 
household of older population in Greece of 2003. Our sample is distributed mainly in 
densely-populated areas (43.67%) of North Greece GR1 (including Thessaloniki) and 
Attiki region GR3 (including Athens) (34.41%) and less in thinly- populated areas 
(17.52%) and Islands, similar to the distribution of the population according to estimates of 
the Greek National Statistical Authority (2011)
75
. Moreover, about the SHIF coverage, the 
majority (43.14%) of the sample has Non-Noble IKA (Social Security Institution) SHIF 
coverage, 37.6% has Noble SHIFs coverage and 19.20% has Non Noble OGA 
(Organization of Agricultural Insurance) SHIF coverage, as expected, given that OGA 
SHIF covers mainly population involved in agriculture and possibly it covers residents in 
thinly populated areas with the smaller sample. Only 88 (3.2%) versus 2,571 individuals 
have VHI coverage. Due to very small sample, it is not included in the analysis.  
Overall, about health care use measures, 8.89% (227 individuals) report having inpatient 
admission with 10.63 conditional inpatient nights, similar to other studies for the general 
population (Table 6.4). The data do not distinguish between public and private inpatient 
admissions76. Only 2.56% or 71 individuals report having outpatient surgery. Moreover, 
the majority (79.21%) of the sample report making any medical visit (except for dentist 
visit and inpatient admissions). Among the individuals reporting a positive medical visit, 
the majority (64.4%) report a GP/HCC physician visit and 35% report making a specialist 
                                                          
 
76 However, there is current evidence that despite the rapid growth of the private sector during the last decade, public 
hospitals are used more than private hospitals (Economou C., 2010).   
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visit, similar to other Greek nationwide studies for the general population (Tountas et al, 
2011; Geitona et al, 2011). Once there is a contact, individuals report 7.0 conditional (≥1) 
number of medical visits and 5.52 GP/HCC physician visits. Unfortunately, there is no 
information for conditional number of specialist visits that could reveal possible 
imbalances in health care provided. Moreover, 37.7% of the sample report making a dentist 
visit. The distribution of utilisation rates by degree of urbanization and region of residence 
indicates regional variances as displayed in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. Overall, it seems that 
regional variations are apparent for all health care types favoring densely-populated areas, 
except for inpatient admissions. Residents of all areas and regions report equal proportion 
of inpatient admissions, irrespective of region of residence and urbanization degree. 
However, when conditional number of inpatient admissions is involved, residents of 
Central Greece and Islands report less conditional number of admissions. We observe 
interregional and intra-regional variances for all the other health care types. Residents of 
densely-populated report higher proportion and more conditional number of visits for most 
health care types (any medical visit, GP/HCC physician visits, specialist and dentist visits). 
Residents of the densely-populated areas as well as residents of Attika-Athens and North 
Greece-Thessaloniki report higher proportion of GP/HCC physician visit and specialist 
visit. On the other hand, residents of thinly-populated areas report lower proportion and 
less conditional number of visits for most health care types. The lowest proportion and less 
conditional number of most health care visits are reported by residents of Central Greece, 
except for inpatient admissions. Considering distribution of health care use by SHIF 
coverage, we observe that variations among Non Noble SHIFs beneficiaries are apparent 
except for inpatient admissions and outpatient surgeries (Table 6.5). Non Noble OGA 
beneficiaries demonstrate higher percentage in GP/HCC physician visit than the other 
SHIFs. Non Noble IKA beneficiaries report the higher percentage and conditional number 
of any medical visits (except for dentists), higher conditional number of any GP/HCC 
physician visits as well as higher percentage of specialist visits. IKA SHIF beneficiaries 
use more primary health care services than OGA SHIF, whereas Noble SHIF beneficiaries 
report the higher percentage of dental care.  It is worth noting that Noble SHIF 
beneficiaries report lower conditional number of inpatient admissions, lower conditional 
number of any medical visits and GP visits, possibly due to better health status. 
Considering OOP payments, it is worth mentioning that half of the older population who 
receive inpatient or outpatient care report facing OOP expenses in an equal percentage 
among inpatient and outpatient care, though the mean OOP amount for inpatient care 
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(1483€) is 4.5 times higher than the mean OOP amount for outpatient care (330€), 
irrespective of income level, SHIF coverage, degree of urbanization and region of 
residence, as indicated in Tables 6.7 and 6.15. The highest proportion of OOP expenses for 
inpatient care as well as for outpatient care concern: (i) individuals in 4
th
 advantaged and 
2
nd
 less advantaged income level; (ii) Noble SHIFs beneficiaries for both inpatient and 
outpatient care and an equal proportion with Non Noble IKA beneficiaries for outpatient 
care; (iii) residents in densely populated areas almost equal with residents in thinly-
populated areas - and residents of Attiki-Athens region. The highest proportion of OOP 
expenses for outpatient care is reported by residents of North Greece-Thessaloniki region 
in a significantly higher proportion than residents of Islands. It is worth mentioning that 
residents of Central Greece report paying OOP for outpatient care in an equal percentage 
with residents of Attika-Athens who are more advantaged. On the other hand, the lowest 
proportion of individuals who report OOP expenses for inpatient care is reported by older 
individuals in highest richer income group 
5
 – even lower than the poorest income group 1 
revealing a regressive relation; by Non Noble IKA SHIF beneficiaries as well as residents 
in intermediate - populated areas and residents of Central Greece and Islands regions. The 
lowest proportion of individuals who report OOP expenses for outpatient care is reported 
by individuals in poorest 1st level, Non Noble OGA beneficiaries, residents in 
intermediate-populated areas and residents of Islands region. 
 
Table 6.1 Need and non need socioeconomic characteristics of the sample – SHARE 
 
Demographics 
Count (N) 
unweighted  
 % 
weighted 
Age 80+ 278 8.34 
Age 70 – 79 562 25.05 
Age 60 – 69 755 30.84 
Ref/ Age 50-59  1,064 35.77 
Total 
Mean Age in years 
2,659 
64.77 (0.20) 
Male 1,235 46.38 
Ref/ Female 1,424 53.62 
Health Status   
SAH “Less than good”(fair. bad and very bad) health   982 37.60 
ref/ “very good and good”health 1,674 62.40 
Long Term Illness (LTI): Suffering  (Yes)  970 37.80 
ref/(No) LTI 1,686 62.20 
GALI: Been severely limited & limited but not severely (Yes)   802 30.99 
ref./ not limited at all (No) 1,853 69.01 
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Number of Chronic Conditions “More than 2 conditions” 1065 40.48 
“1 chronic medical condition”   846 32.06 
Ref/ “0 Chronic medical Conditions”    745 27.47 
Mean Number of chronic medical conditions out of 10 listed 1.46 (0.02) 
Marital status    
Married (& registered partnership) 1,823 69.10 
/ref. single (never married/widowed & 
not remarried /divorced & not remarried)   835 30.90 
Education   
More than secondary School (ISCED 4+5+6)  436 15.76 
Secondary School (partial & completed) (ISCED 2 + 3)  826 29.74 
/ref. No & Primary School (partial &completed) (No + ISCED 1) 1,388 54.49 
Household Size - Total Number of persons in household 
Living in couple (with or without dependent children) 1,957 73.94 
Other (with or without dependent children)   
/ref. Living alone (with or without dependent children)  702 26.06 
Annual Gross Household Total Income equivalized                           
Mean  11,468.31 (SE:235.96)               
Ln Continuous - N   8.92 (SE: 0.03) 
Income Quintile 5 (richest): 16045.66+ 546 19.96 
Income Quintile 4: 9866.68 – 16045.65 558 20.02. 
Income Quintile 3: 7127.01 – 9866.67 520 19.99 
Income Quintile 2: 4928.01 – 7127.00 514 19.84 
Income Quintile 1 (poorest): ≤ 4928.00 521 20.19 
Degree of urbanisation   
Thinly-populated area 400 17.52 
Intermediate area 947 38.81 
ref./ Densely-populated area 1,312 43.67 
Region of residence – Nuts1 level (national level)   
North Greece (GR1) 882 32.55 
Central Greece (GR2) 488 23.61 
Islands (GR4) 161 9.44 
ref ./Attiki - Athens (GR3) 1,127 34.41 
Social Health Insurance Fund (SHIF) coverage   
“Noble SHIFunds"  998 37.67 
“Non Noble OGA-SHIF”  448 19.20 
ref/“Non Noble IKA" 1,118 43.14 
Voluntary (Complementary) Health Insurance   
VHI Coverage (Yes) 88 3.02 
ref/ No VHI Coverage 2,571 96.98 
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Table 6.2 Health care utilization by degree of urbanisation: percentage and sample means of conditional (≥1) number 
of contacts (the last 12 months) 
 Densely- populated areas Intermediate-populated Thinly-populated areas 
 % Conditional 
Mean 
% Conditional 
Mean 
% Conditional 
Mean 
Inpatient night admissions 
*1
 8.7% 9.02 (1.30) 9.0% 11.85 (2.43) 9.1% 11.60 (3.34) 
Outpatient surgery
*1
 3.1% 1.14 (0.07) 1.9%    1.28(0.16) 2.7% 1.25 (0.24) 
Any medical visit
*2
 79.9% 7.69 (0.31) 79.3%   6.86(0.28) 77.4% 5.68 (0.36) 
GP /Physician visits at Health care 
centre (HCC)*
3
 83.2% 5.94 (0.25) 80.6%    5.65(0.25) 78.5% 4.31 (0.30) 
Specialist visits*
3
 94.9%  92.6%  86.0%  
Dental visit- annual*
4 41.3%  37.3%           29.7% 
Note*1: Inpatient admission and outpatient surgery information concern sample with conditional (≥1) number of inpatient admissions and outpatient surgeries 
Note*2: Any medical visit concerns sample with total (including 0) number of any visits except from dentist visit and inpatient admissions 
Note*3: GP/ physician HCC visits and specialist visits concern sample with conditional number of visits for “individuals who reported at least once consultation – any medical visit (≥1)” 
Note*4: There was no information for conditional number of dentist visits 
 
Table 6.3 Health care utilization by region of residence: percentage and sample means of conditional number of contacts   
(the last 12 months) 
 Nuts1 North Greece GR1- 
Thessaloniki 
Nuts1 Central 
Greece GR2 
Nuts1 Attiki GR3- 
Athens 
Nuts1 Islands +Crete 
GR4 
 % Conditional 
Mean 
% Conditional 
Mean 
% Conditional 
Mean 
% Conditional 
Mean 
Inpatient night admissions 
*1
 9.5% 12.59 (2.22) 8.9% 6.94 (1.10) 8.4% 12.28 (2.86) 8.7% 6.53 (1.71) 
Outpatient surgery
*1
 2.5% 1.0 1.9% 1.27 (0.25) 3.3% 1.20 (0.08) 1.7% 2.06 (0.46) 
Any medical visit
*2
 83.4% 6.48 (0.30) 75.6% 5.88 (0.33) 77.2% 8.18 (0.35) 81.5% 7.60 (0.65) 
GP/Physician visits at Health 
care centre (HCC)*
3
 83.4% 5.49 (0.31) 77.5% 4.87 (0.29) 84.7% 6.07 (0.23) 71.6% 5.48 (0.54) 
Specialist visits*
3
 91.7%  90.0%  94.5%  92.3%  
Dental visit *
4 41.9%  30.8%  39.2%  34.5%  
Note*1: Inpatient admission and outpatient surgery information concern sample with conditional (≥1) number of inpatient admissions and outpatient surgeries 
Note*2: Any medical visit concerns sample with total (including 0) number of any visits except from dentist visit and inpatient admissions 
Note*3: GP/ physician HCC visits and specialist visits concern sample with conditional number of visits for “individuals who reported at least once consultation – any medical visit (≥1)” 
Note*4: There was no information for conditional number of dentist visits 
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Table 6.4 Health care utilization: percentage and sample means of contacts 
Type of care Percentage of visit  
Conditional(≥1) 
number of visits 
Total  number of visits 
(including 0 visits) 
(the last 12 months) (%) N Mean   (SD)        Mean   (SD) 
Inpatient night admissions 
*1
   8.89%    227 10.63  (1.29)  
Outpatient surgery
*1
 2.56%      71 1.19  (0.07)  
Any medical visit
*2
 79.21% 2,088 7.0    (0.18) 5.57    (0.16) 
GP /Physician visits at Health care 
centre (HCC)*
3
  
64.39% 1,705 5.52  (0.15) 4.49    (0.13) 
Specialist visits*
3
 35.01%    928   
Dental visit- annual*
4 
37.70% 1,028  
Note*1: Inpatient admission and outpatient surgery information concern sample with conditional (≥1) number of inpatient admissions and surgeries  
Note*2: Any medical visit concerns sample with total (including 0) number of any visits except from dentist visit and inpatient admissions 
Note*3: GP/ physician HCC visits and specialist visits concern sample with conditional number of visits for “individuals who reported at least once  
            consultation – any medical visit (≥1)”; Note*4: There was no information for conditional number of dentist visits 
 
 
Table 6.5 Distribution of health care utilization by SHIF: percentage and sample means of total 
and conditional contacts (the last 12 months) 
 Noble SHIFs Non Noble OGA SHIF Non Noble IKA SHIF 
 % Conditional Mean  % Conditional Mean  % Conditional  
Mean 
Inpatient night admissions 
*1
    7.1%  7.75 (0.91)  12.5% 11.15 (2.34)   8.9 % 12.29 (2.50) 
Outpatient surgery
*1
    2.4% 1.10 (0.06)   3.2%   1.20 (0.19)    2.3%   1.26 (0.13) 
Any medical visit
*2
 77.5% 6.23 (0.27) 79.0 %   6.45 (0.33)  81.6%   7.88 (0.32) 
GP /Physician visits at Health care 
centre (HCC)*
3
  78.2% 4.82 (0.20) 83.7% 5.10 (0.28) 82.9 %    6.26 (0.27) 
Specialist visits*
3
 92.9%  88.4%  94.2%  
Dental visit *
4 
45.7%  28.5%    35.0%  
Note*1: Inpatient admission and outpatient surgery information concern sample with conditional (≥1) number of inpatient admissions and 
outpatient surgeries  
Note*2: Any medical visit concerns sample with total (including 0) number of any visits except from dentist visit and inpatient admissions 
Note*3: GP/ physician HCC visits and specialist visits concern sample with conditional number of visits for “individuals who reported at 
least once consultation – any medical visit (≥1)”  
Note*4: There was no information for conditional number of dentist visits 
 
 
Table 6.6 Percentage and mean conditional OOPP (positive amount >0€) for inpatient and 
outpatient care during the last 12 months 
Type of care (last 12 months) (%) Mean conditional 
payment (€) 
SE N 
Inpatient conditional (>1) number of 
admissions  
47.32% 1483.26 217.26 14 from 227 
Outpatient total (including 0) visits  47.76%   329.79 17.47 1,307 from 2,659 
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6.4.2 Concentration Index Method Results  
Tables 6.8 and Figure 6.2 summarize the                            and the                  
for the probability of health care use and the inequity index. The concentration index sign 
indicates the direction of the relationship between the health care variable and income 
distribution, and its magnitude reflects the strength of the relationship. The CIs for actual 
use                 are negative for the probability of all health care types except for the 
probability of dentist care. The small negative CIs for actual use                             
reveal a weak relationship of the probability of having inpatient admission, the probability 
of making any medical visit and the probability of making any specialist visit with income 
- concentrated among the less advantaged, as it is demonstrated in Figure 6.2. Therefore, 
older individuals have inpatient admissions, make medical visits and make specialist visits, 
irrespective of their income level, slightly favoring the poorest. The negative CIs for need 
(                   - mainly due to differences in need factors, show a pro-poor distribution 
of need factors in all health care types, with the exception of the probability of dentist 
visits. The HI defined as the difference between the CIunadjusted and the CIadjusted is displayed 
Table 6.7 Percentage of sample facing OOP expenses (>0€) for inpatient and 
outpatient care during the last 12 months by Income Quintile, by SHIF, 
by degree of urbanization, by region of residence 
 
Inpatient conditional 
(>1) number of 
admissions 
  Outpatient  
conditional (>1) 
number of visits 
By Income Quintile % N % N 
Income Quintile 5: 16045.66+ 45.3% 19 48.9% 272 
Income Quintile 4: 9866.68 – 16045.65 49,6% 24 47.2% 270 
Income Quintile 3: 7127.01 – 9866.67 46.9% 25 47.5% 258 
Income Quintile 2: 4928.01 – 7127.00 48.6% 24 48.3% 252 
Income Quintile 1: ≤ 4928.00 46.2% 22 46.9% 255 
By SHIF  
 
  
Noble SHIF 52.0% 37 48.4% 486 
Non Noble OGA SHIF 45.4% 28 45.9% 213 
Non Noble IKA SHIF 43.3% 46 48.3% 564 
By degree of urbanisation  
 
  
Thinly populated 49.1% 21 50.8% 216 
Intermediate populated 41.4% 36 44.5% 425 
Densely populated 52.1% 57 49.4% 666 
By region of residence  
 
  
North Greece (GR1) 44.4% 37 52.1% 470 
Central Greece (GR2) 40.6% 19 46.2% 237 
Islands (GR4) 40.4% 6 40.4% 66 
Attiki - Athens (GR3) 57.2% 52 46.8% 534 
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in Table 6.8 and Figures 6.1 and 6.2. Overall, after controlling for the unequal need 
distributions: 
 Inequity in the delivery of health care is distributed among the better off (significantly 
pro-rich) for the probability of inpatient admissions and dentist visits. The strong pro-
rich inequity (HI) for inpatient admissions is the product of the difference of (almost 
zero) pro-poor CIunadjusted and the strong pro-poor CI need adjusted.  
 Inequity is also distributed slightly positively (pro-rich) for the probability of making 
any medical visit, favoring more advantaged individuals.  
 Among the individuals who report any medical visit, inequity is distributed slightly - 
but significantly - negatively for the probability of GP/HCC physician visit, favoring the 
less advantaged. Among the elderly who report a medical visit, the less advantaged are 
more likely to make a GP or HCC physician visit. 
 For the probability of specialist visits, there is almost no income –related inequity, given 
that the small negative magnitudes of CIunadjusted and CIadjusted result in a very small (very 
slightly negative) magnitude of HI index revealing the weak relationship of the 
probability of specialist visits with income. Income has almost no effect on inequity in 
probability of specialist visit. It also indicates that among the elderly individuals who 
report a medical visit, all individuals have the same probability to make a specialist 
visit, irrespective of their income, slightly favoring less advantaged. When need is 
equalized, the use of specialist health care services is related to need, slightly favoring 
the worse off. 
 
Table 6.8: Income - related inequality in probability of inpatient stay, any medical visit, 
GP visit, specialist and dentist visit in the last 12 months 
  Inpatient 
admission
*1
 
Any medical 
visit
*2
 
GP/HCC 
physician visit
*3
 
Specialist 
visit
*3
 
Dentist 
CI unadjusted  -0.001 -0.006 -0.018 -0.002 0.102 
CI adjusted  -0.075 -0.022 -0.004 -0.001 0.033 
HI 0.075 0.016 -0.014 -0.001 0.070 
Bold:p-value <0.01; bold and italics: p-value<0.05; italics:p-value<0.10 
Note*1: Inpatient admission information concerns sample with conditional (≥1) number of inpatient admissions  
Note*2: Any medical visit concerns sample with total (including 0) number of any visits except from dentist visit and inpatient 
admissions 
Note*3: GP/ HCC physician visits and specialist visits concern sample with conditional number of visits for “individuals who reported at 
least once consultation – any medical visit (≥1)”   
 
 
 
276 
 
Figure 6.1: Income – inequity in the probability of health care use types in SHARE 
 
Figure 6.2: Income-inequalities in the probability of health care use types (actual use; 
adjusted for need; HI) in SHARE 
 
6.4.3 Decomposition Analysis – Sources of inequality by type of care  
The results of the decomposition analyses provide indication of the inequity drivers. The 
contributing factors are displayed in detail in Tables 6.9-6.12 and Figures 6.3–6.7 that 
report the                            decomposition for all the health care types. Among other 
contributors we focus on income, region of residence, and SHIFs coverage in compliance 
with the main objectives of our study. Each Table in decomposition analysis includes 
information for: the mean values of the explanatory variables; the extent each contributor 
is distributed across income that is displayed by the partial concentration index (CI); the 
impact of each variable on health care use that is displayed by the Marginal Effect - ME 
(demand elasticity); the complete contribution of each variable to total income inequality; 
the sum and the % contribution to total income inequality. The positive (negative) sign of 
CI indicates that each contributor has a pro-rich (a pro – poor) distribution across income 
and is prevalent among the higher (lower) income groups. The complete contribution (in 
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the fourth column) depends on the impact (Margin effect - ME) of each variable on health 
care use and on its unequal distribution by income (CI). A negative (positive) contribution 
denotes that, if utilization was influenced only by that variable, then it would be pro-poor 
(pro-rich) favoring less (more) advantaged. The Tables can be interpreted in the same way 
as presented in the PatraHIS and GHIS respective chapters, using the example of the 
probability of a specialist visit. Overall, Tables 6.9-6.12 indicate: 
 Pro-poor (negative signs) are apparent for the contributions of need variables for all 
types of care, similar to existing evidence, except the case of probability of receiving 
dental care for which need-adjustment is mainly age standardized. Poorer SAH, chronic 
conditions, LTI, and limitations in general activities (GALI) factors reduce overall 
income –related inequality. They also indicate the greatest needs of the poor comparing 
to the better off.  
 Chronic conditions have the most negative contribution to inequity and consists the 
most important needs-adjustor. LTI has no contribution to income inequity for GP and 
dentists.  
 The non-need factors have a non systemic effect on patterns of health care use by 
income groups. Income has a large effect on inequity in most health care types, but is 
not the only contributor, given that education or SHIF coverage factors do not have 
constant effect. 
 Income contributes positively (pro-rich) to inequity in the probability of inpatient 
admissions, as well as in dentist visit favoring the better off. Higher income elderly are 
more likely to have an inpatient admission and a dentist visit than the worse off elderly. 
 On the other hand, income contributes negatively (pro-poor) to distribution of inequity 
in probability of any medical visit, of GP visit and probability of specialist visits, 
favoring the less advantaged. Less advantaged are more likely to make any medical 
visit, to visit a GP and make a specialist visit than more advantaged, holding all the 
other factors constant. 
 Higher educational level increases inequity in all health care types, apart from 
specialists.  
 The third important non-need contributor is the degree of urbanization. Compared to 
densely populated areas, inequalities are apparent for all health care types due to the 
positive effect of thinly- populated areas, favoring the better off, as following.  
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 Residents of thinly-populated areas – who tend to be less advantaged - face slightly 
pro-rich inequalities in all health care types (inpatient admissions, any medical visit, 
GP/ HCC physician visit, specialist and dentist visits) and significant pro-rich 
inequalities in the probability of inpatient admissions indicating major interregional 
inequalities. 
 On the other hand, residents of intermediate-populated areas – who tend to be more 
advantaged - face weak pro-poor inequalities in all health care types, favoring the 
worse off, apart from no income inequity in the probability of GP/HCC physician 
visits. 
 If we examine the region of residence effect, compared to region of Attiki-Athens, weak 
inter-regional and intra-regional differences are apparent for most health care types, 
apart from no income-related inequity in the probability of making a specialist visit. 
 Region of residence has a similar impact on inequity in the probability of specialist 
visit and probability of any medical visit. The elderly have equal probability to make 
a specialist visit irrespective of their income and their region of residence.  
 Similarly, income-related inequity in any medical visit is not apparent for residents 
of Central Greece and Islands, whereas it is pro-rich for residents of North Greece.  
 Residents of North Greece-Thessaloniki face inequalities in the probability of 
inpatient admissions, any medical visit and dentist visits favoring the better off, but 
they do not face inequalities in probability of GP/HCC physician visits and specialist 
visits. They are more likely to make a GP/HCC and a specialist visit, irrespective of 
their income.  
 Residents of Central Greece region -less advantaged - slightly face pro-poor inequity 
in probability of inpatient admissions and pro-rich inequity in GP and dentist visits. 
They do not face inequalities in any medical visit and specialist visits, as well.  
 On the other hand, Islands region (including Crete) has the weakest effect on overall 
income-related inequity, except for inequity in GP/HCC visits, favoring the better 
off.  
 Social health insurance fund (SHIF) coverage explains a high percentage of 
inequalities: 
 Compared to Non-Noble IKA, SHIF coverage factor reduces inequity in probability 
of inpatient admissions, in probability of GP and dentist visits favoring the worse off.  
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 But, SHIF coverage increases income-related inequity in probability of any medical 
visit and specialist visits favoring the better off, revealing important inequalities.  
 OGA SHIF coverage increases inequity in the probability of any medical visit and 
specialist visits favoring the better off, while it strongly reduces inequity in the 
probability of inpatient admissions, GP/HCC and dentist visits favoring the worse 
off. 
 Noble SHIF coverage increases inequity only in dentist visits, whereas it reduces 
inequity in the probability of inpatient admissions, GP and specialist visits favoring the 
worse off. It has no effect on inequity in the probability of any medical visit. Marital 
status has a weak negative contribution in inequity in probability of inpatient 
admissions, GP and specialist visits favoring the worse off.  
 Household composition and housing tenure have weak positive to no effect on inequity 
in probability of inpatient admissions and dentist visit whereas it has no effect on 
inequity other health care types. Figures 6.3-6.7 indicate the effect of the non-need 
factors to income-related inequity via the decomposition analysis procedure. 
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Table 6.9:  Detailed Decomposition of inequality in the probability of inpatient admissions and probability of any medical visits 
  Probability of inpatient admissions Probability of  any medical visit 
 
Mean CI Margin Effect Contrib. Sum Mean CI Margin Effect Contrib. Sum 
CI unadjusted  -0.001     -0.006    
HI index  0.075     0.016    
        -0.075 -0.075       -0.022 -0.022 
Age (80+ vs 50-59) 0.083 -0.287 0.004 -0.001 
 
0.083 -0.291 0.002 -0.001 
 Age (70-79 vs 50-59) 0.258 -0.161 0.040 -0.006 
 
0.259 -0.161 0.012 -0.002 
 Age (60-69 vs 50-59) 0.309 0.028 0.040 0.001 -0.006 0.308 0.028 0.011 0.000 -0.002 
male vs female 0.464 0.077 0.269 0.021 0.021 0.465 0.077 -0.041 -0.003 -0.003 
SAHEU “Less than Good” (Fair. Bad. Very Bad) vs “Very 
Good & Good”  0.376 -0.135 0.173 -0.023 -0.023 0.375 -0.136 0.009 -0.001 -0.001 
Long Term Illness (Yes vs No) 0.378 -0.051 0.102 -0.005 -0.005 0.376 -0.053 0.027 -0.001 -0.001 
Limited in General Activities Gali (Yes) vs No  0.310 -0.131 0.378 -0.050 -0.050 0.308 -0.135 0.028 -0.004 -0.004 
 “2 + chronic diseases” vs "0" 0.411 -0.105 0.078 -0.008 
 
0.408 -0.107 0.158 -0.017 
  “1 chronic disease” vs "0 " 0.325 0.071 -0.048 -0.003 -0.012 0.325 0.072 0.096 0.007 -0.010 
Non Need variables                     
ln income (x) 8.946 0.060 0.529 0.031 0.031 8.944 0.060 -0.030 -0.002 -0.002 
"More than secondary" vs "Primary" Education 0.162 0.452 0.039 0.018 
 
0.161 0.452 0.008 0.003 
 "Secondary" vs "Primary" Education 0.293 0.101 0.025 0.002 0.020 0.294 0.101 0.013 0.001 0.005 
Married vs No  0.686 0.040 -0.112 -0.004 -0.004 0.688 0.040 0.029 0.001 0.001 
"Homeowner" vs "Not Homeowners" 0.630 -0.014 -0.009 0.000 0.000 0.629 -0.014 0.019 0.000 0.000 
"Couple/Other" vs "Alone" 0.735 0.028 0.221 0.006 0.006 0.736 0.029 0.007 0.000 0.000 
North Greece GR1 vs GR3 Attica 0.320 0.070 0.084 0.006   0.321 0.068 0.037 0.003   
Central Greece GR2 vs GR3 Attica 0.243 -0.101 0.006 -0.001 
 
0.244 -0.101 0.003 0.000 
 Islands +Crete GR4 vs GR3 Attica 0.091 -0.058 -0.001 0.000 0.005 0.091 -0.057 0.007 0.000 0.002 
Thinly-populated vs densely-populated 0.177 -0.198 -0.073 0.014   0.179 -0.197 -0.010 0.002   
Intermediate-populated vs densely -populated 0.389 0.059 -0.012 -0.001 0.014 0.388 0.058 -0.013 -0.001 0.001 
“Noble SHIFunds" vs  “Non Noble IKA" 0.378 0.216 -0.028 -0.006 
 
0.379 0.217 -0.001 0.000 
 “Non Noble OGA-SHIF” vs “Non Noble IKA" 0.189 -0.368 0.074 -0.027 -0.033 0.190 -0.366 -0.016 0.006 0.006 
sum 
   
-0.036 -0.036 
   
-0.009 -0.009 
error 
   
0.036 
    
0.003 
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Table 6.10: Detailed Decomposition of inequality in the probability of GP visits and specialist visits 
 
Probability of GP visits Probability of  specialist visits 
 
Mean CI Margin Effect Contrib. Sum Mean CI Margin Effect Contrib. Sum 
CI unadjusted  -0.018     -0.002    
HI index  -0.014     -0.001    
        -0.004 -0.004       -0.001 -0.001 
Age (80+ vs 50-59) 0.090 -0.284 0.005 -0.001 
 
0.084 -0.22 -0.008 0.002 
 Age (70-79 vs 50-59) 0.280 -0.151 0.015 -0.002 
 
0.286 -0.195 -0.008 0.002 
 Age (60-69 vs 50-59) 0.312 0.063 0.001 0.000 -0.004 0.309 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.003 
male vs female 0.430 0.076 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.419 0.095 -0.005 0.000 0.000 
SAHEU “Less than Good” (Fair. Bad. Very Bad) vs “Very Good 
& Good”  0.430 -0.132 0.008 -0.001 -0.001 0.468 -0.135 0.008 -0.001 -0.001 
Long Term Illness (Yes vs No) 0.440 -0.044 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.5 -0.047 0.014 -0.001 -0.001 
Limited in General Activities Gali (Yes) vs No  0.362 -0.128 -0.017 0.002 0.002 0.419 -0.102 0.012 -0.001 -0.001 
 “2 + chronic diseases” vs "0" 0.478 -0.103 0.017 -0.002 
 
0.535 -0.087 0.006 -0.001 
  “1 chronic disease” vs "0 " 0.338 0.088 0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.304 0.094 -0.009 -0.001 -0.001 
Non Need variables                     
ln income (x) 8.933 0.060 -0.013 -0.001 -0.001 8.94 0.06 -0.08 -0.005 -0.005 
"More than secondary" vs "Primary" Education 0.154 0.439 -0.017 -0.007 
 
0.168 0.449 0.001 0.000 
 "Secondary" vs "Primary" Education 0.288 0.108 -0.013 -0.001 -0.009 0.295 0.107 -0.009 -0.001 -0.001 
Married vs No  0.674 0.038 -0.036 -0.001 -0.001 0.692 0.034 -0.015 -0.001 -0.001 
"Homeowner" vs "Not Homeowners" 0.636 -0.019 -0.016 0.000 0.000 0.624 -0.026 0.009 0.000 0.000 
"Couple/Other" vs "Alone" 0.726 0.024 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.742 0.022 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
North Greece GR1 vs GR3 Attica 0.340 0.066 0.001 0.000   0.315 0.103 0.003 0.000   
Central Greece GR2 vs GR3 Attica 0.232 -0.113 -0.019 0.002 
 
0.23 -0.137 0.001 0.000 
 Islands +Crete GR4 vs GR3 Attica 0.095 -0.031 -0.017 0.001 0.003 0.104 -0.077 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Thinly-populated vs densely-populated 0.175 -0.191 -0.009 0.002   0.194 -0.23 -0.018 0.004   
Intermediate-populated vs densely -populated 0.387 0.059 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.372 0.082 -0.009 -0.001 0.003 
“Noble SHIFunds" vs  “Non Noble IKA" 0.368 0.211 -0.003 -0.001 
 
0.384 0.222 -0.002 -0.001 
 “Non Noble OGA-SHIF” vs “Non Noble IKA" 0.188 -0.377 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.192 -0.436 -0.007 0.003 0.003 
sum       -0.012 -0.012       -0.001 -0.001 
error 
   
-0.006 
    
-0.001 
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Table 6.11:  Detailed Decomposition of inequality in the probability of dentist visits 
  Probability of dentist visits 
 
Mean CI Margin Effect Contrib. Sum 
CI unadjusted  0.102    
HI index  0.070    
        0.033 0.033 
Age (80+ vs 50-59) 0.083 -0.288 -0.058 0.017 
 Age (70-79 vs 50-59) 0.259 -0.161 -0.134 0.022 
 Age (60-69 vs 50-59) 0.308 0.029 -0.061 -0.002 0.037 
male vs female 0.464 0.077 -0.052 -0.004 -0.004 
SAHEU “Less than Good” (Fair. Bad. Very Bad) vs “Very Good & Good”  0.376 -0.136 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Long Term Illness (Yes vs No) 0.377 -0.051 0.006 0.000 0.000 
Limited in General Activities Gali (Yes) vs No  0.310 -0.132 -0.009 0.001 0.001 
 “2 + chronic diseases” vs "0" 0.410 -0.106 0.006 -0.001 
  “1 chronic disease” vs "0 " 0.324 0.072 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
Non Need variables           
ln income (x) 8.946 0.059 0.305 0.018 0.018 
"More than secondary" vs "Primary" Education 0.162 0.452 0.078 0.035 
 "Secondary" vs "Primary" Education 0.293 0.100 0.079 0.008 0.043 
Married vs No  0.686 0.040 0.011 0.000 0.000 
"Homeowner" vs "Not Homeowners" 0.630 -0.014 0.049 -0.001 -0.001 
"Couple/Other" vs "Alone" 0.735 0.028 0.033 0.001 0.001 
North Greece GR1 vs GR3 Attica 0.321 0.070 0.026 0.002   
Central Greece GR2 vs GR3 Attica 0.243 -0.102 -0.020 0.002 
 Islands +Crete GR4 vs GR3 Attica 0.091 -0.058 0.006 0.000 0.004 
Thinly-populated vs densely-populated 0.178 -0.198 -0.022 0.004   
Intermediate-populated vs densely -populated 0.389 0.059 -0.050 -0.003 0.001 
“Noble SHIFunds" vs  “Non Noble IKA" 0.377 0.217 0.024 0.005 
 “Non Noble OGA-SHIF” vs “Non Noble IKA" 0.190 -0.367 0.023 -0.008 -0.003 
sum       0.097 0.097 
error       0.006   
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Table 6.12: Overall Decomposition of inequity in inpatient nights, any medical visits, GP/HCC physician visits, specialist visits, dentist visits 
 Probability of  inpatient 
admission 
Probability of  any medical 
visits 
Probability of GP/HCC 
physician visits 
Probability of  specialist 
visit 
Probability of dentist 
visit 
  CIndex   CIndex   CIndex   CIndex   CIndex   
CI unadjusted -0.001   -0.006   -0.018   -0.002   0.102  
HI index 0.075   0.016   -0.014   -0.001   0.070   
  Contrib. to 
Inequality 
% Contrib. Contrib. to 
Inequality 
% Contrib. Contrib. to 
Inequality 
% Contrib. Contrib. to 
Inequality 
% Contrib. Contrib. to 
Inequality 
% Contrib. 
Need -0.075   -0.0219   -0.004   -0.001   0.033   
Age -0.006 1203.86% -0.0023 37.50% -0.004 19.97% 0.003 -156.09% 0.037 35.74% 
Gender 0.021 -3949.10% -0.0032 52.44% 0.000 -1.08% 0.000 20.54% -0.004 -3.85% 
Health Status -SAH -0.023 4463.84% -0.001 20.64% -0.001 5.85% -0.001 49.87% 0.000 -0.23% 
Health Status - Health Limitations (LTI, Gali. Chronic 
Disease) 
-0.066 12684.16% -0.015 251.63% 0.000 -2.57% -0.003 152.92% 0.000 0.39% 
Ln (income) 0.031 -6008.78% -0.002 29.56% -0.001 4.24% -0.005 230.36% 0.018 17.73% 
Other Non-Need                     
Education 0.020 -3840.78% 0.005 -78.48% -0.009 47.90% -0.001 32.96% 0.043 42.15% 
Marital Status -0.004 857.99% 0.001 -19.16% -0.001 7.46% -0.001 24.30% 0.000 0.42% 
Housing Tenure 0.000 -23.20% 0.000 4.27% 0.000 -1.71% 0.000 11.55% -0.001 -0.68% 
Household Composition  0.006 -1174.51% 0.000 -3.14% 0.000 0.18% 0.000 0.83% 0.001 0.89% 
Region of Residence (vs Urban- Nuts1 Athens) 0.005 -1009.61% 0.002 -29.62% 0.003 -14.92% 0.000 -9.31% 0.004 3.45% 
Degree of urbanisation (vs Densely populated area) 
0.014 -2625.66% 0.001 -19.18% 0.002 -8.56% 0.003 -167.67% 0.001 1.39% 
Social Health Insurance Fund (SHIF) Coverage -0.033 6344.57% 0.006 -91.43% -0.002 10.48% 0.003 -123.15% -0.003 -3.10% 
Error 0.036 -6822.55% 0.003 -55.04% -0.006 32.79% -0.001 32.89% 0.006 5.70% 
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Figures 6.3 - 6.7 Contribution to inequity - SHARE 
Figure 6.3: Contribution to inequity in the probability of inpatient admission – SHARE 
(excluding need variables) 
 
Figure 6.4: Contribution to inequity in the probability of any medical visit – SHARE 
                     (excluding need variables) 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Contribution to inequity in the probability of GP visit– SHARE (excluding   
need variables) 
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Figure 6.6: Contribution to inequity in the probability of specialist visit– SHARE 
(excluding need variables) 
 
Figure 6.7: Contribution to inequity in the probability of dentist visit– SHARE 
(excluding need variables) 
 
6.4.4 Regression Results – Determinants of use in health care  
 Indicators of health care need are the most significant determinants of health service use in all 
areas (except dental care where only age was considered needs -related), mainly the presence 
of activity limitations (GALI), chronic medical conditions and the SAH. About the effect of 
age and gender, older individuals are more likely to be admitted to hospital, and less likely to 
visit a specialist and a dentist. Women are significantly more likely to make any visit, to visit 
a specialist and a dentist, and less likely for inpatient admission (Table 6.13). 
 Non-need factors such as: education, region of residence, degree of urbanization and SHIF 
coverage are also significantly associated with health care use, but not the income. 
 Income has a weak relation with health care utilisation. Only less advantaged older 
individuals in income level 2 are much more likely to make a specialist visit than the poorer 
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individuals in lower groups, whereas all income groups are insignificantly less likely to make 
a GP/HCC physician visit than those in lowest income group.  
 Compared to lower educational level, higher level of education has a strong positive 
association (more likely) only with the probability of a dentist visit and a strong negative 
association (less likely) with the probability of GP/HCC physician visit.  
 Degree of urbanization reveals significant systematic variations in health care use. Residents 
of thinly-populated and intermediate-populated areas use consistently less health care services 
in all types of care. Residents of thinly-populated areas are significantly less likely to have an 
inpatient admission, to make any medical or specialist visit. Residents of intermediate-
populated areas are significantly less likely to make a dentist visit, too.  
 Considering the effect of region of residence, significant inter-regional variations for any 
medical and GP visits are apparent. Compared to Athens, residents of all regions (mainly 
from North Greece-Thessaloniki and Islands) are significantly more likely to make any 
medical visit. Residents of Central Greece and Islands (including Crete) are significantly less 
likely to report any GP/HCC physician visit. However, weak intra-regional variations are 
apparent for the probability of inpatient admissions, specialist and dentist visits.  
 SHIF coverage has a non systematic significant association with the probability of having 
inpatient admissions. Compared to Non Noble IKA SHIF, OGA beneficiaries are significantly 
more likely to have an inpatient admission maybe due to worse health status, and significantly 
less likely to make any medical visit, highlighting significant variations. Both Noble SHIFs 
and Non-Noble OGA SHIFs beneficiaries are less likely to make any medical or specialist 
visit. In addition, they are weakly more likely to make a dentist visit.  
 The other non-need factors of marital status, housing tenure and household composition have 
a weak non-systematic association with all health care types. 
Overall, our findings of the main determinants of health care use are compatible with existing 
international and greek evidence for the general population (Phelps and Newhouse, 1974; 
Newhouse and Marquis, 1978; Wagstaff, 1986; Kasper, 1986; Feldstein, 1988; McGuire et al., 
1988; Marmot and Wilkinson, 1999). More specifically, chronic health problems, perceived 
morbidity, self-rated health, older age, female gender, marital status, education, income, degree 
of urbanization, geographical region and insurance coverage are considered as the most 
important determinants of health services use in the Greek studies (Zavras et al, 2014;Tountas et 
al, 2011; Lahana E. et al, 2011;Alexopoulos and Geitona, 2009;Pappa and Niakas, 2006; 
Economou, 2006; Geitona et al., 2007, Bíró A.,2014). 
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Table 6.13 Regression model analysis for probability of inpatient admissions,of any medical visits, GP visits, specialist visit and dentist visit based on 
SHARE dataset (the last 12 months) 
  
Probability of inpatient 
admission 
Probability of any 
medical visit 
Probability of 
GP visit 
Probability of 
specialist visit 
Probability of 
dentist visit 
    SE   SE   SE   SE   SE 
Need                     
Age (80+ vs 50-59) 1.15 0.35 1.06 0.30 1.37 0.40 0.25 0.13 0.26 0.06 
Age (70-79 vs 50-59) 1.25 0.31 1.30 0.27 1.39 0.29 0.64 0.31 0.42 0.06 
Age (60-69 vs 50-59) 1.15 0.27 1.25 0.18 1.03 0.17 0.98 0.36 0.75 0.09 
male vs female 2.00 0.34 0.59 0.07 1.03 0.14 0.83 0.26 0.83 0.08 
SAHEU “Less than Good” (Fair. Bad. Very Bad) vs “Very Good & 
Good”  1.69 0.37 1.21 0.22 1.10 0.19 1.42 0.54 1.01 0.13 
Long Term Illness (Yes vs No) 1.35 0.29 1.86 0.34 1.05 0.17 1.37 0.52 1.02 0.13 
Limited in General Activities Gali (Yes) vs No  3.26 0.74 2.16 0.46 0.77 0.14 1.55 0.60 0.95 0.13 
 “2 + chronic diseases” vs "0" 1.31 0.40 6.41 1.27 1.19 0.26 1.36 0.61 1.03 0.15 
 “1 chronic disease” vs "0 " 0.86 0.25 2.87 0.42 1.02 0.19 0.75 0.29 1.00 0.12 
Non Need variables                     
Income Q5: 16045.66+€ vs IncQ1:<= 4928.00€ 1.57 0.46 1.03 0.20 0.79 0.18 0.76 0.38 1.24 0.19 
Income Q4: 9866.68€ - 16045.65€ vs  IncQ1:<= 4928.00€ 1.34 0.37 1.11 0.22 0.73 0.16 1.05 0.51 1.04 0.16 
Income Q3:7127.01€ - 9866.67€ vs  IncQ1:<= 4928.00€ 1.44 0.38 1.16 0.23 0.89 0.20 0.71 0.31 1.04 0.16 
Income Q2:4928.01€ - 7127.00€ vs  IncQ1: <= 4928.00€ 1.27 0.33 0.98 0.20 0.77 0.17 2.61 1.44 1.03 0.16 
"More than secondary" vs "Primary" Education 1.39 0.41 1.28 0.25 0.59 0.12 1.06 0.58 2.14 0.33 
"Secondary" vs "Primary" Education 1.12 0.24 1.26 0.19 0.78 0.13 0.64 0.26 1.58 0.18 
Married vs No  0.78 0.23 1.22 0.33 0.74 0.20 0.64 0.65 1.02 0.19 
"Homeowner" vs "Not Homeowners" 1.02 0.17 1.19 0.15 0.86 0.12 1.18 0.34 1.14 0.11 
"Couple/Other" vs "Alone" 1.47 0.47 1.09 0.30 0.98 0.27 0.99 1.03 1.09 0.21 
North Greece GR1 vs GR3 Attica 1.35 0.27 2.00 0.31 0.99 0.16 1.30 0.46 1.15 0.13 
Central Greece GR2 vs GR3 Attica 1.05 0.27 1.13 0.20 0.62 0.12 1.12 0.47 0.85 0.13 
Islands +Crete GR4 vs GR3 Attica 0.98 0.35 1.58 0.43 0.42 0.10 0.98 0.51 1.11 0.22 
Thinly-populated vs densely-populated 0.63 0.17 0.69 0.15 0.78 0.16 0.28 0.12 0.80 0.13 
Intermediate-populated vs densely -populated 0.94 0.18 0.80 0.12 0.99 0.15 0.65 0.23 0.81 0.09 
“Noble SHIFunds" vs  “Non Noble IKA" 0.91 0.19 0.96 0.13 0.96 0.14 0.89 0.30 1.10 0.12 
“Non Noble OGA-SHIF” vs “Non Noble IKA" 1.62 0.38 0.60 0.12 1.04 0.23 0.55 0.26 1.23 0.19 
Bold:p-value <0.01; bold and italics: p-value<0.05; italics:p-value<0.10 
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6.4.5 Regression Results – Determinants of  OOPPs in use of health care 
OOP payments are reported at an equal percentage among inpatient and outpatient care, though 
the mean OOP amount for inpatient care (1483€) is 4.5 times higher than the mean OOP 
amount for outpatient care (330€), as expected. Overall, we observe that OOP expenses 
constitute a significant financial burden to inpatient and outpatient care, irrespective of the 
income level, the region of residence and SHIF coverage of older population. In SHARE 
database we have the chance not only to examine the determinants of the probability of paying 
OOP for inpatient and outpatient health care but also to explore the determinants of OOP 
amount for inpatient and outpatient care, as following.  
 About need variables, chronic conditions and bad SAH are significantly positively 
associated with paying higher OOP mean amount for both inpatient and outpatient care. 
 About non need variables, “couple/family” marital status is significantly positively 
associated with paying higher OOP mean amount for inpatient care. More than secondary 
school level is also significantly positively associated with facing OOP for outpatient care. 
 About the effect of income, older people are more likely to pay higher OOP mean amount 
for inpatient and outpatient care, irrespective of their income. 
 Compared to Non Noble IKA, Noble SHIFs beneficiaries are insignificantly more likely to 
pay OOP for inpatient and outpatient care, and OGA SHIF beneficiaries are less likely to 
pay OOP for inpatient and outpatient care. 
 Residents from all regions - except for Islands- and all areas of urbanization are 
insignificantly more likely to pay higher OOP mean amount for inpatient care, and 
insignificantly less likely to pay higher OOP amount for outpatient care.  
 Compared to densely-populated areas, residents of thinly populated areas – who are less 
advantaged- are insignificantly more likely to pay OOP for inpatient and outpatient care. 
They are more likely to pay higher OOP mean amount for receiving inpatient care. 
In our analysis, we have also the chance to explore to what extent OOP payments for inpatient 
and outpatient care are related to ability to pay as expressed by income and whether they differ 
by SHIF coverage, by degree of urbanization and region of residence. Our findings 
summarized-as displayed in Table 6.15, include the following: 
a) For inpatient care, our analysis reveals a regressive trend in OOP amount for inpatient care 
in terms of ability to pay and region of residence and significant variations among SHIFs.  
 There is a clear trend that OOP mean amount for inpatient admission decreases as the 
income level accedes from the 2nd poorest to richest level, revealing a regressive 
relationship in ability to pay. Elderly in the 2
nd
 poor income quintile face the highest OOP 
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amount (2012.94€) that is almost twice the OOP amount (1118.83 €) paid by the 5th 
richest  
 By SHIF coverage, we find that all SHIFs beneficiaries pay almost the same OOP amount 
except for Noble SHIFs beneficiaries. Noble SHIFs beneficiaries, who tend to be better 
off, face slightly higher OOP amount (almost 70€ more). Among the Non Noble SHIFs, 
OGA beneficiaries pay higher OOP mean amount than those with IKA SHIF coverage. 
 The association of OOP mean amount for inpatient care by degree of urbanization and 
region of residence, indicates that: 
 Residents of thinly-populated areas and residents of Central Greece region – who 
tend to be less advantaged - have less inpatient admissions (lower use proportion) 
and pay higher OOP mean amount almost twice the OOP mean amount paid by the 
residents of intermediate-populated areas, almost twice the OOP mean amount paid 
by the residents of Attiki and three times more the OOP mean amount paid by 
residents of Islands. 
 If we consider the mean annual gross total household income of the sample equalized 
that is estimated 11468€, the higher OOP mean amount of thinly populated areas 
(2107€) for inpatient care represents 18% of the household annual gross income, and 
the higher OOP mean amount of Central Greece (2324€) represents 20% of the 
household annual gross income, which is significant and may reveal catastrophic 
payments for inpatient care.  
b) For outpatient care, our analysis reveals a progressive trend in OOP amount for outpatient 
care in terms of ability to pay, SHIF coverage and region of residence, in contrast with 
inpatient care. 
 It reveals a progressive relationship of OOP mean amount for outpatient care by income 
quintile. The OOP amount increases as the income quintile increases, except the 1
st
 
poorest. The OOP amount for outpatient care is similar among the income quintiles but it 
is significantly lower than the OOP amount for inpatient care. 
 By SHIF coverage, Non –Noble IKA beneficiaries face almost equal OOP amount with 
Noble beneficiaries. They also face higher OOP mean amount than the Non Noble OGA.  
 By region of residence, it is obvious that the residents of densely-populated areas and 
regions of North Greece-Thessaloniki and Attiki -Athens report the highest OOP amount 
versus residents of Central Greece – who tend to be less advantaged. 
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Bold:p-value <0.01; bold and italics: p-value<0.05; italics:p-value<0.10 
: Regression model analysis for probability (yes/no) of paying OOP for inpatient admissions and outpatient visits and probability of paying OOP positive (≥1€) amount 
for inpatient (>672.6€)  vs (1€ - 672.6€) and outpatient care (>194.4€) vs (1€ - 194.4€) based on SHARE dataset 
 Probability of conditional  
OOPP for inpatient 
admissions (≥1€ versus 0€ - 
yes/no) 
OOP amount for 
inpatient admissions 
(>672.6€)  vs (1€ - 
672.6€) 
Probability of 
conditional OOPP for 
outpatient care (≥1€ 
versus 0€ - yes/no) 
OOPP amount for 
outpatient care 
(>194.4€) vs (1€ - 
194.4€) 
     SE   SE   SE   SE 
Need                 
Age (80+ vs 50-59) 1.13 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.67   0.13   0.58 0.15 
Age (70-79 vs 50-59) 1.13 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.82   0.11   0.66 0.13 
Age (60-69 vs 50-59) 0.47 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.74   0.09   0.78 0.13 
male vs female 0.93 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.76   0.07   0.86 0.12 
SAHEU “Less than Good” vs “Very Good & Good”  2.08 0.99 0.99 0.64 1.05   0.13   1.69 0.28 
Long Term Illness (Yes vs No) 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.50 1.11   0.13   0.93 0.15 
Limited in General Activities Gali (Yes) vs No  1.76 0.96 0.96 0.65 1.58   0.20   1.29 0.23 
 “2 + chronic diseases” vs "0" 0.56 6.63 6.63 7.38 1.52   0.22   1.79 0.37 
 “1 chronic disease” vs "0 " 1.02 2.28 2.28 2.75 1.47   0.18   1.16 0.21 
Non Need variables                 
Income Q5: 16045.66+€ vs IncQ1:<= 4928.00€ 1.04 4.26 4.26 4.03 1.00   0.15   1.28 0.28 
IncomeQ4: 9866.68€-16045.65€ vs  IncQ1:<= 4928.00€ 0.81 2.59 2.59 2.88 0.95   0.14   1.11 0.23 
Income Q3:7127.01€ - 9866.67€ vs  IncQ1:<= 4928.00€ 0.98 2.81 2.81 2.42 1.04   0.15   1.15 0.23 
Income Q2:4928.01€ - 7127.00€ vs  IncQ1: <= 4928.00€ 1.10 3.09 3.09 2.59 1.05   0.15   1.24 0.26 
"More than secondary" vs "Primary" Education 3.09 0.16 0.16 0.20 1.50   0.23   1.52 0.34 
"Secondary" vs "Primary" Education 1.72 1.11 1.11 0.86 1.76   0.20   1.18 0.19 
Married vs No  1.82 0.10 0.10 0.10 1.06   0.20   0.92 0.26 
"Homeowner" vs "Not Homeowners" 0.63 0.60 0.60 0.35 0.98   0.09   1.02 0.14 
"Couple/Other" vs "Alone" 0.18 23.82 23.82 23.21 0.61   0.12   1.02 0.30 
North Greece GR1 vs GR3 Attica 0.92 1.11 1.11 0.68 1.49   0.16   0.81 0.13 
Central Greece GR2 vs GR3 Attica 0.67 1.54 1.54 1.22 1.06   0.15   0.56 0.12 
Islands +Crete GR4 vs GR3 Attica 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.52 0.82   0.16   0.75 0.23 
Thinly-populated vs densely-populated 1.27 2.50 2.50 2.16 1.26   0.20   0.94 0.20 
Intermediate-populated vs densely -populated 0.62 1.12 1.12 0.69 0.77   0.08   0.87 0.14 
“Noble SHIFunds" vs  “Non Noble IKA" 1.43 0.64 0.66 0.48 1.03   0.11   0.97 0.14 
“Non Noble OGA-SHIF” vs “Non Noble IKA" 0.79 0.38 0.55 0.44 0.85   0.12   0.66 0.14 
Table 6.14: Regression model analysis for probability (yes/no) of paying OOP for inpatient admissions and outp tient visits and probability of paying OOP positive 
(≥1€) amount for inpatient (>672.6€)  vs (1€ - 672.6€) and outpatient care (>194.4€) vs (1€ - 194.4€) based on SHARE dataset 
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6.5 Discussion 
The purpose of the present study was to explore income–related inequalities in utilisation 
of health care among older population aged over 50 in Greece, to investigate national 
regional inequalities as one of the main contributors to the overall inequity and explore the 
role of out of pocket payment mechanism (OOPP) in health care use as a financial barrier 
to access. Our findings, summarized, reveal the contribution of our study to inequalities in 
health care use among the elderly, as following: 
6.5.1 Inequity in utilization of health care services by health care type 
 The most important determinants of health services utilization by the elderly are the 
indicators of health care need, mainly the presence of activity limitations (GALI), the 
existence of chronic medical conditions, the bad SAH, older age and gender. Older 
individuals are more likely to be admitted to hospital, and less likely to visit a specialist 
and a dentist. Women are significantly more likely to make any visit, to visit a specialist 
and a dentist, and less likely to be admitted as an inpatient. From non need indicators 
education, income, degree of urbanization, region, insurance coverage, marital status 
Table 6.15: Percentage and mean OOP positive amount (>0€) for inpatient and outpatient care during 
the last 12 months by Income, SHIFs, degree of urbanization and region of residence 
 
Inpatient conditional (>1) 
number of admissions 
Outpatient conditional (>1) number 
of visits 
 
% Mean (€) SE N % Mean(€) SE N 
By Income          
Income Quintile 5: 16045.66+ 45.3% 1118.83 230.49 19 48.9% 386.37 62.92 272 
Income Quintile 4: 9866.68 – 16045.65 49,6% 1467.90 288.81 24 47.2% 344.71 32.60 270 
Income Quintile 3: 7127.01 – 9866.67 46.9% 1941.27 661.26 25 47.5% 321.93 28.66 258 
Income Quintile 2: 4928.01 – 7127.00 48.6% 2012.94 616.78 24 48.3% 299.91 21.78 252 
Income Quintile 1: ≤ 4928.00 46.2%   692.30 135.30 22 46.9% 294.79 33.61 255 
By SHIFs  
   
    
Noble SHIF 52.0% 1544.27 372.63 37 48.4% 330.61 24.86 486 
Non Noble OGA SHIF 45.4% 1474.08 493.24 28 45.9% 265.88 24.99 213 
Non Noble IKA SHIF 43.3% 1473.01 343.85 46 48.3% 334.31 19.99 564 
By degree of urbanisation  
   
    
Thinly populated 49.1% 2107.75 737.23 21 50.8% 292.17 27.71 216 
Intermediate populated 41.4% 1045.20 212.45 36 44.5% 329.78 37.30 425 
Densely populated 52.1% 1557.42 303.97 57 49.4% 345.34 21.,67 666 
By Region of Residence  
   
    
North Greece (GR1) 44.4% 1287.95 263.86 37 52.1% 374.19 41.07 470 
Central Greece (GR2) 40.6% 2324.18 699.98 19 46.2% 229.99 18.92 237 
Islands (GR4) 40.4% 820.60 267.65   6 40.4% 257.22 46.79 66 
Attiki – Athens (GR3) 57.2% 1345.48 319.81 52 46.8% 367.79 22.09 534 
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and household composition are considered as the most important determinants, but not 
with the same strength for all the health care types.  
 Inequity in utilization of health care services by health care type 
 Significant pro-rich inequity in probability of inpatient admissions and dentist visits.  
 Slightly pro-rich inequity in probability of any medical visit is apparent. 
 Among the better off elderly who report a medical visit, weak pro-poor inequity was 
found in probability of GP/ HCC physician visit. 
 Almost no significant income-related inequity was found in probability of specialist 
visits, slightly favoring less advantaged. 
 Income has a strong positive (pro-rich) effect on inequity in probability of inpatient 
admissions and probability of dentist visits. It has a weak positive effect on 
probability of any medical visit.  
 Among the elderly who report a medical visit, income has a weak negative (pro-
poor) effect on probability of GP/HCC physician visit and almost no effect on 
probability of specialist visits. 
6.5.1.1 Inequity in utilization of health care services - Comparison with existing 
literature  
By attempting to compare our findings for utilization of care among older population with 
the existing evidence mainly for general population, we conclude the following, based on 
literature review as presented at Chapter One and Appendix Table 1.2-1.5. 
 
Inequity in inpatient admissions (hospital utilization) 
Our findings of a pronounced pro-rich inequity in probability of inpatient admissions, are 
in line with few studies and contradictory to more studies, as following. 
a) In line with: (i) an EU comparative pooled analysis of ECHP including Greece from 
1994-1998 of  Masseria, Koolman & Van Doorslaer, (2004) that found pro-rich inequity 
for inpatient care relevant to non-elective care; (ii) the Greek study of Siskou et al 
(2008) that analyzed private health payments by provider and type of service, which 
showed pro-rich inequity for the total number of private inpatient admissions; (iii) A 
Greek regional cross-sectional study in Thessaly in 2006 of Lahana E. et al (2011) that 
indicates pro-rich inpatient care, but this study has a small sample and its findings 
require caution. (iv) A comparative cross-sectional study for elderly using SHARE data 
– Wave 1 of Allin S. & Masseria C. (2006) which examined the relationship between 
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income and health care utilization across countries and found slightly pro-rich inequity 
in hospital care use. 
b) On the other hand, our finding is contradictory to: two EU comparative studies of the 
ECHP data including Greece of  Van Doorslaer, Koolman and Jones (2004) and Van 
Doorslaer & Masseria (2004) that measured income-related inequity in health care and 
found no income inequity after standardizing for need studies, and  
c) contradictory to: almost all Greek literature that argues no-income related inequity 
(Kyriopoulos et al, 2002; Tountas et al, 2011; Geitona et al, 2007; Siskou et al 2008; a 
telephone interview survey of Liaropoulos et al, 2008; and the urban setting study of 
Pappa E. and Niakas D., 2006). However, we need to treat these findings in caution 
because of limitations in their study design.  
d) contradictory to: two urban setting studies: (i) the cross-sectional study of Pappa E. and 
Niakas D., 2006 in the broader Athens area found that hospital admissions were related 
to need and no socio-economic factor was related; (ii) the cross-sectional study of 
Sissouras A, Karokis A et al (1996) in Patras’ the third largest urban area, within the 
Phase II framework (1993-1997) programme of W.H.O. European Healthy Cities 
Network Survey, that indicated no-income related inequalities in hospital admissions.   
e) For the elderly - contradictory to: a comparative cross-sectional study including Greece 
based on SHARE survey for older population, of Santos-Eggimann B. et al, 2005, and  
Majo M. C., van Soest A. (2012) who explored the relationship of determinants with 
utilization of health care and found a negative but very weak association and no income 
association with inpatient care and inpatient admissions;  
 
Inequity in any medical care (outpatient visit) 
According to our analysis, there is weak pro-rich inequity (almost no inequity) in 
probability of any medical visit. Furthermore, given that the variable “any medical 
consultation” by definition excludes dentist visits and inpatient nights but includes 
emergency and outpatient visits, we could compare our results for any medical visit with 
other evidence for inequity in outpatient visit provided in the wider PHC framework. This 
result is related to the OOP financial barrier of outpatient visits, as well,displayed below.  
a) This finding is in line with few existing evidence for general and elderly population: in 
line with: (i) two studies for general population of no association of socioeconomic 
characteristics with informal payments in public hospitals for outpatient admissions 
(Siskou et al, 2008; Liaropoulos et al, 2008); (ii) two studies evaluating cases treated in 
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the emergency department of a Greek general hospital - reported increased outpatient 
visits not associated with income - and revealed that almost one in three patients in 
specific surgical specialty groups, could have been managed by a GP (Marinos et al., 
2009), as could 40% of orthopaedic cases (Vasileiou et al., 2009); (iii) the results of the 
urban-setting study in Athens for the general population, that doesn’t find any income 
association for outpatient care (Pappa E. & Niakas D., 2006); (iv) the results of a study 
exclusively for elderly of Majo M. & Van Soest A. (2012) based on SHARE data that 
outpatient care does not increase with income.  
b) On the other hand, our finding is contradictory to: (i) the results of cross-sectional 
urban setting study of Sissouras A, Karokis A et al (1996) in Patras’ urban area, within 
the Phase II framework (1993-1997) programme of W.H.O. European Healthy Cities 
Network Survey, that indicated more conditional outpatient visits from those in lower 
SES – mainly for having diagnostic tests and medication prescribing. However, this is 
an older study undertaken before the NHS-ESY reforms of 2001.   
 
Inequity in GP/HCC physician visit 
Among the elderly who report a medical visit, there is a weak pro-poor inequity in 
probability of GP or HCC physician visit. It is worth mentioning that when we interpret 
findings of income-related equity in GP/HCC physician visits, it is important to keep in 
mind that the specific findings are not related to the whole sample of the study but they are 
connected to the individuals who report any medical visit favoring the better off. 
Moreover, given that there is undersupply of GPs in HCCs and oversupply of specialists, 
individuals in Greece usually refer to different specialists for their health problems 
according to their need. Therefore, in reality the question of GP visit or SHIF physician 
visit may be answered as a specialist visit, indicating caution in the interpretation of the 
findings. Consequently, our findings for inequity in GP visits are parallel to inequity in 
specialist visits. Moreover, in some cases, people consult a single provider – specialist 
regularly (or not often a GP at HCCs) and they consider him as their “personal” or 
“family” doctor. There are difficulties, thus, in comparing inequity results for specialists 
versus GP visits.  
a) This finding is compatible with: (i) few EU comparative studies of ECHP in Greece 
pooled analysis of 1994-2001 data of Bago d’Uvaa T., et al (2009, 2007); Bago d’Uvaa 
T. & Jones A. (2009; (ii) Van Doorslaer et al, 2006; and  Van Doorslaer & Masseria 
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(2004) using data of the ECHP 2000 for Greece, that found pro-poor inequity for the 
probability of GP visit. 
b) in line with: (i) a recent cross-sectional nationwide survey study of Zavras D et al, 
(2014) based on examined determinants of PHC services in Greece during 2006 using 
WHO methodology for assessing PHC (Üstün et al., 2001) and found that people with 
lower income report increased PHC services; (ii) another cross-sectional nationwide 
mail survey conducted in Greece 2001 - 2002 of Geitona et al, (2007) that examined the 
determinants of PHC and hospital care utilization and found that the number of PHC 
visits is affected by income only for poor population. 
c) in line with: (i) a cross-sectional regional study of Pappa E. and Niakas D. (2006) in the 
broader Athens area found that SHIF visits are related to pro poor socio-economic 
status. (ii) the cross-sectional urban setting study of Sissouras A, Karokis A et al (1996) 
in the third largest urban area of Patras’, within the Phase II framework (1993-1997) 
programme of W.H.O. European Healthy Cities Network Survey, that indicated more 
conditional SHIF visits from those in lower SES – almost no inequity. 
d) On the other hand, our finding is contradictory to:  (i) two studies of Van Doorslaer et 
al (2004; 2002) using data of the ECHP 1996 for Greece that found slightly pro-rich 
inequity for the probability of GP visit; (ii)  with a recent international study based on 
ECHP data concluded that in Greece higher SES users report average total number of 
GP and specialist visits three times larger than that of the lower SES users (i.e. predicted 
total number of GP users is 1:3.06) (Bago d’Uvaa T. & Jones A., 2009); (iii) a 
nationwide study that finds pro-rich family physician visit but once family physicians 
are not established - due to inexistence of GPs- individuals may consider a specialist as 
their “personal” or “family” doctor. Thus, the results should be treated in caution 
(Tountas et al, 2011).  
e) contradictory to: two studies exclusively for elderly of Majo M. & Van Soest A. (2012) 
and (Allin S. & Masseria C., 2006) based on SHARE data indicated that GP visits are 
positively associated with income.  
 
Inequity in specialist care 
Among the better off who report any medical visit, there is no income-related inequity in 
the probability of specialist visit, slightly favoring less advantaged. Therefore, the elderly 
have equal probability to make a specialist visit, irrespective of their income level. The use 
of specialist health care services is related to need.  
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a) Overall, our findings are in line with little evidence for the general and elderly 
population: (i) a recent cross-sectional nationwide survey study of Zavras D et al, 
(2014) based on determinants of PHC services in Greece during 2006 using the 
methodology of the WHO (Üstün et al., 2001) found that people with lower income 
report increased PHC services; (ii) another cross-sectional nationwide mail survey 
conducted in Greece 2001 - 2002 of Geitona et al, (2007) examined the determinants of 
PHC and hospital care utilization and found that the number of PHC visits is affected by 
income only for poor population;  
b) in line with:(i) few nationwide studies with  evidence of no association of individuals’ 
socioeconomic characteristics with specialist care as an inpatient or outpatient  patient 
for the general population (Tountas et al, 2011; Siskou et al, 2008; Liaropoulos et al, 
2008). (ii) (iii) The cross-sectional regional study of Pappa E. and Niakas D., 2006 in 
the broader Athens area found that for specialist visits almost no (slightly pro rich) 
socio-economic factor was related; (iv) a study exclusively for elderly of Majo M. & 
Van Soest A. (2012) based on SHARE data that no clear association with SES is found. 
c) On the other hand, our finding is contradictory to: four EU comparative studies 
including Greece, of Van Doorslaer, Koolman and Jones (2004) and Van Doorslaer, 
Koolman and Puffer (2002) that measured income-related inequity in specialist care in 
1996; and Bago d’Uvaa T. & Jones A.(2009) and Bago d’Uvaa T. et al (2009) that made 
a pooled analysis of ECHP for Greece 1994-2001 and found significant pro-rich 
inequity for the probability of specialist visit. 
d) Is contradictory to Greek literature of Tountas et al, 2011; and Mergoupis et al, 2003; 
Kyriopoulos et al, 2002 that argue pro-rich inequity for specialist visits. Similarly, 
according to nationwide telephone survey of Souliotis et al (2016) for informal 
payments in health care in 2012, it indicated that more frequent visits to private health 
services (mainly PHC) are reported by persons with higher SES profile. 
e) Is contradictory to urban settings literature of regional cross-sectional studies: (i) in 
Thessaly in 2006 of Lahana E. et al (2011) for determinants of utilisation that indicates 
pro-rich specialist care, similar with (ii) the cross-sectional study of Sissouras A, 
Karokis A et al (1996) in Patras’ the third largest urban area, within the Phase II 
framework (1993-1997) programme of W.H.O. European Healthy Cities Network 
Survey, that indicated pro-rich inequalities in specialist visits.   
f) Is contradictory to studies for elderly of Allin S. & Masseria C., 2006 based on SHARE 
data and found slightly pro-rich inequity, whereas Allin S. et al, 2009 based on SHARE 
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wave 1 found that in Greece wealth-related difference in physician visits was greater 
than income differences.   
 
Inequity in dentist utilization 
Significant pro-rich inequity exists in probability of making a dentist visit; equal in 
magnitude to pro-rich inequality as far as probability of inpatient admissions is concerned. 
(a) Our findings that higher income has been positively associated with dental use as 
expected, are in compliance with other studies: (i) for the general population that identify 
higher dentist and dental care use by individuals in high SES (Koletsi-Kounari H. et al, 
2011; Pavi E, et al, 2010; Koletsi-Kounari H. et al, 2007; Zavras D. et al, 2004; Souliotis 
K. et al, 2016; Van Doorslaer E. & Masseria C., 2004; Kyriopoulos et al, 2002) (ii) A 
study that explored determinants of older Greek adults' oral health patterns found that that 
cost and no disease awareness were the most frequently mentioned barriers to regular 
dental visits (Naka O, Anastassiadou V, 2012) (iii) for the elderly (Majo M. & Van Soest 
A., 2012; Egimann S. et al, 2005; Allin S. & Mossialos, 2004 based on SHARE data that 
identify the significant effect of income in dentist and dental care use; and the study of 
Listl S. (2011) based on SHARE Wave 2 data that explored income inequalities in dental 
care use and preventive treatment by 50+ and found significant pro-rich inequity in dental 
care in Greece, and higher inequalities for preventive treatment among retired individuals. 
(iv) Moreover, a recent study of Listl S (2012) based on life-course data from SHARE 
(waves 1 to 3) that identified pro-higher education inequalities in regular dental attendance 
throughout the life-course and relatively inelastic until age yrs 65+ but not thereafter, due 
to age-related inequality decline in Greece. (b) Our finding is contradictory to: (i) a Greek 
study (Siskou et al, 2008) that found no association of income with dental care use; (ii) 
Few studies that indicate lower levels of oral health associated with those in lower income 
and lower SES (Yfantopoulos et al., 2014; Kyriopoulos et al, 2002).  
Overall, we could claim that the evidence for income-related inequity in inpatient and 
specialist care is mixed, comparing to evidence for inequity in any medical visit or 
outpatient, GP visits and dental care that is clearer. 
6.5.1.2 Inequity in utilization of health care services - Contribution to literature, new 
evidence and discussion 
The aforementioned literature showed that evidence about health care use and treatment is 
mixed: not all studies have found poorer treatment for those in older ages, with patterns 
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varying according to health condition and health care outcome considered (WHO, 2013). 
An important determinant of this diversity in health-care utilization is socioeconomic 
status. Overall, in terms of access to health care and inequalities in use, some interactions 
of low income have been found with gender, education level, region of residence, SHIF 
coverage, marital status and household composition. The highest educational level seems 
to have a significant effect on utilization, as well. It is also worth mentioning that income 
has a weaker effect on utilisation in SHARE dataset compared to the other two datasets – 
survey tools of our thesis. This issue is mainly related to the survey design of SHARE and 
the income measure definition that is completely different than PatraHIS and GNHIS. 
There are significant differences - mainly in definition (categorical versus continuous; and 
net versus gross), in components and in reference period (monthly versus annual) of 
income measure, between the data surveys that could result in response variations and 
overestimation or underestimation of the level of inequity. Thus, the different findings of 
pro-rich inequity in inpatient admissions of SHARE survey versus pro-poor inequity of 
PatraHIS and GNHIS, could be explained by the significant differences in income 
measure. This issue, as well as other differences in survey design, impedes the attempt to 
compare the findings of the three surveys, as we discuss at Methodology Chapter. 
However, evidence also suggests that once individual effects have been isolated, country 
inequalities in use are partly associated with national health policies that generally have not 
kept pace (WHO, 2015; WHO –CSDH, 2013). In Greek health system similar to most 
health systems, older people typically encounter a system that is not designed to address 
their needs, as it is designed around acute care model – in some cases poorly aligned with 
the dominant health issues of older age. This issue is more emphasized in Greece, given 
that LTC or elderly care has not been statutory established yet, and has been less of a 
priority. New approaches are needed to foster the egalitarian principle of equity in access 
NHS-ESY health services as a response to population ageing. Under this framework, our 
study contribute to existing literature by introducing more sophisticated statistical 
methodology in order to examine inequalities in use and breakdown the barriers that older 
people face due to gaps and inefficiencies of the Greek health care system of NHS-ESY in 
the daily provision and finance of health care, and explore challenges in the patterns of 
utilization. In particular, our findings of pro-rich inequity in probability of inpatient care 
and any medical visit corresponding to outpatient care are in accordance with and 
explained by the apparent regional variations favoring residents of thinly-populated areas – 
who tend to be less advantaged - and face pro-rich inequalities in the probability of having 
 
 
299 
inpatient admissions, as well as with the OOP expenses reported that constitute a 
significant financial burden against inpatient and outpatient care by the older people. 
Therefore, if we try to explain these findings, we need to consider the regional 
misallocation of hospital beds and health professionals of the Greek health care system that 
are concentrated in the two most crowded regions of the country. Consequently this 
misallocation of resources leads to uncontrollable interregional flows from rural to urban 
areas or to areas with large university hospitals offering expensive and high-technology 
services, despite possible transportation problems - and “forces” older population to private 
sector seeking for hospital and physician care. It is also related to the increased OOP and 
informal payments that patients face in order to bypass long waiting list to the NHS-ESY 
hospitals due to the demand pressure of the ESY hospitals. We discuss this issue, below. 
Under this framework, in terms of action on the social determinants of inequities in health 
care (WHO-CSDH,2013), given that the Greek NHS-ESY is in ongoing reform, the 
evidence derived by our study -targeting the older population -could be included as part of 
routine intelligence systems to reporting and implementation of action, in order to review 
and perform a comprehensive regional development policy with the aim of incentivizing 
actions on improving allocation of resources to meet health care or social objectives related 
to regional and local characteristics. It is also important to give adequate incentives for 
staffing, as we present below.  
Moreover, our findings of pro-poor inequity in probability of GP visit and the increased 
likelihood of less advantaged elderly to make a GP visit have a parallel gradient with 
specialist visits that conclude in slightly pro-poor or no-income inequity in the probability 
of specialist visits, and can be explained in parallel. Therefore, among the more advantaged 
elderly who make any medical visit, the less advantaged elderly are more likely to make a 
GP or have equal probability to make a specialist visit, irrespective of their income level, 
and the use of specialist health care services is related to need. These findings are related 
with the fragmented –bureaucratic way with a physician-driven (mainly specialist) 
organizational structure of the PHC system in Greek NHS-ESY. As aforementioned in 
Chapter Three, the lack of GPs in HCCs and other PHC centres (EOPYY-PEDI or ex IKA 
SHIF units) and the oversupply of specialists, result in the GP visits to correspond to 
specialist visits. In particular, despite the successive reforms focused on decentralization 
and the growing network of 220 HCCs mainly in rural areas and about 350 outpatient 
facilities owned by (EOPYY ex IKA SHIF) established in urban areas, an integrated PHC 
network based on GPs as gatekeepers was never established due to the hospital-oriented 
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NHS-ESY, under a number of weaknesses, including: inadequate staffing in GPs, 
oversupply of specialists; inadequate medical technology and infrastructure; inefficient 
allocation of resources between isolated regions versus less rural areas and urban areas, 
resulting in low quality of provided public PHC services. As a result, elderly, visit a HCC 
in rural areas or PEDY/SHIF physician in urban areas that is a specialist and not a GP, 
which for the majority of cases is not the proper first PHC contact. Consequently, given the 
inability of PHC centres to act as gatekeepers and referees between primary and secondary 
health care, the elderly patients choose to seek for private providers’ services or visit the 
outpatient facilities of NHS-ESY hospitals as a first PHC contact, making their demand 
pressure worse. This “enforcement” results in OOP expenses, and for some of the most 
poor and vulnerable, possibly in financial ruin. Therefore, in reality the question of any 
visit at HCC may be answered as a specialist visit, indicating caution in the interpretation 
of the findings for the Greek sample of SHARE dataset. n addition, the finding of 
significant pro-rich dental care is related to the poor social health insurance (SHI) 
coverage of dental care, the limited coverage of dental care in the public sector and the 
fragmented way which is provided in NHS-ESY and SHIFs facilities, similar to the other 
datasets and the existing literature. This inadequacy and weaknesses in dental care 
coverage, in combination with the oversupply of private dentists
77
 lead to extended use of 
private dental care sector with high expenditure, especially OOP and informal payments 
(Koletsi-Kounari H. et al, 2011; Siskou et al, 2008) with important implications.  
Overall, our study reveals the deep weaknesses of the Greek NHS-ESY system in terms of 
addressing inequalities in health care use by elderly population. A comprehensive, public- 
health response to the Greek population ageing will need to transform the fragmented 
inefficient Greek health care system that it seems to be misaligned with the population it 
serves. According to evidence of WHO (2015) and WHO-CSDH (2013), in these settings, 
concrete steps need to be taken by the Greek NHS-ESY to ensure that all older people have 
access to needed services – prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and long-term care – 
without the risk of the associated financial hardship that may affect them or their families. 
In particular, Greece similar to few OECD countries could adopt schemes or mechanisms 
to successfully generate universal coverage for ageing population in the following key 
areas: (i) aligning health systems with the needs of the older populations, by developing 
                                                          
77
 Compared to other OECD countries, Greece has the highest number (1.27) of dentists per 1000 inhabitants (OECD, 
2009) and in the same time there are pronounced imbalances in the geographical distribution of dentists,  with 
approximately 50% of all dentists employed in the greater Athens area. 
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and ensuring access to services that provide older-person centred and integrated care; (ii) 
developing systems for providing LTC – an important issue due to inexistence of LTC in 
Greece with a rapidly ageing population; (iii) creating age-friendly environments by 
combating age-based stereotypes, protecting the rights of older and enabling autonomy; 
(iv) improving understanding and monitoring of age-related needs, issues and determinants 
of healthy ageing. In addition, more mechanisms related social protection systems should 
be developed to identify and close more gaps in coverage to achieving equitable access, 
based on key policies such as:  
 universality of social protection coverage based on financial solidarity; and 
 coordination and coherence of existing social protection schemes in order to built a 
well-designed social safety net  based on effective and efficient administration and 
fiscal sustainability.  
 Involvement of population groups and civil society organizations that advocate for older 
adults in decision-making 
Moreover, in these circumstances, it is crucial to ensure that there is collaboration among 
the various schemes and that an integrated and holistic approach is used (WHO, 2015). 
6.5.2 Regional Variances in health care use - Contribution to inequalities in health 
care  
Our findings reveal territorial inequalities in use of most health care types, as following. 
(i) Residents of thinly-populated areas – who tend to be less advantaged - face slightly 
pro-rich inequalities in all health care types and stronger pro-rich inequalities in the 
probability of having inpatient admissions.  
(ii) Residents of thinly-populated areas, of Central Greece and Islands (including Crete) 
are significantly less likely to report making any GP/HCC physician visit, resulting in 
pro-rich inequalities in the probability of making a GP/HCC physician visit.  
(iii) On the other hand, among the better off who report any medical visit, residents of all 
regions are more likely to make a specialist visit and result in no income-related 
inequity in the probability of specialist visit. The elderly have equal probability to 
make a specialist visit, irrespective of their income and their region of residence.  
(iv) About dentist visits, residents of densely-populated areas and North Greece report the 
highest proportion of visits, whereas residents of thinly-populated areas and Central 
Greece report the lowest proportion of pro-rich dentist visits. 
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6.5.2.1 Regional Variances in health care use - Comparison with existing literature  
We compare existing literature for general population with our findings for utilization of 
care among older population, as following.  
a) Our finding (i) that residents of thinly-populated areas face stronger pro-rich 
inequalities in the probability of having inpatient admissions is in line with the evidence 
of pro-rich regional inpatient admissions favoring the residents of the urban regions 
(Van Doorslaer and Masseria, 2004; Lahana E et al, 2011 with a local study); and in line 
with the evidence of geographical proximity barrier in access to inpatient care 
(Economou C, 2015; Brokalaki et al., 2011; Eurofound, 2012; Kentikelenis et al, 2011; 
Anderson, 2004; Masseria C. et al, 2004;). On the other hand, it is contradictory to 
evidence in local and nationwide studies where inpatient care is related to health needs 
and not to socioeconomic factors (Pappa E. and Niakas D., 2006; Tountas et al, 2011; 
Kyriopoulos et al, 2002).  
b) Our finding (i) and (ii) are in line with the evidence that the residents of rural regions 
use in total - fewer health care services (PHC, outpatient, inpatient) comparing to urban 
areas (Zavras D et al, 2014; Tountas Y et al, 2011; Oikonomou N., Tountas Y, 2011; 
Lahana E et al, 2011; Marinos G et al, 2009); as well as in line with evidence of 
geographical proximity barrier to PHC (including access barrier to SHIFs’ physicians 
and to NHS rural HCCs) (Oikonomidou E. et al, 2010; Alber & Kohler, 2004); use less 
hospital care (Economou C, 2015; Brokalaki et al., 2011; Eurofound, 2012; Tountas et 
al, 2011; Kentikelenis et al, 2011; Anderson, 2004; Masseria C. et al, 2004;); in line 
with evidence of geographical proximity barrier to dentist visit favoring the residents of 
rural areas that have to travel to seek private dental visits at urban areas (Koletsi-
Kounari H. et al, 2007; Siskou et al, 2008).  
c) Our finding (ii) that the residents of thinly-populated areas, of Central Greece and 
Islands (including Crete) face pro-rich inequalities the probability of making a GP/HCC 
physician visit is compatible with the study of Oikonomidou E. et al, (2010) that reveals 
geographical proximity as barrier to receive care by the NHS rural HCCs and rural 
settings – (practices) that result in increased number of GP home visits to older patients 
in thinly populated areas; It is also in line with evidence of geographical proximity 
barrier in access to PHC (Economou C, 2015; Brokalaki et al., 2011; Eurofound, 2012; 
Kentikelenis et al, 2011; Anderson, 2004; Masseria C. et al, 2004;).On the other hand, it 
is contradictory to: the study of Geitona et al, (2007) that indicated increased use of 
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GPs by rural population (specifically of Central Greece and Epirus); and the study of 
Van Doorslaer, Koolman and Puffer (2002) that indicate slightly pro- poor probability 
of GP visits.  
d) Our findings (iii) that rural residents of thinly and intermediate-populated areas face no 
income-related inequity in specialist visits are in line with evidence that the residents of 
rural regions report increased utilization of SHIF and private specialists’ consultations, 
in bigger urban centres (Tountas et al, 2011; Oikonomou N., Tountas Y, 2011; Lahana 
E et al, 2011; Vadla D. et al, 2011; Siskou et al, 2008; Pappa, E. and Niakas, D.,2006, 
Geitona 2007; Van Doorslaer, Koolman & Pufffer,  2002; Van Doorslaer and Masseria 
C.,2004).  
6.5.2.2  Regional Variances in health care use - Contribution to literature, new 
evidence and discussion 
Our findings have a major contribution to new evidence of regional disparities. 
Understanding what drives geographic variation in utilization has important implications 
for policy by reorganizing existing services to meet health care objectives, especially for 
the older population. 
Overall, the evidence in our study suggests that geographic differences in health care use 
are not consistent with differences in need or patient preferences. Geographic variations in 
health care are explained by both demand and supply-side factors. From the supply-side, 
our findings indicate the regional misallocation of hospital beds and health professionals 
and reveal significant interregional disparities in resource allocation of the Greek health 
care system, as presented in detail in chapter three. They are also in line with the findings 
of DEA analyses that evaluate hospitals’ technical efficiency under the management of 
regional health authorities (RHAs). According to the data and relevant ratios, the less 
privileged regions lack adequate hospital infrastructure and specific categories of 
specialized physicians, given that the majority of hospital beds and physicians are 
concentrated in the two most crowded regions of the country (Attiki/Athens and Central 
Macedonia/Thessaloniki). On the other hand, on the demand side, several studies have 
showed the influence of socio-economic factors to under-use of services – ie. strong 
correlation with social deprivation of the residents of these regions (OECD 2014; Majeed 
et al., 2000). In particular, Central Greece, Islands, and the thinly-populated areas that 
report the highest inequalities and disparities in PHC and specialist care account for the 
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poorest regions in Greece
78 
with the lowest regional GDP per capita and the highest at-risk-
of poverty indicator (AROPE) for older population
79
 at NUTS1 level since 2004 till 2015, 
as in Chapter three (ELSTAT, 2016). Our findings of thinly-populated areas, Central 
Greece and Islands facing pro-rich inequities in probability of inpatient admissions and 
GP/HCC physicians are in line with these data, as well. Consequently, the inefficient 
geographical distribution of infrastructure and human resources in combination with the 
lack of staff results in underutilization of hospital beds with important implications. This 
issue is important due to the geographical peculiarity of the numerous islands and the fact 
that there is a greater concentration of less advantaged older people in rural areas who 
contribute to an increase in the need for health care. Thus, there is evidence of high 
percentages of uncontrollable interregional flows of patients from rural to urban areas. 
These interregional flaws of patients are also relevant to our finding of no inequity in the 
probability of making a specialist visit and making any medical visit, irrespective of 
income and region of residence. According to evidence of the Health and Welfare Map as 
it was estimated by the National School of Public Health in 2011, patients prefer to travel 
from rural and isolated areas (i.e. mountainous like poor regions of Epirus, Central Greece 
and islands) to urban areas such as Athens (33.2%) or areas with large university hospitals 
(in Thessaloniki 42.6% or in Ioannina- Epirus 66.3%) offering expensive and high-
technology services or visiting private providers (NSPH, 2012). This issue is important due 
to the geographical peculiarity of the regions and substantial transportation difficulties in 
financial and psychological terms, especially for the elderly (Mosialos et al al, 2005; 
Economou, 2010, Altanis P et al, 2008, Petmesidou M, 2006). However, the uncontrollable 
interregional flows to the ESY hospitals in urban areas exacerbate their demand pressure 
and the waiting lists that lead patients either to seek care in the private sector or face 
informal payments, in order to bypass the waiting list, placing at a disadvantage the 
vulnerable populations who do not have the ability to pay. 
Therefore, our findings of NHS-ESY failure to cover the needs of the population in remote 
areas, indicate that the Greek health system is not achieving either the level of performance 
it should, or its commitment to equity in use and universal health coverage (UHC) that are 
the main principles of the egalitarian Greek NHS-ESY since 1983. In order Greece to 
                                                          
78 The poorest regions with the lowest regional GDP per capita are Epirus, Western Greece and Thessaly and those with 
the lowest Gross Value Added are North Aegean, Epirus and Ionian Islands and East Macedonia & Thrace, according 
to the National Accounts by the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT, 2014).  
79 According to the trends of regional variations of at-risk-of poverty indicator (AROPE) for older population at NUTS1 
level from 2004-2015, the period prior crisis in 2004, the highest poverty is recorded at North Greece and Central 
Greece, whereas in 2015 the highest poverty is noted at Central Greece and the Aegean Islands (& Crete Island). 
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successfully generate universal health care coverage for ageing population and eliminate 
regional disparities in use, at first requires a transformation of the NHS-ESY to move 
towards the provision of older-person- centred and integrated care. This requires action in 
the following key areas: 
 The health system requires to be redesigned in a subnational level that has been shown 
to be more effective. This requires the redesign and fully implementation of the 
decentralization of ESY via the existing Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) that have 
been established but partially been implemented since 2001 till today. 
 The well establishment of LTC or elderly care – with the integration of health and social 
care services in a local level that will provide a real safety net for elderly. The starting 
point will need to put older people at the centre of health care, including them as active 
participants in care planning and in managing inequalities in health care according to 
the regional and local needs.  
 Moreover, in order the Government to respond to the issue of undersupply of medical 
staff in thinly-populated areas, given the absence of adequate incentives for staffing, 
should perform a comprehensive regional development policy that aims to distribute 
physicians more evenly across regions. This policy could include strategies to develop 
even resource distribution (OECD, 2013): via increasing the number of qualified 
physicians who are interested in practice in underserved regions; via suitable incentive 
system with not only financial incentives but also suitable regulatory measures; through 
expansion of involvement by non-physician providers or by service delivery innovations 
using technology – telemedicine.  
6.5.3 Social health insurance fund (SHIF) coverage variances – Contribution to 
inequalities in health care use 
 Inequalities are not apparent among the SHIFs in the probability of inpatient 
admissions, the GP/HCC physician visits and the probability of dentist visits favoring 
the worse off.  
 Inequalities are apparent among the SHIFs for the probability of making any medical 
visits and the probability of specialist visits favoring the better off.  
 Non-Noble OGA SHIF coverage has the highest pronounced contribution to overall 
pro-rich inequity in most health care use services favoring the better off, apart from 
GP/HCC. 
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Overall, our findings point out SHIFs coverage variations in the use of most health care 
types. These variations were expected, given the qualitative and quantitative differences 
among the multiple SHIFs in the level of coverage, freedom of choice of primary care 
providers (including private providers), access to specialists and access to private hospitals. 
As aforementioned, these differences exist not only among Noble and Non Noble SHIFs 
but also among Non Noble SHIFs (IKA SHIF versus OGA SHIF). They are also related 
with the fragmented way that PHC is provided, characterized by poor coordination among 
the PHC providers, and absence of referral system from PHC providers to hospitals. 
6.5.3.1 SHIF coverage variances -Comparison with existing literature  
Our findings are in line with the significant differences among health insurance schemes 
regarding the level of coverage (content, procedures and quality) and freedom of choice, as 
they have been confirmed and validated by most Greek and foreign experts in health care 
policy (Mossialos E. et al, 2005; Economou D., 2010; Economou C. & Giorno C., 2009; 
Petmesidou M. & Guillen A.., 2008; Tountas et al, 2011; Kyriopoulos et al, 2002). 
6.5.3.2 SHIF coverage variances -Contribution to literature, new evidence and 
discussion 
The findings contribute to the literature to identify and evaluate the extent to which social 
health protection system – via SHIF coverage - offers adequate protection to the Greek 
elderly, as a critical determinant of progress on UHC objectives, and its policy 
implications. 
 Our findings that inequalities are not apparent among the SHIFs for inpatient 
admissions, GP/HCC physician and dentist visits are related with the free access of the 
population to NHS-ESY hospitals and 220 HCCs mainly in rural areas, irrespective of 
SHIF coverage.  
 Our finding of IKA SHIF beneficiaries to be more likely to report any medical and 
specialist visits, is related with wider freedom of choice provided by ex IKA SHIF 
covering 50.3% of the population, via a nationwide network of about 350 urban PHC 
medical facilities owned, financed and operated by EOPYY-PEDY (ex IKA SHIF), 
mainly located in urban areas and less in rural areas, even though most of the IKA units 
operate in an inadequate way.  
 Our finding of the OGASHIF coverage that reports the highest pronounced contribution 
to overall pro-rich inequity in most health care use services favoring the better off, apart 
from the probability of GP/HCC physician visit is related with the least benefits and the 
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minimum freedom of choice that OGA SHIF offers to its beneficiaries –covering 19.3% 
of the population, mainly people in agriculture - compared to other Non Noble and 
Noble SHIFs. OGA SHIF offers PHC services in rural ESY health centres (HCCs), 
regional offices-rural posts, and outpatient NHS-ESY hospital departments and limited 
dental care in HCCs, whereas any private specialist consultation or private 
hospitalization is not covered, or any visit the IKA SHIF network is not entitled, either. 
Thus, these weaknesses in coverage and limited choice of providers - in combination 
with the low quality services, and problematic operation of HCCs due to significant 
staff shortage (mainly GPs) and irrational regional allocation of resources - as well as 
the long waiting lists in most outpatient ESY departments, lead OGA beneficiaries to 
visit private providers more recently than beneficiaries of other SHI Funds, placing at a 
disadvantage the vulnerable populations who do not have the ability to pay. This result 
is also in line with our findings, beneath, for the financial burden of OOP expenses for 
inpatient and outpatient care of OGA beneficiaries. 
 Our finding of Noble SHIF coverage that reduces inequity in all health care types except 
dental care, compared to Non Noble IKA SHIF, reveals significant inequalities. This 
result is expected, given that Noble Funds provide the most comprehensive benefit 
packages and wider freedom of choice of medical services and providers (public and 
private) than Non-Noble SHIFs in all types of care (inpatient, primary care, specialist 
visits).  
Our findings that reveal gaps in coverage, finance and provision of services, indicate that 
social health insurance in Greece does not ensure comprehensive coverage of older 
population against the risk of illness, and undermine the egalitarian principle of NHS-ESY 
established since 1983, of equity in health care delivery: equity of access to available care 
and equality of utilization for equal need – that implies equal entitlements (Whitehead, 
1991; Mooney 1983 &1986); They also undermine the UHC objectives of financial 
protection, effective coverage and health system performance, as introduced by the WHO 
Health Report 2010 and WHO-CSDH (2013). Under this framework of inequalities in 
SHIFs coverage and gaps in services provided among SHIFs, in combination with the deep 
structural and multifaceted crisis that Greece faces since 2010, the Greek government has 
implemented reforms in health care system in order to protect accessibility to health care 
for vulnerable groups and reduce public health expenditure. The unification of SHIFunds 
(IKA, OGA, OAEE, OPAD) in one scheme (EOPYY) that was established in 2011 as a 
sole purchaser of health services with the Law 3918/2011 implementing risk-pooling, is in 
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the right direction. The unification under EOPYY has produced major benefits for social 
solidarity by establishing a common basic package of health-care services in EOPYY, but 
there are still differences in eligibility conditions. However, in the current austerity-driven 
context, the common package was accompanied by reductions in benefits and by increases 
in copayments and user charges for visits to HCCs and hospital outpatient departments, 
pharmaceuticals and laboratory tests. Following, in spite of the magnitude of the gap in 
coverage created by the crisis, two ministerial decisions in 2014 and a recent Law 
4368/2016 were introduced and only extended coverage of prescription drugs and inpatient 
care to the uninsured (estimated, between 1.5 and 2.5 million people due to 
unemployment) – including vulnerable elderly. Therefore, it seems that the Government 
developed specific mechanisms to support equitable access to needed services for 
vulnerable groups initially limited, slow and ineffective (Economou et al. 2015). 
Therefore, it is clear that the Greek NHS-ESY should develop more schemes and 
mechanisms to provide at least essential benefits for the elderly to ensure them fully access 
to affordable services and financial protection. Expansion of existing social health 
insurance (SHI) for LTC or care for the elderly could be a potential instrument for 
protecting from health risks, because it is effective in reaching a large number of poor 
people. However, as Yang W (2013) highlights, in reality, it is not certain that health 
insurance always reduces health expenses, as it may result in ex post moral hazard 
(Dusansky and Koc, 2010, Feldman and Dowd, 1991, Arrow, 2001), or may raise an 
incentive for doctors to provide more care because payment is dependent on the quantity of 
care, rather than quality of care, resulting in increased OOP payments, that is usually 
common under a fee-for-service system similar with the compensation system of PHC 
physicians contracted with the Greek SHI system under EOPYY (Eggleston et al., WHO, 
2010). Therefore, based on the above weaknesses, we believe that the establishment of 
statutory LTC (including policies for coordinating health and social needs of the elderly) 
along with a universal health insurance system, in combination with a supplemented 
private insurance and incentives to providers, could be introduced in order to ensure 
equitable access to and utilization of care services, provide faster access, better quality of 
services and increased consumer choice in the public sector, limit informal payments and 
provide a safety net for older people– and their families. 
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6.5.4 Out of pocket payments (OOPPs) as a dimension of inequalities in the 
utilization of health care services  
Our findings, summarized, reveal that OOP expenses constitute a significant financial 
burden against inpatient and outpatient care for older population, irrespective of ability to 
pay by their income level, the region of residence and SHIF coverage, as following: 
 The mean OOP amount for inpatient care (1483€) is 4.5 times higher than the mean 
OOP amount for outpatient care (330€), as expected. 
 Residents of thinly populated areas are insignificantly more likely to pay OOP for 
inpatient and outpatient care. They are more likely to pay higher OOP mean amount for 
receiving inpatient but not for outpatient care. In terms of ability to pay: 
(a) A regressive trend is apparent in OOP amount for inpatient care in terms of ability to 
pay and region of residence. In particular:   
 OOP mean amount for inpatient admission decreases as the income level accedes 
from the 2nd poorest level to the richest one. The elderly in the 2nd poor income 
quintile face twice the mean OOP amount paid by individuals in the 5th richest. 
 The household income of the elderly patients seems not to be related with the 
possibility of OOP payments for inpatient care. 
 Residents of thinly-populated areas and Central Greece region – who tend to be less 
advantaged - pay higher OOP mean amounts than residents of densely-populated 
areas and residents of other urban regions (Attiki- Athens and North Greece-
Thessaloniki). 
 Residents of thinly-populated areas pay OOP amount (2107.75€) almost twice the 
OOP mean amount paid by the residents of intermediate-populated areas (1045€).  
 Among the Non Noble SHIFs, OGA beneficiaries pay higher OOP mean amount 
than those with IKA SHIF coverage. 
(b) There is a progressive trend in OOP amount for outpatient care in terms of ability to 
pay, SHIF coverage and region of residence.  
 The OOP amount increases as the income quintile increases. In addition, the OOP 
mean amount for outpatient care is significantly lower than the OOP amount for 
inpatient care. 
 The residents of densely-populated areas and regions of North Greece-Thessaloniki 
and Attiki-Athens report the highest OOP amount for outpatient care. Residents of 
Central Greece – who tend to be the less advantaged - pay the lowest OOP amount. 
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 Non–Noble IKA beneficiaries face almost equal OOP amount with Noble 
beneficiaries, and higher mean OOP amount than the Non Noble OGA SHIF.  
6.5.4.1 Out of pocket payments (OOPPs) –Comparison with other studies  
By comparing with the existing evidence - mainly for general population, our findings that 
OOP expenses as a financial barrier contribute to inequalities in health care use, are in line 
with most of the aforementioned evidence.  
(a) Our findings of OOPPs for inpatient admissions and outpatient care, irrespective of 
income level, region of residence and SHIF coverage are in line with studies indicating 
that individuals face OOP and informal payments for receiving specialist care as an 
inpatient or outpatient irrespective of their socioeconomic characteristics and SHIF 
coverage (Siskou et al; Liaropoulos et al, 2008; Tountas et al, 2011; Kaitelidou D. et 
al, 2013 and Penders Y. et al, 2016; Matsaganis M., Mitrakos T., Tsakloglou P, 2008). 
Similarly, the recent qualitative WHO study of Economou C (2015) revealed that 
certain users view informal OOPPs as facilitators for timely access to qualitative 
services, especially inpatient care. 
(b) Our findings of OOP expenses as a financial barrier for inpatient care are in line with 
studies indicating that OOP and informal payments (hidden economic activity) to 
specialists, primarily surgeons concern the provision of inpatient and outpatient care, 
so that patients can bypass waiting lists or ensure better quality of service and more 
attention from doctors (Souliotis et al, 2016; Kaitelidou et al, 2013; Kentikelenis A. et 
al, 2011; Siskou et al, 2008; Liaropoulos et al, 2008; Mosialos et al, 2005). The 
nationwide telephone survey in 2012 of Souliotis et al (2016) found that 
approximately 32.4% of public hospital admissions accounted for informal payments, 
with main reason (20%) to ensure better care – similar to 24% for private clinics. 
Another telephone nationwide survey in 2008, reported that 36% of those treated in 
public hospitals had made at least one informal payment wishing to avoid a waiting 
list (72%) and 137% greater for patients requiring surgery (Liaropoulos, Siskou, 
Kaitelidou et al., 2008).  
(c) Our findings of regressive trend in OOP amount for inpatient care in terms of ability 
to pay are in line with a lot of the aforementioned studies for the fairness and 
economic impact of informal payments.(i) Matsaganis M et al, (2008) found that the 
top 1% of all households accounts for 37.6% of all OOP hospital expenditure. (ii) 
Similarly, according to ELSTAT (2015) with recent Household Budget Survey data, 
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the poor households’ expenditure is 9% of the family budget, whereas the 
corresponding percentage for non-poor households is 7%. (iii) Moreover, in Greece, 
the poorest respondents state that they make OOP three times more than the richest 
ones, a reversed pattern compared to Italy and Spain (Rodridues R. et al, 2013). (iv) 
Considering evidence for older population, few studies that investigated the size and 
determinants of OOPs using SHARE comparative data, found that in Greece the 
poorest spend a higher share of their income on OOP health expenditures on all health 
care than the better-off (Holly A. et al ,2008; Bφrsch-Supan A. et al, 2005; 2008) and 
Scheil-Adlung & Bonan (2013), found that OOP expenditure on inpatient care takes 
up a higher share 6.1% of household income from the lowest income quintile than 
0.5% from richest quintile. In addition, 2% of elderly households face ruinous OOP 
expenditure for health care. (v) Similarly, the study of Economou, Karabli et al., 
(2004) found that 2.44% of households in Greece face the danger of making 
catastrophic payments for health care, and as in Souliotis et al., (2016) the majority 
(55.8%) of those with bad financial status reported a large impact on their income and 
living conditions. 
(d) Moreover, our findings of regressive trend in OOP amount for inpatient care affiliated 
to region of residence, are in line with a few studies revealing that residents of rural or 
other than Attica areas use and pay OOP for private health services more than 
residents of Attica (including the capital Athens) or urban dwellers (Souliotis et al, 
2016; Tountas et al, 2011). However, it is contradictory to Kaitelidou D. et al (2013) 
who revealed that informal payments for maternal services in public hospitals were 
higher for women living in Athens. 
(e) Our finding of significant variations in OOP amounts for receiving inpatient care 
affiliated to the SHIF coverage are in line with: (i) other studies indicating that the 
distribution of health care expenditures is related to the fragmented SHI system 
favouring the Noble SHIFs beneficiaries revealing a regressive relation (Liaropoulos, 
1995; NSSG, 2002; INE-GSEE, 2010). (ii) This finding is also compatible with a 
recent study that reveals the inefficient way that the SHI system protects individuals 
against catastrophic OOP payments for inpatient care in private hospitals contracted 
with EOPYY in three urban centres in Greece in 2013 (Grigorakis et al., 2016;2014). 
This study indicated that the SHIF- EOPYY covered only 47.3% of the total 
hospitalization cost; the rest 52.7% was OOP expenses with the average OOP amount 
€1655.24 paid to surgeons; 10% of the sample made OOP hospital payments that 
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exceeded one quarter of their annual wage or pension income. However, this study 
included only private hospitals in main urban areas and excluded rural population – 
such as farmers. On the other hand, our findings are contradictory to Tountas et al 
(2011); Siskou et al (2008) and Liaropoulos et al (2008)  studies which found that 
OOP for hospital admissions - are not influenced by SHIFs. 
(f) Our findings that OOP constitute a burden against outpatient visits of older population 
are in line with nationwide studies that reveal high percentage of OOP and informal 
expenses for private practitioners contacts (Souliotis et al (2016) that revealed 36% of 
informal payments; Tountas et al, 2011 in Hellas Health I study with 39% of the 
sample paid OOP and Siskou et al (2008) that one out of three patients for specialist 
outpatient care.  
(g) Moreover, our findings that OOP expenses burden outpatient care to a lower 
magnitude than inpatient admissions are in line with Liaropoulos, Siskou, Kaitelidou 
et al. (2008) mail study that the probability of making such payments was 137% 
greater for patients requiring surgery, with the median payment amount reached €300 
– double the amount of monthly household spending on private health care, or 15% of 
their aggregate monthly outlays – and €200 in the case of gratuities. Other study of 
Siskou et al. (2008) has been estimated that, on average, patients pay additional fees of 
approximately €5300 for heart operations. In addition, a study for obstetric services in 
four general public hospitals (Kaitelidou, Tsirona et al., 2013) found a high rate of 
informal payments: 74.4% of the women were involved in informal transactions with 
mean total OOP amount of €1549, comprising a mean informal payment of €848 and a 
mean formal payment of €701. The Transparency International survey in Greece 
conducted in 2013 indicates that the amount of informal payments in public hospitals 
accedes from €50 to €7000 for surgery; and from €30 to €5000 for a doctor’s payment.  
6.5.4.2 Out of pocket payments (OOPPs) – Contribution to literature, new evidence 
and discussion 
Overall, our findings of the role of OOP payments have a fundamental contribution to 
literature in inequity in use, as they fill the gap in literature, and also give the opportunity 
not only to identify the determinants of OOPPs, but also to explore the regressive 
relationship in ability to pay OOP and region of residence.  
Initially, the financial burden that our findings indicate with regard to inpatient and 
outpatient care is related to the significant pro-rich inequity in probability of inpatient 
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admissions and slightly pro-rich inequity in probability of any visit that were extracted 
from our analysis. As far as it concerns inpatient care, our study reveals that the extent of 
personal funding and OOP expenses is not affected by the household earnings and the gap 
in financial protection being more severe for poorer households than for the wealthier. 
The important results of regressive relationship in ability to pay OOP and region of 
residence reveal that the egalitarian perspective of the Greek NHS-ESY to ensure that 
health care is financed according to ability to pay- not influenced by income or wealth 
exists only in theory. As aforementioned, the Greek NHS-ESY health system was 
introduced aiming at achieving universal and equitable access and ensuring that people are 
protected from the financial consequences of illness and death, or at least from the 
financial consequences associated with the use of medical care (Wagstaff A., 2009). 
Moreover, equity in health care is often defined in terms of health-care financing based on 
the concept of vertical equity principle of unequal payment for unequals- in which 
unequals are defined in terms of their level of income (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer 2000; 
Wagstaff et al. 1999). Therefore, our results reveal an “unfair” NHS system in terms of 
finance (Van Doorslaer et al., 1992). In addition our findings are compatible with the fact 
that  OOP and informal payments in health care tend to be the ‘‘tradition’’ for health 
services reimbursement in Greece, as they are reported consistently for many years 
(Chereches R,et al, 2011; Souliotis, 2016; Yfantopoulos, 2013; Siskou et al, 2008; Tountas, 
2011; Kutzin J, 2013; Mossialos E. et al, 2002). In a nutshell, two types of informal 
payments prevail in the existing literature: Informal payments to healthcare providers in 
order to achieve higher quality or improved access to care before treatment; and payments 
made to providers as an expression of gratitude from their patients after treatment 
(Chereches R,et al, 2011; Souliotis, 2016; Siskou et al, 2008). The wider theoretical 
framework that attempts to explain and distinguish between causal factors of OOP and 
informal payments - a task that remains very complex, is that informal payments can be 
explained by structural (poor organization, low quality, low/irregular reimbursement of 
health care providers, lack of regulation etc), or cultural factors (related to local customs 
with a deeply rooted notion of expressing gratitude and reward to providers for health care) 
(Cohen et al., 2012). According to most Greek researchers, among these models, the 
theoretical concept that could explain better the persistence of informal payments in 
Greece, is the ‘‘alternative politics’’ described by Cohen et al. (2004) – related to the 
“culture” or “tradition” of informal payments in Greek public sector in general and used as 
an alternative means of improving public product and service provision. (Yfantopoulos 
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J.,2014; Souliotis K et al, 2016; Yfantopoulos, 2003; Siskou et al, 2008; Liaropoulos et al, 
2008, Mossialos et al, 2005). Informal payments are related with tax evasion and “black 
economy” and constitute a serious problem of the Greek public sector and health care 
financing system as they represent one of the main sources of the regressive redistributive 
effects of the tax system in Greece. A current study by Yfantopoulos J. (2013) on a pooled 
cross section-time series analysis for the period 1958-2011, revealed that overall, more 
than one quarter to one third of Greek economic activities have been either unrecorded or 
hidden from official statistics – valued from 24.66% (sd.± 2.8) to 30.13% of the GDP 
with a significant percentage attributed to health care. Specifically, in 2006, the shadow 
economy in all sectors accounted for 25.3 % of GDP in Greece, much higher than the 
OECD average of 15.8 % of GDP (Yfantopoulos, 2013). The high OOP expenses, create a 
black economy within the public health sector, and, for some of the most poor and 
vulnerable older patients, possibly financial ruin.  
As far as it concerns outpatient care, our result that there is a progressive trend in OOP 
amount in terms of ability to pay, that is, the OOP amount increases as the income quintile 
increases could be explained as the existence at the country level-of a redistribution from 
the rich to the poor (‘Robin Hood’ role) through informal payments as suggested by Ensor 
and Savelyeva (1998), pointing out that “it is not impossible that some providers 
(especially in private practice) actually apply price discrimination by setting their fees 
according to the living standards of the patients for the same medical care” (Szende and 
Culyer, 2006). However, to test this hypothesis at the level of doctors, at a national level, 
we would need appropriate microdata. Moreover, the results of distribution of OOPPs in 
health care affiliated to the density and region of residence is coherent with the unequal 
regional allocation of NHS-ESY infrastructures, human and financial resources, given that 
the concentration of most of resources is in large urban areas, with significant inequalities 
in thinly populated areas, such as Central Greece and Islands. The fact that our findings of 
financial and geographical barriers prevent the poorest to access health care indicates 
important policy issues. The disproportionate burden of informal payments on the worse-
off highlights the need to ensure a better financial risk protection to the poorest elderly 
patients. The measures of financial protection developed to date are based on OOP 
spending on medical care and relate these payments to a threshold (Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer 2003) by classifying spending as catastrophic if it exceeds a certain fraction of 
household income. According to Wagstaff A (2009) another approach is to classify it as 
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impoverishing if it is sufficiently large to make the difference to a household being above 
or below the poverty line. It seems also reasonable that financial protection measures 
should capture forgone utilization caused by high OOP costs. However, in Greece, the 
problematic existence of egalitarian NHS-ESY health system in terms of financing due to 
the extremely high proportion of health care OOPs, are comparable to those health systems 
in economies with insufficient social health insurance (Sun et al, 2009, Wagstaff A, 2009; 
Doorslaer, et al 2007, O’Donnell and Van Doorslaer, 2005). The results of our study 
confirm the literature for Greek and other health systems which suffer high proportion of 
OOPPs despite the coverage and safety nets of insurance systems (Xu et al, 2007). 
According to many studies and especially Scheil-Adlung & Bonan (2013) study, ruinous 
OOP expenditure for health care affects 5% of elderly households in Greece that is 
significant and alarming, given that according to aging projection, older vulnerable 
population in Greece will soon increase dramatically. Moreover, this burden is increased if 
we consider the fact that as LTC for elderly is not statutory available and the state 
expenditure is less than 0.3% of GDP, the real costs are likely to have been shifted to 
inappropriate use of acute health-care services (EC, 2014) that include OOPPs to fund a 
large portion of LTC resulting in significant adverse impact on the disposable income of 
older people and their families. A core policy issue is how these costs can be equitably 
shared. Expansion of existing social health insurance (SHI) for LTC or care for the elderly 
could also be a potential instrument for protecting from health risks, because it is effective 
in reaching a large number of poor people. However, as Yang W (2013) highlights, in 
reality, it is not certain that health insurance always reduces health expenses, as it may 
result in ex post moral hazard (Dusansky and Koc, 2010, Feldman and Dowd, 1991, 
Arrow, 2001), or may raise an incentive for doctors to provide more care because payment 
is dependent on the quantity of care, rather than quality of care. This issue leads to 
increased OOP payments, that are usually common under a fee-for-service system similar 
with the compensation system of PHC physicians contracted with the Greek NHS-ESY 
(Eggleston et al., WHO, 2010). Moreover, this issue is more apparent in the case of SHI 
coverage for private care, given the existing paradox reimbursement policy of inpatient 
care in private hospitals on DRG’s practice80  without a gate-keeping system subjected to 
clinical audit, that permits the private hospitals to impose high (30% or 50%) proportionate 
                                                          
80
Care Regulation of EOPYY, published in the 3054/18-11-2012 Gazette of the Government. 
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personal cost participation to the insured, especially for severe medical DRGs and often 
results in supplier – induced demand that consequently all these lead to increments for SHI 
and insured OOP funding (Matsushima and Yamada, 2013). Therefore, it seems that the 
SHI system partially protects insured members against financial burden due to OOPs. The 
alarming findings of our study -under the new health insurance system in Greece of the 
unified SHIF (EOPYY) that was established as a sole purchaser of health services with the 
Law 3918/2011- impose the adoption of policy measures that will drastically reduce the 
high individuals’ contribution to total health expenditure. The revision of Greek DRG’s 
pricing with higher reimbursement rates is essential primarily in order to categorize the 
cost components of inpatient health care;  The allocation of more financial resources (e.g. 
higher salaries to medical and nursing staff) to public hospital system is imperative for 
eliminating great barriers of the past; Moreover, complementary or supplementary private 
health insurance working in parallel to social insurance and LTC insurance could be a 
potential mechanism of eliminating the high share of OOP expenses and offer solutions to 
the enormous funding problems of social insurance systems (Sekhri and Savedoff, 2005; 
Siskou et al, 2009). More recently, studies show that supply-side interventions (treatment 
protocols, drug lists, and so on) have more success in improving financial protection than 
expansion of insurance coverage. This reinforces the point that policy-makers have a 
variety of instruments available to increase financial protection in health.  
6.6 Conclusion 
The purpose of the present study was to explore income–related inequalities in utilization 
of healthcare among the population over 50 years old in Greece, to point out national 
regional inequalities in access of health care use, to explore the role of out of pocket 
payment mechanism (OOPP) in health care use as a dimension of inequalities  in the 
utilization of health care services and a financial barrier to access on the basis of 
fragmented social health insurance coverage. Finally, it aims at discussing  their policy 
implications. Using the nationwide Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE) for Greece, we have tested the hypotheses: 
(i) The inequalities in use of health care is derived from the different socioeconomic 
characteristics of the older population that use the health services;  
(ii) Individuals at higher income are more likely to use health care services than lower 
income comparators;  
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(iii) Individuals in densely-populated areas are more likely to use more health care 
services than comparators in intermediate and thinly – populated areas; 
(iv) Individuals with “Non Noble” social health insurance coverage are more likely to 
pay OOP for using health care than comparators with “Noble” social health 
insurance coverage. 
Applying different methodological approaches, such as the horizontal inequity index via 
the calculation of  concentration indices (as developed by Van Doorslaer and colleagues) 
and using regression model, we quantify income–related inequity and measure the effect of 
socioeconomic indicators on the likelihood of contact with health care services. Moreover, 
using regression model, we measure the effect of socioeconomic indicators on the 
likelihood of paying OOP for using health care. Our findings support the existence of 
significant pro-rich inequity in probability of inpatient admissions and dentist visits and 
slightly pro-rich inequity in probability of any medical visit. Given the slightly pro-rich 
inequity in any medical visit among the elderly who report a medical visit, weak pro-poor 
inequity was found in probability of GP/ HCC physician visit. Taking into account the 
slightly pro-rich inequity in any medical visit among the elderly who report a medical visit, 
almost no significant income-related inequity was found in probability of specialist visits, 
slightly favoring less advantaged. Income has a strong positive (pro-rich) effect on inequity 
in probability of inpatient admissions and probability of dentist visits. It has a weak 
positive effect on probability of any medical visit. Given the slightly pro-rich inequity in 
any medical visit, income has also a weak negative (pro-poor) effect on probability of 
GP/HCC physician visit and almost no effect on probability of specialist visits.  Our 
findings indicate that income itself is not the only contributor, provided that higher 
educational level status, degree of urbanization, region of residence and SHIF coverage do 
not have a consistent effect and explain a high percentage of inequalities in almost all 
health care types. In addition, by decomposing income – related inequity we identify and 
measure the extent of regional inequalities as one of the main contributors to the overall 
inequity in the likelihood of using health care. Our findings signify that regional variations 
in terms of degree of urbanization are apparent for most health care types. Compared to 
residents of densely-populated areas, residents of thinly-populated areas – who tend to be 
less advantaged - face slightly pro-rich inequalities in all health care types and stronger 
pro-rich inequalities in the probability of having inpatient admissions. Among the better 
off who report any medical visit, residents of thinly-populated areas, of Central Greece and 
Islands (including Crete) are significantly less likely to report making any GP/HCC 
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physician visit, resulting in pro-rich inequalities. On the other hand, among the better off 
who report any medical visit, residents of all regions are more likely to make a specialist 
visit and result in no income-related inequity in the probability of specialist visit. Among 
those who report any medical visit, the elderly have equal probability to make a specialist 
visit, irrespective of their income and their region of residence. Furthermore, our findings 
indicate that inequalities are apparent among the SHIFs for the probability of making any 
medical visits and the probability of specialist visits favoring the better off. Inequalities are 
not apparent among the SHIFs for the probability in inpatient admissions, the probability in 
GP/HCC physician visits and the probability in dentist visits favoring the worse off. Non-
Noble OGA SHIF coverage has the highest pronounced contribution to overall inequity in 
most health care use services, favoring the worse off in the probability of having inpatient 
admissions, GP/HCC physician visits and dentist visit. Moreover, Non-Noble OGA favors 
pro-rich inequity in the probability of any medical visit and specialist care, revealing an 
unfair relationship with important policy implications. OOP expenses constitute a 
significant financial burden to inpatient and outpatient care, irrespective of income level, 
the region of residence and SHIF coverage. The mean OOP amount for inpatient care is 4.5 
times higher than the mean OOP amount for outpatient care. As far as it concerns inpatient 
care, there is a regressive trend in OOP amount for inpatient admission in terms of ability 
to pay and region of residence. For outpatient care, there is a progressive trend in OOP 
amount in terms of ability to pay, SHIF coverage and region of residence. Residents of 
thinly-populated areas and Central Greece region – who tend to be less advantaged - pay 
higher OOP mean amounts than residents of densely-populated areas and residents of other 
regions (Attiki- Athens and North Greece-Thessaloniki) who tend to be better off. 
Residents of thinly-populated areas pay OOP mean amount (2107.75€), almost twice the 
OOP mean amount paid by the residents of intermediate-populated areas (1045€). All 
SHIFs beneficiaries pay almost the same OOP amount except for Noble SHIFs 
beneficiaries who face higher OOP amount than the other SHIF beneficiaries. Among the 
Non Noble SHIFs, OGA beneficiaries pay higher OOP mean amount than those with IKA 
SHIF coverage. There are significant policy actions that stem from our study findings. The 
existence of the above inequalities at different levels of Greek NHS indicates that although 
in Greece the NHS - ESY offers universal coverage of the older population similar to the 
general population, a debate is emerging about whether access to health care is indeed 
equally available to all, especially during the current economic crisis. The current 
economic crisis with continuous public expenditure decline leads to increased concerns 
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about inequalities in health care use and access to health care services, especially for the 
elderly who contribute to some increase in the need for health care. It is worth noting that 
two years ago, WHO EURO pointed out that the Greek government as well as the other 
European governments are required to act right away to guarantee universal access to high 
quality health services focused on humans in a period of global economic crisis; in short, to 
be people-centered (WHO EURO 2013a and 2013b). The Greek Ministry of Health 
endorsed policy document and National Action Plan to ensure universal access to health 
services to the citizens, beyond the implications of economic crisis for health sector. 
(Ministry of Health, 2013). However, compared to the evidence carried out on the socio-
economic inequalities, there is little research about the corresponding inequalities in use 
and access to healthcare services offered to the general population, especially the older 
one. The close relation of barriers to healthcare access and the organization of health care 
system on the side of both supply and demand is complex and there is currently a gap in 
the evidence base. There is also a gap between evidence and policy relevance. This study 
sets barriers on the system characteristics (supply side) as well as barriers at demand side 
and fills the gap in the evidence. The evidence by this study will permit examining the 
impact of inequalities and barriers to access, not only on the population in general but on 
the older population –where the available evidence is even more limited. This study will 
permit to assess and ensure that the current health care services provided are ready to meet 
the healthcare needs of the older people in Greece. Furthermore, this research improves our 
knowledge of health care issues for the older population in Greece by addressing priority 
issues and questions for further research. 
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Chapter Seven 
7. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The main hypothesis of this thesis is that the population is expected to face high 
inequalities in health care use, particularly the elderly who are the most constant 
consumers of health services. Inequalities in health care use are expected with regard to: 
region variations in health care use caused by inadequate allocation of human and 
infrastructure resources, variations in health care use among different social health 
insurance funds due to unequal health insurance coverage  resulting  in increased out of 
pocket payments. We start this chapter by summarizing the findings and results of the 
empirical chapters. Then, we present international literature and policy actions in the 
context of health care inequalities in an ageing population. Finally, we consider a 
framework of policy implications for addressing issues of inequities and inefficiencies in 
the Greek healthcare system related with the empirical findings, as well as future research 
agenda. Relevant limitations are aforementioned in Chapter Two. 
  
Table 7.1 Overall Income –related inequity (HI) by health care type and data-Survey 
PatraHIS 
 Inpatient 
nights *
1
 
Outpatient 
days *
1
 
SHIF physician 
visits*
2
 
Specialist 
visits*
2
 
Dental 
visit *
3
 
Probab.of visits -0.049 0.009 0.007 0.128 0.020 
GHIS 
 Inpatient 
nights *
1
 
Outpatient 
days *
1
 
GP visits*
2
 Specialist 
visits*
2
 
Dental 
visit *
3
 
Probab.of visits -0.0275 -0.0017 0.0046 0.0666 0.1037 
Total No visits -0.1306 0.0528 -0.0153 0.0548  
Conditional No visits -0.0716 0.1160 -0.0419 -0.0183  
SHARE 
 Inpatient 
admission
*1
 
Any medical 
visit
*2
 
GP /HCC 
physician visit
*3
 
Specialist 
visit
*3
 
Dental 
visit *
3
 
Probab.of visits 0.075 0.016 -0.014 -0.001 0.070 
Bold:p-value <0.01; bold and italics: p-value<0.05; italics:p-value<0.10 
Note *1: PatraHIS: Inpatient probability of admissions concerns “the last 12 months”  
    GHIS:   Inpatient/outpatient admissions probability of visit, conditional number of visits and total   number of visits 
concern “the last 12 months”  
SHARE:   Inpatient admission information concerns concerns “the last 12 months” 
Note *2:  PatraHIS:  Outpatient, SHIF physician and specialist private probability of visit concerns “the last 3 months”  
GHIS: For GP/specialist visits probability of visit concerns “the last 12 months”, conditional number of visits and 
total number of visits concern “the past 4 weeks” 
SHARE:   Any medical visit concerns sample with total (including 0) number of any visits except from dentist visit 
and inpatient admissions concerns “the last 12 months” 
Note *3:PatraHIS: Dentist probability of visits concerns “the last 5 years”  
 GHIS:   Dentist probability of visits concerns “the last 12 months”, conditional monthly dentist visits were only (12) 
cases 
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SHARE:   GP/ HCC physician visits and specialist visits concern sample with conditional number of visits for 
“individuals who reported at least once consultation – any medical visit (≥1) the last 12 months”. Dentist 
probability of visits concerns “the last 12 months”. 
 
7.1 Summary of the findings 
Table 7.1 above summarizes the inequity index (HI) by health care type and data-Survey, 
as displayed in relevant Chapters for each Survey. The summary of empirical findings of 
the three survey tools’ analysis, the measures of health care use and the income definition 
are displayed in Appendix Tables 7.2-7.4. Furthermore, we summarize the findings of the 
thesis across the three essays, as following:  
(1) About income-related inequalities, the findings of the thesis suggest that inequalities 
in health care exist mainly for the probability of specialist and dentist private visits. 
 Inpatient admissions: Income- related inequalities are less apparent in probability 
of inpatient admissions, favoring the less advantaged. However, pro-rich inequity 
in probability of inpatient admissions is apparent only in SHARE study.  
 Outpatient visits: No significant income-related inequity was found for probability 
of outpatient admissions for PatraHIS and GNHIS. However for GNHIS study, 
once at least one visit is included, there is pro-rich inequity for conditional number 
of outpatient visits similar with SHARE study findings of slightly pro-rich inequity 
for any medical (not dentist/not inpatient) visit.  
 GP/HCCs physician visits or SHIFs visits (for PatraHIS): No significant income-
related inequity (or slightly pro-poor) was found for the probability of making 
GP/HCCs.  
 Specialist visits: pro-rich inequity in probability of specialist visits for PatraHIS 
and GNHIS that results in high OOP expenses and comply with the way that 
primary care is provided, as we present at the respective chapters and the OOPPs’ 
section, below. However for GNHIS study, once at least one visit is included, there 
is pro-poor inequity for conditional number of specialist visits favoring the less 
advantaged. Given that the act of a first visit is a patient's decision, while 
subsequent visits are a medical decision, this result suggests that inequity is 
determined by the patients' behavior and incentives and not by physicians' attitudes. 
Similarly, for SHARE study, no income-related inequity was found in probability 
of specialist visits, slightly favoring less advantaged. 
 Dental visits: Pro-rich inequity in probability of dentist visits is apparent for all 
surveys.  
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 Income itself is not the only contributor.  
(2) In addition, our findings indicate intra and interregional variations in most of health 
care services that contribute to a large extent to the overall inequity. Compared to 
densely-populated areas and Athens region, thinly-populated areas– who tend to be 
less advantaged - and Central Greece exacerbate the use of most health care services 
for the older population.  
 Compared to densely-populated areas, residents of thinly-populated areas face pro-
rich inequalities for almost all health care types (inpatient admissions, outpatient 
and specialist care) for both GNHIS and SHARE studies, except for pro-poor 
inequity in probability of GP visits for GNHIS study.  
 Overall, we find regional variations in PHC for thinly populated areas and Central 
Greece (GP care, outpatient visits, and probability of specialist visits) favoring the 
better off, revealing inadequate PHC provided in these regions. On the other hand, 
regional inequalities are not apparent for inpatient care (slightly for Islands), 
mainly due to the significant positive effect of Central Greece on overall inequity, 
but on a weaker magnitude than the degree of urbanization. 
 About the probability of specialist visits and outpatient admissions for the residents 
of intermediate-populated areas, Central Greece and North Greece, pro-rich 
inequity is apparent for the GNHIS study in the access to the first visit, but not in 
the subsequent positive (conditional) visits indicated by the physician. Pro-poor 
inequity is apparent for the conditional number of specialist visits for the GNHIS 
study similar to the pro-poor inequity in the probability of specialist visit for the 
SHARE study and equity for residents of all regions in the first specialist visit for 
the SHARE. This significant gradient of regional inequalities in specialist care 
reveals that the ineffective primary care services on intermediate-populated and 
rural areas “force” residents to specialist care, mainly privately provided, 
irrespective of the income level of the individuals, or the need to travel long 
distance with incurring large time and costs. 
 Intermediate-populated areas seem to have a parallel effect with Central Greece 
and North Greece on overall inequity in most health care services, income-related 
equity in the probability of GP/HCCs visits for both GNHIS and SHARE studies 
and equity in the probability of dentist visits for GNHIS and SHARE studies. 
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 Furthermore, compared to Attiki-Athens, region of Islands (& Crete) has the lowest 
effect on overall inequity, but inequalities- though small and weak in strength- still 
exist. 
These findings of regional disparities in health care signal either under-utilisation (Central 
Greece, Islands and the thinly-populated areas mainly for PHC services), or over-
utilisation (mainly North Greece) of care, raise questions about the issues of equity, 
efficiency and the overall health system performance. Similarly, the contribution of 
regional disparities to inequalities in use by income, that reveal strong pro-rich (positive) 
effect of thinly-populated areas- that is less advantaged, for most health care types except 
the probability of GP visit, as well as the pro-poor inequity in using specialist care mainly 
accessed in urban areas, have important implications for policy making especially as far as 
it concerns the growth and provision of PHC system in rural and remote areas. They are 
explained by both demand and supply-side factors. On the demand side, several studies 
have showed the influence of socio -economic factors to under-use of services – ie strong 
correlation with social deprivation (OECD 2014; Majeed et al., 2000). In particular, 
Central Greece, Islands, and the thinly-populated areas that report the highest inequalities 
and disparities in PHC and specialist care account for the poorest regions in Greece
81 
with 
the lowest regional GDP per capita and the highest at-risk-of poverty indicator (AROPE) 
for older population
82
 at NUTS1 level since 2004 till 2015. On the supply side, it points to 
the fact that there is unmet need in regions of low activity - explained by unequal regional 
allocation of health infrastructure (ie the number of hospital beds per capita indicator) or 
variations in medical practices (number of physicians per capita or number of nurses per 
capita). In particular, Central Greece, Islands, and the thinly-populated areas that report the 
highest inequalities in PHC and specialist care, have the lowest density in doctors and 
nurses
83
,
84
 and consist the poorest regions in Greece with highly mountainous and isolated 
areas, whereas the majority of physicians are concentrated in the two most crowded 
                                                          
81 The poorest regions with the lowest regional GDP per capita are Epirus, Western Greece and Thessaly and those with 
the lowest Gross Value Added are North Aegean, Epirus and Ionian Islands and East Macedonia & Thrace, according 
to the National Accounts by the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT, 2014).  
82 According to the trends of regional variations of at-risk-of poverty indicator (AROPE) for older population at NUTS1 
level from 2004-2015, the period prior crisis in 2004, the highest poverty is recorded at North Greece and Central 
Greece, whereas in 2015 the highest poverty is noted at Central Greece and the Aegean Islands (& Crete Island). 
83 About regional allocation of physicians, the regions with the lowest density in doctors (Western Macedonia, Ionian 
Islands and North Aegean Islands) less than half of the national average (614.4 doctors). Western Macedonia has 4.5 
lower density of physicians than the national average. About the allocation of nurses, Central Greece with the lowest 
density in nurses (144) has 0.40 nurses of the national average of 354 nurses. 
84 According to Greek Statistics Authority for 2007, the concentration of doctors in the area of greater Athens (Attica) is 
remarkable (7.3 physicians per 1.000 inhabitants), the second in concentration area is Central Macedonia (5.3), Crete 
has 5.4 physicians, whereas the regions of Central Greece (2.7), Western Macedonia (3.2) and the South Aegean 
Islands (3.2) that display the largest scarcities (Economou, 2010). 
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regions of the country in Attika/Athens - the capital and in Central 
Macedonia/Thessaloniki- North Greece that report the lowest inequity in specialist visits. 
Despite the fact that health centers (HCCs) have generally increased in rural areas during 
the last decades, primary care in rural areas is highly deficient because of inadequate 
staffing (mainly GPs), old-fashioned and useless biomedical technology and facilities as 
well as lack of financial and managerial autonomy. This result in a failure to cover the 
needs of the population in remote areas and in high percentages of uncontrollable 
interregional flows of elderly patients to urban areas such as to Athens to seek private care 
or to areas with university hospitals, despite possible transportation problems
85
 (“Health 
and Welfare Map” – NSPH, 2011). In this case, our findings indicate that the Greek health 
system is not achieving the level of performance it should, mainly for PHC. Given that the 
Greek NHS-ESY is in ongoing reform, the evidence derived by our study gives the 
opportunity for reorganization of existing services or for re-direction of resources to meet 
health care or social objectives related to regional and local characteristics, especially for 
the older population, similar to many countries, with the aim of incentivizing actions on 
eliminating geographical and regional disparities in health care use (WHO-CSDH, 2013). 
Moreover, in order the Government to respond to the issue of undersupply of medical staff 
in thinly-populated areas, given the absence of adequate incentives for staffing, should 
perform a comprehensive regional development policy and strategies to distribute 
physicians more evenly across regions. These strategies include: to target future physicians 
(increasing the number of qualified physicians who are interested in practice in 
underserved regions); to target current physicians (via suitable incentive system with not 
only financial incentives but also suitable regulatory measures); to learn do with less 
(through expansion of involvement by non-physician providers or by service delivery 
innovations using technology - telemedicine). 
(3) In addition, we identify that inequalities are apparent among the SHIFs in use of most 
health care types, except the probability of inpatient admissions and the probability of 
GP/HCC physician visits favoring the less advantaged.  
 There is an unfair relationship among the SHIFs coverage and benefits. Compared 
to Non Noble IKA SHIF, Non-Noble Farmers OGA SHIF coverage has the highest 
pronounced contribution to overall pro-rich inequity in most health care use 
services for both PatraHIS and SHARE studies, including inequity to probability of 
                                                          
85 According to the “Health and Welfare Map” data as estimated by National School of Public Health in 2011, patients 
prefer to travel from rural and isolated areas (ie mountainous as in poor regions of Epirus, Central Greece and islands) 
to urban areas such as to Athens (33.2%) or to areas with large university hospitals (in Thessaloniki 42.6% or in 
Ioannina- Epirus 66.3%) offering expensive and high-technology services or visiting private providers (NSPH, 2012). 
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specialist visits favoring the worse off and to inequity in the probability of SHIF 
physician visits (PatraHIS) or any medical (outpatient) visit (SHARE) favoring the 
better off than the Noble SHIFs . 
Furthermore, these findings are expected given the least benefits and the minimum 
freedom of choice that OGA SHIF provides to its beneficiaries. As aforementioned, OGA 
beneficiaries were not entitled to visit the IKA SHIF nationwide network of about 350 
urban primary care medical facilities, either. In addition to these weaknesses in coverage, 
there is also significant staff shortage and under-functioning of many public health units 
and services mainly in rural and isolated areas that concerns the limits of accessibility of 
farmers OGA SHIF beneficiaries to specialized health care. Thus, the limited choice of 
providers- in combination with the low quality services and problematic operation of 
HCCs- as well as the long waiting lists in most outpatient ESY departments lead OGA 
beneficiaries to visit private providers more recently than beneficiaries of other SHI Funds 
with more choices.  
(4) This thesis also finds that OOP expenses constitute a significant financial burden to 
most health care types according to the available information of the two surveys. Our 
thesis finds that OOP expenses especially for specialist and inpatient care irrespective 
of ability to pay, SHIF coverage and region of residence, could be a serious barrier to 
access health care and a heavy burden on individual and household incomes. 
 According to the available information, PatraHIS indicates that OOP expenses as a 
financial barrier contribute more to the probability of specialist private visits. On 
the other hand, given that SHARE survey provides OOPPs information only for 
inpatient and outpatient care, OOP expenses constitute a significant financial 
burden to inpatient and outpatient care, irrespective of income level, the region of 
residence and SHIF coverage.  
 For PatraHIS, the OOP amount is a significant barrier to specialist private visit in 
terms of ability to pay by income revealing a regressive relationship, as well as in 
terms of SHIF coverage among the older population.  
 According to the PatraHIS study, when we consider the mean conditional- 
positive (>0€) OOPP amount for the specialist private visit by income quintile, 
there is a clear trend that mean OOPP positive amounts decrease as the income 
level proceeds from poorest to richest level, revealing a regressive relationship. 
 Considering mean OOP amount (≥ 0€) for specialist visit by SHIF coverage, 
elderly with Non Noble OGA SHIF coverage – who tend to be less advantaged 
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– face the highest OOP mean amount for a specialist private visit, slightly higher 
than the amount paid by Non Noble IKA beneficiaries. 
  Nevertheless, if we consider mean conditional-positive (> 0€) OOPP by SHIF 
coverage, it is apparent that elderly pay a higher OOP amount than the median 
of 40€, irrespective of their SHIF coverage, though elderly with Noble SHIF 
coverage pay somehow a higher in magnitude OOP amount. 
Furthermore, the results of pro-rich inequity in probability of specialist visit in 
combination with high OOP expenses mainly for the specialist and outpatient visit are 
related to the oversupply of specialists
86
 and the anachronistic retrospective remuneration 
system, where physicians are paid on low salary, and the contracted physicians are 
reimbursed on a low fee-for-service basis with a limited number of visits per month, 
regardless their specialty and their performance. This reimbursement method does not 
provide efficiency-promoting incentives and indirectly encourages physicians to induce 
unnecessary demand for health care services as well as to ask for informal additional 
payment. Specific mechanisms within and beyond social health protection schemes should 
be developed to address the potential risk of impoverishment of vulnerable groups. In 
order to address related issues, the Government needs to identify and close more gaps in 
coverage and develop effective policies targeting the most vulnerable, such as: tailored 
benefit packages for those most in need; and abolishment of co-payments and user fees for 
the most vulnerable in order to limit the burden of OOPPs. Overall, in all schemes and 
systems, an attempt should be make to provide at least essential benefits for the elderly to 
ensure them access to affordable services and financial protection. 
 On the other hand, for the SHARE survey, OOP expenses constitute a significant 
financial burden to inpatient and outpatient care, irrespective of income level, the 
region of residence and SHIF coverage. The mean OOP amount for inpatient care is 4.5 
times higher than the mean OOP amount for outpatient care.  
(a) As far as it concerns inpatient care, there is a regressive trend in OOP amount for 
inpatient admission in terms of ability to pay and region of residence. 
 The elderly in the 2nd poor income quintile face twice the mean OOP amount 
paid by individuals in the 5
th
 richest group.  
 Residents of thinly-populated areas and Central Greece region – who tend to be 
less advantaged - pay higher OOP mean amounts than residents of densely-
                                                          
86
 Compared to other OECD countries, Greece has the highest number (3.9) of physicians specialists and dentists (1.27) 
per 1000 inhabitants and the lowest number of GPs (0.31).  (OECD, 2013; OECD, 2009) and in the same time there are 
pronounced imbalances in the geographical distribution of medical professionals. 
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populated areas and residents of other regions (Attiki- Athens and North 
Greece-Thessaloniki) who tend to be better off.  
 Among the Non Noble SHIFs, OGA beneficiaries pay higher OOP mean 
amount than those with IKA SHIF coverage. 
(b ) For outpatient care, there is a progressive trend in OOP amount in terms of ability 
to pay, SHIF coverage and region of residence.  
 There is a progressive relationship given that the OOP amount increases as the 
income quintile increases.  
 Non–Noble IKA beneficiaries face almost equal OOP amount with Noble 
beneficiaries, and higher mean OOP amount than the Non Noble OGA SHIFs 
beneficiaries.  
 Furthermore, the residents of densely-populated areas, regions of North Greece-
Thessaloniki and Attiki-Athens report the highest OOP amount for outpatient 
care. Residents of Central Greece – who tend to be the less advantaged - pay the 
lowest OOP mean amount. 
Overall, the thesis suggests that inequalities in use of health care exist, especially with 
regard to primary health care services. Moreover, it is worth noting that if we attempt to 
compare the findings of the surveys, we need to take into consideration the differences in 
survey design of the datasets, as in the paragraph below. Thus, the different findings of 
pro-rich inequity in inpatient admissions of SHARE survey versus pro-poor inequity of 
PatraHIS and GNHIS, could be explained by the significant differences - mainly in 
definition (categorical versus continuous; and net versus gross), components and reference 
period (monthly versus annual) of income measure. These differences in income measure 
could result in response variations and overestimation or underestimation of the level of 
inequity.  
7.2 Comparing with international literature and policy implications 
Since the early 2000s, in the context of ongoing health care reforms in most European 
countries, international organizations, national governments and researchers have made 
efforts to identify the impact of different institutional features on access to care. 
On the one hand, research has focused on analysing the existence of barriers to access, 
across population groups (geographical, ethnic, or, most commonly, socio-economic 
groups), and on the other hand, researchers have attempted to measure the degree to which 
utilization of health care services is based on need for health care and equity in access to 
health care is achieved, mainly for the general population. There is substantial body of 
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international comparative evidence and country-specific studies aimed at analyzing health 
and healthcare inequities for the general population that can be discriminated between:  
(a) Previous evidence in the early 2000s under the ECuity Project - a multiyear study 
aimed at analyzing health and healthcare inequities in OECD countries and other 
affiliated countries. This evidence for countries with universal coverage health 
systems, showed income-related equity in the probability of a GP visit, and a pro-poor 
distribution in follow up visits to the GP (less clear cut picture). By contrast, in all 
countries, there was evidence for substantial pro-rich inequities in the probability of 
contacting a medical specialist and a dentist that was stronger in countries where 
either private insurance coverage or private practice options were offered to purchase 
quicker and/or preferential access (Van Doorslaer et al., 2000; Van Doorslaer, 
Koolman and Puffer, 2002; Van Doorslaer et al,2004; Van Doorslaer, & Masseria, C, 
2004)
87
;  
(b) Current international comparative studies using old data around the year 2000 under 
the ECuity Project, that confirmed the previous patterns (Or Z et al, 2008; Bago 
d’Uva, T, 2009);  
(c) A number of country-specific studies for the early 2000s, comparing inequities across 
types of services, across geographic regions, and before and after the implementation 
of healthcare reforms. For the countries with universal coverage and establishment of 
NHS, the evidence shows equity or pro-poor distribution of GP visits and 
hospitalizations and emergency services (Van Ourti,2002; Morris et al., 2003; Garcia 
Gómez and López,2004), and differences in physician visits by region of residence 
(Costa and Gil, 2005). They also found pro-rich horizontal inequity in the access to 
the first GP or specialist visit, but not in the subsequent visits indicated by the 
physician (Leu and Shellhorn, 2004); Our  findings for older population are consistent 
with these studies. Nevertheless, the differences in access increase between those with 
and without private health insurance.  
(d) More current research that re-examines income-related inequalities in health care use 
with more current data of 2006–2009 mainly from European Health Interview Survey 
(EHIS) as well as individual country studies evolve before the onset of the global 
economic crisis, given that governments have prioritized equity of access (Devaux M, 
                                                          
87 Similar comparative evidence exists under EquiLAC project by World Bank and the IHEP collaboration 
aimed at quantifying and comparing inequities for the general population.across a number of less developed 
countries in Latin America.   
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2015, 2012; Ono, T et al, 2014; De Looper M & Lafortune G., 2009; Urbanos and 
Meneu, 2008; Mackenbach, J.P. & EUROTHINE, 2007). However, a decade later, 
this evidence shows that in the majority of countries, still exists little inequity in visits 
to GPs, pro-rich inequity to consult a specialist and a dentist and regional variations in 
terms of supply-side factors, with increased inequalities in France and USA, and 
lower inequities in Switzerland and UK.  
(e) As far as it concerns older population, there is growing concern and research activity 
on socio-economic inequalities in health and health care among the elderly in the last 
15 years (Allin et al, 2011, 2006, 2009; Blay et al, 2008; Kim D. et al, 2011; Chen & 
Escarce, 2004; Jun, Raven, & Tang, 2007; Luo et al., 2009; Perelman et al., 2009; 
Schellhorn et al, 2000; Santos-Eggimann et al, 2005; Huisman et al, 2005; 
Mackenbach et al, 2003). This evidence is more clear-cut and shows inequalities 
favoring the better off, in the majority of countries. There is evidence from UK 1997-
2993 for pro-rich inequity for all services areas, but not significantly in hospital care 
(Allin et al., 2011); similar evidence from the international comparative study for 
elderly SHARE for 2004 (Allin, 2009); similar evidence for income-related inequality 
to be highest among American seniors despite publicly financed programs including 
Medicaid, Medicare (Chen and Escarce, 2004); pro-rich inequity to physician visits 
and pro-rich hospitalization after adjusting for health conditions in China (Jun et 
al.,2007 and Luo et al.,2009); pro-private health insurance facilitated outpatient access 
in Swiss elderly (Blay et al., 2008); and pro-rich inequity for both outpatient and 
inpatient care utilization for elderly in Korea (Kim D et al, 2012).  Both studies for 
general and older population show that for the countries with universal coverage and 
establishment of NHS, there is equity or pro-poor distribution of GP visits and 
emergency services, but a concentration of specialty visits favoring high-income 
groups, similar with dentist visits. For inpatient care, the evidence is not clear-cut. It 
seems that for the elderly population dominates inpatient care favoring the better off. 
However, these studies do not separate public from private hospital services, which is 
a strong limitation. The significant role of private health insurance and regional 
variations on inequity is visible, as well. Following the international literature for 
older population, it is apparent that the findings of our study are consistent with the 
aforementioned studies and literature for the older population.  
Overall, the larger inequities  are found in countries where: universal health coverage is 
not achieved, health care financing relies on a large share of private insurance and out-of-
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pocket payments, GPs do not act as gatekeepers, health care provision is mostly private 
and national cost sharing arrangements do not include free care at the point of delivery. 
Moreover, the fact that a decade later and after rapid reforms, the evidence shows that in 
the majority of countries, inequity favoring the higher socioeconomic groups still exists, 
calls for a need to combine universal policies that affect the whole population with more 
targeted policies aimed at vulnerable and older populations. This issue is important given 
that in the same period, all over Europe - including Greece, the health care systems are 
reformed under the pressure of economic globalization -trying to balance increasing 
demand with declining budget, whilst still remain firmly within the parameters of a 
universalistic and egalitarian health care system. Under this framework, it is therefore 
particularly important to ascertain which of the main elements of health care systems need 
to be safe-guarded during the development of reforms if equity is to be ensured. In order to 
improve access to care and reduce inequalities, most of the OECD countries have 
introduced reforms to their health care system including: the extension of primary health 
coverage in the USA; the introduction of exemptions of co-payments and up-front 
payments for vulnerable populations visiting GPs in Belgium since 2011; the suppression 
of co-payments for GP and specialist visits in Germany since 2013. 
However, the increased investigation in the last 15 years to reveal socioeconomic 
inequalities in health care utilization among the elderly has not been sufficient to support 
policy decisions. Only recently, there is growing concern about the policy implications of 
these inequalities among the elderly, by international projects such as WHO Healthy 
Ageing Report (2015) and the OECD Ageing Equally Action Plan for 2017 that enable 
countries to design sustainable policy approaches to better adapt to population healthy 
ageing by understanding of compounded health inequalities over the life-cycle linked with 
poor labour market experience during active years and poor social outcomes among the 
elderly, efficiently rather than waiting for when people retire. According to these projects, 
the impact of ageing populations on health systems will give rise to a number of 
challenges and policy options. Each country or region needs to assess its current situation 
and what is likely to work in its context before mapping the specific next steps that will be 
most appropriate. A number of priority areas for action to reduce health care inequalities 
among the elderly, can be identified: 
 One key component of a health-systems’ response must be to breakdown the barriers 
(affordability barriers, transportation, limitation capacity, health workforce behavior, 
long waiting times) that limit health-care utilization by the older people who need it. 
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 Given the chronic and complex health-care needs of the older population, and the fact 
that many existing services were designed to cure acute conditions often managed with 
a fragmented manner, with coordination  frequently lacking across care providers, 
settings and time, significant changes are required in the way health systems are 
structured and health care is delivered.  
 The health services will have to be redesigned to deliver the comprehensive and 
coordinated care that has been shown to be more appropriate and more effective. 
Changes are needed to the health systems that will require a shift that extends beyond 
disease-based curative models and towards the provision of older-person-centred and 
integrated care. 
 Health services have to be better integrated between levels and across specialist 
groupings. The development - sometimes from nothing- of comprehensive systems of 
LTC (for countries like Greece where LTC is non-statutory), as a coordinated response 
from multiple levels of government, is needed, as well. 
 These changes appear to be both affordable and sustainable. However, how action 
might be financed will vary among settings. Some may be financed by adapting current 
services to the changing demographic and epidemiological contexts. Concrete steps 
need to be taken to ensure access to universal coverage for health care and LTC – that is 
still a distant ambition - to needed services – prevention, health promotion, treatment, 
rehabilitation and LTC – without the risk of the associated financial hardship that may 
affect them or their families. Where this cannot be achieved immediately for the whole 
population due to resource constraints, the initial target should be those with the 
greatest needs and with the least resources to meet their needs.  
 Making progress on reducing inequalities will require improving understanding and 
monitoring on a routine vasis of age-related needs, issues and determinants of healthy 
ageing and evaluating existing policies.  Quantitative target setting is a useful 
instrument to guide policy making. 
 Policies and interventions to reduce health care inequalities should be tailored to the 
specific pattern of health inequalities prevailing in a country. Countries differ strongly 
in the health determinants which make the largest contribution to the explanation of 
health inequalities. 
 Addressing policies to “upstream” determinants of inequalities, including income and 
education, via introducing measures to ensure that older people are protected from 
poverty, for example through social protection schemes -  are necessary ingredients, but 
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the persistence of inequalities in countries with universal welfare systems show that 
they are not sufficient to eliminate health care use inequalities.  
Overall, we cannot expect to reduce health care inequalities substantially without a 
powerful, sustained and systematic effort to develop systematic strategies that Eurothine 
Health Inequalities Project suggests to include: political commitment; attainable 
objectives; package of effective policies and interventions (to build a comprehensive 
evidence-based); effective implementation (via quantitative target setting as a useful 
instrument); evaluation and monitoring (not only to understand the dynamics, but also to 
see what degree of inequality might be avoidable) (Mackenback, Eurothine, 2007). 
It may not be realistic to eliminate health care inequalities in the foreseeable future, but 
reducing them to more acceptable levels is well within the realm of possibility.  
However, the empirical findings of our essays –that are consistent with the aforementioned 
studies and literature for the older population - provide useful tools for understanding and 
exploring inequalities in the use of health care among the older population in Greece. 
Given that most of the reform processes in Greek health care system are still ongoing, our 
findings can shed light on the types of services and sources of inequities that need more 
serious attention. Future studies using a similar methodology with post-reform data would 
shed light on the impact of the current reforms in terms of inequity, quality of access, and 
use of healthcare services. Moreover, this thesis goes further than the existing studies of 
equity by discussing the policy context in which inequalities in use arise, and thus it can be 
addressed. Our results have implications for other countries with aging populations, as 
well. 
7.3 Policy implications/challenges of our study  
Our findings similar to the health care system characteristics highlight the fragmented 
physician-driven organizational structure of the primary health care (PHC) system and the 
weaknesses that obstruct its efficiency, as presented in chapter two. The thesis suggests 
that inequalities of access exist, especially with regard to primary health care services. 
Most of the health care system weaknesses are caused -to a great extent- by the incomplete 
carrying out of changes and attempts of reform. According to several authors “The most 
significant problem facing health policy in Greece is the gap between declared objectives 
and the enactment and implementation of the legislation” (Economou, 2010 p. 159; 
Mossialos et al, 2005; Petmesidou M., 2006; Tinios et al, 2011). Drawing from the 
empirical results of the essays presented, we make a number of policy recommendations. 
However, policy recommendations need to be raised thoroughly under the current 
 
 
333 
circumstances of the financial crisis, when a large part of the population is deprived of 
health insurance.  
 
Restructuring of primary health care by enhancing the quality of public primary health 
care services 
Greater continuity and coordination in the supply of health care are required for the 
improvement of the quality of public primary services, given the fragmented physician-
driven organizational structure of the primary health care (PHC) system that leads to 
regional variations in accessibility of health care and interregional patient flows, to 
increased use of hospital outpatient services as well as to private health sector with the 
prevalence of OOP expenses and informal payments.  
 A number of relevant measures related to the redesigning of PHC into an integrated 
model that have been recently enacted but not implemented, are suggested, such as:  
 The upgrade of the gate-keeping role of GPs and the development of an electronic 
system / database of referring physicians to hospitals in order to control public 
spending, avoid unnecessary technical exams and make PHC more cost-effective. 
 the introduction of an electronic medical file for each patient with systematic 
records and disease registries to coordinate PHC with hospital care and produce 
incidence rate data, in combination with 
 the systematic introduction of medical protocol- not only to control and monitor 
the PHC physician prescribing behavior (via e-prescribing and e-referrals) – as 
slowly adapted since 2013 – but also to improve PHC operation. 
These measures would focus on more patient-oriented services that enhance the 
quality of public PHC. 
 It is important that we examine the consolidation of HCCs and EOPYY units and 
upgrade the HCCSs’ role by the increase of number of HCCs operating in the urban 
areas, given the existing evidence that HCCs provide care mainly to less advantaged 
population. Thus, it would be easier for HCCs and EOPYY units to act - as they were 
planned - as gatekeepers and referees to more specialized treatments for ESY 
secondary health care in urban areas and eliminate hospitals’ demand pressure and 
waiting lists.  
 In addition, given that HCCs operate understaffed and they are administered by ESY 
hospitals that do not favour their expansion, it is important that HCCs should be 
managed independently with their own budget. Given the significant staff shortage of 
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HCCs due to undersupply of GPs and oversupply of specialists, incentives are 
required to increase the proportion of GPs and to shift specialists to general practice as 
well as staff restructuring best suited in PHC. 
 In addition a new remuneration system -connected with the performance and 
specialty- is required for the PHC physicians – employed in the public sector on a 
salary basis or in the private sector on a fee-for-service contract basis. It could be 
payment by capitation or a combination of capitation and salary instead of fee-for-
service in order to restrict the incentives for physicians to induce demand and health 
expenditure and reduce informal payments by patients (Mossialos et al, 2005).    
 It is also important that a system for the evaluation of PHC services provided be 
developed. 
 
Review the governance of the health care system by setting necessary conditions for 
improving efficiency 
 A wider consolidation of all bodies within a single ministry is required.This is obvious 
given the existence of different bureaucratic subsystems and organizational models 
involved in administering the supply of health care services and managing day-to-day 
operations between the NHS-ESY, EOPYY and other SHIFs. The separation of health 
from the pension- social branch of the social insurance funds since 2013 is an important 
first step. 
 There is a necessity for decentralization in practice, flexibility and higher level of 
autonomy in healthcare management of health care units, ESY hospitals, ESY and 
EOPYY PHC units, which currently are mainly administered and not managed, in 
combination with strict control on costs and outputs. The necessity for more flexibility 
and autonomy in management derives from the current limited decentralization of 
competences of regional health authorities – DYPEs as well as EOPYY units, since the 
capital investment, recruitment policy and all the financial transactions of DYPE and 
EOPYY have to be approved by the Ministry of Health (MoH) and Ministry of Labour 
(MoL) for other SHIFs. 
 As far as it concerns the establishment and efficient operation of the recently unified 
fund (EOPYY) in terms of financing the system, we set a number of future 
developments: 
 Provided that a multipayer system still exists due to the failure of multiple attempts 
to establish an organization  which will act as a third party payer, it is important 
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that the recently unified fund (EOPYY) will act as the main public and social 
financier and not as a provider. EOPYY could pool public health resources from 
social insurance contributions and taxation (direct, property and indirect taxes). As 
authors have pointed out, EOPYY could collect contributions either directly or 
indirectly by pension funds, on an online monthly basis (Karakolias & Polyzos, 
2014; Polyzos et al, 2014).  
 Subsequently, EOPYY could separate its purchasing and provider functions and 
become a sole purchaser with monopsony power with the broader goal to have 
bargaining power by setting contracts for providers, assess their performance and 
finally drive the prices down. The relevant Law adopted one year ago about the 
transfer of PHC responsibility and EOPYY units to RHAs and ESY needs to be 
implemented.   
 Furthermore, given that EOPYY needs to operate as a unified social health 
insurance fund in practice, it could also undertake individual managerial roles such 
as contributing to evasion management or controlling the budget state subsidies. 
This way it would compensate ESY hospitals and HCCs for the services provided 
to its beneficiaries.  
 Changing the payment system of providers by the introduction of a prospective 
payment system for public hospitals in combination with reviewing arrangements for 
eliminating transfers from the state budget to hospitals, PHC and EOPYY will 
contribute to better resource allocation and offer incentives to providers for improving 
productivity and effectiveness. The current pilot introduction of DRGs method under a 
revised pricing method of ESY hospitals is in the right direction. 
 The introduction of revised pricing system in combination with global budgets and the 
faster introduction of health information systems and accounting system- which will 
permit establishing high-quality statistical techniques and systematic reporting methods 
on health services performance- will lead to significant changes in the managerial 
structure of health care system – especially hospitals and provide incentives for more 
productivity and effectiveness. 
 The development of an integrated and better monitored public procurement system 
under systematic health technology assessment (HTAs) and economic evaluation will 
improve the efficiency of the current procurement system. The centralized public 
procurement legislation that was introduced since the 2007 reform needs to be adopted 
faster.  
 
 
336 
Eliminating inequalities in access to health care due to differences in SHIFs coverage  
As far as it concerns the issue of inequalities in health care use among SHIFs, it is derived 
– as mentioned above - by the qualitative and quantitative differences of multiple SHIFs in 
the range of entitlements, the level of coverage, freedom of choice of primary care 
providers (including private providers), access to specialists and  to private hospitals, and 
uneven contribution rates. This issue of inequalities among the merged SHIFs is not just an 
issue of fairness.  Given the establishment and operation of recently unified fund 
(EOPYY), it is important that we eliminate the above differences among the SHIFs almost 
three years after the operation of EOPYY. The standardization of benefit package among 
the unified SHIFs based on the EOPYY Integrated Health Care Regulation (EKPY) - 
established two years ago - is moving towards the right direction. 
 
Eliminating inequalities in access to health care due to regional disparities - 
Implications 
With regard to the geographical inequalities in access to health care as described above, 
they will be reduced under the implementation of a rational allocation formula in 
combination with the systematic development of “Health and Welfare Map” of the country 
that highlights the health needs of the population and the ESY’s and EOPYY’s staffing 
problems in every region. In order to solve the staffing problem of specific regions (i.e. 
more isolated regions of Central Greece, Western Greece and Islands) a different 
employment and reimbursement policy must be adopted by MoH and MoF. Incentives for 
attracting and retaining health personnel to rural areas in combination with reimbursement 
connected with the performance and specialty, would be probably the alternative option of 
investing in productive human capital and improving equity in access as well as reducing 
the interregional flows to private providers with increased expenses or to the ESY 
hospitals in urban areas.This would exacerbate their demand pressure and the waiting lists. 
In addition, a routine use of telemedicine could link the remote areas with specialized 
medical centres, as suggested by a lot of authors (Healy & McKee, 2004; Simoens & 
Hurst, 2006). 
Moreover, with respect to access, for the future it is important: 
 To directly inquire how rural beneficiaries’ use rates can be related to rates for urban 
beneficiaries and whether rural areas have fewer local physicians per capita than urban 
areas. 
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 To attain a thorough understanding of recipients’ perspectives and individuals who 
provide health care in different areas of the country, particularly, in diverse rural 
areas. 
 To focus on diversity within rural areas with regard to rural patients’ satisfaction 
concerning access and quality. 
 To inquire into the reasons why patients travel to urban areas for receiving care: In 
some cases, they do so because of the lack of local providers; in other cases, they 
select to bypass local providers for urban providers, as well as the specific health care 
services they demand for travelling. 
 To direct additional predictors of regional disparities in health care use such as:  
 Different rates of poverty after adapting the cost of living among rural and urban 
areas.  
 Different share of population over 65 and for those over 85 among urban and rural 
areas. 
 Characteristics of rural areas population: whether rural recipients are of older age 
or sicker, or constantly live in communities with higher percentage of poverty as 
opposed to the urban areas. 
 
Controlling the role of OOP expenses and informal payments as a significant financial 
barrier to access health care services 
As far as it concerns the role of OOP expenses as a financial barrier to access health care 
services, our findings - similar to limited evidence - indicate that OOP expenses and 
informal payments constitute a serious problem of the Greek health care financing system. 
Furthermore, our findings of OOP expenses and mainly informal payments, especially for 
specialist and inpatient care irrespective of ability to pay, SHIF coverage and region of 
residence, indicate that OOP payments could be a serious barrier to access health care and 
a heavy burden on individual and household incomes.The problems get worse due to the 
economic crisis the country is currently facing. As a lot of authors have pointed out, given 
the incomprehensive and uneven development of health coverage and the lack of a rational 
pricing and remuneration policy, informal payments were developed as complement to 
public funding (Brian-Abel Smith et al (1994); Mosialos et al, 2005; Liaropoulos et al, 
2008). Provided the Greek evidence that informal payments concern patients’ attempt to 
bypass waiting lists or ensure better quality of service and more attention from doctors, it 
is obvious that there is no simple solution, especially during the era of the economic crisis. 
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To address drivers of OOPPs and informal payments, wide policies are needed, as 
following. 
 Supplemented private insurance along with a universal health insurance system could 
be introduced in order to provide cover for faster access, better quality of services and 
increased consumer choice in the public sector, based on income and ability to pay 
and limit informal payments (Kaitelidou et al, 2013) Complimentary or duplicate 
coverage is also possible (Looper M, 2009). 
 Certain mechanisms that will increase the accountability and transparency of the 
whole health system should be developed in order to maximize the success of any 
efforts to control and eliminate informal payments. According to the last study of 
European Commission on corruption in the healthcare sector (EU, 2013), the Greek 
government – similar to other Member States, is indicated to: 
 To apply self-regulation, for instance through a Code of Conduct or Code of 
Ethics of the industry. 
 To ameliorate transparency in healthcare system, for example by publication of 
waiting lists (and queuing times).  
 To ameliorate transparency in the relation between the industry and healthcare 
providers which can be initiated by either the sector itself or government policies.  
 Furthermore, to induce physicians to prescribe generic instead of brand medicines 
as a good transparency enhancing policy. 
 To motivate – independent – media involvement, ‘civil society’ watchdogs and 
patient groups to find out and report on informal payments and corruption. 
Moreover, to make them organise awareness campaigns and fraud reporting as 
good examples of mobilisation of countervailing powers. 
Given that little research has been carried out, systematic research is recommended 
to explore the scope, scale, the impact of informal payments in the healthcare sector 
and possible policies to limit it. 
 It is also important to systematically evaluate the policies and their impact in order to 
facilitate successful implementation under the current circumstances of economic 
crisis.  
 
Priority areas – next steps in reducing health care inequalities among the elderly 
In a nutshell, following the aforementioned international priority areas for action to reduce 
health care inequalities among the elderly, Greece - similar to other EU and OECD 
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countries- need to adopt schemes or mechanisms to successfully generate universal health 
care coverage for ageing population that include action in the following key areas: (i) 
aligning health systems with the needs of the older populations, by developing and 
ensuring access to services that provide older-person centred and integrated care; (ii) 
developing systems for providing long-term care – an important issue due to inexistence of 
LTC in Greece with a rapidly ageing population; (iii) creating age-friendly environments 
by combating age-based stereotypes, protecting the rights of older and enabling autonomy; 
(iv) improving understanding and monitoring of age-related needs, issues and determinants 
of healthy ageing. Overall, in all schemes and systems, an attempt should be made to 
provide at least essential benefits for the elderly to ensure them access to affordable 
services and financial protection. In addition, more mechanisms related social protection 
systems should be developed to identify and close more gaps in coverage to achieving 
equitable access, based on key policies such as:  
 Universality of social protection coverage based on financial solidarity via development 
of tailored benefit packages; abolishment of co-payments and user fees for the most 
vulnerable in order to limit the burden of OOPPs; and 
 Coordination and coherence of existing social protection schemes in order to built a 
well-designed social safety net based on effective and efficient administration and fiscal 
sustainability.  
 Placing more emphasis on local solutions via the involvement of local people and 
communities as a key factor in shaping priorities for action on social determinants in 
eliminating inequalities in health care  
Moreover, we believe that the orientation of the Greek fragmented health system designed 
to provide acute care, to an integrated care system among levels and services focus on the 
needs of older population is crucial. In addition, the establishment of statutory LTC 
(including policies for coordinating health and social needs of the elderly) based on 
ensuring equitable access to and utilization of care services will provide a real safety net 
for older people– and their families. It will also help to share the risk of catastrophic 
health-care costs, reduces burdens on families and promotes social cohesion. Moreover, 
supplemented private insurance along with a universal health insurance system could be 
introduced in order to provide cover for faster access, better quality of services and 
increased consumer choice in the public sector, based on income and ability to pay and 
limit informal payments. 
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In addition, without a clear understanding of the cause of the causes of inequities in health, 
action is likely to be ineffective, project-driven and inappropriately targeted at the bottom 
of the social gradient. Proportionate universal policies and action focused on the social 
determinants of health across the life-course require clarity of understanding, a defined 
strategy and concerted leadership across key agencies to be effective. 
Overall, the investigation and measurement of inequalities in health care use the period 
preceding the current economic downturn (with reference from 2003 till 2008), could help 
health policy-makers to examine the impact of the crisis on equitable access to health care 
services, and the reforms implemented in the Greek health sector during the last eight 
years, under the imposition of public health spending restrictions and specific operational 
policy measures, that seems to ignore the citizen/patient side. This perspective is 
important, since 2009 the public health sector is called upon to meet the increasing needs 
of the population with decreasing financial resources, leading to negative effects, 
particularly for those most at risk of vulnerability, as the older population, especially in 
terms of increased restrictions on access to quality health and social care. 
7.4 Future research agenda 
The Greek healthcare system in the last twenty years is at least a continuous process of 
"transition" and ongoing structural and organizational changes. Given the current 
weaknesses of the Greek NHS with regard to organization, coverage, funding and 
delivering health services, it will undoubtedly continue to experience changes and reforms. 
Therefore, future research agenda is useful to enrich more the existing literature for 
inequalities in health care use among older population in Greece.  
 It would be ideal to re-estimate and re-analyse the SHARE survey results using data 
collection after the 2004 baseline wave. Since 2004, Greece conducted the second wave 
of SHARE data collection in 2006, and the third wave of SHARElife data in 2008-09 
that is focused on the collection of detailed life-histories of respondents who 
participated in previous waves. Thus, we could conduct another study based on either 
cross-sectional or longitudinal data of SHARE survey that will permit to address our 
research issue of inequalities in health care among the elderly on “an ongoing large-
scale cross-national study with a longitudinal perspective” (SHARElife, 2010). We 
could examine the SHARELIFE survey conducted in 2009 as a unique cross-national 
survey that complements the SHARE data of Wave1 in 2004 and Wave2 in 2006 by 
providing life history information to enhance our understanding of how early life 
experiences and events throughout life influence the circumstances of older people.  
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 Furthermore, we could investigate inequalities in health care use based on the dataset of 
Household Budget Survey conducted annually since 2008 till 2014 by the National 
Statistical Authority of Greece under the coordination of Eurostat. The Household 
Budget Survey provides high-quality statistical information on expenditure on health 
care recorded on a household rather than on an individual basis. Therefore, future 
analysis of household budget survey dataset since 2008 either on cross-sectional or on 
longitudinal basis, will provide a unique opportunity to address our research topic to the 
economic crisis period. Given the major health care initiatives undertaken during the 
economic crisis since 2010, in particular the reduction in economic resources via 
income significant reduction and reduction in health insurance coverage, using the 
household budget surveys data, we could learn a lot about the effects of these reforms 
on the health care utilisation behaviour and the well-being of Greek elderly citizens.  
 Another significant issue of future research agenda that it would also be worth thinking 
is how the results generated from the application of CI and the methods of measurement 
of health inequity can be related to policy implication. Further research is required to 
correlate the method of measuring inequity and inequalities via CI with the particular 
features of the elderly population in Greece and convey the conclusions to policy 
makers.   
 Finally, the indicator of care quality could also be included in future research agenda. 
Comprising some measures of quality of care (i.e. waiting times) would be crucial so 
that we can realise in depth to fully realise the nature and extent of existing inequalities. 
It is worth mentioning that the indicator of care quality has never been examined in the 
existing evidence for inequalities in health care use in Greece. 
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APPENDICES 
Chapter One: Tables 1.2 - 1.5:  Evidence for inequalities in utilisation of health care in Greece 
Table 1.2 Evidence for inequalities in utilisation of health care in Greece - EU Comparative studies with the participation of Greece 
 (Income-related inequalities) 
Study Data and year 
the data refer to 
Method Subject Measures Results for General Population Other Results Notes 
Bago d' Uva 
T., Jones A. 
and Van 
Doorslaer E. 
(2009) 
Comparative 
Study - 
European 
Community 
Household 
Panel 
(ECPH) for 
Greece 
1994 - 2001 
(pooled 
analysis) 
Econometric 
estimation 
(measure: number of  
contacts, variations in 
time) 
Short -term and long-
term inequalities in the 
use of 
physician visits 
GP visits: 1. pro-poor inequalities 
2. pro-poor short run 
3. pro-poor long- run 
 Since there are 
few GPs that do 
not act as 
gatekeepers in 
Greece, the 
results for GP 
visits should be 
treated with 
caution. 
Medical specialist 
visit: 
1. pro-rich inequalities in all waves 
2. Long-run pro-rich inequality for 
specialists visits   
 
The average short-run HIs 
underestimate long run  inequity 
by a proportion ranging from 6% 
(Greece) This suggests that not 
only richer individuals tend to use 
more specialist care in the short-
run (controlling for need), but also 
that individuals moving up in the 
income distribution over time tend 
to visit a specialist more often than 
those moving to the opposite 
Bago d’Uvaa 
T. & Jones A. 
(2009) 
Comparative 
Study - European 
Community 
Household 
Panel 
(ECPH) for 
Greece 
1994 - 2001 
(pooled analysis) 
Econometric 
estimation- 
latent class (LC) hurdle 
for modeling individual 
effects. 
(measure: total contacts, 
variations in time) 
The effects of income 
on probability and 
total use of GPs, on 
probability and total 
use of specialist visits 
-  inequalities in the 
use of 
physician visits 
probability and 
total number  of 
GP visits: 
1. Slightly pro-rich (almost zero) 
inequity  
2. insignificant but positive 
elasticity of income effects on 
total number of GPs visits 
Insignificant but positive elasticity 
of income effects on total number 
of GPs visits. 
since there are 
few GPs that do 
not act as 
gatekeepers in 
Greece, the 
results for GP 
visits should be 
treated with 
caution 
probability and 
total number  of 
specialist visit: 
1. pro-rich inequity  
2. Large income elasticities of the 
expected (total) number of 
specialist visits 
Large income elasticities of the 
expected (total) number of 
specialist visits 
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Study Data and year 
the data refer to 
Method Subject Measures Results for General Population Other Results Notes 
Bago d' Uva T., 
Jones A. and 
Van Doorslaer 
E. (2007) 
Comparative 
Study - European 
Community 
Household 
Panel 
(ECPH) for 
Greece 
1994 - 2001 
(pooled analysis) 
econometric 
estimation 
(measure: total contacts, 
variations in time) 
Short -term and long-
term inequalities in the 
use of 
physician visits 
GP visits: 1. pro-poor inequalities  2. large 
variations across time (in waves 
3,5,6,8: less pro-poor), (in waves 2, 
4: larger pro-poor) 3. pro-poor long-
run income inequalities 
1. pro-poor long-run income 
inequalities for GP visits   
2.Long-run pro-rich inequality for 
specialists visits  
Since there are 
few GPs that do 
not act as 
gatekeepers in 
Greece, the 
results for GP 
visits should be 
treated with 
caution 
Medical specialist 
visit: 
1. pro-poor inequalities in all waves  
2. Long-run pro-rich inequality 
Van 
Doorslaer E., 
Masseria C. 
and Koolman 
X. (2006) 
Comparative 
cross sectional 
Study - ECPH 
for Greece 2000  
Econometric 
estimation 
(two 
measures: 
annual mean; 
probability 
of contact) 
Income-related 
inequality in the use of 
physician visits in 21 
OECD countries 
total physician 
visits: 
No inequity in the annual 
probability 
  
Since there are 
few GPs that do 
not act as 
gatekeepers  
Greece, the 
results for GP 
visits should be 
treated with 
caution. 
 
GP visits: 1.low proportion visiting GP 
2.Pro-poor 
Medical specialist 
visit: 
pro-rich  
MasseriaC., 
Koolman X., 
Van Doorslaer 
E., (2004) 
Comparative 
Study -European 
Community 
Household 
Panel 
(ECPH) for 
Greece 
1994 - 1998 
(pooled analysis) 
econometric 
estimation 
(three 
measures: 
total contacts, 
probability for 
one contact, 
and 
(conditional) 
number of 
subsequent 
visits) 
1. Long-run inequity in 
the use of inpatient care 
2. Impact of inter-
regional differences and 
bed availability (supply 
side factor) on inequity 
Hospital 
(inpatient) care 
utilization: 
1. pro rich inequity relevant to 
regional disparities  
2.pro need inequity for inpatient 
care relevant to the total number of 
specialist visits  
3.significant pro rich inequity for 
inpatient care relevant to non-
elective care (after standardising 
for specialist visits) 
 1. pro rich inequity for inpatient 
care relevant to regional 
disparities  
2. pro rich and higher educated 
income-related inequity for 
specialist visits. 
3. No supply-based inequity 
  
 
Medical specialist 
visit: 
pro rich and higher educated 
income-related inequity 
 
 Comparative econometric income-related GP visits: pro poor inequity    Since there are 
 
 
365 
Study Data and year 
the data refer to 
Method Subject Measures Results for General Population Other Results Notes 
Van 
Doorslaer & 
Masseria 
(2004) 
cross sectional 
Study - European 
Community 
Household 
Panel 
(ECPH) for 
Greece, 2000  
estimation 
(two 
measures: 
total contacts 
and 
probability for 
one contact) 
inequality in the use of 
medical care in 21 
OECD countries 
 few GPs in 
Greece - the 
results for GP 
visits should be 
treated with 
caution. 
Medical specialist 
visit: 
1. pro rich,  
2. higher educated,  
3. pro-rich regional disparities 
income-related inequity 
For specialists visits: 
1.higher educated income-related 
inequity   
2.pro-rich regional disparities  
Hospital 
(inpatient) care 
utilization: 
no income related inequity / slightly 
pro poor  
For inpatient care: some pro rich 
regional contribution to income 
inequity (the richer versus poorer 
regions & the urban versus rural 
regions –Athens)  
Dental care: strong pro rich inequity   
van 
Doorslaer, 
Koolman, & 
Jones (2004) 
Comparative 
cross sectional 
Study - European 
Community 
Household 
Panel 
(ECPH) for 
Greece 
1996 
econometric 
estimation 
(three 
measures: 
total contacts, 
probability for 
one contact, 
and 
(conditional) 
number of 
subsequent 
visits) 
income-related 
inequality in utilization 
of GPs and specialists 
GP visits: probability of contacting a GP: 
slightly pro rich 
  Since there are 
few GPs that do 
not act as 
gatekeepers in 
Greece, the 
results for GP 
visits should be 
treated with 
caution. 
Medical specialist 
visit: 
 For the probability of contacting a 
specialist: significant pro rich 
income-related inequity 
Hospital 
(inpatient) care 
utilization: 
(after need standardization): no 
inequity – Related to how hospital 
care is distributed 
For the probability 
of any inpatient 
care use (at least 
one night)  
(before standardizing for need): pro 
poor 
van 
Doorslaer, 
Koolman, & 
Puffer (2002) 
Comparative 
Study - European 
(ECPH) for 
Greece 
1996 
(cross sectional) 
Econometric estimation 
(total contacts, 
probability for one 
contact; and number of 
subsequent visits) 
1. income-related 
inequality in use 
of GPs and specialist   
2. Impact of  private 
health insurance and 
regional disparities on 
inequity 
total physician 
visits: 
1. Significant pro rich income-
related inequity 
2.  Slightly pro poor inequity in 
total doctor visits, after adjusting 
for Private Medical Insurance 
coverage  
3. Slightly pro inequity in total 
doctor visits, after adjusting for 
regional disparities 
 Significant horizontal inequities 
related to regional disparities in 
doctor visits and not related to 
need 
 
Medical specialist 
visit 
pro-rich  
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 Chapter One: Table 1.3 Evidence for inequalities in utilisation of health care in Greece - EU studies with the participation of Greece 
(Barriers to access) 
Study Data and year the 
data refer to 
Method Subject Measures Results for General Population Other Results Notes 
Rodrigues, 
R., et al 
(2013) 
Comparative Study - 
EU-SILK for Greece 
2006 , 2011 
 
Descriptive Descriptives of 
unmet and 
enforced unmet 
need between 
2006 and 2011 
Enforced unmet need for 
medical examination  
The most important reason in 2011 
was the cost (more than 60%)  
 The percentage of people 
reporting cost as a barrier is 
highest in Greece (31%), 
even though financial 
barrier is not the first reason 
 Greece is the top 
one country versus 
EU-27 confronting 
accessibility 
problems when 
visiting a specialist 
 
Enforced unmet need for 
medical examination by 
income 
people on low income tend to report 
more enforced unmet needs than 
higher earners  
The lowest income quintile 
reported an increase 1.41% 
2006–2011 change in 
enforced unmet need. The 2
nd
 
to 5
th
 income quintile had 
1.78% increase.  
Anderson et 
al - 
Eurofound  
(2012) 
Comparative Study - 
cross-sectional The 
Third European 
Quality of Life Survey 
(2011) 
Descriptive - 
and 
nationwide 
Reasons for 
difficulties of 
access to 
doctors 
Financial barrier -Cost of 
seeing the doctor 
("Reporting very difficult") 
1. 64% Reporting difficulty  
2. Pro poor Reporting "very difficult" 
  
1. Greece features in the top 
three countries with 
problems caused by all 
five types of problems. 
2. If we rank the barriers to 
access, the most frequent 
barriers are waiting time 
and delay in getting 
appointment, financial 
barrier (cost) is the third 
reason, and distance to 
doctor is the forth barrier 
Some of the 
dimensions of 
quality of life are 
measured with 
narrower set of 
indicators than 
could be used in 
highly specialized 
surveys. 
Geographical access - 
Distance to doctor’s 
office/hospital (Rural - 
Urban Differences) 
45% reporting difficulty 
Waiting time to see doctor 
on day of appointment 
66% reporting difficulty 
Delay in getting 
appointment 
67% reporting difficulty 
Finding time because of 
work or care  
39% reporting difficulty 
Eurofound 
(2013) 
 
Comparative Study - 
Analysis of EU-SILK 
macro data from 2007 
to 2011 (pooled 
analysis) 
Descriptive - 
and 
nationwide 
 
Determinants of 
unmet needs 
Financial barrier -Cost 1. Greece has the highest reporting 
cost (43%) 
2. Larger problem in urban areas 
3. Per unemployed people 
4. Per migrants 
 Some of the 
dimensions of 
quality of life are 
measured with 
narrower set of 
indicators than it 
could be used in 
highly specialized 
surveys. 
Comparative Study - 
Analysis of the third 
European 
Geographical access- 
Distance to doctor’s 
office/hospital (Rural - 
Urban Differences) 
1. More difficulties (27%) because 
of distance in 2011 than 2007 
(22%) 
2. The proportion of people 
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Study Data and year the 
data refer to 
Method Subject Measures Results for General Population Other Results Notes 
Quality of Life Survey 
2012 
reporting unmet need almost 
tripled between 2007 and 2011. 
Waiting time to see doctor 
on day of appointment 
 Reporting difficulty (11% for general 
population; 14% for disability 
persons) 
Delay in getting 
appointment 
1. Reporting increased  difficulty in 
2011 than in 2007. 
2. High trade off between getting an 
appointment and affordable 
access 
Koolman, X. 
(2007), 
EU Statistics on 
Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILK) 
for Greece 
2004 (cross- sectional) 
econometric 
estimation 
(measures: 
unmet need 
for medical 
examination / 
treatment 
1. Unmet need 
by cause  
2. Inequalities 
in unmet in 
relation to: 
income; 
education; 
degree of 
urbanisation;  
 
Unmet need by cause  
 
1. Cost is the most important cause 
(58%) on average  
2. Distance difficulty (10%) 
3. Watchful waiting (9%) 
4.  Waiting lists (7%), 
5. Lack of time (7%) 
5.2% of the sample claims 
unmet need during the last 
12 months. 
 
 
Unmet need by income Pro-poor unmet need; Unmet need is 
(strongly) concentrated among the 
lower income househ.  
Income inequalities are 
larger than other inequalities. 
Unmet need by education No inequity. Educational level does 
not affect unmet need  
Unmet need by degree of 
urbanisation 
1. Slightly favoring urban areas  
2. People in more urban areas are 
insignificantly slightly  more likely 
to report unmet need 
 
Unmet need by country of 
birth   
1. Slightly favouring immigrants 
 
Citizens born out of the EU 
had a significant and 
comparatively large greater 
probability of reporting 
unmet need compared to 
natives. 
Anderson - 
Eurofound,  
(2004) 
Comparative Study - 
European 
Quality of Life Survey 
2003 
(cross sectional) 
Descriptive 
and 
nationwide 
Cost sharing -
Financial 
barrier 
Cost of seeing the doctor 
("Reporting very difficult") 
Pro poor Reporting "very difficult" 
(30% of lowest income quantile v. 
13% of highest  
 
 
Geographical 
access 
Distance from doctor’s 
office/hospital (Rural - 
Reporting difficulty No association of household 
size and assessment of 
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Study Data and year the 
data refer to 
Method Subject Measures Results for General Population Other Results Notes 
Urban Differences) quality 
Waiting times Waiting time to see doctor 
on day of appointment 
Reporting difficulty No association of number of 
children and assessment of 
quality 
Delay Delay in getting 
appointment 
Reporting difficulty  
Alber & 
Kohler 
(2004) 
Comparative Study - 
Eurobarometer (1999, 
2002) 
Descriptive, 
nationwide 
Geographical 
access 
Geographical proximity to 
hospitals   
1. Greece at the bottom of the 
distribution of EU-15.   2. 96% of the 
Greek population need less time than 
one hour to get to a hospital at the 
distribution of EU-15  
1. Only 40% of the long-
term ill find quick access 
to a doctor. 
2. There is more variation 
with respect to proximity 
to GPs than with respect 
to proximity to hospitals. 
3. Higher proportions of the 
populations have faster 
access to hospitals than to 
GPs. 
4. Almost no difference in 
access to hospitals by 
income. 
5. Only 40% of the long-
term ill find quick access 
to a doctor 
1. Since there are 
few GPs that do 
not act as 
gatekeepers in 
Greece, the  
results for GP 
visits should be 
treated with 
caution. 
2. The income 
measure has a lot 
of limitations in 
Eurobarometer 
and needs to be 
treated in caution  
Geographical Proximity to 
hospitals by income - 
Difference between lowest 
and highest quartile 
Almost no difference in access to 
hospitals by income (8,5% difference 
in Greece versus 15% in EU-15) 
geographical proximity to 
GPs (% having access in 
less than 20 minutes) 
Greek people report the highest 
proportion in EU-15 with very 
difficult access 
geographical proximity to 
GPs by income 
Small difference in access to GPs by 
income (14,9% difference in Greece 
versus 2,7% in EU-15) 
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Chapter One: Table 1.4 Evidence for inequalities in utilisation of health care in Greece - Greek studies  
(determinants of health care utilisation) 
Study Data and year the 
data refer to 
Method Subject Measures Results for General 
Population 
Other Results Notes 
Souliotis K. et 
al, (2016) 
Cross-sectional, 
nationwide, telephone 
study (2011) 
Descriptive 
nationwide - 
binary logistic 
model 
For the impact of 
informal and 
OOPPs: the 
nationwide sample 
is extrapolated  to 
the results of the 
2012 Household 
Budget Survey 
Utilisation and 
informal and OOP 
payments (OOPPs) 
for private and 
public health 
services (PHC and 
hospital) 
Both public and 
private health care 
services 
1. Pro-poor, women, older age: 
66+, lower education, residents 
of Attica 
2. More inpatient care in public 
hospitals than private clinics 
 The majority 58% of health 
care recipients paid OOP. 
 
It is a telephone 
survey and has a 
complicated study 
design, as the 
nationwide sample 
is extrapolated on 
the results of the 
2012 HBS. The 
results should be 
treated with 
caution. 
Private sector: (a) 
private PHC: 
Specialist visits; 
dental care visits; 
diagnostic centers  
and (b) private 
inpatient care. 
1. Men, younger groups, residents 
of rural areas, pro-rich, higher 
educational level 
2. More private PHC than private 
hospital care 
 
Overall OOP and 
informal payments 
for Hospital care 
(private vs public) 
(a) Private clinics: Higher OOPPs 
but lower informal payments 
versus 
(b) Public hospital care: less 
OOP but more informal (32.4% 
of OOPPs are informal in public 
hospitals) 
Reasons for informal payments 
to hospital care: 
1. To ensure better care: 24% 
for private versus 20% for 
public hospitals 
2. Patient gratitude: 4% for 
private vs 13.6% for public 
hospital care 
Overall OOP and 
informal payments 
for PHC (private 
specialists vs 
public HCCs and 
SHIF visits 
1. Higher informal (under-the-
table) payments to private PHC 
(specialists and dentists) versus 
public PHC (HCCs and SHIF 
visits) 
Reasons for informal payments 
in PHC: 
1. Ease of access and 
reduction in waiting times 
(70.6% for SHIF visits and 
86.6% for private PHC- 
diagnostics) 
2. Higher quality care: 13.4% 
for private PHC-
diagnostics and 29.4% for 
SHIF visits 
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Study Data and year the 
data refer to 
Method Subject Measures Results for General 
Population 
Other Results Notes 
Informal and 
OOPPs for public 
sector: (a) hospital 
care and (b) PHC: 
HCC physician 
and SHIF 
physician. 
1. 26.04% OOPPs for public 
hospital care (32.4% are 
informal payments) 
2. Informal payment for public 
PHC: 12.2% for HCC physician 
visit and 10.6% for SHIF 
physician visit. 
Economic impact of OOP and 
informal payments:  
1. Significant impact (46.6%)  
2. Medium impact (22.8%) 
3. Small impact (23.3%) 
4. Neutral (7.4%)  
Informal and 
OOPPs for private 
sector: (a) private 
clinics and (b) 
specialists and 
dentists  
1. Higher OOPPs to specialists and 
dentists (36%) than private 
clinics (13.5%) 
2. (28% of OOPPs are informal 
(under-the-table) to specialists 
and dentists. 
1. The majority (55.8%) of 
those with bad financial 
status made informal 
payments. 
2. Informal – hidden 
payments were estimated 
28% of households’ health 
expenditure or €1.5 billion 
for 2012 
Grigorakis et 
al (2016; 
2014) 
Cross-sectional, 
nationwide (2013) 
Descriptive 
qualitative 
nationwide - based 
on documentation 
and interviews 
The relationship 
between OOPs and 
SHI funding for 
private 
hospitalization. 
Moreover, the 
catastrophic impact 
of OOPs on 
individuals’ living 
standards. 
1. Costs (SHI 
and OOP and 
informal)  in 
private clinics/ 
hospitalisation; 
2. funding 
arrangements, 
(SHI, and 
categorization of 
OOPs. 
1. SHIF- EOPYY covered only 
47.3% of the total 
hospitalization cost; 
2. the rest 52.7% was OOP 
expenses with the average 
OOP amount €1655.24 paid to 
surgeons; 
3. Informal total payments to 
physicians is greater than 13% 
of overall inpatient OOPs. 
1. The effect of OOP on the 
household income: 10% 
made OOP hospital 
payments that exceeded 
one quarter of their annual 
wage or pension income 
Included only 
private hospitals 
in main urban 
areas and 
excluded rural 
population – such 
as farmers. 
Economou C 
(2015) 
Cross-sectional WHO 
qualitative nationwide  
study on barriers in 
access to health services 
(2014) 
Descriptive 
qualitative 
nationwide - based 
on interviews and 
focus groups 
discussions with 
Tanahashi 
framework 
Barriers in access 
to health services, 
with a focus on 
barriers 
experienced by 
socially excluded 
populations and 
other 
vulnerable/high 
risk groups. 
Geographical 
access and 
regional 
disparities 
1. Significant regional disparities 
favouring the residents of rural 
regions- who are less 
advantaged. 
2. Interregional variations in 
hospital services favoring the 
residents of rural areas that have 
to travel to seek hospital care at 
urban areas. 
3. geographical proximity barrier to 
inpatient care 
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Study Data and year the 
data refer to 
Method Subject Measures Results for General 
Population 
Other Results Notes 
methodology Financial Barrier 
to access (OOP 
and Informal 
Payments) and 
affordability  
1. Large increases in OOP 
expenditures for: medical 
prescriptions; unlisted drugs; and 
laboratory tests. 
2.  Informal OOPPs for timely and 
qualitative access to inpatient 
care.  
Zavras D et al 
(2014) 
Cross-sectional, 
nationwide – based on 
WHO Multi-country 
Survey Study for 
assessing PHC 2006 
Descriptive 
nationwide – 
logistic regression 
model 
 
Socioeconomic 
determinants of 
utilisation of the 
Greek PHC 
services 
Number of PHC 
physician visits 
1. Younger age; women; 
2. Less than good SAH; chronic 
conditions; 
3. Lower income groups (pro-
poor) 
4. Residents of Attika 
 
 Not discrimination 
between public 
and private PHC 
visits  
Kaitelidou et 
al (2013) 
Cross-sectional, 
nationwide (2013) 
Descriptive 
nationwide (3 
provincial and 1 
general hospital in 
Athens) - binary 
logistic model 
Socioeconomic 
determinants of 
OOP and 
informal 
payments for 
obstetric services 
in 4 public 
hospitals 
Total informal 
payments 
(probability and 
amount) 
1. 74% of women paid informally 
2. Living in Athens 
3. Higher educational level 
4. Higher income 
5. Mean total private payments 
were €1549: mean informal 
payment of €848; and a mean 
formal OOPP of €701 
The most common reason 
for under-the-table payment 
was the obstetrician’s 
request (56.3% of 
respondents). 
Small sample size 
Pappa E. et al, 
(2013) 
Cross-sectional, 
nationwide (2010) 
Descriptive 
nationwide - 
binary logistic 
model 
Socioeconomic 
determinants of 
unmet need in the 
Greek primary 
health care 
services (PHC) 
Unmet needs for 
health services 
(family doctor, 
specialist, 
medication) 
Pro-poor, cost -financial barrier, 
young age: 25-34 group 
Distribution of reasons for 
unmet needs:  
1. Accessibility (33.6%) 
2. Cost (25.4%) 
3. SHIF coverage (5.2%) 
4. Distance (3.0%)  
 
Kentikelenis 
et al (2011) 
Comparative- 
EU Statistics on 
Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILK) 
for Greece 
2007 - 2009 (pooled 
analysis) 
Descriptive - 
nationwide 
(Logistic 
Regression 
Model- they 
created a financial 
crisis dummy 
variable)  
Socioeconomic 
determinants of 
unmet need in 
health and  
health care in 
Greece-effect of 
the economic 
crisis 
1. Unmet need 
for medical 
physician 
examination or 
treatment 
 
1. Significant increase in people 
reporting that they did not go to 
a doctor or dentist despite 
feeling that it was necessary 
2.Not related to inability to afford 
; 
3. Related to: long waiting   
times; travel distance to care; 
 The analysis is 
based on the 
creation of a 
financial crisis 
model and its 
results should be 
treated with 
caution. 
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Study Data and year the 
data refer to 
Method Subject Measures Results for General 
Population 
Other Results Notes 
waiting to feel better; and other 
1.Supply-side 
problems 
2. Bribes 
1. About 40% cuts in hospital 
budgets; understaffing, reported 
occasional shortages of medical 
supplies, and bribes given to 
medical staff to jump queues in 
overstretched hospitals; 
2. Rise in admissions to public 
     hospitals of 24% in 2010 
compared to 2009; and 8% in the 
first half of 2011 compared with 
the same period of 2010. 
3.Decline 25–30% in admissions to 
private hospitals 
Tountas et al, 
2011 
Cross-sectional 
nationwide household 
survey Hellas Health I 
(2006) 
Descriptive - 
Nationwide -
Logistic 
regression model 
Socioeconomic 
determinants of 
utilisation of the 
Greek primary 
and hospital 
health care 
services 
 Family physician 
visits for primary 
health care 
1. Higher SES more likely  – pro 
rich  
2. Higher educational level 
3. Pro – voluntary private health 
insurance (PHI) 
Pro rural areas -  The institution of 
the family doctor 
is not well 
established –due 
to inexistence of 
GPs, and people 
who consult a 
single provider 
regularly –ie a 
specialist may 
consider him as 
their ‘personal’ or 
‘family’ doctor. 
Specialist visits 1. Higher SES more likely  – pro 
rich, Men, chronic illness  
2. Pro -Higher educational level 
3. Pro – voluntary private health 
insurance (PHI) 
Pro rural areas favor specialist 
visits 
Total physician 
(PHC) visit  
1. Higher educational level 
2. Pro – voluntary private health 
insurance (PHI) 
Pro urban areas - Residents of 
urban areas favour any PHC 
physician visit  
Inpatient 
admission 
1. No income related 
2. Higher educational level 
 
OOPPs during 
visits to health 
care professionals 
1. Residents of rural areas favour 
OOPPs 
2. VHI owners favour OOPPs 
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Study Data and year the 
data refer to 
Method Subject Measures Results for General 
Population 
Other Results Notes 
Lahana E., 
Pappa E. & 
Niakas D. 
(2011) 
Cross-sectional, 
regional (2006)  
Descriptive - 
regional (Thessaly 
region – Central 
Greece) -Logistic 
regression model 
Socioeconomic & 
ethnicity 
determinants of 
utilisation of the 
Greek primary and 
hospital health care 
services 
Social Health 
Insurance Fund 
(SHIF) physician 
visits for primary 
health care 
1. Pro-higher educated; Greeks 
2. More residents of urban areas. 
3. In urban areas, the middle-aged 
visit a private doctor and the 
elderly (65+) to visit a SHIF 
physician. 
Higher educated residents and 
higher income residents of 
rural areas favor SHIF 
physician visits 
The study has 
small size and its 
findings need to 
be treated in 
caution.  
 Specialist private 
practitioner visits 
Pro -rich Pro-rich in rural areas favour 
specialist visit 
Outpatient 
department visit 
1.More immigrants 
2. Lower-educated 
 
Inpatient 
admission 
Pro rich Pro rich favour inpatient 
admission two times more than 
pro poor  
Tountas Y, 
Oikonomou N. 
(2011) 
Cross-sectional 
nationwide household 
survey Hellas Health I 
(2006) 
Descriptive - 
Nationwide  
Primary health 
care use of rural 
population 
PHC services visit 
of rural residents 
versus urban 
residents 
1. Rural/semi rural residents: 
 The majority (31.8%) make a 
private PHC visit; 
  15.7% visit a private doctor 
contracted to SHIF at urban 
regions;  
 13.7% visit Insurance Fund’ 
(SHIF) polyclinic; 
 15.3 % make hospital outpatient 
visit at urban areas 
Urban residents: 
 The majority (28.9%) visit a 
private doctor contracted to 
SHIF; 
 the (28.1%) visit a SHIF’s 
polyclinic physician 
 24% visit a private doctor; 
 11.9 % make a hospital 
outpatient visit 
 
Brokalaki et al., 
2011 
A cross-sectional study 
conducted during a 2-
year period (2006 to 
2008) in two large 
tertiary hospitals in 
Greece 
Descriptive –  
Medical exam & 
interview 
(Athens urban 
setting versus 
Crete Island –
rural)  
Factors that delay 
hospital arrival 
among patients 
with acute 
myocardial 
infarction (AMI) 
patients’ 
proximity to 
health units 
associated with 
delays in 
treatment 
The risk of delayed hospital arrival 
when the AMI occurred was 
almost 20 times greater among 
patients who reported a main 
residence located more than 10 km 
from the nearest hospital. 
  
Koetsi-Kounari 
H et al (2011) 
Cross-sectional, 
nationwide (2010) 
Descriptive - 
Nationwide -
Logistic 
regression model 
Socio-
demographic and 
health-related 
lifestyle 
Dentist visits the 
past 12 months 
1. Younger age (<56 years) 
2. High SES (higher educational 
level) 
 
Healthier diet and physically 
active and low obesity 
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Study Data and year the 
data refer to 
Method Subject Measures Results for General 
Population 
Other Results Notes 
determinants of  
the use of dental 
services 
Pavi E et al 
(2010) 
Cross-sectional, 
nationwide (2010) 
Descriptive - 
Nationwide -
Logistic 
regression  
Social 
determinants of  
dental health 
services use 
Dentist visits the 
past 12 months 
1. Pro-need 
2. Lower income correlates to 
lower number of dental visits 
Having visited for treatment 
(rather than for prevention) 
correlated to higher number of 
dental visits 
 
Oikonomidou 
E. et al, 2010 
Cross-sectional, 
nationwide, mail study 
(2007) 
Descriptive - 
Nationwide – mail 
study- via the 
opinion of RS’s 
physicians. 
Evaluate the 
number of GPs 
serving in the NHS 
regional RS 
(practices) 
and their working 
conditions in terms 
of personnel and 
equipment 
Proximity as a 
barrier to access 
the RS of the 
NHS- HCCs  
1. The average distance of the RS 
from the HCC is 24 km and 
from the local hospital 35 km. 
2. The majority (87.9%) of the 
rural doctors perform home 
visits, as the older – mainly – 
patients have difficulty in 
arriving at the RS 
26 consultations were reported 
on average per day, with GPs –
who overall are very few, 
reporting more consultations 
as compared with the non-
specialized doctors. 
Mail study with 
low response rate 
40.3%. 
Marinos G et 
al, 2009 
Cross-sectional, urban 
setting in ED  of a big 
University Hospital in 
Athens (2006) 
Descriptive –
qualitative 
evaluation of 
medical records 
for patients 
attending Hospital 
ED in 2006.  
Evaluation of 
medical records for 
patients attending 
the ED  – 
outpatient 
Department of a 
big University 
Hospital in Athens 
with respect to the 
necessity for 
hospital rather than 
GP attendance. 
They were 
classified into 
6 groups. 
The total number 
of patients who 
visited the ED was 
classified into 
6 groups Medical 
records for 
patients Athens’ 
ED – outpatient 
visits. 
1. Of these, mean age was 
65.6 years and (17%) residents 
of rural areas and visited the 
hospital with or without a 
referral from a private 
physician. 
2. Almost one in three patients in 
specific surgical specialty 
groups, could have been 
managed by a GP. 
  
Vasileiou I. et 
al, (2009)  
Longtitudinal, urban 
setting study in ED  of a 
Descriptive – 
qualitative 
Evaluation of 
medical records for 
The total number 
of patients who 
1. Of these, (52.6%)  were men  
2. Increased outpatient visits not 
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Study Data and year the 
data refer to 
Method Subject Measures Results for General 
Population 
Other Results Notes 
big University Hospital in 
Athens retrospective 
evaluation 2001-2006, 
(2006) 
retrospective 
evaluation of 
medical records 
for patients 
attending Hospital 
ENT ED (Jan. 
2001 –Jan. 2006). 
patients attending 
ear, nose or throat 
(ENT)- ED of a 
big University 
Hospital in Athens 
with respect to the 
necessity for 
hospital rather than 
PHC-GP 
attendance.  
visited the Athen’s 
Hospital ENT-ED  
Jan. 2001- Jan. 
2006 
were included 
retrospectively 
and classified into 
8 groups. 
associated with income 
3. Of these, 40% in ENT specialty 
groups could have been managed 
by a PHC-GP attendance. 
Siskou et al, 
(2008) 
Cross-sectional, 
nationwide study 
(2005) 
Descriptive - 
nationwide;  
For the OOPPs: 
the nationwide 
sample is applied  
to the results of 
the 2005 
Household Budget 
Survey  
Socioeconomic 
determinants of 
utilisation of the 
private health care 
services in Greece 
and distribution of 
the OOPPs 
Outpatient 
services 
(frequency of use)  
1. Not related to income level. 
2. Lower educational level tend to 
visit doctors in surgical.l 
specialties privately more often 
3. Rural dwellers seek private 
outpatient care more often. 
1. 66% of total household 
health expenditure is for 
outpatient care (31.1% for 
dental services)  
2. Private facility is higher 
among families of higher 
income and those with 
private insurance coverage 
It has a 
complicated study 
design, as the 
nationwide sample 
is applied on the 
results of the 2005 
HBS. The results 
should be treated 
with caution. 
OOPPs for 
Outpatient 
services 
OOPPs to surgeons and dentists is 
not related to the SES 
 
Hospital inpatient 
services 
1. Family disposable income is 
highly correlated with the 
probability of admission to a 
private hospital. 
1. 36% of those treated in 
public hospitals had at least 
one informal payment to a 
hospital doctor or 2.9% of 
total household health 
expenditure. 
OOPPs for 
hospital inpatient 
services 
Significant part (20%) of hospital 
care financed privately concerns 
informal payments within public 
hospitals. 
 
Liaropoulos L. 
et al (2008) 
Cross-sectional, 
nationwide, telephone 
study (2004) 
Descriptive - 
nationwide;  
telephone survey 
 
Socioeconomic 
determinants of 
informal payments 
(OOPPs) for public 
hospital services 
 
 
OOPPs for 
admission to 
1. 4:10 respondents reporting pay 
OOP to doctors for at least one 
admission to public hospitals. 
2. The size of OOPPs is not 
related to SES 
3. Paying OOP is 2.73 times 
higher for patients undergoing a 
1. 36% of those treated in 
public hospitals had at least 
one informal payment to a 
hospital doctor; 
2. Admissions through normal 
procedures is 3.38 times 
higher for patients waiting 
It is a telephone 
survey and the 
results should be 
treated with 
caution. 
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Study Data and year the 
data refer to 
Method Subject Measures Results for General 
Population 
Other Results Notes 
public hospitals surgery procedure compared to 
non surgical cases. 
for 10 days compared to 
those waiting a day or less; 
3. 72% greater probability of 
people wishing to avoid a 
waiting list compared to the 
standard admission 
procedures and 13.7% 
higher for patients 
requiring surgery 
4. 48.5% of admissions were 
labeled as emergencies. 
Matsaganis 
M., Mitrakos 
T., Tsakloglou 
P. (2008) 
Cross-sectional, 
nationwide, Household 
Buget Survey (02/2004 
- 01/2005) 
Econometric 
estimation- 
Comparing two-
part models and 
generalised linear 
models  
Determinants of 
OOPPs -  
Modelling 
household 
expenditure on 
health care in 
Greece  
Household 
expenditure 
(OOPPs) on all 
health care 
1. Households with PHI spend 
almost twice as ones without 
PHI. 
2. For elderly households, high 
spending on health is not 
related to income. 
3. Non Noble OGA SHIF elderly 
beneficiaries’ households 
spend more than other SHIFs. 
4. Residents of urban regions pay 
higher OOP for all health care 
1. Elderly households spent 
on health (12% to 13% of 
budget shares); 
2. Only 10.7% of all 
individuals in the survey 
have 0€ expenditure on 
any health care at all. 
3. The top 1% of cases 
account for 14.0% of all 
health expenditure 
 
 
Household 
expenditure 
(OOPPs) on 
hospital services 
1. Households with PHI spend 
almost twice as ones without 
PHI. 
2. For all households, high 
spending on health is not 
related to income. 
3. Noble OAEE and Non Noble 
OGA SHIF beneficiaries’ 
households spend more than 
other SHIFs. 
4. Residents of rural regions pay 
higher OOP for all health care 
1. proportion of individuals 
with 0€ expenditure on 
hospital services is 
83.2%. 
2. The top 1% of cases 
account for 37.6% of all 
hospital expenditure. 
 
Geitona M., 
Zavras D., 
WHO Multi-country 
Survey Study (mail 
Descriptive - 
Nationwide 
Socioeconomic 
determinants of 
utilisation of the 
Number of PHC 
visits 
1. Less than good SAH; women; 
2. Income affects only pro-poor 
(lower income groups) 
Residents of Epirus favour 
PHC physician visit 
Mail survey: Less 
than 40% response 
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Study Data and year the 
data refer to 
Method Subject Measures Results for General 
Population 
Other Results Notes 
Kyriopoulos J. 
(2007) 
survey) (2002) 
(cross sectional) 
Greek primary and 
hospital health care 
services 
3. Residents of Central Greece & 
Epirus 
rate - caution in 
interpretation  
Number of 
inpatient 
admissions 
1. Poor SAH,  
2. Pro Non Noble SHIFs 
(mainly OGA);  
3. Favoring residents of 
Peloponnese region 
1.Pro Non Noble SHIFs 
(mainly OGA) are more 
likely to make inpatient 
admissions; 
2. Residents of Peloponnese 
region more likely to have 
inpatient 
Koletsi-
Kounari H et 
al (2007) 
Household Budget 
Survey of the National 
Statistical Service of 
Greece  between 1987-
1998- nationwide (pooled 
analysis) 
Econometric 
estimation- 
Private dental 
expenditure was 
estimated using 
the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI). 
 
Evolution of 
private dental 
health expenditure 
in Greece by 
region and income, 
between 1987 and 
1998 
Private dental 
expenditure 
1. The greatest annual dental health 
expenditure per capita was 
observed in urban areas and in 
1998 it had increased by 9.4% 
while in semi-urban and rural 
areas it decreased (by 33.33% 
and 11.25% respectively). 
2. In 1998 the more pronounced 
and higher income groups 
showed an increase of 67.2% in 
annual expenditure per capita 
Similar percentages in the 
distribution of dental 
expenditure between the 
geographic areas suggest that 
during the decade no changes 
have been made towards 
increasing the amount of 
dental care for members of 
populations in semi-urban 
and rural areas. 
Private dental 
health expenditure 
in Greece is 
differentiated by 
income level and 
geographic region 
and these 
variations became 
more pronounced 
over the decade. 
Pappa E. & 
Niakas D. 
(2006) 
Cross-sectional, urban 
setting  
Descriptive – 
urban setting 
(Athens area) -
Logistic 
regression model  
Socioeconomic 
determinants of 
utilisation of the 
Greek primary and 
hospital health care 
service 
 Social Health 
Insurance Fund 
(SHIF) physician 
visits for primary 
health care 
 Pro-poor, Women, Elderly, Lower 
health status 
  
Specialist private 
visits 
1. No- income related (slightly 
better- off favour specialist 
visits) 
2. Pro-higher educated 
5. Women, Lower health status 
Outpatient 
department visit 
1. No- income related 
2. Need-related 
Inpatient visits 1. No- income related 
2. Need-related 
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data refer to 
Method Subject Measures Results for General 
Population 
Other Results Notes 
Zavras D et al 
(2004)  
WHO Multi-country 
Survey Study (mail 
survey) (2001) 
Descriptive - 
Nationwide 
Determinants of 
dental utilisation 
1.Any dental visit 
2. Number of 
dental visits 
1. Higher SES (higher educational 
level) 
2. Pro-rich 
3. Increased age reports lower visits 
4. Better SADentalH reports lower 
visits 
No statistically significant 
geographical imbalances with 
regard to dental services use 
Mail survey: 
36.4% low  
response rate - 
caution in 
interpretation 
Economou, 
Karabli et al., 
(2004) 
1998 – 1999 Household 
budget surveys; 1998 
Social Budget of the 
Ministry of Labor & 
Social Insurance 
Econometric 
estimation: WHO 
adopted utilization 
of Index of 
Fairness in 
Financial 
Contribution 
Fairness of health 
financing in the 
Greek household 
expenses 
Out of pocket 
payments 
(OOPPs) that 
include all 
categories of 
health related 
household expen. 
2.44% of households in Greece 
face the danger of making 
catastrophic payments for health 
care 
  
Mergoupis 
(2003) 
Eurobarometer (1996) 
(cross sectional) 
Country Specific – 
Nationwide -
Descriptive  
 Income, health 
and socio-
demographic 
inequalities in the 
use of health care  
Doctor contacts 
(no distinguish 
between GPs and 
specialists): 
pro rich inequity  Income data in 
Eurobarometer are 
not carefully 
collected - caution 
in interpretation Hospital 
(inpatient) care 
utilization: 
pro poor income inequity 
For diagnostic 
care use 
pro rich inequity 
Kyriopoulos et 
al, 2002 
WHO Multi-country 
Survey Study (mail 
survey) (cross sectional) 
Descriptive - 
Nationwide 
1.General Health 
Status 
Assessment  
2. Assessment of 
the Greek health 
care system 
responsiveness 
total doctors visits pro poor, worse health status 1.For total doctor visits: low 
educational level   
2.no regional differences in 
use  
Mail survey: Less 
than 40% response 
rate - caution in 
interpretation 
Medical specialist 
visit: 
pro rich, better health, higher 
education 
For specialists visits: higher 
educational level 
Inpatient care:  1. Worse self reported health 
status 
2. Not income - related 
3. Lower educational level 
4. Uninsured 
Pro Non Noble SHIFs (mainly 
OGA);  
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Study Data and year the 
data refer to 
Method Subject Measures Results for General 
Population 
Other Results Notes 
Dental care: pro rich inequity 
pro increased age 
 
1.Dental visit increased with 
increased income  
2. pro high SADH 
Sissouras A, 
Karokis A et al, 
1996 
W.H.O.  – Patras 
European Healthy Cities 
programme - Phase II 
framework (1993-1997) -
Patras Health Profile; and 
Patras Health Plan (1994) 
(cross sectional) 
Descriptive – 
urban setting 
(Patras 
Municipality) – 
(measure: number 
of  contacts and 
SES groups) 
Socioeconomic  
inequalities –
determinants (SES) 
of health and 
utilisation of the 
Patras’ PHC and 
hospital health care 
services 
 Social Health 
Insurance Fund 
(SHIF) PHC visit 
1. No- income related 
2. Slightly more visits by lower 
SES 
 An older study 
conducted before 
the NHS-ESY 
reforms of 2001 Specialist private 
visits 
1. Pro-rich; More visits by higher 
SES 
Outpatient 
department visit 
2. Pro-poor; More visits by lower 
SES 
3. Need-related: 
4. For diagnostic tests; and 
medication prescribing 
Inpatient care 1. No- income related 
2. Need-related 
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Table 1.5: Evidence for inequalities in utilisation of health care among the older population in Greece - EU Comparative studies with 
the participation of Greece (older population) 
Study Data and year 
the data refer to 
Method Subject Measures Results for Elderly Population (50+ or 
65+) 
Other Results Notes 
Penders 
Y et al 
(2016) 
Comparative, 
longtitudinal post-
death SHARE data 
study: Ten EU 
countries, SHARE 
Wave2- Wave 5 
(2005- 2012) for 
Greece: Wave2 to 
W3 (2009). 
Econometric 
estimation- 
Descriptive, 
nationwide, end-of 
–life interviews – 
Multilevel 
modelling 
Determinants of 
OOPPs  associated 
with healthcare in 
the last year of life 
of older adults 
Total OOP costs as a 
percentage of median 
household income  
 
1. 80% of the sample paid OOP  
2. Higher OOPPs (44%) for PHC (GPs and 
specialists) 
3. 54% of the sample paid OOP for specialist 
care 
4. Median total OOPPs is 6% of median 
household income (based on 2009 median 
household income – OECD extracted). 
5. More than two ADLs had significantly 
higher OOPPs relative to median household 
income. 
6. More than 3–6 months inpatient care during 
the last year of life had significantly higher 
OOP costs. 
1. No Hospice use  
2. Median total OOPPs 
(0.37) are below but 
close to the average 
total health spending. 
Recall bias as 
data are based on 
end-of –life 
interviews  and 
not on real cost 
data; No 
connection of 
OOP costs with 
SHIF costs.- 
Caution on 
interpretation 
Bíró A. 
(2014) 
Comparative Study 
-SHARE for 
Greece 2004 - 
Wave1 
(cross sectional) 
Descriptive, 
nationwide, 
regression models 
and Two-part 
models 
Supplementary 
private health 
insurance and 
health 
care utilization 
1. Likelihood of 
inpatient nigths; 
GP visit; specialist; 
dentist 
2. No of: inpatient, 
GP, specialist visit 
1. PHI coverage increases dental visits;  
2. PHI decreases (30%) GP visits; 
3. PHI has little and insignificant influence on 
inpatient and specialist visits 
  
Scheil-
Adlung, 
X. and 
Bonan, 
J., (2013) 
Comparative Study 
-SHARE for 
Greece 2004 - 
Wave1 
(cross sectional) 
Descriptive, 
nationwide  
Incidence of OOP 
expenditure on 
private health care 
and  LTC and 
impact on 
household gross 
income 
Incidence of OOP 
expenditure on private 
health care as a 
financial barrier to 
access health care. 
1. 87% of elderly households incur OOPPs 
2. Prescribed medication accounts for 46% 
and private outpatient care accounts for 
44% of this OOPP. 
1. Older people (80+) is 
less likely to visit a 
specialist. 
 
Not analysis of 
OOPPs for 
public health 
care services and 
no connection of 
OOP costs with 
SHIF costs 
Impact of OOP 
expenditure on the 
household total gross 
income of the elderly 
1. The poorest pay OOP 11% of their 
household income versus 1% of the rich.  
2. Health related OOP expenditure for private 
health care exceeds 5% of the elderly 
households’ income. 
3. Ruinous OOP expenditure for health care 
affects 2% of elderly households (or 220,000 
households) in Greece in 2004.  
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the data refer to 
Method Subject Measures Results for Elderly Population (50+ or 
65+) 
Other Results Notes 
Rodrigu
es, R., et 
al 
(2013) 
Comparative Study 
- EU-SILK for 
Greece 
2006 , 2011  
Descriptive, 
nationwide 
Descriptive of 
unmet and 
enforced unmet 
need between 
2006 and 2011 
Enforced unmet needs 
by age 
people aged 65+ years were more than twice as 
likely to have an enforced unmet need as those 
of working age (1.89% increase among 2006 - 
2011) 
  
Majo M. 
& Van 
Soest A. 
(2012) 
Comparative Study 
-SHARE for 
Greece 
2004 - Wave1 
(cross sectional) 
and HRS for USA 
Descriptive, 
nationwide – probit 
model (2004) 
Income and health 
care use 
Any physician visit Pro-poor income-related inequity   
GP visit Pro-poor income related inequity 
Outpatient visit  No clear association of income with specialist 
visits 
Specialist visits No clear association (slightly pro-rich) of 
income with specialist visits  
Inpatient stay Slightly pro-rich income-related inequity 
Dental visit  Pro-rich 
Listl S 
(2012) 
Comparative, 
longtitudinal 
retrospective life-
history 
SHARELIFE study 
for Greece Wave1- 
Wave3 (2004-
2008) 
Econometric 
estimation using:  
Concentration Index 
(CI) 
Inequalities in 
dental attendance 
throughout the 
life-course  
Retrospective 
variables constructed 
on life-course: 
Whether respondents 
had regularly visited a 
dentist throughout life 
history: 0-15; 16-25; 
26-40; 41-55; 56-65; 
66-75; 76+ years  
1. Pro-rich throughout the life-course. 
2. Inequality levels remained relatively 
inelastic until age 65+ but not thereafter. 
3. Pro-higher educational attainment 
throughout life years. 
  
Naka O 
& 
Anastass
iadou V 
(2012) 
Cross-sectional 
urban-setting study 
- University 
Prosthetic Public 
Dentistry Clinic 
(2011) for older 
population. 
Descriptive  
Qualitative: clinical 
examination and 
interview. 
Determinants - 
Barriers to regular 
dental visits in 
public outpatient 
Clinic. 
Factors that serve as 
barriers to or enablers 
of older adults' 
behaviour and 
attitudes towards oral 
health. 
1. cost and no disease awareness the most 
frequently mentioned barriers; 
2. low level of income and education for 
public dental care;  
3. reduced presence of adverse dental health 
symptoms compared with the actual oral 
health status 
  
Rodrigue
s, R., et 
al (2012) 
Comparative, 
cross-sectional - 
SHARE study for 
Greece 
Descriptive, 
nationwide 
Out-of-pocket 
expenditure 
(OOPP) as a 
financial barrier to 
OOP expenditure on 
all healthcare 
1. In the case of quintile 1 (poorest), the share 
of out-of-pocket expenditure on all 
healthcare was over 18% in Greece 
2. In Greece there were three times as many 
respondents reporting non-zero out-of-
pocket expenditure on health in quintile 1 
OOPP is very regressive: 
low-income persons aged 
50+ spent more on health 
as a proportion of their 
income in 2006 than  their 
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65+) 
Other Results Notes 
2006 - Wave2 
 
access health care (poorest) as in quintile 5 (richest).  high-income counterparts 
OOP expenditure on 
inpatient care 
OOPP is very regressive: low-income persons 
aged 50+ spent more on health as a proportion 
of their income in 2006 than did their high-
income counterparts 
OOP  expenditure on 
outpatient care  
OOPP is very regressive: the income share of 
the poorest (quintile 1) was 10% and it fell 
below 0.5% for the richest (quintile 5) 
OOP expenditure on 
medicine 
1. low-income persons aged 50+ spent 4.1% 
of their income on medicines. 
2. The income share of OOPP on medicine 
declined as income increased to below 1% 
for those higher up in the income 
distribution (quintile 4 or higher)  
Vadla R. 
et al 
(2011) 
Comparative Study 
- Five European 
Regions 
2005 (cross 
sectional) 
Descriptive, 
regional (Crete 
Region), 2005 - 
Second decennial 
survey of older 
people, EC project “ 
Tipping the Balance 
towards Primary 
Healthcare (TTB) 
Network”  
Descriptive of 
health care use in 
elderly 
Self-reported 
frequencies of visits to 
physicians (specialists) 
1. The highest proportion of specialist visit 
(70%) was encountered in Greece 
2. Poor self-rated health  
3. Poor health; male gender; synergy of male 
gender and single life were significantly 
associated with specialist visits 
1. Self-rated poor health 
appears to be the only 
common denominator 
associated with 
increased healthcare 
utilisation.  
2. The use of a specialist 
care was more frequent 
in southern than in 
northern districts. 
Since there are 
few GPs that do 
not act as 
gatekeepers in 
Greece, the 
Greek elderly 
can approach a 
specialist 
directly. 
Therefore, 
comparison 
results need to be 
treated in 
caution. 
Self-reported 
hospitalisation rates 
1. The highest proportion of hospitalisations 
(32%) was encountered in Greece 
2. Younger age is associated with more 
frequent hospitalisations 
Listl S. 
(2011) 
Comparative, cross 
sectional, SHARE 
study including 
Greece – 14 EU 
members -Wave 2, 
2006-07 
Econometric 
estimation using:  
Concentration Index 
(CI); and the Slope 
Index of Inequality 
(SII), 2006-07 
Income 
Inequalities in 
dental care use and 
preventive 
treatment by 50+ 
1. “any treatment” 
the last 12 months 
2. Preventive and/or 
operative 
treatment 
1. Significant pro-rich inequity in dental care  
2. For preventive treatment, CIs differ 
significantly in Greece (higher inequalities 
among retired individuals). 
 
1. Inequalities in 
preventive dental visits 
2. Lower absolute 
inequality among 
denture-wearers.  
3. Greece is characterized  
by strong inequalities 
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65+) 
Other Results Notes 
in dental care and 
preventive dental care 
and lower inequalities 
among denture-
wearers. 
Mielck A 
et al. 
(2009) 
 
Comparative, cross 
sectional, SHARE 
study including 
Greece - Five EU 
members W1, 2004 
Descriptive, 
nationwide, 2004 
Association 
between forgone 
care and 
household income 
Forgone care due to 
costs/unavailability 
1. Greece has the prevalence (9.85%) of the 
respondents’ experienced forgone care. 
2. The prevalence of forgone care increases 
with decreasing self assessed health. 
3. Forgone care is more prevalent among 
women than among men. 
Greece is characterized  
by low average income 
and high income 
inequalities. 
Paradoxically to a less 
extent, the highest income 
groups in Greece showed 
a higher prevalence in 
forgoing care than the 
middle-income groups 
 
Forgone care per 
income group 
1. Greece has the prevalence of highest forgone 
care in the lowest income group as compared 
with the highest income group, adjusted for 
age and sex. 
2. Low income groups report forgone care 
usually more often than high income groups. 
Forgone care due to 
costs 
“Forgone care due to costs” is not associated 
with income levels.  
Allin S., 
Masseria 
C. & 
Mossialo
s E. 
(2009) 
Comparative Study 
-SHARE for 
Greece 
2004 - Wave1 
(cross sectional) 
 
econometric 
estimation 
(two measures: 
probability for 
one contact, 
and (conditional) 
number of 
subsequent 
visits) 
Income-related 
inequalities in use 
of health care by 
wealth versus by 
income 
Income-related 
inequalities in prob./ 
conditional number of 
any physician visits by 
wealth.  
In Greece, wealth-related difference in 
physician visits was greater than differences 
related to income. 
Higher educational 
attainment significantly 
increased the odds of 
visiting a physician in 
Greece. 
Measuring 
socioeconomic 
disparity by 
wealth as 
opposed to 
measuring it by 
income, the level 
of  disparity in 
use of 
physician 
services was 
twice as high for 
wealth as for 
income in Greece 
Income-related 
inequalities in 
probability / 
conditional number of 
any physician visits  
Income-related inequalities in probability of 
dentist visit by wealth 
1. The odds of visiting a 
dentist were higher for 
richer individuals in 
terms of wealth 
2. The odds of a dentist 
visit increased in 
Greece with the other 
level of education.  
Income-related 
inequalities in 
probability of dentist 
visit by income 
the odds of visiting a dentist were higher for 
richer individuals, in terms of income 
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Litwin H. 
&Sapir 
E.V. 
(2009) 
Comparative, 
cross-sectional 
study: Eleven EU 
countries, SHARE 
Wave1 for Greece 
(2003-04) 
Descriptive, 
nationwide, 2004 
Logistic Regression 
- Andersen 
&Newman (1973) 
framework for 
health care use 
Forgo health care 
due to cost 
Forgo any types of 
(health) care because 
of the costs you would 
have to pay (financial 
barrier) 
 
1. pro younger old age; pro-greater health 
needs;and perceived economic inadequacy. 
2. 6% forgone health care due to cost 
3. Forgone visits to GPs were relatively rare, 
except in Greece 
4. The health service most frequently forgone 
was dental care, followed by medications 
and visits to specialists. 
1. the Greek respondents 
reported spending 
almost 8% of their 
disposable income on 
OOP funded health 
services; 
2. Most of the older 
populations in Greece, 
considered their 
household incomes as 
inadequate to make 
ends meet 
 
Mielck A 
et al. 
(2007) 
 
Comparative, 
cross-sectional 
study: Ten EU 
countries, SHARE 
Wave1 for Greece 
(2003-04) 
Descriptive, 
nationwide, 2004 
Association 
between forgone 
care and 
household income 
Forgone care due to 
costs/unavailability 
1. Greece has the prevalence (9.3%) 
experienced forgone care. 
2. Controlling for age, sex, SAH, forgone care 
is always higher in the lowest income 
group (3.24 times) vs the highest income.  
3. The risk of forgone care increases with 
decreasing income. 
The results support the 
inverse care law – health 
care is provided less to 
those who mostly need it 
(the low income group).  
 
Allin S, 
& 
Masseria 
C. (2006) 
 
 
 
 
Comparative Study 
-SHARE for 
Greece 
2004 - Wave1 
(cross sectional) 
Econometric 
estimation 
(measures:  
probability of any 
physician; GP; 
specialist visit; 
inpatient care) 
Income inequity in 
the use of 
physician and 
hospital care 
Any physician visit Pro-rich income-related inequity Pro - higher educated 
level; No wealth-related 
inequity 
 
GP visit Slightly pro-rich (almost zero) income-related 
inequity 
Specialist visits Slightly pro-rich inequity Slightly pro-rich (almost 
zero) wealth-related 
inequity 
Inpatient stay Slightly pro-rich inequity 
Measures for 
barriers to access: 
forgo care; waiting 
time. 
Inequalities in 
forgo care and  
waiting times by 
income and educ.  
Forgo health care by 
income level 
1. 10% in Greece declare forgo health care 
2. In Greece 26% of those who reported very 
poor health declared that they had to forgo 
care. 
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   Waiting Times For the majority of the population there is no 
waiting time for emergency visits in Greece. 
2.  For non - emergency visits (new problem), 
the median waiting time is one week in Greece. 
More than 90% of the demand for non-
emergency visits is covered in three or 
maximum four weeks in Greece. 
Regarding inpatient admission, the only country 
where the median waiting time is less than a 
month is Greece. 
In favour of highest 
educational level 
Santos 
Eggiman
n et al, 
2005 
Comparative Study 
-SHARE for 
Greece 
2004 - Wave1 
(cross sectional) 
Descriptive 
Comparison 
(measure: reported 
medical 
consultations) 
Inequalities in the 
use of 
health care in 9 
EU countries 
Ambulatory Care 1.  Pro age and associated with Gender 
inequalities 
 2. No education associated inequality 
  
Inpatient Care 1.No gender inequalities  
2. Lowest level of education associated with a 
lower level of hospital admission 
Inpatient Surgery Care 1. Associated with Age and negatively 
perceived health  
2.  Highest level of education associated with 
frequent hospital admissions 
Dental visits The lowest rates of dental visits  
Anderson
,  (2004) 
Comparative Study 
- European 
Quality of Life 
Survey 2003 - For 
Greece 
Descriptive 
Comparison 
Cost sharing Cost of seeing the 
doctor ( "Reporting 
very difficult") 
No evidence for difficulty Association of retirement 
with positive assessment 
of quality 
 
Geographical 
access 
Distance to doctor’s 
office/hospital (Rural - 
Urban Differences) 
20% of population 65+ reporting "Very 
difficult" for accessing doctor 
No association of 
household size and 
assessment of quality 
Waiting times Waiting time to see 
doctor on day of 
appointment  
No evidence for difficulty No association of number 
of children and 
assessment of quality 
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Chapter Four: Tables A1.1 – A.1.2:Dependent and explanatory variables- Patra HIS
Appendix- Chapter Four: Table A1.1 Dependent variables- Patra HIS 
Health Care Use Facing OOP expenses 
Inpatient 
overnight 
admissions (the 
last 12 months):  
(Yes/No) 
Outpatient 
care (the last 
3 months) 
(Yes/No) 
SHIF physician 
visit (the last 3 
months) (Yes/No) 
Specialist 
Private (the last 
3 months) 
(Yes/No) 
Dental visit (the 
last 5 years) 
(Yes/No) 
Out of Pocket 
(OOP) Payment 
during the last 
inpatient 
admission (the 
last 12 months) 
Out of Pocket 
(OOP) Payment 
during the last  
outpatient visit / 
treatment (the 
past 3 months) 
Out of Pocket 
(OOP) Payment 
during the last  
SHIF physician 
visit (the past 3 
months) 
OOP amount 
paid for the last 
private 
specialist visit 
(the past 3 
months 
SHIF Coverage 
of expenses 
(OOP) for 
inpatient 
admission (the 
last 12 months) 
 
SHIF Coverage of 
expenses (OOP) 
for outpatient visit 
/treatment (the 
past 3 months) 
“During the last 
twelve months, 
have you been 
in a hospital 
(public or 
private) 
overnight? (Yes 
/No) with No as 
the reference 
 “During the 
last three 
months, have 
you received 
outpatient 
treatment in a 
hospital? (Yes 
/No) with No 
as the 
reference 
 
“During the last 
three months, 
have you 
consulted any 
physician of your 
SHIF”? (Yes /No) 
with No as 
reference  
“During the last 
three months, 
have you 
consulted any 
specialist 
privately? (Yes 
/No) with No as 
the reference 
“During the last 
five years, have 
you consulted 
any dentist?” 
(Yes/No) with 
No as the 
reference 
category, 
“During your last 
inpatient 
admission, did 
you pay any OOP 
expenses?” 
(Yes/No) with No 
as the reference 
category (the last 
12 months) 
“During your last 
outpatient visit / 
treatment, did 
you pay any OOP 
expenses?” 
(Yes/No) with No 
as the reference 
category (the past 
3 months) 
“During your last 
SHIF physician 
visit, did you pay 
any OOP 
expenses?” 
(Yes/No) with No 
as the reference 
category (the past 
3 months) 
“During your 
last specialist 
private visit, 
what is the OOP 
expenses 
amount that you 
paid? ”   
Two categories: 
(i)≥31€ (ii)  
(ii)≤30€  with 
(ii) ≤30€  as the 
reference 
category (the 
past 3 months) 
 
 
“Did your SHIF 
cover all the OOP 
expenses for this 
last inpatient 
admission?” 
(In Total & 
partial/No)  
with No as  
the reference 
category 
“Did your SHIF 
cover all the OOP 
expenses for this 
last outpatient visit/ 
treatment?” (In 
Total & partial/No)  
with No as the 
reference 
 category 
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Age Gender Health Status Net Household 
Monthly Income 
Highest Educational 
Level 
Marital Status Housing Tenure Household Type Social Health Insurance 
 Fund (SHIF) 
VHI 
Insurance 
age (60-69 
vs 50-59) 
male vs 
female as 
/reference 
EQ-5D,SAH -Mobility Problems: 
"Extreme &  Moderate" vs "No 
Problems” as reference 
10 deciles of net 
heousehold monthly  
income, recorded into 5 
quintiles  & ln income (x)  
"More than secondary 
School (ISCED 4+5+6)" vs 
"Primary (ISCED 1)"  with 
Primary as reference  
 
“Married or registered & 
living or not with 
children” vs “ Never 
Married & Divorced / 
Widowed” as reference 
“Owners” vs  “Not 
Owner  (tenant / 
subtenant/rent free)” 
with “Not Owner” as 
reference 
“Living in a couple 
& Other (family) 
with & without 
children) vs "Living 
alone" as reference 
 “Noble SHIFunds”:  Public 
Sector –OPAD + Self  Employed 
– OAEE+ Banks + Health 
Professions+ Lawyers   
VHI 
coverage 
(Yes) 
age (70-79 
vs 50-59) 
 EQ-5D, SAH Self – Care 
Problems: "Extreme & 
Moderate" vs "No problems" as 
reference 
It is derived as the sum 
from any source per 
equivalent member added 
up, after tax and social 
security contributions 
"Secondary education 
ISCED 2+3 " vs "Primary 
(ISCED 1)" with Primary 
as reference 
   “Non Noble –  OGA SHIF”:  
Rural Sector OGA SHIF 
No VHI 
Coverage/ as  
the reference 
 (80+ vs 50-
59) 
 EQ-5D, SAH Usual Activities 
Problems: "Extreme & 
Moderate" vs "No problems" as  
reference 
    “Non Noble – IKA SHIF: 
Private Sector Employees IKA 
SHIF , as reference  
 
 
  EQ-5D, SAH Pain/ Discomfort: 
"Extreme & Moderate" vs "No 
problems" as reference 
    Other SHIF  
  EQ-5D, SAH Anxiety/  
Depression:"Extreme & 
Moderate" vs "No problems” as  
reference category 
     No SHIF  
  SAH “Less than Good” (Fair, 
Bad,Very Bad) vs “Very Good & 
Good” SAH as reference 
category 
    “Noble SHIFunds”: Public 
Sector –OPAD + Self Employed 
– OAEE+ Banks + Health 
Professions+ Lawyers   &  Other 
 
  SAH current vs last 12months 
1.“Worst” vs "Better" SAH last 
12m 
    “Non Noble SHIFs: IKA SHIF + 
OGA SHIF” , as  reference 
 
  2. “the Same” vs "Better" SAH last 
12months, as reference category 
    No SHIF: None  
  1. “2+ chronic medical 
conditions” vs  "0"  
      
  2. “1 chronic condition” vs "0 
conditions" as reference 
      
  SADH “Less than Good” (Fair, 
Bad,Very Bad) vs “Very Good & 
Good” SADH  
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Appendix – Chapter Four: Tables B1-B2 More health care use disciptives- PatraHIS 
Appendix – Chapter Four Table B1. Health Care Variables - Contact with Physicians during the last 12 
months - PatraHIS 
Inpatient stay 
(at least one 
night) in the last 
12 months 
Inpatient stay (yes) 101 14.9% 
No Inpatient stay (No)  579  85.1% 
Type of 
hospitals 
(Public or 
Private or 
Outside the city 
of  Patras) 
Public hospitals refers to: General 
Hospital “St.Andrews”; Military 
Hospital 409; Hospital of Thorac 
Diseases; General University Hospital 
of Patras (Rio) 
91 from 101  90.1% 
Private hospitals refers to: 
“Solomou” Private Thorac Diseases 
Clinic; “Olympion” Private Hospital; 
Private Maternity Clinic & others 
inside Patras  
3 from 101  3.0% 
Other Hospital outside the city of 
Patras  for inpatient treatment 
received.  
7 from 101  6.9% 
Missing 579  85.1% 
Reason for 
inpatient 
treatment 
Surgery 38 from 101  37.6% 
Non surgical reasons  53 from 101  52.5% 
Having medical tests  6 from 101  5.9%  
Missing 583  85,7% 
Having 
outpatient 
diagnostic 
medical tests 
during inpatient 
treatment 
Yes 33 from 101  32.4% 
No Diagnostic Medical Tests for 
inpatient treatment  69 from 101  
67.6% 
Missing 578  85% 
 
Outpatient visit 
in a public 
hospital during 
the last 3 months 
Public Specialist outpatient visit (yes) 123  32,4% 
No Public Specialist outpatient visit (No) 557  67,6% 
Type of public 
hospital for 
outpatient 
treatment 
Public Hospital refers to: General 
Hospital “St.Andrews”; Military 
Hospital 409; Hospital of Thorac 
Diseases; General University Hospital 
of Patras (Rio) 
110 from 123  89.4% 
Other public Hospital inside the 
city of Patras for outpatient 
treatment  
3 from 123  2.4% 
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  Other public Hospital outside the 
city of Patras for outpatient 
treatment  
 
10 from 123  8.1% 
Reason for 
outpatient visit 
Disease or symptom 50 from 121  41.3% 
Regular, scheduled visit 25 from 121  20.7% 
Check up & results 24 from 121  19.8% 
Drugs prescribing 9 from 121  7.4%  
Doctor referral 4 from 121  3.3% 
Missing 559  82.2% 
SHIF physician 
visit in the last 3 
months 
SHIF physician visit (yes) 414  60.9% 
No SHIF physician visit (No) 266  39.1% 
SHIF Physician 
Specialty  
Pathologist  238  57,5% 
Cardiologist   74  17,9% 
Orthopedic Specialist    29  7,0% 
Reason for 
SHIF Physician 
visit 
Disease or symptom 48 from 414  11,6% 
Regular, scheduled visit 73 from 414  17,6% 
Check up & results 54 from 414   13.0% 
Drugs prescribing 231 from 414  55,8% 
Doctor referral 6 from 414   1,4% 
Specialist 
Private visit in 
the 3 last months 
Specialist Private visit (yes) 148  21.8% 
No Specialist Private visit (No) 532  78.2% 
Physician 
Speciality type 
of visit 
Pathologist  50 from 148  33.8% 
Cardiologist 25 from 148  16.9% 
Orthopedic Specialist 14 from 148  9.5% 
 
Reason for 
Private 
Specialist visit 
Disease or medical symptom 45 from 148  30.4% 
Regular, scheduled visit 50 from 148  33.8% 
Check up & results 36 from 148  24.3% 
Drugs prescribing 12 from 148  8.1% 
Doctor referral   4 from 148  2,7% 
Complementary 
and alternative 
medicine use 
during the last 
12 months 
Type of 
complementary 
and alternative 
medicine 
services  
Type1: Homeopathic; 
Physiotherapist; Chiropractor; 
Dietician; Speech therapist; Other 
Alternative Therapist visit (yes) 
71  10.4% 
Type2: Home Care Services) (yes) 4  0.6%  
Type3: Outpatient Mental Health 
Care & Mental Health Care 
Therapists visitors (Yes) 
7  1% 
None Special health care services use 598  87.9% 
Dental visit in 
the last 5 years 
Any Dental visit (Yes) 388  57.1% 
No dental visit 291  42.9% 
Type of Dentist 
visit: 
Private dentist 530  79.7% 
Contracted SHIF dentist 90  13.5% 
SHIF Dental Centre physician 45  6.8% 
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Chapter Four – Table B2. Other Health Care Use Variables - PatraHIS 
Private care 
received  
 
Inpatient treatment received in 
Private Hospitals in the last 12 
months refers to private hospitals: 
“Solomou” Private Thorac Diseases 
Clinic; “Olympion” Private Hospital; 
Private Maternity Clinic 
Inpatient Treatment  in 
Private Hospitals (yes) 
3 from 101  3% 
Ref/No Private inpatient 
treatment received 
98 from 101  97% 
Private Specialist Care received in  
the last 3 months -Dummy (yes/no)  
private specialist visit 
(Yes) 
148  21.8% 
No private specialist visit  532  78.2% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Out of 
Pocket 
(OOP) 
expenses 
 
Inpatient care 
during the last 12 
months 
OOPP for inpatient care: (yes) 19 from 101  18,6% 
Ref / No OOPP for inpatient care 83 from 101  81.4% 
Missing 578  85% 
SHIF Coverage of  inpatient care cost 
(OOP) (In total / partial) 
90 from 101  93.8% 
No Coverage of cost – Paid by patient 
as OOP   
6  
6.3% 
Missing 584  85.8% 
SHIF Coverage of Medical Tests cost 
(OOP) for inpatients (In total / partial) 27 from 101  
77,1% 
No Coverage of Medical Tests cost 
(OOP) for inpatients – Paid by patient 
as OOP   
8  
22.9% 
Missing 66  64.7% 
Outpatient care  
during the last 3 
months 
OOPP for outpatient care (yes) 30  24.6% 
No OOPP for outpatient care 92  75.4% 
Missing 558  82% 
SHIF Coverage of  cost (OOP) for 
outpatient care (In total / partial) 
96  
 
82.8% 
No Coverage of cost – Paid by patient 
as OOP 
20  17.2% 
Missing 564  82.9% 
SHIF Physician 
visit in the last 3 
months 
Payment out of pocket (OOP) for SHIF 
Physician visit 
19  4.6% 
No OOPP for SHIF Physician visit 395  95.4 % 
 
 Missing 266  39.12% 
Private specialist 
visit during the last 
3 months 
OOP amount (€) <=25€ 38  26,6% 
OOP amount (€) 26 - 50 €  79  55,2% 
OOP amount (€):51-99 €  17  11,9% 
OOP amount (€):>100 €    9  6,3% 
Mean OPP amount >0 (€)  49,82 (SE:3,44) 
 
 
Stand.Dev.(SD)  37,51  
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Appendix – Chapter Five: Table A1.1 Dependent variables - GNHIS 
 Annual (the 
past 12 
months) 
overnight 
inpatient 
admissions:  
(Yes/No) 
Annual (the 
last 12 
months)  
number of 
overnight 
inpatient 
admissions: 
frequency 
Annual (the 
past 12 
months) 
outpatient 
admissions: 
(Yes/No) 
Annual 
(one year 
ago) 
number of 
outpatient 
days: 
frequency 
Annual GP 
contacts/ 
consultations: 
“Less than 12 
months ago” versus 
“12 months or 
longer & never”  
Monthly 
(4 weeks) 
number 
of GP 
contacts: 
frequency 
Annual 
specialist 
contacts: 
“Less than 
12 months 
ago” versus 
“12 months 
or longer & 
never”  
Monthly 
(4 weeks) 
number 
of 
specialist 
contacts: 
frequency 
Annual 
dentist 
visits:  “Less 
than 12 months 
ago” versus “12 
months or 
longer & never” 
Forgone 
Hospital 
(inpatient/out
patient) Care: 
(during the past 
12 months) 
(Yes/No) 
Forgone 
specialist 
visit:  
(during the 
past 12 
months) 
(Yes/No) 
Financial 
Barrier as 
the main 
reason for 
forgone 
hospital 
and 
specialist 
care:  
“During the past 
12 months, that is 
since (date one 
year ago), have 
you been in 
hospital as an 
inpatient that is 
overnight or 
longer? (Yes /No) 
with No as  
reference  
 "Thinking of 
inpatient stay(s), 
how many nights in 
total did you spend 
in hospital?" 
Referring to the last 
12 months.  
“During the past 
12 months, that is 
since (date one 
year ago), have 
you been 
admitted to 
hospital as a day 
patient, that is 
admitted to a 
hospital bed, but 
not required to 
remain 
overnight?” (Yes 
/No) with No as 
reference  
“How many 
days have you 
been admitted 
as a day patient 
since (date one 
year ago)?”  
“When was the last 
time you consulted a 
GP (general 
practitioner) or family 
doctor on your own 
behalf?” We use two 
dummies: “Less than 
12 months ago” 
versus “12 months or 
longer & never” as the 
reference.  
“During the 
past four 
weeks ending 
yesterday, that 
is since (date), 
how many 
times did you 
consult a GP 
(general 
practitioner) 
or family 
doctor on your 
own behalf?”  
"When was 
the last time 
you consulted 
a medical or 
surgical 
specialist on 
your own 
behalf?” We 
use two 
dummies: 
“Less than 12 
months ago” 
versus “12 
months or 
longer & 
never” as the 
reference  
“During the 
past four 
weeks ending 
yesterday that 
is since (date) 
how many 
times did you 
consult a 
specialist on 
your own 
behalf?” 
“When was the 
last time you 
visited a dentist or 
orthodontist on 
your own behalf 
(that is, not while 
only 
accompanying a 
child, spouse, 
etc.)? We use two 
dummies: “Less 
than 12 months 
ago” versus “12 
months or longer 
& never” as the 
reference  
“During the past 12 
months, was there 
any time when you 
really needed to be 
hospitalised 
following a 
recommendation 
from a doctor, either 
as an inpatient or a 
day patient, but did 
not?” (Yes, there 
was at least one 
occasion/No) with 
No as reference. 
“Was there 
any time 
during the 
past 12 
months when 
you really 
needed to 
consult a 
specialist but 
did not?” 
(Yes, there 
was at least 
one 
occasion/No) 
with No as 
reference. 
“What was the 
main reason for 
not being 
hospitalized/ or 
for not consulting 
a specialist?? (a) 
Financial 
barrier:“Could 
not afford to (too 
expensive or not 
covered by the 
insurance fund); 
(b) Waiting list; 
(c) Could not 
take time; (d) 
Distance barrier: 
Too far to travel / 
no means of 
transportation; (e) 
Fear of 
treatment”; (f) 
Other. 
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Appendix- Chapter Five: Table A1.2 Explanatory variables: Need and socio-economic indicators - GNHIS 
Need variables Socio-economic variables 
Age Gender Health Status Net Household 
Monthly Income 
equalised 
Highest 
Educational Level 
Marital Status Household 
Type 
Regional 
information 
Degree of 
urbanisation: 
age (60-
69 vs 50-
59) 
male vs 
female 
SAH (Self-assessed health)  “Less 
than Good” (Fair, Bad, Very Bad) 
vs “Very Good & Good” 
10 deciles of heousehold 
income, recorded into 5 
quintiles  & ln income 
(x)  
"More than secondary 
School (ISCED 
4+5+6)" vs "Primary 
(ISCED 1)" 
Married or registered 
living or not with 
children vs Never 
Married & Divorced/ 
Widowed  
"Living in a 
couple" (with & 
without children) 
vs "Living alone" 
Nuts1 North Greece 
GR1- Thessaloniki 
vs Nuts1 Athens 
Intermediate area 
vs Densely 
populated area 
age (70-
79 vs 50-
59) 
 LTI Suffering from any long term 
health problems (illness, disability 
or infirmity) vs No LTI 
It is derived as the sum 
from any source per 
equivalent member 
added up, after tax and 
social security 
contributions: income 
from work (as employee 
or self-employed); from 
Unemployment benefits; 
from Old-age and 
survivor's benefits; 
Sickness and disability 
benefits; Family/ 
children related 
allowances; Housing 
allowances; Education-
related allowance; Other 
regular benefits 
 
"Secondary education 
ISCED 2+3 " vs 
"Primary (ISCED 1)" 
 "Other with & 
without children" 
vs  "Living 
alone" 
Nuts1 Central 
Greece GR2 vs 
Nuts1 Athens 
Thinly populated 
area vs Densely 
populated area 
age (80+ 
vs 50-59) 
 Limited in General Activities Gali 
The person has been limited in 
general activities (Yes) vs No 
GALI 
   Nuts1 Islands 
+Crete GR4 vs 
Nuts1 Athens 
 
   “2 + chronic diseases” vs  "0 
chronic medical conditions " 
     
     “1 chronic disease” vs "0 chronic 
medical conditions " 
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Chapter Six: Tables A1.1-A.1.2 Dependent and explanatory variables - SHARE 
Appendix - Chapter Six: Table A1.1 Dependent variables - SHARE 
Health Care Use OOP amount 
Annual – No of any 
medical visit (not 
dentist visit/ not 
inpatient admissions) 
 Annual – No of 
GP contacts/ 
consultations  
Annual specialist 
contacts 
(Yes/No) 
 Annual 
overnight 
inpatient 
admissions:  
(Yes/No) 
Annual - No 
of overnight 
inpatient 
admissions:  
(Yes/No) 
Annual dentist 
visits (Yes/No) 
Out of Pocket (OOP) 
Payment Amount for all 
inpatient admissions (the 
last 12 months) 
Out of Pocket (OOP) 
Payment Amount for all 
outpatient visit / treatment 
the last 12 months (for all 
physicians, dentists, exams, 
outpatient surgery – Not 
medicines) 
 “During the 12 
months, about how 
many times in total 
have you seen or talked 
to a medical doctor 
about your health? 
Please exclude dentist 
visits and hospital 
stays, but include 
emergency room or 
outpatient clinic visits”. 
We measure:  
(i) the likelihood of any 
visit (Yes= ≥1 and 
No=0) with No as the 
reference. 
(ii) The mean 
conditional (>0) 
number of  medical 
visits  
“How many of 
these contacts 
were with a GP or 
with a 
doctor at your 
health care 
center?” 
We measure:  
(i) the likelihood 
of any GP visit 
(Yes= ≥1 and 
No=0) with No as 
the reference. 
(ii) The mean 
conditional (>0) 
number of  GP 
visits  
“During the last 
12 months, have 
you 
consulted any of 
the specialists 
mentioned?” 
We measure:  the 
likelihood of any 
specialist visit 
(Yes /No) with 
No as reference 
 
“During the last 
12 months, have 
you been in a 
hospital 
overnight?” 
We measure:  
the likelihood of 
any inpatient 
admission (Yes 
/No) with No as  
reference  
 
How many 
nights 
altogether 
have you spent 
in hospitals 
during the  
last 12 
months? 
We measure:  
The mean 
conditional 
(>0) number 
of  inpatient 
nights  
 
During the last 
12 months, have 
you seen a 
dentist or a 
dental 
We measure:  
the likelihood of 
any dentist visit 
(Yes /No) with 
No as reference 
 
“Not counting health 
insurance premiums or 
reimbursements from 
employers, about how 
much did you pay out-of-
pocket for all your 
hospital inpatient care in 
the last 12 months?” We 
measure:  
(a) the likelihood of paying 
OOP (≥1€ versus 0€) and  
(b) OOP positive amount 
>0€ (>672.6€) versus (1€-
672.6€) where 672.6€ is 
the median 
(c) the mean positive (>0€) 
OOP amount 
“Not counting health 
insurance premiums or 
reimbursements from 
employers, about how much 
did you pay out-of-pocket 
for all your 
outpatient care, in the last 12 
months?” 
We measure:  
(a) the likelihood of paying 
OOP (≥1€ versus 0€) and  
(b) OOP positive amount >0€  
(>194.4€) versus (1€-194.4€) 
where 194.4€ is the median 
(c) the mean positive (>0€) 
OOP amount 
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Appendix Chapter Six: Table A1.2 Explanatory variables: Need and socio-economic characteristics - SHARE 
Need variables Socioeconomic variables 
Age Gender Health Status Household Total 
Gross Annual 
Income 
equivalized 
Highest 
Educational 
Level 
Marital 
Status 
Housing 
Tenure 
Household 
Type 
Regional 
information 
(Nuts1) 
Degree of 
urbanisation: 
Social Health 
Insurance 
 Fund (SHIF) 
age 80+ Male  SAH (Self-assessed 
health)  “Less than 
Good” (Fair, Bad, 
Very Bad) vs “Very 
Good & Good” as 
reference 
Recorded into 5 
quintiles  &  
ln income (x)  
"More than 
secondary School 
(ISCED 4+5+6)" vs 
"Primary (ISCED 1)" 
Married or 
registered living or 
not with children   
“Owners”  “Living in a 
couple & Other 
(family) with & 
without 
children)”  
North Greece 
GR1- 
Thessaloniki  
Densely populated 
areas as reference 
 “Noble 
SHIFunds”:  Public 
Sector –OPAD + Self  
Employed – OAEE+ 
Banks + Health 
Professions+ 
Lawyers   
age 70 -
79 
Female as 
reference 
LTI Suffering from 
any long term health 
problems (illness, 
disability or infirmity) 
Yes) vs No LTI as 
reference 
 "Secondary 
education ISCED 
2+3 " vs "Primary 
(ISCED 1)" 
Never Married & 
Divorced/ Widowed 
as reference 
“Not Owner 
(tenant / 
subtenant/rent 
free)” as 
reference 
“Living alone" 
as reference 
Central Greece 
GR2  
Intermediate 
populated areas  
“Non Noble –  OGA 
SHIF”:  Rural Sector 
OGA SHIF 
age 60- 
69 
 GAL I Limited in 
General Activities 
(Yes) vs No GALI as 
refer. 
 Primary (ISCED 1) 
(No+partial+ 
complete ISCED 1) 
as reference 
    Attika GR2 - 
(Athens) as 
reference 
Thinly 
populated area  
“Non Noble – IKA 
SHIF: Private Sector 
Employees IKA SHIF , 
as reference  
Age 50-
59 as 
reference 
  “2 + chronic 
diseases” 
     Islands +Crete 
GR4  
 Other SHIF 
 
  “1 chronic disease”  
“0 chronic diseases” 
       No SHIF 
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Chapter Seven: Tables 7.1  - 7.3.2 Summary of empirical findings by survey tool 
Appendix - Chapter Seven: Table 7.1 The summary of empirical findings of PatraHIS survey analysis 
Study Data 
and 
year the 
data 
refer to 
Subject Income Variable Income 
non 
response 
rate 
Measures Results Other Results – 
OOP expenses as a 
barrier to access 
Other Results – 
Inequalities among 
SHIFs (Compared to 
Non Noble IKA SHIF) 
Patra 
Health 
Interview 
Survey 
(PatraHIS) 
 
 
Urban-
setting  
(Patra, 
2005)  
Inequalities 
in the use 
of 
health care 
among the 
population 
50+ in  
Patra’s 
urban area 
Net Household Monthly 
Income (2005): 
It is derived as the sum from 
any source per equivalent 
member added up, after tax 
and social security 
contributions 
5.2% Inpatient overnight 
admissions (the last 
12 months):  
(Yes/No) Likelihood 
Pro poor 
inequity  
Lower in magnitude 
financial barrier of 
OOP expenses for 
inpatient admissions 
 Pro-poor inequalities 
among the SHIFs 
Outpatient care (the 
last 3 months) 
(Yes/No) Likelihood 
No inequity 
(slightly 
pro poor) 
Higher in magnitude 
financial barrier of 
OOP expenses for 
outpatient visit 
Pro-rich inequalities 
among the SHIFs  
(Noble SHIFs increase 
inequity– pro rich 
contribution) 
SHIF physician visit 
(the last 3 months) 
(Yes/No) Likelihood 
No inequity 
(slightly 
pro poor) 
 Pro-rich inequalities 
among the SHIFs 
Specialist Private 
(the last 3 months) 
(Yes/No) Likelihood 
Pro rich 
inequity 
Higher in magnitude 
financial barrier of 
OOP expenses for 
specialist private 
visit 
Pro-poor inequalities 
among the SHIFs (OGA 
SHIF has a  pro poor 
contribution) 
Dental visit (the last 
5 years) (Yes/No) 
Likelihood 
Pro rich 
inequity 
 Pro-rich inequalities 
among the SHIFs 
(Noble SHIFs increase 
inequity – pro rich 
contribution) 
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Out of Pocket 
(OOP) Payment 
during the last 
inpatient admission 
(the last 12 months) 
Likelihood  
 Lower in magnitude 
financial barrier of 
OOP expenses for 
inpatient admissions 
 
Out of Pocket 
(OOP) Payment 
during the last  
outpatient visit / 
treatment (the past 3 
months) Likelihood 
 Higher in magnitude 
financial barrier of 
OOP expenses for 
outpatient visit 
 
Out of Pocket 
(OOP) Payment 
during the last  SHIF 
physician visit (the 
past 3 months) Likel. 
   
OOP amount paid 
for the last private 
specialist visit (the 
past 3 months 
 For mean (≥0): 
Regressive relation 
by income quintile;  
For mean (>0): 
Progressive relation 
by income quintile 
For mean (≥0): Non 
Noble OGA SHIF pays 
higher OOP than Noble 
SHIFs (Regressive 
relation); For mean 
(>0): Noble SHIFs pay 
higher OOP than Non 
Noble IKA 
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Appendix - Chapter Seven: Table 7.2 The summary of empirical findings of GNHIS survey analysis  
Study Data and 
year the 
data refer 
to 
Subject Income Variable 
 
Income 
non 
response 
rate 
Measures Results Other Results – Degree 
of urbanization 
compared to densely – 
populated areas (Urban 
versus rural areas) 
Other Results 
– Regional 
Variations 
compared to 
Attika – 
Athens region 
Greek 
National 
Health 
Interview 
Survey – 
Wave 1 
(GNHIS) 
 
Nationwide 
(Greece, 
2009) 
Inequaliti
es in the 
use of 
health 
care 
among the 
populatio
n 50+ in 
Greece 
Net Household Monthly 
Income equalized (2009): 
It is derived as the sum from 
any source per equivalent 
member added up, after tax 
and social security 
contributions: income from 
work (as employee or self-
employed); from 
Unemployment benefits; 
from Old-age and survivor's 
benefits; Sickness and 
disability benefits; 
Family/children related 
allowances; Housing 
allowances; Education-
related allowance; Other 
regular benefits 
 
16.5% Annual (the past 12 
months) overnight 
inpatient 
admissions:  
(Yes/No) 
Likelihood 
Pro poor 
inequity 
Pro –rich inequity 
favoring thinly populated 
areas. Pro-poor inequity 
favouring intermediate-
populated areas 
Pro poor 
inequity 
favouring 
Central Greece 
& North 
Greece 
Annual (the last 12 
months)  number 
of overnight 
inpatient 
admissions: 
conditional number 
Pro poor 
inequity 
Pro –rich inequity 
favoring thinly populated 
areas. Pro-rich inequity 
favouring intermediate-
populated areas 
Pro poor 
inequity 
favouring 
Central Greece 
& North 
Greece 
Annual (the past 12 
months) outpatient 
admissions: 
(Yes/No) 
Likelihood 
No inequity Pro –rich inequity 
favoring thinly populated 
areas. Pro-rich inequity 
favouring intermediate-
populated areas 
Pro-rich 
inequity 
favouring 
Central Greece 
& Islands 
Annual (one year 
ago) number of 
outpatient days: 
conditional number 
Pro rich 
inequity 
Pro –poor inequity 
favoring thinly populated 
areas. Pro-poor inequity 
favouring intermediate-
populated areas. 
Pro-poor 
inequity 
favouring 
Central & 
North Greece 
Annual GP 
contacts/ 
No inequity Pro-poor inequity 
favouring thinly populated 
Pro-rich 
inequity 
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consultations: 
“Less than 12 
months ago” versus 
“12 months or 
longer & never” 
Likelihood 
areas. Equity favouring 
intermediate - populated 
areas 
favouring 
Central Greece 
& no inequity 
in North Gr. & 
Pro –rich 
inequity 
favoring 
Monthly (4 weeks) 
number of GP 
contacts: 
conditional number 
Slightly pro-
poor inequity 
Pro –rich inequity 
favoring thinly populated 
areas. Pro-poor inequity 
favouring intermediate  
Pro –rich 
inequity 
favouring 
Islands 
Annual specialist 
contacts: “Less 
than 12 months 
ago” versus “12 
months or longer & 
never” Likelihood 
Pro rich 
inequity 
Pro –rich inequity 
favoring thinly  and 
intermediate - populated 
areas 
Pro –rich 
inequity 
favouring 
Central & 
North Greece – 
Equity for 
Islands 
Monthly (4 weeks) 
number of 
specialist contacts: 
conditional number 
Pro-poor 
inequity 
Pro –rich inequity 
favoring thinly populated 
areas. Pro-poor inequity 
favouring intermediate 
populated areas. 
Pro – poor 
inequity 
favouring 
Central & 
North Greece – 
Equity for 
Islands 
Annual dentist 
visits:  “Less than 
12 months ago” 
versus “12 months 
or longer & never” 
Likelihood 
Pro rich 
inequity 
Pro –rich inequity 
favoring thinly populated 
areas. Equity favouring 
intermediate - populated 
areas 
Pro –rich 
inequity 
favouring 
North Greece; 
Equity for 
Central Greece 
& Islands 
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Appendix - Chapter Seven: Table 7.3.1 The summary of empirical findings of SHARE survey analysis (1) 
Study Data and 
year the 
data refer 
to 
Subject Income Variable Income 
non 
response 
rate 
Measures Results 
Survey of 
Health, 
Ageing 
and 
Retiremen
t in 
Europe 
(SHARE) 
 
Nationwide 
(Greece,  
2004)  
Inequalities 
in the use 
of 
health care 
among the 
population 
50+ in  
Greece 
Household Total Gross 
Annual Income 
equivalized (2003): 
It is derived as the sum over 
all household members of 
the individual – level values 
from any source added up: 
from employment; from  self 
- employment or work for a 
family business; income 
from (public or private) 
pensions or invalidity or 
unemployment benefits; 
income from alimony or 
other private regular 
payments; income from long 
term care; sum of the gross 
incomes of other household 
members and other benefits, 
capital assets income 
(income from bank accounts, 
from bonds, from stocks or 
shares and from mutual 
funds), rent payments 
received, plus imputed rents, 
all of them calculated, 
generated, imputed. 
17.4% Annual overnight inpatient 
admissions:  (Yes/No) Likelihood 
Pro rich inequity 
Annual  Number of any medical 
visit (not dentist visit/ not inpatient 
admissions) (Yes= ≥1 and No=0) 
Likelihood 
Slightly pro rich inequity  
Annual Number of GP/HCC 
physician contacts/ consultations 
(Yes= ≥1 and No=0) Likelihood 
Slightly pro poor (weak) inequity 
Annual specialist contacts 
(Yes/No) Likelihood 
No inequity 
Annual dentist visits (Yes/No) 
Likelihood 
Pro rich inequity 
Probability of OOPP for inpatient 
admissions (the last 12 months) 
(Yes= ≥1€ versus No=0€) 
Higher in magnitude financial barrier of OOP 
expenses for inpatient admissions 
OOP amount for inpatient 
admissions (>672.6€)  vs (1€ - 
672.6€) 
A regressive trend in OOP amount for 
inpatient care in terms of ability to pay (ATP) 
Probability of OOPP for 
outpatient care (the last 12 
months) (Yes= ≥1€ versus No=0€) 
Lower in magnitude financial barrier of OOP 
expenses for outpatient visit 
OOPP amount for outpatient care 
(>194.4€) vs (1€ - 194.4€) 
A progressive trend in OOP amount for 
inpatient care in terms of ability to pay (ATP) 
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Appendix - Chapter Seven: Table 7.3.2 The summary of empirical findings of SHARE survey analysis (2) 
Study Data 
and 
year the 
data 
refer to 
Subject Measures Other Results – 
OOP expenses as a 
barrier to access  
Other Results – 
Inequalities among SHIFs 
(Compared to Non Noble 
IKA SHIF) 
Other Results – Degree 
of urbanization 
compared to densely – 
populated areas (Urban 
versus rural areas) 
Other Results – 
Regional Variations 
compared to Attika – 
Athens region 
Survey of 
Health, 
Ageing 
and 
Retireme
nt in 
Europe 
(SHARE) 
 
Nationw
ide 
(Greece,  
2004)  
Inequalities 
in the use 
of 
health care 
among the 
population 
50+ in  
Greece 
Annual overnight 
inpatient 
admissions:  
(Yes/No) Likelihood 
 Higher in magnitude 
financial barrier of 
OOP expenses for 
inpatient admissions 
Non Noble OGA SHIF and 
Noble SHIFs reduce inequity 
in inpatient admissions 
favoring the worse off.  
Pro-rich inequity favoring 
thinly-populated areas. 
Pro-poor inequity 
favoring the intermediate-
populated areas. 
Pro poor inequity 
favouring Central Greece. 
No inequity favouring 
Islands.  
Annual  Number of 
any medical visit 
(not dentist visit/ not 
inpatient admissions) 
(Yes= ≥1 and No=0) 
Likelihood 
Lower in magnitude 
financial barrier of 
OOP expenses for 
outpatient visit 
Non Noble OGA SHIF 
increases inequity in any 
medical visit favoring the 
better off. Noble SHIFs have 
no effect on inequity in any 
medical visit. 
Pro-rich inequity favoring 
thinly-populated areas. 
Pro-poor inequity 
favoring the intermediate-
populated areas. 
Pro rich inequity 
favouring North Greece. 
Equity favouring Central 
Greece & Islands 
Among those who 
report any medical 
visit, annual 
number of GP/HCC 
physician contacts/ 
consultations (Yes= 
≥1 and No=0) 
Likelihood 
 Non Noble OGA SHIF  and 
Noble SHIFs reduce inequity 
in GP/HCC physician 
favoring the worse off.  
Pro-rich inequity favoring 
thinly-populated areas. 
Equity for intermediate 
areas. 
Pro-rich inequity 
favouring Central Greece 
& Islands. Equity for 
North Greece.  
Among those who 
report any medical 
visit, annual 
specialist contacts 
(Yes/No) Likelihood 
 Non Noble OGA SHIF 
increases inequity in 
specialist visit favoring the 
better off. Noble SHIFs 
reduces inequity favoring the 
worse off. 
Pro-rich inequity favoring 
thinly-populated areas. 
Pro-poor inequity 
favoring the intermediate-
populated areas. 
Equity favouring all 
regions 
Annual dentist 
visits (Yes/No) 
Likelihood 
 Non Noble  OGA SHIF 
strongly reduces inequity in 
dentist visit favoring the 
worse off. Noble SHIFs 
Pro-rich inequity favoring 
thinly-populated areas. 
Pro-poor inequity 
favoring the intermediate-
Pro-rich inequity 
favouring Central Greece 
& North Greece. 
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increase inequity favoring the 
better off.  
populated areas. 
Probability of 
OOPP for inpatient 
admissions (the last 
12 months) (Yes= 
≥1€ versus No=0€) 
 Higher in magnitude 
financial barrier of 
OOP expenses for 
inpatient admissions 
Noble SHIFs beneficiaries 
are insignificantly more 
likely to pay OOP for 
inpatient care than Non 
Noble SHIFs. Farmers OGA  
is less likely to pay OOP for 
inpatient care than IKA 
Residents of all areas are 
more likely to pay higher 
OOP mean amount than 
lower OOP amount for 
inpatient care. 
All regions - except for 
Islands are more likely to 
pay higher OOP mean 
amount than lower OOP 
amount for inpatient care. 
 
OOP amount for 
inpatient admissions 
(>672.6€)  vs (1€ - 
672.6€) 
The mean OOP 
amount for inpatient 
care (1483€) is 4.5 
times higher than the 
mean OOP amount 
for outpatient care 
(330€). 
 
All SHIFs beneficiaries pay 
almost the same OOP 
amount (slightly higher pay 
the Noble SHIFs. Among the 
Non Noble SHIFs, OGA 
beneficiaries pay higher OOP 
mean amount than IKA. 
Residents of thinly-
populated areas pay 
higher OOP mean amount 
almost twice the OOP 
mean amount paid by the 
residents of intermediate-
populated areas. 
Residents of Central 
Greece pay higher OOP 
mean almost twice the 
OOP mean amount by 
Attiki and three times 
more the OOP mean 
amount paid by residents 
of Islands. 
Probability of 
OOPP for 
outpatient care (the 
last 12 months) 
(Yes= ≥1€ versus 
No=0€) 
 Noble SHIFs beneficiaries 
are insignificantly more 
likely to pay OOP for 
inpatient care than Non 
Noble SHIFs. OGA is less 
likely to pay OOP for 
inpatient care than IKA 
Residents of all areas are 
less likely to pay higher 
OOP amount for 
outpatient care.  
Residents of thinly 
populated areas are more 
likely to pay OOP for 
inpatient and outpatient 
care. 
All regions - except for 
Islands are less likely to 
pay higher OOP amount 
for outpatient care.  
 
OOPP amount for 
outpatient care 
(>194.4€) vs (1€ - 
194.4€) 
Lower in magnitude 
financial barrier of 
OOP expenses for 
outpatient visit 
Non –Noble IKA 
beneficiaries face almost 
equal OOP amount with 
Noble beneficiaries. OGA 
SHIF pay less. 
Densely-populated areas 
report the highest OOP 
amount for outpatient 
care.  
North Greece  & Attiki 
report the highest OOP 
amount for outpatient 
care. Central Greece pay 
the lowest OOP mean 
amount.  
 
